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ABSTRACT  
Background: Genetic technologies have identified some of the genes implicated in 
cancer susceptibility.  Women with mutations in breast/ovarian cancer-susceptibility 
genes (BRCA1 and 2) have a lifetime combined risk of breast/ovarian cancer of more 
than 80%.  Risk reducing surgery (RRS) reduces cancer risk by as much as 90% in 
high risk populations.  Despite this, some BRCA1/2 mutation-positive women say no 
to RRS.   
Purpose: To illuminate an understanding of why women at high risk of developing 
breast/ovarian cancer say no to risk reducing surgery (RRS). 
Design: Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography was combined with Dolby-Stahl’s 
(1985) literary folkloristic methodology to provide a contextualised narrative of the life 
experiences of six high risk women who said no to RRS.  The participants’ stories 
were captured through semi-structured interviews then read and interpreted through 
the lenses of three literary theories namely Marxist, Foucauldian and Feminist.  
Findings: Different understandings of risk were central to the decision to say no to 
RRS.  RRS was understood as a risk to body and self which superseded the genetic 
risk of cancer.  However despite having the strength to keep their still-healthy bodies 
intact, the participants benchmarked their decisions to say no against the dominant 
discourse on cancer risk, leaving them in an unending state of flux as to whether they 
had made the right decision.   The participants shared a genetic pessimism but there 
also existed an emergent private folklore which illuminated how they attempted to 
make sense of their experiences and negotiate the conflicts and contradictions thrown 
up by competing discourses. 
Conclusions:  The relationship between genetic testing and cancer prevention 
strategies is not straightforward and genetic information has the potential to harm as 
well as help high risk women.  It is important health care providers approach this area 
from the viewpoints of those directly involved since without understanding; strategies 
to support these women may be ineffective.  
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Preamble  
When Oscar-winning actor Angelina Jolie announced in the New York Times on 14th 
May 2013 that she had undergone bilateral risk reducing mastectomy followed by 
reconstruction with breast implants, the world took notice.  Jolie’s editorial in the New 
York Times (2013, May 14), entitled “My Medical Choice”, described her decision to 
undertake RRS after she tested positive for a BRCA1 gene mutation which 
significantly increased her risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.   
 
Jolie’s mother died from ovarian cancer aged 56.  Her aunt had breast cancer and 
died shortly after Jolie’s editorial was published.  Jolie’s lifetime risk of developing 
breast cancer was estimated to be 87%, and ovarian cancer, 50%.  Jolie stated “I 
decided to be proactive and to minimise the risk as much I could” (Jolie, 2013, para 
5), a decision her partner Brad Pitt described as “absolutely heroic" (Pitt, 2013, cited 
in Messer, 2013, para 2).  Jolie (2013, para 11) further explained her decision:  
I wanted to write this to tell other women that the decision to have a 
mastectomy was not easy. But it is one I am very happy that I made. 
My chances of developing breast cancer have dropped from 87 percent 
to under 5 percent. I can tell my children that they don’t need to fear 
they will lose me to breast cancer. (…) and they know that I love them 
and will do anything to be with them as long as I can. On a personal 
note, I do not feel any less of a woman. I feel empowered that I made a 
strong choice that in no way diminishes my femininity…. I want to 
encourage every woman, especially if you have a family history of 
breast or ovarian cancer, to seek out the information and medical 
experts who can help you through this aspect of your life, and to make 
your own informed choices.  
 
Angelina Jolie’s familial cancer story made headline news around the world and 
sparked extensive media, medical and public debate regarding the sensibility or not of 
having one’s healthy breasts removed in order to prevent cancer developing. Her 
editorial attracted more than 1700 reader comments compared with 170 for an 
editorial following the Boston Marathon bombings (List, 2013).  Macmillan Cancer 
Relief, a leading United Kingdom (UK) Cancer Charity, reported an 1140% increase in 
visits to the online genetic breast cancer self-assessment tool (Macmillan Cancer 
xiv 
 
Relief, 2013) and the number of women undergoing genetic testing for breast/ovarian 
cancer doubled in some areas of North America (Chustecka, 2014).  Cancer Council 
Australia similarly reported an 866% increase in women phoning their help line as a 
result of the ‘Angelina effect’ (Chustecka, 2014).  Dr Allan Spigelman, director of 
Sydney’s Kinghorn Cancer Centre not only predicted increased numbers of women 
undergoing genetic testing worldwide, but also hinted at the sensibility of Jolie’s 
decision given her genetic status: 
I fully anticipate there will be very significantly renewed interest in 
breast cancer gene testing across the world as a result of this high-
profile person very sadly carrying the gene change but very bravely 
going ahead to have preventative surgery. (“Jolie’s mastectomy 
revelation” ABC news, 2013, May 15)  
 
The furore surrounding Angelina Jolie’s breasts reflects Western society’s obsession 
with the female breast (Thomas, 2006) and public ownership of female body parts 
(Millsted & Frith, 2003).  Jolie’s story and the prominence attached to it also exposes 
the public’s fascination with genetics and genetic testing (Royal et al., 2010) and the 
perceived importance of genetics in everyday life (Anderson, 2002; Bates, 2005).  
Warnings that genetics services would be unable to cope with demand highlighted the 
almost panic reaction to the news of Jolie’s surgery and the significance afforded to 
breast/ovarian cancer genetics and RRS.  
 
The overall message from Jolie’s story was clear:  “a woman at genetic risk should 
feel empowered to remove both breasts as a way to prevent the disease” (Grady, 
Parker-Pope & Belluck, 2013, para 2). On March 24th, 2015, Jolie followed up on her 
original editorial to reveal that she had subsequently also undergone removal of her 
ovaries and fallopian tubes to reduce her risk of developing ovarian cancer.  Angelina 
Jolie, it appears, has opted to manage her genetic breast/ovarian cancer risk through 
RRS and she stated that she felt empowered by her decision.  This decision is in 
keeping with Western medical discourse and identifies Jolie as a sensible woman who 
has acted appropriately by forfeiting her breast and ovaries to protect her health, her 
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life and her family.  However, some women have a different experience: those 
women’s experiences are the focus of this study. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship in the kingdom of the well and the 
kingdom of the sick. Although we all prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or 
later each of us is obliged, least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that 
other place.” 
(Sontag, 1978, p. 3). 
 
Foreword 
This research is broadly concerned with the decision to say no to risk reducing 
surgery (RRS) for hereditary breast/ovarian cancer (HBOC).  Modern Western 
medicine has led the increasing emphasis on genetic testing for many human 
ailments including HBOC (Conrad, 2001).  Recognition of a genetic component to 
breast/ovarian cancer development has fuelled a public demand for information, 
reassurance and genetic testing (Chustecka, 2014) which has in turn led to an 
increasing number of women being offered RRS to remove healthy breasts and 
ovaries in order to reduce the risk of future disease (Stratton & Rahman, 2008).    
 
The focus of this study are women who have been identified with carrying a genetic 
mutation which predisposes breast/ovarian cancer development and who have been 
offered but said no to RRS.  For ease of writing the term ‘high risk’ is used to refer to 
women who carry these mutations. The aim of this study was to explore the 
experiences of high risk women who said no to RRS, and to illuminate an 
understanding of why these women made what appeared to be anti-health decisions 
in the context of modern Western medicine.  The influence of dominant medical and 
sexual discourses is considered, as it is argued such communal discourses influence 
perceptions of women and women’s experiences in Western society and the resulting 
decisions they make with regards to RRS.   
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This study is timely in light of growing public and professional interest on genetic 
causes of disease and subsequent management of pre-disease ‘patients’.  This 
interest was palpably exposed in 2013 following revelations one of the world’s most 
famous women had undergone surgical removal of her healthy breasts because of a 
genetic predisposition to breast/ovarian cancer.  The resulting media coverage 
catapulted genetic testing and RRS into the public domain and sparked extensive 
debate on the rights and wrongs of what is arguably extreme preventative medicine.  
 
Introduction 
My interest in the topic of this study dates back to the early 1990s whilst working as a 
Breast Care Nurse Specialist.  In my clinical practice, I primarily dealt with women 
undergoing surgical and medical interventions for breast cancer.  At this time, women 
who attended the Breast Clinic because they had a family history of breast cancer, the 
so-called ‘worried well’, were managed ad hoc as there were no clinical guidelines 
which outlined best practice for these women.  Their management inevitably involved 
a clinical breast examination, mammography, ‘reassurance’ and discharge from the 
clinic with no follow up.  This changed in the early 00s when clinical testing for genetic 
breast cancer became widely available.  The ‘worried well’ became ‘presymptomatic 
patients’ and guidelines were developed which outlined how such women should be 
counselled, screened and managed.  I worked with many women who had a family 
history of breast/ovarian cancer and witnessed first-hand the anxiety, fear and distress 
which accompanied their situation. Despite genetic counselling and risk estimation 
information, for some of these women, their perceived reality involved a frightening 
choice: amputate their breasts and ovaries or develop cancer.  It was my work with 
these women which ignited my interest in cancer genetics and propelled an interest in 
developing ways of supporting high risk women through their difficult journey, 
culminating in this dissertation.   
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Contextualising the research 
Continuing advances in molecular biology, health technologies and imaging have 
changed the landscape of Western medicine as the quest for the ever-earlier 
detection of disease continues (Moynihan, Doust, & Henry, 2012).  This is exemplified 
by the Human Genome Project (HGP) which began in 1990 and aimed to unearth and 
understand the genetic makeup of the human species (National Institutes of Health, 
(NIH), 2010).   The primary goal of the HGP was to determine the sequence of 
chemical base pairs which make up Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid (DNA) and to identify 
and map the approximately 25,000 genes of the human genome from both a physical 
and functional standpoint.  This map would reveal everything which is genetically 
determined about an individual’s life: their genetic blueprint.  This blueprint could be 
used to identify an individual’s susceptibility to certain disease conditions and inform 
specifically tailored strategies for the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease 
(Jenkins & Collins, 2003).  The human genome sequence was eventually completed 
in April 2003 and more than 1800 genes implicated in the development of a number of 
diseases have been discovered (NIH, 2010).   
 
The sequencing of the human genome led to the identification of two genes (BRCA1 
and BRCA2) which are implicated in the development of up to 10% of all breast 
(Apostolou & Fostira, 2013) and ovarian (Prat, Ribe & Gallardo, 2005) cancers.  
Deleterious mutations in these genes confer a significantly elevated lifetime risk of 
developing breast and ovarian cancer (Rebbeck, Kauff & Domcheck, 2009), although 
debate exists as to the most accurate risk estimation (National Cancer Institute (NCI), 
2013).  The discovery of, and subsequent clinical testing of these genes implies the 
generation of diagnoses on the basis of risk rather than causality (Webster, 2002) 
leading to a subset of high risk patients who have no symptoms of disease but who 
may develop cancer.   Genetic testing represents a shift from a diagnostic model of 
medicine to a more prognostic-preventive model increasingly concerned with future 
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health (Paul, Banerjee & Michl, 2014).  Whilst strong evidence supports a link 
between certain gene mutations and the development of cancer (Apostolou & Fostira, 
2013), the tendency to treat genetic risk as disease in itself (Conrad, 2007) means 
people who carry BRCA1/2 mutations are essentially marked for cancer.  Genetic 
testing thus has the potential to cause harm by revealing variations in genetic make-
up which are associated with certain diseases, but which may never cause a threat to 
health (Faulkner, 2012; Melzer & Zimmerman, 2002).  
  
Medical interventions to manage high risk women range from surveillance strategies 
to RRS and chemoprevention (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE), 2013).  RRS does not entirely negate risk (Kraus & Adlard, 2013), however 
there is conclusive evidence Risk Reducing Mastectomy (RRM) and Risk Reducing 
Salpingo-oophorectomy (RRSO) significantly reduce the risk of developing breast and 
ovarian cancer in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (Kraus & Adlard, 2013; Lostumbo, 
Carbine & Wallace, 2010).  Therefore, although overall risk is lowered, cancer 
development following surgical removal of the breasts and ovaries can and does 
occur (Lostumbo et al., 2010).  This means some women who have their healthy 
breasts and ovaries removed will still go on to develop cancer which adds to the 
complexity of the decision making around risk calculation and RRS.  Additionally, 
although RRS reduces disease incidence in high risk populations, evidence to support 
a survival benefit is weak (Neuburger, MacNeill, Jeevan, van der Meulen & Cromwell, 
2013) because should a woman develop cancer, she may be cured by conventional 
treatments.  Therefore, located within the myriad of molecular and genetic discoveries 
are a group of women for whom technological advancements have raised many 
questions which cannot yet be resolutely answered.  This is an important area of 
health research as the increasing number of women experiencing complex 
psychological issues as a result of being identified at high risk of cancer is well 
recognised (Eijzenga, Hahn, Aaronson, Kluijt & Bleiker,  2014; Lerman, Croyle, 
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Tercyak & Hamann, 2002) and women owing BRCA1/2 mutations experience 
significant levels of emotional distress and anxiety (McLamara, 2013).  This is not 
surprising given cancer remains the most feared of diseases (Vrinten, van Jaarsveld, 
Waller, Wagner & Wardle, 2014) and is surrounded by a discourse of fear and terror 
(Harrington, 2012).  
 
The need for research 
In an ever more technical world, advancements in medical technologies mean 
problems of a biological or pathological nature are increasingly able to be resolved, 
yet a corresponding efficacy in solving social and ethical dilemmas created by such 
advancements has yet to be achieved (Paul et al., 2014).  In relation to HBOC, clinical 
advancements in the field of genetics have changed the landscape of the 
management of high risk women yet research on the impacts of such advancements 
is comparatively limited.   
 
In 2013 in the UK, NICE published updated clinical guidelines for the classification, 
care and management of familial breast/ovarian cancer.   The Guideline Development 
Group noted, with concern, the relative paucity of evidence upon which to base 
recommendations in many areas covered by the guidance.  An overall increase in 
research on all aspects of HBOC was recommended.  Similarly, a Cochrane Review 
on cancer genetic risk assessment in familial breast cancer (Hilgart, Coles & Iredale, 
2012) concluded that more research on peoples’ experience of the cancer genetics 
journey was needed, including decision making with regard to the uptake of 
preventative measures such as RRS.  Of particular note, the authors’ emphasised 
research on the impact of testing on those identified as high risk as an important area 
for further research, again highlighting the need for studies to explore women’s 
experiences of being identified as owning a cancer predisposing gene fault.   
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This study addresses an important area of concern in contemporary health care: the 
care of people with presymptomatic conditions. The expansion of genetics in medicine 
has led to the identification of an increasing number of women as high risk of 
developing breast and/or ovarian cancer.  In keeping with clinical guidelines, women 
identified as high risk of developing cancer will be required to make a decision as to 
whether to have their healthy breasts and/or ovaries surgically removed to prevent 
cancer (Eijzenga et al., 2014; Fuller & Anderson, 2006).   
 
Public and professional interest in genetic testing continues to grow (Chustecka, 
2014; Paul et al., 2014) and thresholds for genetic testing for breast/ovarian cancer 
have lowered (NICE, 2013) pre-empting an increase in RRS (Semple et al., 2013).  
An understanding of the needs of these women has yet to be obtained and they face 
a complex and, at times, difficult and distressing journey (Mahon, 2011; McLamara, 
2013).   
 
The growing dialogue on breast/ovarian cancer predisposition is reflected in the 
coining of the term ‘previvor’ in 2000.   The origin of the term is attributed to the 
American-based non-profit organisation FORCE (Facing Our Risk of Cancer 
Empowered) and the term ‘previvor’ is now a registered trademark of the organisation.   
A ‘previvor’ is someone who does not have cancer but has a genetic predisposition to 
developing cancer (Mahon, 2011): a pre-survivor (Cruz, 2007). The word was 
described by Time magazine as being in the top 10 buzzwords for 2007 (Cruz, 2007) 
and its seemingly increasing importance reflected in the United States of America 
(USA) Congress supporting the designation of September 29th 2010 as ‘National 
Previvor Day’ (US  Government, 2010).  Although the concept of ‘previvorship’ is not 
the focus of this research, it none-the-less highlights the increasing prominence of 
HBOC in the public discourse.   It is also interesting to note that the use of the term is 
now entering the professional discourse on hereditary breast/ovarian cancer (Hoskins, 
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Roy & Greene, 2012; Mahon, 2011; Pirzadeh, 2012; Tercyak, Mays, DeMarco, Sharff 
& Friedman, 2011).  Use of the term ‘previvor’ is not without controversy (Oransky, 
2012) and the ‘previvorship’ concept in health care research highlights how public and 
professional discourses can influence each other in contemporary health care.   
Moreover, the concept of previvorship reveals further evidence of medicalisation in 
health care (Oransky, 2012), in this case, the medicalisation of the risk of disease. 
 
Scholars have increasingly commented on medicalisation within Western culture, 
whereby aspects of human life  come to be considered as medical problems (Maturo, 
2012) which can then be reduced or cured by medical interventions (Conrad, 2001, 
2005).  In this study, it is argued that women and their bodies and breasts are 
medicalised as a result of social, cultural and moral attitudes concerning the breasts 
and breast/ovarian cancer genetics.  The medicalisation of women’s breasts and the 
medicalisation of the risk of breast/ovarian cancer have implications for the ways in 
which women experience being diagnosed with a genetic predisposition to developing 
cancer, and to the subsequent decisions they make about their care.  Medicalisation 
then constructs the breasts and ovaries of high risk women as faulty and is supported 
by a medical discourse which seeks to deal with the risk of cancer through various 
interventions on the body.  
 
Biomedicine is the dominant Western medical discourse (Lane, 2014).  Biomedicine is 
an organ-based approach to medicine which focuses on disease mechanisms (Lane, 
2014) and is underpinned by the conviction that humans are biological organisms 
understood by the examination of constituent parts using the empirical scientific 
methods (Mehta, 2011).  Accordingly, disease is a result of identifiable causes, 
located within the individual and best attended to by corrective surgical and 
pharmacological interventions (Filc, 2004; Mehta, 2011).  The discourse of Western 
biomedicine is legitimised by its historical status and affiliation with scientific 
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disciplines (Davis, 2008).  The biomedical model is helpful for those affected by 
disease as it is in the main, effective in diagnosing and treating disease (Lane, 2014). 
However, recognition of the impact of societal and cultural forces on the development, 
treatment and meaning of illness and disease is limited within this model (Davis, 2008; 
Filc, 2004; Lane, 2014).  Thus the biomedical model is challenged by those who claim 
disease is a phenomenon with a biological component but also entails social stigmas 
and labels which require the individual to construct an identity which takes account of 
the illness (Davis, 2008). Hence the biological cannot be separated from the social 
and personal aspects of disease (Lane, 2014). This is particularly important in relation 
to cancer given the discourse of fear and terror (Harrington, 2012) within which cancer 
is enmeshed.   Despite this, there is a paucity of  research  focussed on  
understanding why some people refuse conventional therapeutic interventions for 
managing cancer within the context of Western medical discourse (Citrin, Bloom, 
Grutsch, Mortensen & Lis, 2012;  Frenkel, 2013; Verhoef, Rose, White & Balneaves, 
2008).  
 
This study concerns the experiences of high risk women who say no to RRS despite 
its emergence as the principle primary intervention for reducing breast/ovarian cancer 
risk (Ingham et al., 2013) and clinical guidance that surgery  be offered to all high risk 
women (Cancer Australia, 2011; NICE, 2013).  It is contended that the women in this 
study rejected the conventional therapeutic approach despite being at high risk of 
developing cancer.  Davis (2008) notes that, all individuals are essentially ‘at risk’ of 
illness, disease or harm simply by being alive although for the majority this risk is 
tolerable and resides in the background of the person’s life. However, being identified 
as having a genetic predisposition to cancer conveys inevitability about cancer 
development (Crabb, 2006) and brings this risk into the foreground of life (Davis, 
2008).   
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What then for the woman with a genetic predisposition to breast/ovarian cancer facing 
RRS to remove her still healthy breasts and/or ovaries?  These presymptomatic 
women live in a society where cancer seems omnipresent and remains the most 
feared (Vrinten et al., 2014) and stigmatised of diseases (Clarke & Everest, 2006) and 
where breast and ovarian cancer remain leading causes of death (Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 2012; World Health Organisation (WHO), 2009).  
These women have been informed they are genetically predisposed to developing 
breast and/or ovarian cancer as a result of genetic testing, yet medical science cannot 
prevent cancer, nor can any guarantee be given of avoiding cancer, even following 
removal of the breasts/ovaries. There is an assumption women at risk of cancer will 
engage in preventative strategies as they are the only sensible course of action 
(Davis, 2008).  How then do we understand those who reject the conventional within 
modern Western medicine and make what appear to be ‘anti-health’ decisions 
regarding avoiding cancer?  This is the juxtaposition women with a genetic 
predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer face: although still healthy, these 
women are being asked to undergo surgical removal of their organs. 
 
The predicament of high risk women offered RRS is further complicated by the 
symbolisation of the breast, and to a lesser extent the ovary, as a defining part of the 
female form.  Davis (2008) notes the female breast is an icon of the private individual 
self and the culturally shaped public self. The meaning attached to, and the resulting 
folklore surrounding the female breast is in many ways highlighted by the acceptance 
of cosmetic breast augmentation in Western society which reifies the notion of the 
perfect breast (Filc, 2004).  Further, Filc (2004) argues the undertaking of a potentially 
risky surgical procedure in order to perfect breasts which do not conform to the 
socially and culturally constructed ideal is another example of the hegemony of 
Western medical discourse and resulting medicalisation of non-medical issues.   
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Justification for the approach taken 
A growing body of literature exists on genetic breast/ovarian cancer and the merits of 
various therapeutic interventions and responses to such interventions.  The focus of 
research in the main has been concerned with efficacy of different risk reducing 
interventions and the associated potential benefits and harms.  There is an absence 
of research which investigates the social, cultural and historical contexts in which 
decision making around HBOC is made.  The majority of studies, to date, have used 
standardised psychometric instruments to assess the impact of risk, risk calculation 
and risk reducing interventions on women at risk of developing HBOC. Such 
instruments utilise pre-determined criteria for measuring women’s responses, 
attitudes, beliefs and so forth, which arguably leads the research from the standpoint 
of the researcher and assumes what the women’s responses might be beforehand.  
 
The focus has tended to be on identification and measurement of variables which may 
influence or predict decision-making in high risk women.  A challenge inherent in this 
type of approach is attempting to make real-life, personal experience fit into 
preconceived, so-called expert opinion on what is important.   It may be contended 
that such approaches fail to take account of the entire range of influences on making 
health-related decisions, conscious and sub-conscious, known and unknown, to which 
women in Western society are subject. Moreover, despite the importance attached to 
women’s breasts and ovaries in Western society, little consideration has been given to 
the ways dominant societal discourses impact on women’s experiences and decision 
making in relation to RRS.  What is lacking from this body of research is an 
understanding of the experience of saying no to RRS from the perspective of high risk 
women based on the material and social conditions of their everyday lives.   
 
The approach taken in this study sought to explore the experiences of high risk 
women who said no to RRS.  Further, by giving voice to this group of women, this 
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study revealed an understanding of the public and private folklore shared by these 
women, of a life trajectory compounded by living with a cancer predisposition.  This 
voice was heard within the context of personal, social, cultural and historical 
influences.  Illuminating an understanding of this will help inform and influence 
counselling of high risk women.  
 
A qualitative approach which combined Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography with 
Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology was used as a method through 
which the women’s stories could be gathered, read and interpreted.  Each woman’s 
experiences were valued and worthy of investigation. This approach is particularly 
suited to understanding an individual’s experiences at key moments in their lives 
(Surr, 2006) such as women who had been told they are at high risk of developing 
cancer but said no to RRS.   Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology was 
used to unravel and interpret these women’s stories and to determine the private 
folklore of this group of women.  Without such an understanding, it is difficult for health 
care providers to justify approaches taken to support and care for such women.  
Without understanding it is argued, there can be no real knowledge.  
 
Significance of the research 
The significance of this study is the generation of new knowledge related to the 
experiences of women who say no to RRS following a mutation-positive genetic test 
result. The study questions taken-for-granted assumptions of how women who are 
formally acknowledged to be high risk of developing cancer make the decision to take 
no action. By stimulating debate and providing future directions for research on how 
high risk women come to say no to RRS, this study opens up possibilities for critically 
examining current care practises of high risk women and has implications for how 
information is presented and communicated to high risk women.  The knowledge 
gained will assist in the care of women through the development of information and 
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support strategies which are relevant and meaningful to high risk women considering 
RRS.  This knowledge will inform health professionals, educators and policy makers 
of new ways to consider the management of presymptomatic genetic testing to 
transform disease prevention and develop targeted interventions.  
 
Purpose of the research 
The purpose of this study was to explore the experiences of women who said no to 
RRS following a mutation-positive genetic test result.   
 
The aims of the study were: 
1. To explore the experiences of high risk women who say no to RRS. 
2. To create new knowledge regarding the refusal of RRS in high risk women within 
the framework of Western medical discourse. 
3. To add to the current understanding of how high risk women come to say no to 
RRS and make recommendations for the care, counselling and support of such 
women.  
 
Chapter summary and overview of chapters to come 
This chapter introduced the issues of concern in this study and outlined the purpose 
and aims of the research.  Justification for the approach taken has been presented 
and the need for and significance of this research is explained.  Chapter 2 comprises 
a review of pertinent literature in order to contextualise the analysis which follows in 
subsequent chapters.  In Chapter 3 the methodological approach taken is described 
and justified.  Chapter 4 outlines the steps taken in the conduct of the study and 
provides a comprehensive overview of the literary theories used to interpret the 
participants’ experiences.  Chapter 5 introduces the participants, describes how 
intimacy was established presents the participants’ biographical timelines with family 
histories and epiphany moments.  Chapter 6 is the analytic chapter in which the 
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women’s experiences and influences on their decision to say no to RRS are 
interpreted through the three literary theory lenses.  The thesis concludes with 
Chapter 7 which draws together the key findings from the study, considers 
implications for clinical practice and further research and presents the researchers’ 
reflexive account.   
 
To conclude this section, it is important to stress it is not the intention of this thesis to 
criticise genuine attempts to reduce the harm caused by breast/ovarian cancer nor to 
deny the potential positive impact genetic testing and RRS can have on the lives of 
some high risk women.  Likewise, any critique is not directed at the women making 
difficult choices when faced with the prospect of hereditary breast/ovarian cancer.  
Rather, the aim is to problematise the dominant discourse on genetic testing and RRS 
which constructs such interventions as universally and inherently a good thing.  This 
thesis critiques ways in which women at risk of cancer and their choices are 
represented in discourse.  It presents alternate meanings attached to the experience 
of being identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian and in doing so, generates 
broader discourses which construct how HBOC is talked about and ultimately 
experienced.  If medicine is to abide by its founding principle to ‘first do no harm’, then 
any medical advancement which does appear to cause harm in some women is 
worthy of exposure and investigation.  
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 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The overall purpose of this literature review was to provide an overview of the issues 
of concern in this study in order to contextualise the analysis which follows in later 
chapters.  The approach taken in this study contends that a communal folklore 
surrounding breast/ovarian cancer exists.  This communal folklore is underpinned by 
dominant modes of thinking which consent to or censure certain ways of being and 
acting when faced with the risk of cancer.  In the dominant medical discourse, women 
identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer are able to circumvent their 
genetic destiny through the surgical removal of their still-healthy breasts and ovaries.  
Medical discourse fails to articulate an understanding of other dominant gendered 
discourses which shape the experiences and lives of high risk women in Western 
society because ideologies of treatment for risk take precedence.  The decision of 
women identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer to say no to RRS is 
argued to be ‘anti-health’ within current Western medical discourse however as will be 
discussed, this decision makes sense when it is made within other dominant 
discourses.  This is the paradox faced by high risk women. 
 
At this point, attention is drawn to the rapidly changing landscape that is HBOC.  The 
introduction to this thesis highlighted how HBOC has been catapulted into the public 
arena in the last two years as a result of widespread media coverage of Angelina 
Jolie’s risk reducing surgery to remove her breasts and ovaries.  Professional 
discourse on the management of HBOC is likewise dynamic with the most recent UK 
guidelines published as recently as July 2013 (NICE, 2013).  These guidelines in 
themselves reveal not only is the medical management of HBOC currently unstable, 
but also that much remains unknown about how best to manage HBOC in terms of 
clinical and psychosocial indicators since gaps exist in the evidence base to support 
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current clinical recommendations.  This is not surprising when one considers it is not 
yet 20 years since the two key genes implicated in the development of HBOC were 
mapped, isolated and subjected to extensive scrutiny.  Consequently widespread 
genetic testing has been available for a relatively short period of time therefore 
research around risk reducing interventions is somewhat limited in comparison to 
other areas of cancer care.  The nursing research in relation to the care and 
management of women facing HBOC is an emergent area therefore gaps also existed 
in the literature in relation to sourcing relevant sources to support this research.  This 
meant it was necessary at times to extrapolate from wider literature which related to 
women diagnosed with breast and/or ovarian cancer.   This in itself was not 
problematic and as is seen, it is evidence of dominant yet dynamic discourses on risk, 
genetics and cancer which expose women with no disease to a number of influences, 
ideologies and impacts which are also faced by women with breast/ovarian cancer.  
 
Search parameters 
The literature search commenced in 2009 using several electronic databases:  
MEDLINE, Medline In Process and Other Non-Indexed Citations, MEDLINE Daily 
Update, CINAHL, CancerLit, EMBASE, Cochrane Library, PsycInfo, Web of Science 
and Journals@OVID.  The search was limited to articles written in English and was 
updated on a continual basis.  The generic internet search engines ‘Google’ 
(http://www.google.co.uk) and ‘Google Scholar’ (https://scholar.google.co.uk/) were 
also utilised as potential sources of literature.  Government and health organisation 
websites were accessed and a hand search conducted of the reference lists of papers 
and documents retrieved for additional literature.  Literature over 10 years old was 
included if it was of a seminal nature and/or written by prominent authors in the field.  
 
A number of key search words were utilised in the search which reflected the key 
areas of concern and included: familial, genes, genetic, genetic testing, screening, 
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hereditary, breast, ovarian, cancer, predisposition, susceptibility, risk, high risk, cancer 
risk, communicating risk,  BRCA, mastectomy, oophorectomy, prophylactic, 
preventative, risk reducing, surgery, Western, medical, medicine, discourse, women, 
female, femininity, society, ideology and medicalisation.  Literature pertaining to the 
method was also extensively searched using the same process and involved the key 
search words: interpretive biography, biographical, Marxism, Marxist, feminist, 
feminism, Foucault, Foucauldian, literary theory, literary criticism, folklore, life stories, 
personal experience narratives and narrative analysis.    
 
A considerable body of literature was found in relation to risk reducing interventions 
for high risk women.  Given the focus of the research were high risk women who say 
no to RRS within the context of Western medical discourse, this study was 
contextualised within several key areas of literature. First, literature relating to 
breast/ovarian cancer genetics, risk estimation and genetic testing was reviewed.  The 
focus of the review then narrowed to draw upon literature related specifically to risk 
reducing interventions and the physical and psychosocial impacts of RRS.  The 
review concludes with a discussion of the concepts of medicalisation and risk and how 
these concepts have contributed to contemporary understandings of breast/ovarian 
cancer.  Literature pertaining to the method is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Cancer genetics 
The term ‘cancer’ refers to a number of diseases caused by the uncontrolled division 
and replication of abnormal cells in a part of the body.   In normal cells, growth and 
division is a carefully regulated process which depends on the interaction of a number 
of regulatory factors contained within the genetic material of the cell, the DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) (Corner, 2008).   Homeostasis is maintained when there is a 
balance between cell proliferation and cell death.   Cancer results from a series of 
genetic alterations which lead to a progressive disordering of the normal cell control 
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mechanisms, a multi-step process known as carcinogenesis (Corner, 2008) the 
process of which is influenced by a number of genetic, epigenetic and non-genetic 
factors (Van Gerpen, 2007).   
 
All cancers have a genetic basis, that is, they occur as a result of mutations in genes.  
Genes are sub-units of DNA and are formed as 23 pairs of chromosomes; therefore, 
cells contain two copies of each gene (Cancer Research UK, 2014).  The majority of 
cancers are caused by acquired, chance mutations through an individual’s exposure 
to endogenous and exogenous DNA-damaging elements (Stratton, 2011) such as 
viruses, radiation, carcinogenic agents and naturally occurring random mutations 
which corrupt DNA.  These are known as somatic mutations and are present only in 
the damaged cells, therefore these mutations cannot be passed to offspring (Arden-
Jones, Thomas, Docherty & Eles, 2008).  Multiple mutations which corrupt both 
copies of a gene are necessary before loss of cellular control occurs.  Whole genome-
sequencing studies have shown between 1000 and 10,000 somatic mutations to be 
present in most adult solid tumours (Baird & Caldas, 2013). 
 
In contrast, inherited mutations, such as those associated with HBOC, are germline 
mutations which means the mutation is present in the sex chromosomes (of the sperm 
and ova) hence can be passed on to offspring (Arden-Jones et al., 2008).  During 
conception, the developing zygote randomly inherits a single copy of every 
chromosome from each parent.  Since there are two copies of each chromosome, the 
child could inherit the faulty (mutated) copy or the normal copy.  If either parent has a 
germline mutation, each child conceived has a 50:50 chance of inheriting that 
mutation (Cancer Research UK, 2014).   Additionally, because the mutation is in the 
germline, it will be present every DNA-containing cell in the individual’s body (Arden-
Jones et al., 2008).  Germline mutations confer increased susceptibility to cancer 
through various mechanisms including directly promoting cell growth, altering the rate 
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of mutation in somatic cells and loss of modulating harmful effects of carcinogen 
exposure (Stratton, 2011).  Cancer is more likely if a mutated version of the 
chromosome/gene is inherited because the person already has one faulty copy of a 
gene therefore requires less subsequent corrupting events to develop cancer, as 
outlined in the diagram below. 
 
Sporadic cancer: mutation on both copies of gene acquired over time 
     
Uncontrolled cell proliferation leading to cancer. 
 
Inherited cancer: one mutated copy inherited and already present 
               
Uncontrolled cell proliferation leading to cancer. 
Figure 1: Sporadic versus inherited mutation gene corruption. 
Breast/ovarian cancer predisposition 
Breast cancer is the most common cancer diagnosed in women and accounts for 
almost 25% of all female cancer (NICE, 2013).  The worldwide overall lifetime risk of 
women developing breast cancer remains approximately 1 in 10 (NCI, 2013).  In 
Western countries, the risk is higher.  Women in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Australia have a 1 in 8 chance of developing breast cancer before the age of 85 
(AIHW, 2012).  Sixty-six percent of deaths from breast cancer occur in Western 
countries, although breast cancer incidence and mortality continues to rise in 
developing countries (WHO, 2008).   
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The worldwide overall lifetime risk of a woman developing ovarian cancer is 
approximately 1 in 71 or 1.4% (NCI, 2013).  The risk in Australia is comparable at 1 in 
77 (AIHW, 2010).  In the United Kingdom however, the risk is higher at 1 in 54 
(Cancer Research UK, 2012).  Reasons for this are believed to be a higher 
prevalence of known risk factors such as older age, high fat diet and high alcohol 
consumption, fewer pregnancies/children and higher usage of hormone replacement 
therapy (Cancer Research UK, 2012).  
 
The clustering of breast cancer in families has been recognised for several hundred 
years, although it was not until the mid-20th century when more systematic attempts to 
document ‘cancer families’ led to the hypothesis some breast cancers may have a 
strong hereditary element (Easton, Antonio & Thompson, 2008).  Epidemiological 
studies identified first-degree female relatives of women with breast or ovarian cancer 
were more likely to develop the disease than the general population, and this was 
more likely to be a result of genetic predisposition rather than environmental or 
behavioural factors (Stratton & Rahman, 2008). It is now estimated up to 10% of 
breast (Apostolou & Fostira, 2013) and ovarian (Rosenthal et al., 2012) cancers are 
hereditary, that is, attributable to deleterious mutations in the genetic material passed 
on from parents to offspring.   Family history is considered the most significant risk 
factor for ovarian cancer development (Easton et al., 2008; Prat et al., 2005) and one 
of the most important for breast cancer development (Antoniou & Easton, 2006; NICE, 
2013).  
 
Genetic mutations and breast/ovarian cancer predisposition 
Gene sequencing technology has identified some of the genes implicated in 
susceptibility to breast/ovarian cancer development (Antoniou & Easton, 2006; NICE 
2013).  These include the BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, TP53, and PTEN genes although 
mutations in the latter three are rare compared with BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations 
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(Walsh et al., 2006).  Thus, BReast CAncer1 (breast cancer susceptibility gene 1) 
and BReast CAncer2 (breast cancer susceptibility gene 2), are considered the most 
important cancer predisposition genes (Bradbury & Olopade, 2007) and the majority 
of women identified as high risk will carry a deleterious mutation in one of these genes 
(NICE, 2013).   BRCA gene mutations are also associated with a higher risk of other 
cancers including cancers of the head, neck and skin (Narod & Offit, 2005), pancreas, 
uterus and biliary system (Thompson & Easton, 2001) and fallopian tubes and 
peritoneum (Casey et al., 2005).  
 
Identified in the mid 1990’s, BRCA1 and BRCA2 are genes located on chromosomes 
17 and 13 respectively.  BRCA1 and BRCA2 are tumour suppressor genes involved in 
various cell regulation functions including DNA repair, cell cycle regulation and 
apoptosis (the process of programmed cell death) (Yoshida & Miki, 2004).  Tumour 
suppressor genes prevent neoplastic development by repressing or inhibiting cell 
division and growth thus maintaining homeostasis.  BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations 
therefore are not oncogenes, that is, they do not cause cancer.  Rather their inability 
to function normally increases the likelihood of malignant transformation in cells.  
 
Thousands of different disease-associated mutations in the BRCA1/2 genes have so 
far been identified although much fewer are known to be deleterious (Antoniou & 
Easton, 2006; Borg et al., 2010).  It is estimated approximately 0.25% of the general 
population will carry BRCA1/2 mutations (NCI, 2014).   This figure rises to 2% for 
women with breast cancer, 5% for men with breast cancer and 10-15% for women 
with ovarian cancer.  Rates in the Ashkenazi Jewish population are higher at 2.5% for 
the general population, 10% for women with breast cancer, 19% for men with breast 
cancer and 36-41% for women with ovarian cancer (NCI, 2014).  The higher incidence 
of BRCA mutations in people of Ashkenazi Jewish descent is a result of what is 
termed the ‘founder effect’.  This occurs when a new population is established by a 
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small group of people (founders) who are culturally and/or geographically isolated, 
leading to inbreeding and a loss of genetic variation (Ferla et al., 2007). Founder 
mutations are those present in the DNA of the founders of the new population which 
can be passed down to other generations.   Three founder mutations (two in BRCA1 
and one in BRCA2) are known to be present in the Ashkenazi Jew population 
accounting for this particular group’s higher incidence of inherited breast and ovarian 
cancer (Ferla et al., 2007).   
 
Transmission of BRCA1/2 mutations occurs in an autosomal dominant pattern which 
means inheriting only one copy of the mutated gene increases cancer risk (NCI, 
2014).  Each child of a carrier parent has a 50% chance of inheriting the mutated copy 
therefore both mothers and fathers can transmit a BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation to sons 
and daughters. 
 
Figure 2: Autosomal dominant inheritance.* 
(*Attribution: By U.S. National Library of Medicine (Genetics Home Reference) [Public domain], via Wikimedia 
Commons) 
 
BRCA1/2 mutations and breast/ovarian cancer risk estimation 
Germline mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 confer higher risks of developing breast 
and ovarian cancer although penetrance, the likelihood of a mutation-carrier 
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manifesting the disease, is incomplete (Lessick, 2007) therefore not all mutation 
carriers will go on to develop the disease.  Since there is no test or intervention which 
can accurately predict who will go on to develop breast/ovarian cancer, many women 
will have RRS needlessly (Lostumbo et al., 2010) because they would never have 
developed cancer.  Thus the genetic pathway associated with breast/ovarian cancer 
gene mutations differs to that of other single disorder/high penetrance genes such as 
those associated with Huntington’s disease where penetrance is almost 100% (Melzer 
& Zimmerman, 2002).   
 
Attempts have been made to estimate the cancer risk conferred by BRCA1/2 
mutations.   The majority of studies have identified BRCA1 mutations as conferring 
greater risk than BRCA2 (NCI, 2014).  Three large meta-analyses have been 
conducted although in the most recent (van der Kolk et al., 2010) a greater risk for 
breast cancer was associated with BRCA2 mutations.  van der Kolk et al. (2010) 
acknowledged the BRCA2 breast cancer risk reported was higher than most other 
published data, but reasons for this were not fully articulated.  Risk estimates by 
mutation and cancer type are summarised in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Risk estimates by mutation and cancer type 
Authors Cancer 
type 
BRCA1 mutation risk by age 
70 years 
BRCA2 mutation risk by age 
70 years 
van der Kolk et 
al. (2010) 
Breast  71.4% (95% CI, 67.2 - 82.4%) 87.5% (95% CI, 82.4 - 92.6%)    
van der Kolk et 
al. (2010) 
Ovarian  58.9% (95% CI, 53.5 - 64.3%) 34.5% (95% CI, 25.0 - 44.0%) 
Chen & 
Parmigiani (2007) 
Breast  57% (95% CI, 47% - 66%) 49% (95% CI, 40% - 57%) 
Chen & 
Parmigiani (2007) 
Ovarian  40% (95% CI, 35% - 46%) 18% (95% CI, 13% - 23%) 
Antoniou et al. 
(2003) 
Breast 65% (95% CI, 44 - 78%) 45% (95% CI, 31 - 56%) 
Antoniou et al. 
(2003) 
Ovarian 39% (95% CI, 18 - 54%). 11% (95% CI, 2.4 - 19%).   
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Cancers arising as a result of BRCA1/2 mutations are also associated with a number 
of negative biological characteristics in comparison with sporadically occurring 
cancers.  These include younger age at diagnosis, (Salhab, Bismohun & Mokbel, 
2010), more aggressive disease (Kuhl, Kuhn & Schild, 2005; Zagouri et al., 2013), 
negative prognostic indicators such as oestrogen-receptor negative status (Calderon-
Margalit, & Paltiel, 2004; Domcheck et al., 2010) and contralateral disease (Evans et 
al., 2013).    
 
BRCA1/2 mutations are also associated with an increased risk of male breast cancer.  
Male breast cancer is rare and accounts for less than 1% of all breast cancer cases 
(Tai, Domchek, Parmigiani & Chen, 2007) and the general population risk of breast 
cancer in men is 0.1% (Berliner, Fay, Cummings, Burnett & Tillmanns, 2013).  
Increased rates of male breast cancer of 1.2% (Tai et al., 2007) and 4% (Ottini et al., 
2003) have been reported in BRCA1 mutation carriers.  The link with male breast 
cancer is more established for BRCA2 mutations (Weiss, Moysich, & Swede, 2005) 
with increased rates of 6.8% (Tai et al., 2007) and 5 – 10% (Institute of Cancer 
Research, (2015) reported.   
 
Overall then, there is agreement owning a BRCA1/2 mutation confers an increased 
risk of breast and/or ovarian cancer but the magnitude of risk varies.  Several factors 
are apparent which may explain this.  Although gene mutations have been identified 
which appear to predispose cancer development, the exact mechanism by which this 
process occurs is not understood.  Different BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations are 
associated with varying degrees of penetrance (Njiaju & Olopade, 2012).  For 
example, mutations in the central region of the BRCA1 gene confer lower breast 
cancer penetrance than mutations in other positions on the gene (Thompson & 
Easton, 2001).  Available evidence also suggests breast/ovarian cancer risk is 
modified through various genetic, epigenetic and non-genetic factors which impact on 
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penetrance.  Age at diagnosis of affected relative, cancer type in affected relative, 
parity, body mass index, exposure to endogenous hormones, age at menarche and 
menopause, early oophorectomy and breast density are believed to modify cancer 
risk in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (Antoniou & Easton, 2006) and the general 
population (Easton, Antoniou & Thompson, 2008).   A further complicating factor is 
that several known risk factors for breast cancer in particular also have a hereditary 
basis, for example, breast density and age at menarche/menopause (Easton et al., 
2008).  This means clusters of breast cancer may appear in families without a 
heritable gene mutation. 
 
Accurate risk estimation in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers is also hampered because not 
all genes involved in cancer development have been identified or understood 
(Antoniou & Easton, 2006).  It is estimated that BRCA1/2 mutations account for less 
than 5% of the total incidence of breast/ovarian cancer (Oldenburg, Meijers-Heijboer, 
Cornelisse & Devilee, 2007) and no more than 25% of familiar breast/ovarian cancer 
(Antoniou & Easton, 2006).   There is general agreement many more cancer genetic 
susceptibility genes exist which have not been discovered (NCI, 2014; Oldenburg et 
al., 2007).  Furthermore, the ways in which multiple genes modify cancer risk is not 
understood which further limits the effectiveness of risk estimation in mutation carriers 
(Antoniou & Easton, 2006).   
 
The model used to estimate cancer risk also impacts on the risk estimate obtained 
(Antoniou, Pharoah, Smith & Easton, 2004; NICE, 2013).   A range of computational 
risk assessment models have been developed in attempts to quantify risk assessment 
for individuals with a breast/ovarian cancer family history (Bradbury & Olopade, 2007).   
The use of a particular model must be tailored to the individual’s characteristics and 
family history, which must be similar to the study population upon which the model is 
based (NCI, 2014).  Moreover, no model has been developed which takes account of 
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all cancer risk factors, ethnicity, and individual non-genetic risk factors (Bradbury & 
Olopade, 2007; NICE, 2013).   Different models show variation in risk estimate for the 
same clinical scenario (NCI, 2014) therefore a degree of expertise is needed in 
choosing the most appropriate model(s) for calculating risk breast/ovarian cancer risk 
(Bradbury & Olopade, 2007).    It is widely acknowledged current models of risk 
estimation are more accurate in determining population risk and are limited in their 
predictive ability for individual risk calculation (Antoniou & Easton, 2006; Bradbury & 
Olopade, 2007; NICE, 2013; Prado, Andrades & Parada, 2010). 
 
Overall then, although understanding of breast/ovarian cancer genetics is increasing, 
much remains unknown about how breast/ovarian cancer develops in women who 
carry BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations.  Current interventional strategies for high risk 
women, including RRS, are based on risk estimations gained from mathematical 
models which are acknowledged as being limited in terms of predictive ability for 
individual risk calculation. Moreover, much of the information used in genetic 
counselling is based on uncertainty and probability (Emery, Murphy & Lucassen, 
2000) rather than sureness and certitude.  A Cochrane review on RRM  for the 
prevention of breast cancer (Lostumbo et al., 2010) highlighted there was insufficient 
evidence regarding its effectiveness in reducing mortality in all but very high risk 
women and stated there was a risk of over-treatment for many women.  Nonetheless, 
cancer prevention remains central to worldwide cancer control strategies and attempts 
to identify high risk individuals who may benefit (in terms of lowering risk) from 
aggressive risk reducing strategies remain a key feature of cancer medicine.   
 
Genetic testing for breast/ovarian cancer predisposition  
Clinical testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations became available in 1996 
(Bonadies, Myer & Matloff, 2011) and now forms a standard part of HBOC 
management (NICE, 2013).   Although the associated technology is now established, 
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the overall process is complex and uncertainty exists regarding who and when to test 
and the most accurate methods of estimating and communicating risk (NICE, 2013).  
Additionally, challenges exist in determining the accuracy of a family history.  There 
may be poor communication between families, dates of diagnosis may be inaccurate 
or unknown and there may be missing information if relatives are deceased or 
estranged (Parker, London & Aronson, 2013).  Malignancies of the pelvis and 
abdomen are commonly confused in families (NICE, 2013), for example, believing a 
cancer of the cervix or endometrium to be a cancer of the ovary or vice versa.  
Genetic testing is also prone to revealing incidental findings, or information which was 
not requested such a child conceived through an extra-marital affair or an adopted 
child (Greenbaum, 2013) hence people may withhold information or intentionally 
provide erroneous information (Parker et al., 2013).  In cases where the family history 
is unclear or incomplete, it is necessary for clinicians to make decisions on testing 
locally on a case-by-case basis (NICE, 2013).  It is evident therefore the genetic 
testing journey is varied and people’s experiences will differ depending on their family 
and personal history and the geographical area in which their health care services are 
situated. Consequently, this section provides a general overview of genetic testing for 
illustration purposes but it may be individual experiences differ to those presented.   
 
Genetic testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations in suspected HBOC families is a 
two-step process.  The first step involves a mutation screen on the DNA (obtained 
through a blood sample) of an affected family member, that is, a living person 
diagnosed with breast or ovarian cancer.  This is referred to as diagnostic testing 
(National Library of Medicine, 2013) and involves searching the affected person’s 
DNA to identify a particular mutation on the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene.  If a deleterious 
gene mutation is identified, other unaffected family members can be tested for the 
presence of the mutation, a procedure known as predictive (or presymptomatic 
testing) (National Library of Medicine, 2013).  If the mutation is found in the person’s 
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DNA, they are classified as high risk and a personalised risk assessment can be 
generated.  If on the other hand the person has not inherited the mutation, their risk is 
the same as the general population risk.  A third outcome is the individual is found to 
own a variation of unknown (uncertain) significance (VUS) (Esplen & Bleiker, 2015).  
No robust clinical data is available to recommend a specific strategy for dealing with 
VUS therefore the clinical management of such individuals requires to be 
individualised according to family history and other personal risk factors (NCI, 2014).   
 
Threshold for genetic testing 
Genetic testing for cancer predisposition involves significant financial and human 
resources and has important implications for those tested, therefore guidance exists 
on when individuals should be offered a diagnostic or predictive test.  NICE (2013) 
guidelines allow mutation screening on individuals where there is a 10% or greater 
likelihood of detecting a deleterious mutation. This figure is lower than the previous 
threshold of 20% set by NICE in 2006 therefore more people now meet the criteria for 
genetic testing.  
 
The Manchester Scoring System (Evans et al., 2004) is the most frequently used 
empirical scoring system to estimate the likelihood of detecting a BRCA1/2 mutation in 
an individual’s DNA (NICE, 2013).  The score generated is dependent upon various 
criteria including the age at diagnosis of affected individuals, type of cancer, the 
presence of male breast cancer and/or multiple cancers in the family.  A higher score 
equates with higher likelihood of a gene mutation being detected and therefore aids 
decision making on who is suitable for testing (Evans et al., 2004).  In Australia, the 
Familial Risk Assessment - Breast and Ovarian Cancer (FRA-BOC) (Cancer Australia, 
2011) is used to estimate an unaffected woman’s risk of developing breast/ ovarian 
cancer and identify who should be referred to a specialist family cancer clinic for 
further assessment and testing. The process is presented diagrammatically below.    
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 Figure 3: Genetic testing process. 
Intervention strategies for women at high risk of developing breast/ovarian 
cancer 
 
Genetic testing for breast/ovarian cancer predisposition is carried out on the premise it 
allows interventions aimed at reducing cancer morbidity and mortality (Esplen & 
Bleiker, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2012).  Although there is an emerging literature on the 
benefits and drawbacks associated with risk reducing interventions, gaps exist in the 
evidence to support such strategies (NICE, 2013; Schwartz et al., 2012).  This is not 
surprising when one considers BRCA1 and BRCA2 were only identified in 1996 
therefore the evidence to date has been accumulated in a relatively short period of 
time.  The implication of this is current guidance on management is likely to continue 
to be modified over coming years as new evidence emerges and preliminary research 
study findings are validated or not.  Indeed the literature review for this study identified 
a rapidly changing medical and genetic landscape in relation to breast and ovarian 
cancer even over the relatively short study period.   
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Surveillance strategies 
Surveillance strategies for high risk women are based on the premise early detection 
of disease potentially reduces cancer-related morbidity and mortality (NICE, 2013).  A 
number of surveillance strategies have been implemented and evaluated in attempts 
to devise an optimal strategy for high risk individuals. 
 
Breast examination 
There is no evidence breast self-examination (BSE) or clinical breast examination 
(CBE) confers any survival benefit in high risk women (Horsman et al., 2007; NICE, 
2013).  Both procedures have been identified as potentially harmful (Koster & 
Gotzsche, 2003; NICE, 2013) as there can be an association with unnecessary 
biopsies, anxiety and false reassurance leading to delays in diagnosis should an 
interval cancer develop (Horsman et al., 2007).  CBE however is recognised as 
potentially beneficial if undertaken by a skilled clinician in conjunction with other 
surveillance measures (Horsman et al., 2007; NICE, 2013).  In keeping with health 
advice aimed at the general population, high risk women are encouraged to be ‘breast 
aware’ by knowing how their breasts look and feel and to seek medical advice if any 
changes or abnormalities become apparent (NICE, 2013).  
 
Surveillance by imaging 
Mammography and more recently magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) are the main 
surveillance methods for detecting breast cancer (NICE, 2013).  The majority of 
published evidence relates to mammography owing to the relative recency of MRI 
screening.    NICE (2013) recommend BRCA mutation carriers with no personal 
history of breast/ovarian cancer commence annual mammographic breast 
surveillance at age 40 years and annual MRI surveillance at age 20 years, although 
breast surveillance has been recommended elsewhere to commence as early as 25 – 
30 years of age (de Gonzalez, Berg, Visvanathan, & Robson, 2009).    
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There is established evidence mammography reduces breast cancer mortality in the 
general population (Independent UK Panel on Breast Cancer Screening, 2012; 
Warner et al., 2011) but there is much uncertainty regarding absolute benefit in terms 
of lives saved and possible harms of screening (Independent UK Panel on Breast 
Cancer Screening, 2012).  Similarly, mammography has become widely used in the 
high risk population although available evidence has yet to demonstrate the overall 
safety and efficacy of it (de Gonzalez, et al., 2009) and the impact on survival 
(Horsman et al., 2007; Schwartz et al., 2012).   
 
Mammographic screening in BRCA mutation carriers poses particular challenges 
owing to breast and tumour biology, the age of the target population and the potential 
harms of mammography (Horsman et al., 2007; Kuhl et al., 2005; Zagouri et al., 
2013).  Breast density in pre-menopausal women makes mammography less 
sensitive and therefore less effective in detecting malignancy (Warner et al., 2008).  
There is the potential for harm because a dose-response relationship exists between 
ionising radiation and breast cancer development (Kuhl et al., 2005; Preston et al., 
2009) therefore high risk women who commence mammographic surveillance at an 
earlier age will accumulate a greater lifetime exposure hence a greater risk of 
mammography-induced cancer (de Gonzalez, et al., 2009; Kuhl et al., 2005; Kurian, 
Sigal & Plevritis, 2010).  Moreover, some deleterious BRCA mutations are associated 
with a reduction in capacity to repair DNA (Brennan, 2002; Kuhl et al., 2005) therefore 
the breasts of high risk women may be paradoxically more sensitive to the harmful 
effects of mammography (de Gonzalez et al., 2009; Kuhl et al., 2005; NICE, 2013).   
 
Mammographic screening is also associated with increased psychological distress 
and anxiety and reduced quality of life (Kurian et al., 2010).  Women may be falsely 
reassured by a ‘clear’ result and therefore neglect to report breast abnormalities which 
occur during the interval between scans (Griffiths, Bendelow, Green & Palmer, 2010).   
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False positive results can lead to unnecessary exploratory operations and increased 
biopsies (Hallowell, 1988; Kurian et al., 2010), whereas false negatives may result in 
malignancy being missed and delay diagnosis of cancer (Kurian et al., 2005).   
 
Attempts have been made to address the potential drawbacks of mammographic 
surveillance through the implementation of MRI screening.  MRI offers some benefits 
particularly in younger women as it is unaffected by breast density and does not use 
ionising radiation (Kuhl et al., 2005; Warner et al., 2008).  MRI hence offers improved 
sensitivity over mammogram (Kuhl et al., 2005; NICE, 2013, Warner et al., 2008) but 
is less specific (Evans & Howell, 2007; Kuhl et al., 2005) particularly for invasive and 
in situ cancer (Kurian et al., 2005).  Evidence suggests a combination of 
mammography and MRI may offer the most effective surveillance strategy in high risk 
women (Kuhl et al., 2005; Warner et al., 2008), but more data are required to 
determine the associated risks and benefits across a range of outcome indicators 
(Horsman et al., 2007; Schwartz et al., 2012). 
 
No effective screening method for ovarian cancer exists (Chai et al., 2014; Domcheck 
et al., 2010).  Ovarian surveillance for high risk women aims to detect tumours at 
sufficiently early stage to improve survival given the poor prognosis associated with 
late stage ovarian cancer (Evans et al., 2009).  Surveillance utilising transvaginal 
ultrasound (TVU), (combined with serum CA125 testing) has been the most 
extensively investigated (Das & Bast, 2008).    All evidence to date suggests annual 
TVU and/or serum CA125 monitoring has no impact on survival in high risk women 
(Das & Bast, 2008; Domcheck et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2009; Moyer, 2012) and the 
potential harms of screening have been highlighted as an area of concern (Moyer, 
2012).   
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One of the largest studies to examine the safety and efficacy of ovarian surveillance in 
high risk women was the UK Familial Ovarian Cancer Screening Study (FOCSS) 
(Rosenthal et al., 2012).  Phase 1 of the study of 3563 high risk women ended in 2010 
and found screening in the year prior to a diagnosis of ovarian cancer reduced the 
incidence of late stage cancers but did not increase the incidence of early stage 
(stage 1) cancers. A non-significant trend to increased survival was found but this may 
have been a result of lead-time bias, that is, longer survival owing to earlier diagnosis 
rather than efficacy of screening.  The authors concluded that increased frequency of 
screening could potentially improve the detection of stage 1 ovarian cancers hence 
may lead to improvement in survival.  Phase 2 of the trial was designed to investigate 
4-monthly surveillance on a sample of 4531 high risk women.  Recruitment to this 
phase has ended with results to be published late 2015.  
 
Primary prevention 
Interventions for the primary prevention of breast/ovarian cancer in high risk women 
comprise chemoprevention, RRM and RRSO.   
 
Chemoprevention 
Chemoprevention is defined as “the use of natural, synthetic, or biologic chemical 
agents to reverse, suppress, or prevent carcinogenic progression to invasive cancer” 
(Tsao, Kim & Hong, 2004, p.  150).   In relation to breast and ovarian cancer, 
chemoprevention strategies aim to exploit hormone related pathways which influence 
cancer development.  Notably, oestrogen acts as a potent growth factor for breast 
cancer cells and increased serum concentrations of oestrogen are strongly associated 
with the development of breast cancer (Travis & Key, 2003).  Several drugs are 
available which decrease exposure to oestrogen: aromatase inhibitors (AIs) which 
work by blocking oestrogen production and selective oestrogen receptor modulators 
(SERMs) which block the effects of oestrogen on breast tissue (Calderon-Margalit & 
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Paltiel, 2004).  SERMs have been most widely used and studied and currently form 
the mainstay of chemoprevention of breast cancer (NICE, 2013).  Tamoxifen is the 
most widely used SERM although several newer agents are under investigation 
(Howell & Evans, 2013). 
 
There is well established evidence tamoxifen, a non-steroidal anti-oestrogen agent, 
improves disease-free and overall survival in women with breast cancer (NICE, 2013).  
Consequently, a number of clinical trials have been designed to assess the efficacy 
and safety of tamoxifen as a chemoprevention agent.  The largest of these was the 
US Breast Cancer Prevention trial which recruited 13,388 women aged 35 and older 
between April 1992 and September 1997 (Fisher et al., 1988).  The double-blinded 
trial randomly assigned women to receive tamoxifen 20mg daily (n=6706) or placebo 
(n=6681) for five years.  Early data suggested a benefit in taking tamoxifen over 
placebo with a reduction in breast cancer development of 45% in the tamoxifen group.  
This prompted the investigators to unblind the trial and disclose the findings early to 
allow the women in the placebo group to take tamoxifen in view of its reported clear 
benefits in lowering breast cancer risk.   However, the adverse event profile was 
greater in the tamoxifen group where there were statistically significant increases in 
endometrial cancers, cataracts, pulmonary emboli and deep venous thrombosis.  The 
exception was fractures where a protective effect from tamoxifen was found.  Fisher et 
al. (2005) later published seven-year and final update data which reported similar 
reductions in breast cancer incidence among women taking tamoxifen and 
comparable rates of adverse events.  Additionally, although more breast cancers 
developed in the placebo group, deaths from breast cancer was not statistically 
different between the groups therefore an overall positive impact on survival was not 
equivocally demonstrated (Fisher et al., 2005).  Subsequent large, international 
clinical trials of tamoxifen to reduce breast cancer risk in high risk women have 
confirmed its potential to significantly lower breast cancer risk but also confirmed the 
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associated increased risk of adverse events (Cuzick et al., 2002, 2007; Visvanathan 
et al., 2009).    
 
The unfavourable side effect profile of tamoxifen has led to efforts to source other 
SERMs which may be beneficial in reducing breast cancer risk (Vogel et al., 2010).  
The Study of tamoxifen and raloxifene (STAR) trial (Vogel et al., 2006, 2010) was one 
of the largest and involved almost 20,000 high risk postmenopausal women.  Results 
demonstrated that raloxifene was slightly less effective than tamoxifen in reducing 
breast cancer risk but conferred a lower risk of endometrial cancer development, 
thromboembolic events and cataracts than tamoxifen (Vogel et al., 2010).   
 
In summary, tamoxifen and raloxifene are used to lower breast cancer risk in high risk 
women but confer a number of potential adverse events.   Evidence suggests the 
benefit is greatest in preventing oestrogen receptor positive cancers with little or no 
effect on oestrogen receptor negative cancers (Cuzick et al., 2013).  Since the 
majority of BRCA1 mutation carriers are more likely to develop oestrogen receptor 
negative cancers, women with mutations in BRCA1 may not benefit from tamoxifen or 
raloxifene (Calderon-Margalit & Paltiel, 2004) and further trials are needed to 
determine the specific effects of chemopreventive agents on different types of 
BRCA1/2 mutations (Cuzick et al., 2013; Visvanathan et al., 2009).   
 
Risk reducing surgery (RRS) 
RRS is the principle primary intervention for reducing breast/ovarian cancer risk 
(Guillem et al., 2006; Ingham et al., 2013).  The aim of RRS is to prevent cancer 
mortality whilst minimising the potential negative sequelae of such interventions 
(NICE, 2013).   
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Risk reducing mastectomy (RRM) 
RRM is the surgical removal of the breast in the absence of malignancy to reduce the 
risk of breast cancer developing (NCI, 2014).   No surgical technique is able to 
remove all breast tissue since it is spread anatomically across the entire anterolateral 
chest wall and axilla, therefore a balance must be struck between removing maximal 
amounts of breast tissue and leaving a physically and cosmetically acceptable result 
(Guillem et al., 2006).    
 
Several mastectomy techniques exist under different names which reflect the degree 
of tissue removed.  Total mastectomy provides greatest breast cancer protection 
since it involves removal of the entire breast including the nipple and areola complex 
(NCI, 2014).  Subcutaneous mastectomy preserves the nipple and areola complex but 
leaves the most residual tissue (Guillem et al., 2006) hence a greater risk of cancer 
development (Zagouri et al., 2013).  More recently, the total skin sparing mastectomy 
(TSSM) has been proposed as an effective method for maximising breast tissue 
removal and cosmesis (Zagouri et al., 2013).  TSSM removes the breast tissue but 
the entire skin envelope of the breast, including the outer nipple and areola complex, 
are left intact (Peled et al., 2012).  Peled et al. (2012) undertook the largest review to 
date on TSSM carried out on 657 breasts (428 patients) between 2001 and 2010.   
The data obtained showed no significant negative oncologic or post-operative 
outcomes leading the authors to conclude TSSM is both oncologically safe and 
technically viable, although the relatively short period of follow up of the women was 
acknowledged.  However, skin sparing mastectomy can leave behind as much as 
10% residual breast tissue therefore longer term follow up studies are required to 
confirm its overall oncological safety (Salhab et al., 2010).   
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Risk reducing salpingo-oophorectomy (RRSO)  
Since oestrogen is a potent growth factor in the development of breast cancer, RRSO 
reduces the risk of both breast and ovarian cancer (Domchek et al., 2010; Guillem et 
al., 2006).  Interestingly, although most BRCA1 associated tumours are oestrogen 
receptor negative, RRSO still has a protective effect which is believed to occur owing 
to a reduction in circulating oestrogen metabolites with carcinogenic properties 
(Salhab et al., 2010).  High risk women are therefore recommended to undergo RRSO 
once childbearing is complete and prior to natural menopause (Challberg et al., 2011). 
RRSO involves the surgical removal of both ovaries and fallopian tubes since BRCA 
mutations also confer a higher risk of fallopian tube and peritoneal cancers (Salhab et 
al., 2010).   Similar to RRM, it is not possible to remove all ovarian epithelial tissue 
and a residual amount of tissue will remain following RRSO (Guillem et al., 2006).     
 
RRSO is generally carried out laparoscopically (Ingham et al., 2013) unless extensive 
intra-abdominal adhesive disease is suspected (Ward, 2015).  Laparoscopic RRSO is 
argued to be a relatively straightforward from a surgical perspective (Guillem et al., 
2006) although as with any surgical procedure, adverse effects are possible.  A key 
issue with RRSO is the surgical induction of early menopause and the potential 
physical and emotional sequelae of such, which is explored in more detail later on in 
this chapter. 
  
Impact of RRS on cancer risk and cancer survival   
Studies consistently show a reduction in breast cancer risk/development following 
RRS in high risk populations (Domcheck et al, 2010; Lostumbo et al., 2010; Guillem et 
al., 2006; NICE 2013).  The first study to quantify risk reduction estimates in BRCA1/2 
mutation carriers was initiated by Rebbeck et al. (2002) who followed BRCA1/2 
mutation carriers recruited from 22 North American and European centres between 
1974 and 2008 (follow up was until the end of 2009).  Rebbeck et al. (2002) reported 
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RRSO prior to menopause reduced ovarian cancer risk by approximately 85% and 
breast cancer risk by approximately 25% in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers.  Eight (n=259, 
3.1%) ovarian cancers were diagnosed at or following RRSO compared with 58 
cancers (n=292, 19.9%) in matched controls with a mean follow up of between five 
and 8.8 years.  Data on breast cancer risk reduction were later reported by Rebbeck 
et al. (2004) who reported RRM with RRSO reduced breast cancer risk by as much as 
95% in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers while RRM alone reduced breast cancer risk by 
90% in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers with intact ovaries.  Mean follow up was 6.4 years 
in which two women (n=105, 1.9%) who underwent RRM developed breast cancer 
compared with 184 (n=378, 48.7%) in matched controls.   
 
Domcheck et al. (2010) reported later findings following the end of the PROSE study 
follow-up period.  Risk reduction estimates were expressed as hazard ratios where 
possible. BRCA1/2 mutation carriers with no history of breast cancer who underwent 
RRSO had a lower risk of ovarian cancer compared with those who did not (6% vs 
2%; HR, 0.28 [95% CI, 0.12-0.69]) and a lower risk of first diagnosis of breast cancer 
in BRCA1 mutation carriers (20% vs 14%; HR, 0.63 [95% CI, 0.41-0.96]) and BRCA2 
mutation carriers (23% vs 7%; HR, 0.36 [95% CI, 0.16-0.82]). No breast cancers were 
detected in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers who underwent RRM (n=247) compared with 
98 breast cancers (n=1372, 7%) in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers did not.   Overall, RRM 
was confirmed as conferring a statistically significant decreased risk of breast cancer 
in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers and RRSO as conferring a statistically significant 
decreased risk of breast and ovarian cancer in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers.   
 
Domcheck et al. (2010) also reported mortality and morbidity data from the PROSE 
study.  A survival benefit for RRM alone could not be demonstrated however in 
women who underwent RRSO compared with those who did not, there were fewer 
diagnoses of ovarian cancer (1.1% vs 5.8%) and breast cancer (11.4% vs 19.2%) and 
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lower all-cause mortality (3.1% vs 9.8%).  Recent data reported by Finch et al. (2014) 
confirms RRSO reduces ovarian cancer risk and all-cause mortality.  Following a 
mean follow up of 5.6 years, RRSO was associated with an 80% reduction in the risk 
of ovarian, fallopian tube, or peritoneal cancer in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers and a 
77% reduction in all-cause mortality. 
 
Ingham et al. (2013) presented survival data from a study involving 345 BRCA1 
mutation carriers and 346 BRCA2 mutation carriers with no history of breast or 
ovarian cancer which demonstrated an overall survival benefit with any type of RRS 
(RRM and/or RRSO) which are summarised in Table 2 below.  Although all-cause 
deaths were recorded, the authors reported the majority of deaths occurred from 
breast or ovarian cancer.  Ovarian cancer deaths were more common than breast 
cancer deaths in BRCA1 carriers.  Additionally, it was reported a reduction in mortality 
was found in women undergoing RRM alone but this was not statistically significant 
once adjusted for age. 
 
Table 2: Survival rates according to risk reducing intervention (Ingham et al., 
2013) 
Procedure/number of 
women 
Number of 
deaths 
10 year survival 
No RRS/n=457 71 84.3% (95% CI, 80.1 – 87.8%) 
RRM/n=58 1 98.1% (95% CI, 87.1 – 99.7%) 
RRSO/n=108 4 98.2% (95% CI, 92.9 – 99.6%) 
RRM and RRSO/n=68 1 98.3% (95% CI, 88.6 – 99.8%) 
 
To sum up, there is convincing evidence RRS lowers the risk of breast/ovarian cancer 
in high risk women, but estimates of the magnitude of reduction vary.  Furthermore, 
RRS does not does not entirely negate risk (Lostumbo et al., 2010).  The remaining 
risk of breast cancer post RRM is believed to be 10% or less with an approximately 
5% risk for peritoneal carcinoma post RRSO (Lodder et al., 2002) although these 
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figures have yet to be adequately quantified.  Evidence regarding the impact of RRS 
on survival is weak (Neuburger et al., 2013) and further studies are needed to 
compare RRS with optimal screening (Domchek et al., 2010).  If a high risk woman 
elects not to undergo RRS and has effective surveillance and intervention should 
breast cancer develop, the paradox is that she may be cured by less extensive breast 
conservation surgery (Lostumbo et al., 2010; Press, Fishman & Koenig, 2000).   
 
Impact of RRS  
The surgical removal of any body part exposes people to anaesthetic and surgical 
risks (Bosma, Veen, de Jongh & Roukema, 2012) and the invasive effects of surgery 
may impact negatively on body image (Atkinson & Pudner, 2010).  General risks of 
surgery and anaesthesia include pain, infection, septicaemia, haematoma formation, 
haemorrhage, major organ dysfunction, thrombosis formation, nerve damage, skin 
breakdown and death (Bosma et al., 2012).  Women who undergo RRM with breast 
reconstruction additional face risks associated with these procedures and younger 
women undergoing RRSO must also contend with issues surrounding premature, 
surgically induced menopause.   Not surprisingly then, both RRM and RRSO have the 
potential to cause physical and psychological morbidity (Altschuler et al., 2008).   
 
Evidence suggests women undergoing RRS experience a range of adverse events 
and a degree incapacitation for which they are largely unprepared (Hatcher & 
Fallowfield, 2003; Rolnick et al., 2007).  The most commonly reported physical 
symptoms post-RRM include numbness and loss of sensation (Barton et al., 2005; 
Gahm, Wickman & Brandberg, 2010; Hallowell et al., 2012; Metcalfe, Esplen, Goel & 
Narod, 2004; Rolnick et al., 2007), tingling sensation (Gahm et al., 2010; Metcalfe et 
al., 2004), pain (Barton et al., 2005; Bresser, 2009; Gahm et al., 2010; Hallowell et al., 
2012; Rolnick et al., 2007) and infection (Barton et al., 2005; Gahm et al., 2010; 
Metcalfe et al., 2004).  Other reported adverse events include swelling (Metcalfe et al., 
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2004), seroma formation/lymphatic fluid leakage (Barton et al., 2005), limited arm 
movement (Barton et al., 2005; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 2003) and difficulty sleeping 
(Gahm et al., 2010; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 2003). 
 
Post-operative complications frequently necessitate additional surgical interventions 
cumulatively exposing women to further surgical risks (Barton et al., 2005), more so if 
breast reconstruction is also carried out (Gopie et al., 2013; Guillem et al., 2006; 
Rebbeck et al., 2004). Zion et al. (2003) reported 6% of women undergoing RRM 
without reconstruction n=318) required at least one further operation compared to 
52% of women who had also undergone reconstruction (n=1099), mostly related to 
implant problems.  Hatcher and Fallowfield (2003) likewise found implant removal 
because of infection to be problematic following RRM with half of respondents 
reporting post-operative complications still ongoing 18 months after surgery.   More 
recently, Koskenvuo, Svarvar, Suominen, Aittomäki and Jahkola (2013) reported 
findings on 55 women undergoing either bilateral or contralateral RRM, 85% of who 
also underwent breast reconstruction with autologous tissue transfer and/or implant 
insertion. Overall, 42% of women experienced complications which required re-
operation.  Almost a third of complications were due to problems with autologous 
tissue transfer and 42% were a result of implant problems.   
 
The physical impacts of breast removing surgery have emotional consequences which 
may lead to women having negative feelings towards their post-surgery bodies as a 
result of scarring, changes and altered body image (Brandberg et al., 2008; Hallowell 
et al., 2012; Lindwall & Bergbom, 2009).  A relationship also exists between 
increasing incidence and severity of surgical complications and reduced psychological 
wellbeing (Hopwood et al., 2000) and regret following surgery (Gahm et al., 2010), 
highlighting again how RRS has the potential to significantly impact on physical and 
emotional wellbeing.   
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RRSO also involves a range of potential adverse physical impacts as a result of the 
surgical procedure itself and the resulting loss of ovarian function in premenopausal 
women. In addition to the general risks of surgery, RRSO can result in excessive 
bleeding (Kauff et al., 2002; Meeuwissen et al., 2005), urinary and bowel problems 
(Guillem et al., 2006; Kauff et al., 2002; Michelsen, Dørum & Dahl, 2009) and 
pain/discomfort (Fang, Mckenzie, Miller and Daly, 2005; Madalinska et al., 2005; 
Michelsen et al., 2009).   
 
Moreover, in premenopausal women, a surgical menopause is induced resulting in an 
abrupt decline in gonadal hormones (Kotz, Alexander & Dennerstein, 2006). The 
resulting oestrogen deprivation is associated with an increase in severity of 
menopausal symptoms and negative bodily changes which impact on physical and 
emotional well-being, more so than the more gradual decline which accompanies 
natural menopause (Bresser, 2009).  Loss of ovarian function following RRSO results 
in a range of negative sequelae including vaginal dryness (Bonadies et al., 2011; 
Fang et al., 2009; Finch et al., 2011; Robson et al., 2003), night sweats and hot 
flashes (Bonadies et al., 2011; Finch et al., 2011; Tollin, 2011), sleep disturbances 
(Bonadies et al., 2011; Tollin, 2011), hair thinning (Bonadies et al., 2011) cognitive 
changes (Guillem et al., 2006), dyspareunia (Bonadies et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2009; 
Finch et al., 2011; Hallowell et al., 2012), weight gain and change in body shape 
(Bonadies et al., 2011; Hallowell et al., 2012).   
 
Oestrogen deprivation in also associated with higher risks of all-cause mortality 
(Sharma, 2011), a loss of bone mineral density resulting in an increased risk of 
osteoporosis and bone fracture (Cohen et al., 2012; Guillem et al., 2006; Sharma, 
2011) and an increase in onset and incidence of cardiovascular disease (Guillem et 
al., 2006; Sharma, 2011) which may shorten lifespan (Howell & Evans, 2011).  The 
increasingly recognised health risks associated with premature menopause 
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(Domcheck et al., 2010) requires a judgement to be made regarding the use of 
hormone replacement therapy (HRT) in high risk women who undergo RRSO (Finch 
et al., 2014).  HRT reduces menopausal symptoms and is associated with benefits to 
cardiovascular and bone health (Bresser, 2009; Rebbeck et al., 2009) but also confers 
an increase in breast cancer risk in the general population (Beral, Reeves, Bull & 
Green, 2011; Fournier, Berrino, Riboli, Avenel & Clavel‐Chapelon, 2005) although 
studies exploring this link are of varying quality (NICE, 2013).  The increased risk 
observed in the general population raises legitimate concerns that HRT use may 
negate the protective effects of RRSO in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (Rebbeck et al., 
2005).   Several studies have reported observational data which suggests HRT does 
not increase breast cancer risk in women undergoing RRSO (Anderson et al, 2003; 
Challberg et al., 2011; Rebbeck et al., 2005).  Furthermore and somewhat 
paradoxically, Rebbeck et al. (2009) reported RRSO in women under 45 years of age 
may be associated with increased mortality if HRT is not taken due to the risks to 
cardiovascular health.  Further research is needed to determine the benefits and risks 
of HRT use in BRCA1/2 carriers (Domcheck et al., 2010; Madalinska et al., 2006; 
Rebbeck et al., 2009). 
 
In addition to the physical risks outlined above, the folklore and symbolisation 
attached to female breasts and ovaries in Western society means RRS exposes 
women to potential negative psychosocial impacts (Schulzke, 2011).  Breast loss is 
more often constructed as an emotional rather than physical crisis because it is 
equated with a loss of sexual identity and attractiveness (Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011) 
and ovarian loss is associated with a negative effect on body image, femininity and 
personal identity (Hallowell et al., 2012).  Commonly reported psychosocial impacts of 
RRS include a negative impact on body image (Altschuler et al., 2008; Bonadies et 
al., 2011; den Heijer et al., 2012; Gopie et al., 2013; Hallowell et al., 2012; Kurian et 
al., 2005; Sheppard & Ely, 2008) sexuality (Altschuler et al., 2008; Kurian et al., 2005; 
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Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011; Sheppard & Ely, 2008) and sexual activity or functioning 
(Bonadies et al., 2011; Gahm et al., 2010; Hallowell et al., 2012; Sheppard & Ely, 
2008).  Women also report feeling less attractive following RRS (Gahm et al., 2010; 
Gopie et al., 2013; Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011; Sheppard & Ely, 2008) and experience 
reduced emotional wellbeing associated with cosmesis, ‘womanliness’ and the 
irreversibility of the surgery (Altschuler et al., 2008; Howard, Balneaves,  Bottorff & 
Rodney, 2011; Sheppard & Ely, 2008).   
 
Negative psychosocial impacts can present as a result of the surgery itself but may 
also be exacerbated by physical impacts such as pain, swelling, loss of sensation 
(Gahm et al., 2010; Gopie et al., 2013) and oestrogen deprivation (Bonadies et al., 
2011).  The post-operative period can also incur a period of immobilisation which 
results in absence from work and interferes with home and family commitments 
(Hallowell, 1998) which may be longer than anticipated if complications and further 
operations are required (Gopie et al., 2013).   
 
Overall then, RRS is associated with a number of potential negative impacts on 
physical and psychosocial wellbeing, but at the same time, the procedure does reduce 
risk in high risk populations therefore offers a degree of protection from cancer and its 
harmful effects.    The potential to reduce cancer-related worry/anxiety was largely 
presented in the literature as the most positive impact of RRS (Hatcher & Fallowfield, 
2003; Fang et al., 2005; Gopie et al., 2013; Guillem et al., 2006; Hallowell et al., 2012; 
Hatcher, Fallowfield & A’Hern, 2001; Hopwood et al., 2000; Litton et al., 2009; Lodder 
et al., 2002; Lostumbo et al., 2010; van Dijk et al., 2003).   Such findings have led to 
suggestions that RRS may be the only way high risk women can effectively reduce 
cancer worry (Litton et al., 2009).   However, the relationship between reducing 
cancer worry and RRS is not straightforward.  Although an anticipated reduction in 
cancer worry is a key driver in the decision to undertake RRS (Fry, Rush, Busby-Earle 
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& Cull, 2001a; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 2003; Lodder et al., 2002; Litton et al., 2009) 
women with high levels of cancer worry who undertake RRS report equivalent levels 
of cancer worry following surgery to women who do not have RRS (Fry, Busby-Earle, 
Rush, & Cull, 2001b).  Furthermore, cancer-related worry was also found to be linked 
to the impact of surgery in terms of satisfaction and regret following surgery.  Women 
who exhibited greater cancer-worry and anxiety were less likely to be satisfied with 
the results of surgery (Metcalfe et al., 2004) and felt most regret following surgery 
(Fuller & Anderson, 2006).  This is concerning as it suggests women may be driven by 
worry to undertake RRS yet may remain worried and experience less satisfaction and 
more regret following surgery.  
 
To conclude this section, RRS is an effective way of controlling cancer risk in high risk 
populations but much remains unknown about the best way to manage women at high 
risk of HBOC (Kurian et al., 2010; NICE, 2013).  Although RRS may reduce cancer-
specific distress, this is replaced by other problems including negative impacts on 
physical, emotional and psychosocial health (Gopie et al., 2013).  Decision-making 
about RRS can thus be understood as a negotiation of competing risks to body and 
self: although surgery may offer protection from cancer, the folklore in Western society 
surrounding the female breasts, and to a lesser extent the ovaries, means surgery to 
remove these organs results in other risks to a woman’s body and self-identity 
(Howard et al., 2011).   
 
Surgical interventions on women’s bodies in response to risk can be understood as an 
expansion of medicalisation whereby risk is treated in the same way as disease 
(Conrad, 2007).  The next section explores this concept further through a critique of 
medicalisation, risk and risk management practices in relation to HBOC.   
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Medicalisation, risk and HBOC 
The concepts of medicalisation and risk were useful in this study as a means of 
positioning HBOC within wider societal and medical discourses which impact on high 
risk women and their experiences.  The discussion to follow therefore provides a 
background against which women’s decisions to refuse RRS are contextualised.  The 
examination of risk as a medicalised phenomenon in Western society adds to 
contemporary understandings of how cancer risk is constructed and managed.  
Furthermore, the ongoing and increasing medicalisation of women’s breasts and 
ovaries in Western society is understood as a product of emerging genetic and 
medical technologies which both define and produce women’s bodies in particular 
ways and allow still-healthy organs to be surgically removed on the basis of risk.  
Attention is also drawn to the medicalisation of the female breast, as exemplified 
through the normalisation of cosmetic and reconstructive breast surgery, which serves 
as evidence of the importance placed on women’s breasts in Western society, a key 
area of concern in this study. 
 
Medicalisation  
The concept of medicalisation is used to examine ways in which aspects of human life 
are constructed as medical problems requiring intervention (Maturo, 2012).  Although 
the disease of breast/ovarian cancer is real, the women in this study were disease-
free yet they faced surgical ‘treatment’ to prevent a potential future cancer from 
occurring.  This represents a medicalisation of risk (Maturo, 2012) as risk factors 
themselves are perceived as disease (Conrad, 2005, 2007).    
 
Riska (2003) claimed the trend in biomedicine to focus on how individuals’ behaviours 
influence disease development, promotes a risk-factor approach to health.  Breast 
cancer risk in particular is frequently associated with so-called ‘lifestyle factors’ 
(Finkler, 2000), fuelling a wide body of research aimed at modifying women’s lifestyles 
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in order to reduce cancer risk (Chlebowski, 2010).  Thus, an individual’s lifestyle and 
habits are constructed as risk factors for certain diseases which can be modified 
though compliance with medicine.  Such assumptions about health and disease 
further drive medicalisation in Western society because individuals charged with self-
responsibility for health seek increasingly technical medical solutions to repair their 
‘broken’ bodies (Conrad, 2005).    
 
Of particular relevance to this study, it has been argued in this era of genomic 
medicine (Conrad, 2005), that the hegemony of the gene (Finkler, 2000) has placed 
genetics at the centre of the public and professional dialogue on cancer (Maturo, 
2012).  Modern medicine’s seemingly increasing ability to identify individuals at risk of 
disease by nature of their genetic make-up problematises the concept of health itself.  
Genetics further drives medicalisation by expanding the medical gaze to include 
people with no pathology but who may develop disease at a point in the future (Crabb, 
2006; Riska, 2003) because perceptions of the value of genetic tests are vastly 
inflated (Conrad, 2005; Finkler, 2000; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; Melzer & Zimmerman, 
2002).   
 
Moreover, the availability of genetic information on people regarding their future risk of 
disease has created a new category of ‘patient’: those who are pre-disease (Webster, 
2002).  Genetic testing allows the identification of people who are “potentially ill” 
(Conrad, 2005, p. 8), “genetically at risk” (Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 486) or what Finkler 
(2000, p. 58) referred to as “perpetual patients without symptoms”.  Timmermans and 
Buchbinder (2010, p. 409) similarly argued genetics had led to a population of people 
trapped between normalcy and pathology as “patients-in-waiting”.   Genetic testing 
thus has the potential to do more harm than good by marking people for disease 
which may never happen or cause a threat to health (Faulkner, 2012).   
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Medicalisation and female experience 
The concept of medicalisation is particularly useful in examining women’s health 
experiences owning to the patriarchal nature of Western medicine which tends to 
support traditional male/female roles in society (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2010; Waitzkin, 
1978, 1989) and categorise medical issues on the basis of gender (Bilton, et al., 2002; 
Griffiths et al., 2010).  Consequently, normal female experiences such as childbirth, 
menstruation and menopause have been medicalised in Western society (Purdy, 
2001; Riessman, 1983; Westfall & Benoit, 2008; Wylie, Potter & Bauchspies, 2012).  
The menopause for example, is viewed as a hormonal deficiency which predisposes 
women to heart disease, osteoporosis, Alzheimer’s disease and ultimately a 
premature death.  Other factors such as diet, exercise and socio-economic factors 
which have a greater impact on female longevity receive less attention (Riska, 2003). 
The medicalisation of women’s experience is arguably no more evident than in 
relation to the breasts.  In this study, it is argued women and their bodies and breasts 
are medicalised as a result of social and cultural assumptions about women’s bodies 
which allow elective surgical interventions on healthy breasts, for ‘cosmetic’ reasons 
or for cancer risk.   
 
Women’s breasts have been manipulated by societal discourses and the medical 
profession for some time.  The first surgical correction of the breasts is believed to 
have taken place in 17th century Europe when a woman’s very large breasts were 
surgically removed by a barber to reduce the pain and embarrassment caused 
(Ferguson, 2000).  Until the 20th century, surgery to the breasts was primarily carried 
out to remove tumours or reduce the size of large breasts (Jacobson, 1998).  
Interventions to enlarge breasts are a relatively modern phenomenon, reflecting 
changing social and cultural expectations of what women should look like (Darling-
Wolf, 1997) and how cosmetic surgery is tailored to meet the body  aesthetic 
considered ‘fashionable’ in different times and cultures (Riggs, 2012).  
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Coco (1994) identified culturally specific perceptions of the female breast drove 
medicalisation and created the “official breast” (Coco, 1994, p. 35).   The official 
breast conformed to externally-imposed cultural norms and values against which other 
breasts were viewed as substandard and deviant.  The medicalisation of women’s 
breasts was palpably exposed in the 1980s when the American Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive surgeons (ASPRS) used the term ‘micromastia’ to describe the 
‘disease’ of small breasts (Wilson, 2002). Micromastia medicalised and pathologised 
small breasts, identifying them as something abnormal that required an operative cure 
(Ferguson, 2000).  The following quote from a past president of the ASPRS, taken 
from Coco (1994, p. 32) accentuates the derision with which small breasts were 
viewed and the perceived link between a woman’s breasts and life experience: 
(…) these deformities [small breasts] are really a disease 
which result in the patient’s feelings of inadequacy, lack of 
self-confidence, distortion of body image and a total lack of 
well-being due to lack of perceived femininity.  The 
enlargement of the underdeveloped breast is therefore very 
necessary to ensure the quality of life of the patient. 
 
Consequently, a double pathology is evident (Ferguson, 2000): small breasts 
constitute a disease and the trauma caused by having small breasts causes 
psychological distress in need of medical treatment.  Medicalisation thus allows 
medical practice to act as a vehicle for controlling breasts which are considered 
deviant for the purpose of securing conformity with social norms (Thomas-Pollei, 
2008).    
 
Breast augmentation surgery is now the most common cosmetic procedure globally 
and rates have increased by more than 800% since the 1990s (Lavigne et al., 2013).  
Most breast augmentations are carried out in women aged 20 – 30 years (Wilson, 
2002) although in Brazil, age 15 is considered the ideal age for enlarging breasts 
(Riggs, 2012).   Since implants last on average 10 – 15 years, most women will 
require multiple surgical interventions to maintain their altered breasts.  Breast 
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enlargement has been carried out using injections of paraffin and wax and insertion of 
glass balls, plastic wool, animal fat, ivory, ox cartilage and synthetic sponges 
(Donohoe, 2006).  The first documented use of silicone to enlarge breasts dates back 
to the Second World War, when silicone in the form of engine coolant, was injected 
into the breasts of Japanese prostitutes to suit the preferences of American 
servicemen (Ferguson, 2000).  Silicone injections directly into the breast were 
considered too dangerous by the American Food and Drug Agency hence silicone 
implants were developed as a safer alternative (Darling-Wolf, 1997).    
 
Since the 1950s, silicone gel filled implants have been the intervention of choice to 
enlarge women’s breasts (Donohoe, 2006).  In the booming cosmetic surgery market, 
the previous medical use of silicone in devices including urinary catheters, 
intravenous tubing and pacemakers ostensibly made it the ideal synthetic for 
enlarging breasts.  However, silicone is not as inert as previously believed and 
silicone entering the bloodstream has been linked to reports of blindness, gangrene, 
auto-immune disorders (Ferguson, 2000) and connective tissue diseases and 
neurological disorders (Donohoe, 2006).  Other complications associated with silicone 
breast implants include decreased sensitivity of the breasts and nipples, painful 
swelling and hardening of the breasts, implant rupture and encapsulation (Wilson, 
2002).  Between 1985 and 1998, around 180,000 adverse reactions and 118 deaths 
have allegedly occurred as a result of silicone implant insertions (Ferguson, 2000).  
Post-augmentation surgery complications are associated with an increase in 
depression and suicide, especially in relation to multiple implant surgeries (Breiting et 
al., 2004). Breast augmentation decreases the sensitivity of mammography (Donohoe, 
2006) and although no evidence has been found to suggest silicone implants cause 
breast cancer, the presence of silicone implants may delay diagnosis of breast cancer 
and adversely affect survival following diagnosis (Lavigne et al., 2013).   
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In contemporary Western society, female breasts are medicalised to the extent plastic 
surgeons are now able to define and construct the ‘perfect breast’ (American Society 
of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS), 2014).  The concept of the ‘perfect’ breast derived from 
the writings of plastic surgeons Mallucci and Branford (2012, 2014) who aimed to 
produce a guide for women and surgeons to achieve “more acceptable, longer lasting 
results and ultimately more beautiful breasts"  (ASPS, 2014, para 12).  Mallucci and 
Branford (2012) undertook an observational study of the breasts of 100 topless 
models identified by the editors of a tabloid newspaper as having the most attractive 
breasts and compared these with women identified as having ‘less attractive breasts’ 
in order to define “critical ideals of breast beauty” (p. 65)  A follow-up survey (Mallucci 
& Branford, 2014) was conducted to determine the ideal breast and concluded the 
"upper pole to lower pole ratio of 45:55” had universal appeal in defining the perfect 
breast hence “this proportion should be used as a basis for design in aesthetic 
surgery” (Mallucci &  Branford, 2014, p. 436) as deviation from the ‘norm’ produced 
less attractive breasts.  Such suggestions reify the ‘perfect breast’ as something 
women need and completely preclude discussion of social, cultural and economic 
drivers in breast medicalisation and the potential harmful effects of a medically 
unnecessary surgical procedure.   
 
Equally it can be argued the prominence of surgical breast reconstruction in 
definitions of breast cancer treatment (Haines et al., 2010) further medicalises the 
breasts and promotes a view women without breasts are deviant and/or diseased 
(Crompvoets, 2012; Ferguson, 2000).  Cobb and Starr (2012) drew parallels between 
breast reconstruction post-mastectomy and cosmetic breast surgery and argued both 
are aesthetic practices which promote a view women need a particular body and 
breast type.  This serves as evidence of medicalisation of the female breasts/body 
because both are socially mandated but medically unnecessary procedures.  
Furthermore, the prominence of cosmetic surgery has been argued to drive 
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expectations women’s breasts can be improved following RRS and reconstruction (de 
la Peña-Salcedo, Soto-Miranda & Lopez-Salguero, 2012).  In the de la Peña-Salcedo 
et al. (2012) paper, examples of such improvements are provided, namely large, 
spherical, silicone implants which are significantly greater in size than the woman’s 
pre-operative breasts, accompanied by the commentary “Note the postoperative 
aesthetic outcome, by far better than the preoperative condition” (p. 144).  There is, as 
Löwy (2010, p. 215) claimed, a promise of “new breasts for the old” which supports 
the medicalisation of women’s breasts and bodies and promotes a particular type of 
breast as acceptable and necessary.  
 
However it must also be acknowledged the relationship between medicalisation and 
the body/breasts is complex and multi-factorial because medical interventions have 
unquestionably improved many areas of women’s health.  Purdy (2001) rightly points 
out some areas of health which have been medicalised such as infertility and 
childbirth are at least in part medical issues.  Thus medicalisation is not fundamentally 
unwelcome but rather part of the problem and the solution to improving women’s 
health (Riessman, 1983). Although childbirth has been largely medicalised in Western 
society, accompanying improvements in pain relief, infection and mortality have 
resulted (Riessman, 1983).  Breast augmentation surgery can give women a feeling of 
being empowered by doing something positive about looks in order to resemble the 
norm (Cheek & Porter, 1997) hence a medical diagnosis can support a woman’s 
legitimate claim for breast enlargement surgery for mental health reasons (Conrad, 
2005).  Moreover, cosmetic breast surgery may serves as a means of achieving social 
and economic security for some women whose life circumstances are otherwise 
curtailed (Davis, 1995; Morgan, 1991).  Breast reconstruction following breast loss 
may impact positively on quality of life and improve body image (Bresser, 2009).   
Furthermore, once a disease or condition is medically authenticated and endorsed, 
social stigma is reduced and shortcomings in the individual which may have been 
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attributed to the development of the condition are mitigated, hence medicalisation may 
offer comfort to those afflicted (Lock & Nguyen, 2010).  Thus women are not merely 
passive victims of medicalisation, but may seek medical intervention in order to 
improve their lives and life experiences (Conrad 2007; Green, Thompson & Griffiths, 
2002; Griffiths et al., 2010; Lock & Nguyen, 2010).    
 
In summary, the concept of medicalisation applied to this study suggests the risk of 
breast/ovarian cancer is now conflated with the disease of breast/ovarian cancer, 
allowing medical interventions to remove healthy breasts and ovaries.  Furthermore, 
the normalisation of cosmetic surgery and the essentialness of reconstruction 
following mastectomy medicalises women’s breasts and bodies and stigmatises 
women with breasts which are absent or ‘deviant’.  This is the reality faced by the 
women in this study: the medicalisation of risk means RRS appears prima facie to be 
the obvious action to deal with cancer risk.  What is concealed in the medicalisation 
discourse is the uncertainty associated with genetic risk calculation for individuals and 
ways in which perceptions of risk influence decision making in response to risk.  The 
next section further explores the concept of risk and examines how differing 
constructions and perceptions of risk may influence how people and institutions such 
as medicine respond to risk. 
 
The concept of risk 
This study concerns women identified as high risk of developing breast and/or ovarian 
cancer who say no to RRS despite evidence of its effectiveness in lowering cancer 
risk, a decision which is argued to be at odds with Western medical discourse on how 
best to attend to risk.  Accordingly, a review of the concept of risk is mandatory as 
perceptions of risk and decision making in response to risk are key concepts in 
providing a framework for understanding the women’s stories in relation to their high 
risk status and RRS.  
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Health care is increasingly organised, described and practised around the construct of 
risk (Maturo, 2012; Robertson, 2000).  Within medical discourse, risk is now 
established as a fundamental feature of cancer development (Davis, 2008) and as a 
key construct in public health and preventative medicine (Hallowell & Lawton, 2002).  
The concept of risk has been extensively written about and problematised across the 
social and natural sciences.  Across disciplines, risk is generally agreed to be about 
uncertainty and response to uncertainty.  However, the conceptualisation of risk 
differs according to discipline-specific assumptions about the nature of the human 
world.  Irrespective of the stance taken, a politics of risk now exists and public and 
professional debate is intensified through scientific, medical and legal discourses on 
the nature of risk and how risk impacts on people’s everyday lives (Tulloch & Lupton, 
2003).   
 
Risk in the natural sciences 
In the natural sciences including medicine, the concept of risk is grounded in 
assumptions about the natural world and the laws of nature which govern it.  Risk is 
defined as the probability distribution of harmful events and risk calculation uses 
statistical computations based on binary logic utilising probability theory (Grossi, 
2005).  This traditional approach to risk values logic and positions humans as rational 
actors who make sensible decisions based on objective truths when faced with risk 
(Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006).   
 
From a medical perspective, the concept of risk is most frequently associated with 
factors which modulate the probability of a disease or condition occurring, worsening 
or improving.  There is a focus on identifiable, measurable risk factors, causal 
relationships and statistical models which predict outcomes (Costa & Carneiro, 2011; 
Offord & Kraemer, 2000) so that risk can be reduced and future harm prevented 
through accepted health promotion strategies (Costa & Carneiro, 2011; Ilkilic, 2009).  
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In medicine, information from clinical and epidemiological studies is used to collate 
evidence for determining risk.  In order to determine cause-effect relationships, 
randomised controlled clinical trials are considered the ‘gold standard’ approach 
(Pearson, 2010).  Where this is not feasible, observational case-control and cohort 
studies are used.  These studies typically make comparisons between groups of 
people with/exposed to the risk factor and groups not carrying/exposed factor in order 
to calculate an odds ratio of how likely/unlikely an outcome is to occur in different sub 
groups (Ho, Peterson & Masoudi, 2008). Such studies cannot determine causality, 
only association between variables and/or risk factors/exposure (Costa & Carneiro, 
2011).  Epidemiological data identifies risk factors for disease/conditions which are 
then manipulated through clinical trials.  If an overall reduction in harm is 
demonstrated, the intervention becomes standard treatment for that particular group 
of patients (Karlawish, 2010).  
 
Risk calculations are used in HBOC management in several ways: to calculate the 
probability of identifying a deleterious mutation in an individual, to calculate the 
probability of an individual developing cancer should a mutation be present and to 
calculate the risks/benefits of risk reducing interventions (Costa & Carneiro, 2011).  A 
number of risk-assessment models have been developed to facilitate risk calculation 
although no model exists which is able to account for all factors which affect risk 
(Evans & Howell, 2007).   Some of the challenges inherent in calculating risk for 
breast/ovarian cancer predisposition were discussed earlier in this chapter.  In 
addition, these models are highly complex and arguably beyond the understanding of 
most people (Klitzman, 2010).  To contextualise this, an example of a risk estimation 
model is shown below.   
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Figure 4: Example of a risk estimation equation (taken from Antoniou et al., 
2003, p. 1121). 
 
Despite the primacy of risk-estimation models the context of supporting decision 
making around RRS, some challenges are evident.  Studies examining breast/ovarian 
cancer risk and RRS tend to be observational and use case-control studies or 
mathematical computations (Lostumbo et al., 2010) owing to ethical challenges in 
devising a randomised controlled trial to determine causality (Kurian et al., 2010).  
Indeed as Frasier, Greenberg & Neuman (2015) note, there is no Level 1 evidence 
which demonstrates a survival benefit with RRS and this is unlikely to ever be 
available given the ethics associated with randomising women to surgery or no 
surgery.  This means data from studies show an association between RRS and 
reduced cancer incidence, but cannot categorically determine that surgery caused the 
reduction in risk.  Although risk-estimation models are able to provide information on 
population risks for breast/ovarian cancer (NICE, 2013) it is not possible to predict 
which women will go on to develop the disease (Evans & Howell, 2007).   If a woman 
To construct CIs for the log (RR) estimates, we assumed that the parameters 
were asymptotically normally distributed with the covariance matrix given by 
inverting the information matrix. Cumulative risk or penetrance and 95% CIs 
were calculated from the cumulative incidence λ(t), where 
, where ik is the incidence in noncarriers in the kth 
age band of length tk and βk is the ln(RR) in the kth age band. The variance of 
the cumulative risk is given by the expression 
 
and the cumulative risk F(t) is then given by F(t)=1-exp[-Λ(t)], with a 95% CI of 
. Uncertainty in RRs for factors with more 
than two categories (e.g., center) is presented as floating CIs. 
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undergoes RRM and RRSO and does not develop cancer, it is not possible to know if 
surgery prevented cancer or if she would never have developed the disease in the 
first place.  Furthermore, no risk-estimation model is able to account for all factors 
which affect risk (Evans & Howell, 2007) and the relationship between genes and the 
social and physical environment hence individual risk estimates are highly 
questionable in many circumstances (Lock, 2005).   Genetic knowledge in particular is 
not fixed or absolute and is often anomalous and ambiguous (Timmermans & 
Buchbinder, 2012), therefore risk calculations require clinicians to use judgement to 
determine significance of test results and apply to individual people, a judgement 
which is based on both known and unknown factors.   
 
In summary, risk has become an increasingly important concept in modern medicine.  
Models of risk calculation are algorithmic, focussing on objective measurements, risk 
factors and evidence-based risk reducing interventions.  The construction of risk as a 
statistical measure is problematic because it may not be representative of individual 
risk (Costa & Carneiro, 2011). Furthermore, risk in the medical discourse fails to 
incorporate individual perceptions and understandings of risk (Timmermans & 
Buchbinder, 2012) which influence health behaviours (Davis, 2008).  In contrast to risk 
in the natural sciences, sociological perspectives of risk are based on the assumption 
that all social action, including risk practices, are shaped by social institutions and 
culture rather than rational planning and logic (Taylor-Gooby & Zin, 2006).  The next 
section therefore focusses on sociological theories of risk which examine perceptions 
of risk and risk management in social and cultural contexts in order to elucidate how 
people understand and respond to risk in contemporary society.    
 
Sociological and cultural perspectives on risk 
A substantial and growing body of literature on risk exists in the social sciences which 
reflect the importance of risk as a defining cultural characteristic of modern society 
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(Maturo, 2012).  The increasing complexities of technology and of social institutions 
which govern people’s lives serve not only to identify risk, but also to publicise risk 
and the at times catastrophic results of technological and social breakdown (Peterson 
& Wilkinson, 2008).  Paradoxically, the increased ability to identify risk has raised 
awareness of society’s inability to control risk and hazards to life.  The recognition 
society and technology are not able to rescue humans from risk politicises risk and 
gives rise to debate and conflict which has fuelled increasing interest in risk research 
(Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006).  Three key sociological theories on risk are evident in 
the literature (Brown, 2014; Zinn, 2008): Beck’s Risk Society, Douglas’ Cultural 
Theory and Governmentality theory which draws on Foucault’s work on modern 
society and ways in which institutions and organisations exert control over individuals.  
The discussion to follow focusses on key concepts in relation to the sociology of risk 
which were particularly relevant to this study.    
 
The Risk Society  
One of the first sociological theories of risk was proposed by the German sociologist 
Ulrich Beck.  Beck (1992, p. 21) defined risk as “a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself”. The 
consequences of modernisation were argued to be a set of risks or hazards which 
were unlike any previously experienced in pre-modern societies, thus creating a risk 
society.   Beck (1992) argued people’s perception and experience of hazards and risk 
changed as society modernised and related this to a three stage periodisation of 
social change: pre-modernity, simple modernity and reflexive modernity.  In pre-
modern societies there was no real notion of the concept of risk (Giddens, 1998).  
Although hazards and risks to life existed, they were attributed to non-human sources 
(Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006) and occurred through fate, divine intervention or nature: 
that is, danger was placed on mankind from ‘outside’ society (Beck, 1992).   As 
society modernised, the economy and way of life changed and became shaped by 
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industrial/technological processes and problems.  Industrialised societies produced 
‘goods’ such as wealth, employment and technological and scientific advancement but 
also ‘bads’ or dangers (Lash & Wynne, 1992) such as pollution, crime and traffic 
accidents (Zinn, 2008).  Modern was not inherently good but rather was increasingly 
problematic and modern societies were progressively uncertain societies to live in.  
Beck (1992) referred to this as a process of reflexive modernisation: the 
modernisation of modern society itself.  Reflexive modernisation challenged 
established ways of knowing and existing social structures because of awareness that 
societies’ dangers and hazards are in the main, created by society itself (Zinn, 2008).  
A preoccupation with danger and the need to avoid danger through controlling 
measures gave rise to the concept of risk (Giddens, 1998).  Reflexive modernity is 
thus co-existent with the risk society; in effect its own self-creation resulting from a 
dystopian industrialised society (Lash & Wynne, 1992).   Hence, modern societies are 
risk societies and being ‘at risk’ is now an integral part of the human condition (Beck, 
2006).   
 
It is important to identify the risk society is no more ‘risky’ than previous societies 
(Giddens, 1998).  Rather the nature of risk and how risk is perceived and experienced 
has changed with modernisation (Lupton, 2006; Zinn, 2008).  Technological 
advancement allowed hazards to be identified before they occurred and humans 
moved from living life as fate to living life as uncertain.  Contemporary risks such as 
radiation and food toxins are often invisible until made visible and defined by experts 
(Beck, 2006).  Likewise, modern technology has allowed genetic mutations to be 
identified and a category of risk attached. Adam and van Loon (2000) contend this is 
an area of public concern and suggest genetic technology has superseded nuclear 
power as the greatest concern in late-modern society.    
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The technology to define, categorise and measure genetic risk allows experts and 
expert knowledge to dramatise or minimise risk (Beck, 1992).  Breast/ovarian cancer 
risk is defined by experts then placed onto women as a result of their genetic material, 
individualising risk (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003) and attaching human responsibility to risk 
(Lupton, 2006).  Risk has come to mean the anticipation of a future bad event, 
experienced in the present, creating a politics of fear and a politics of prevention 
(Beck, 2009).  Women at high risk of developing cancer are thus expected to manage 
risk through medical interventions such as RRS, surveillance and chemoprevention, 
each of which carries its own set of risks.  Paradoxically, freedom of choice, autonomy 
and self-agency are promoted in a society of increasing uncertainty, creating tension 
between freewill and doing what appears sensible to reduce risk (Zinn, 2008). 
 
Beck’s (1992) risk society has been criticised for failing to account for the role 
inequalities play in modern society and how gender, race and socio-economic 
influences  impact on risk and risk perception (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003).  Some have 
also argued risk society dogmatically over-emphasises the prominence and relevance 
of risk in everyday life and fails to capture what is essentially different in modern 
society (Elliot, 2002).   Nonetheless, Beck’s (1992) risk society is useful in 
problematising medical and genetics discourses in relation to risk by highlighting how 
genetic technology has created and heightened awareness of new genetic risks, and 
placed responsibility for risk at the door of affected individuals, such as the women in 
this study.    
 
Cultural theory and risk 
Another central theory in sociological risk research is the Cultural Theory of risk which 
draws on the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas and is based on the belief risk 
practises are a product of acculturation and social learning (Lupton, 2006). Cultural 
theory forms part of Douglas’s (1970) wider typology of Grid and Group societies.  In 
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Douglas’s (1970) theory, ‘grid’ refers to laws, social relations, expectations and other 
constraints imposed on a group which regulate the actions of individuals.  ‘Group’ 
refers to how bonded and well-connected group members feel with each other as a 
result of group dynamics.   Different grid/group environments reflect varying degrees 
of social stratification and social solidarity and therefore how individuals function and 
participate within groups (Fox, 2000).    
 
In terms of risk, cultural theory supports a social constructionist view of risk and 
contends different risk responses are entwined with different patterns of social 
organisation and how people perceive risks to their group/society (Brown, 2014; Fox, 
2000).  Like Beck (1992), Douglas (1992) claimed the meaning associated with risk 
changed over time.  Historically, risk was a neutral concept as it took account of the 
probability of both losses and gains which could result from an action or event.  
However as society modernised, Douglas (1992) argued risk became equated only 
with loss.  Whereas previously ‘high risk’ could lead to ‘high gain’, risk became 
associated with negative outcomes, danger and loss.   Cultural theory then identifies 
risk as a social-cultural construct (Brown, 2014) and explains risk in terms of how 
people understand and react to perceived dangers in their societies.  
  
The equating of risk with danger in modern societies maligns those who engage in 
‘risky’ pursuits and people/things which present a danger (Petersen & Wilkinson, 
2008) and becomes a vehicle to apportion blame for unwanted outcomes (Lupton, 
2006).  Moreover, risk becomes a conduit for moral regulation because risks and risk-
behaviour are undesirable, involving some intervention to avoid, minimise, correct or 
rectify (Peterson & Wilkinson, 2008).  In relation to HBOC, medical discourse 
assumes risk avoidance is the norm and that people will take steps to reduce the risk 
of cancer developing.  Saying no to RRS is thus seen as a form of risk-taking 
therefore women who refuse RRS may be seen as ‘risky’, creating a feeling of 
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individual and group uncertainty which may serve to exclude women from certain 
social groups and create a sense of non-belonging.  Although breast/ovarian cancer is 
a ‘natural’ danger, in modern society risk is politicised into a moral concern (Brown, 
2014) hence women who say no to RRS may be held accountable and blamed for 
their ‘risky’ behaviour.   
 
Governmentality  
The Governmentality perspective on risk in sociological theory draws on Foucault’s 
theorising on societal governance strategies.  Although the concept of risk was not 
extensively written about by Foucault, theories about power, self-regulation and 
control in modern society have been applied to sociological theories on risk and the 
role played by risk in the regulation of modern societies (Lupton, 2006). Foucault used 
the term ‘governmentality’ to refer to the relationship between ‘governing’ and 
‘mentality’ (Zin & Taylor-Gooby, 2006) and the way modern states exercised control 
over the individuals to maximise the productive power of the population (Turner, 
2008).  Punishment and coercion were curtailed in favour of more subtle persuasive 
techniques which ensured social control through various societal institutions including 
medicine, the family, education and so forth (Gutting, 2008).  Risks to the desired 
social order such as illness, poverty and unemployment were constructed as 
problems which could be solved through taking the appropriate actions (Lim, 2011).  
In the modern state however, although governments are responsible for identifying 
and distributing risks across society, risk avoidance is socially constructed as an 
individual duty (Maturo, 2012) hence risk thus becomes personal rather than societal, 
making it a moral technology which demands individual action (Lupton, 2013).  
Relating governmentality theory on risk to Western medicine reveals a connection 
between risk, medical discourse and risk reducing practices. In modern society, good 
health is perceived as a fundamental human right therefore health practices are 
constructed as inherently good (Crabb, 2006).  Moreover, in the modern state 
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individuals are constructed as free-thinking, rational beings who make autonomous 
choices to better themselves and the wider society (Lupton, 2013), therefore 
responsibility for health is a requirement of good citizens (Peterson & Wilkinson, 
2008).  Since risk is now morally charged, it is a tool of power because once 
individuals are aware of risks, they are increasingly expected to self-regulate, conform 
to normalising strategies and reduce risk (Brown, 2014; Lemke, 2004). Women who 
conform to cancer risk management strategies by disciplining their risky bodies in 
accordance with medical discourse are doing ‘the right thing’, whereas those who do 
not, such as the participants in this study, may be considered morally lax (Lupton, 
1995).  Although not held personally accountable for their genetic material, women 
are held responsible for the actions taken or avoided to manage genetic risks 
(Hallowell & Lawton, 2002; Ilkilic, 2009).    
 
To conclude this section, sociological theories on risk are primarily concerned with 
how risk has come to be a defining feature of modern societies.  Of particular 
relevance to this study, changing perceptions of health based on risk perceptions for 
future disease are an inevitable outcome of advances in genetic testing in modern 
society (Maturo, 2012).   Genetic testing for BRCA mutations permits a shift in the 
conceptualising of risk from abstract associations to something tangible and 
quantifiable. In modern medicine, the genetic risk of cancer represents a shift from 
disease as categorical (either the disease is present or it is not) to disease as 
dimensional on the continuum of risk.  Disease as a pathological condition of the body 
is replaced with a reconstruction of disease as future impairment, or what Lupton 
(2006, p. 17) referred to as a “liminal category of wellness”; neither diseased nor fully 
well.  However risk is in itself only a form of information and no test can definitively 
predict who will and who will not develop cancer.   
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Sociological perspectives on risk thus expose the irony of risk in modern society and 
in modern medicine.  Attempts to calculate and control for risks to health are a key 
area of concern in modern medicine despite risk being by its very nature 
unpredictable, unknown and ever changing.  In medicine, attention is focussed on 
presenting accurate, objective risk calculations and communicating these in such a 
way that individuals can make rational responses based on knowledge of the ‘facts’.  
Within this discourse, personal, subjective and contextual meanings attributed to risk 
are unaccounted for, despite their importance in decision making.  The next section 
expands this discussion by turning attention to risk communication in health care, 
especially in relation to the complex area of genetics.   
 
Communicating cancer risk 
Communicating information about cancer risk aims to inform individuals about risk 
management options whilst limiting anxiety and distress (Braithwaite, Emery, Walter, 
Prevost & Sutton, 2006). Communicating genetic risk attempts to reconcile personal 
perceptions of risk with objective assessments of risk (McInerney‐Leo et al., 2006) so 
that clinicians can present data to individuals in a way which facilitates autonomous, 
informed decision making (Eijzenga et al., 2014)  However, despite the importance 
placed on autonomy and communicating risk in medicine, the best way of 
communicating risk is unknown (Ahmed, Willoughby & Edwards, 2012; Heshka, 
Palleschi, Howley, Wilson, & Wells, 2008) and the complex relationship between risk 
estimates, personal risk perceptions and risk communication is not well understood 
(Braithwaite et al., 2006; Klitzman, 2010; NICE, 2013; Wagner, 2011).  It is therefore 
widely acknowledged that communicating information about risk is inherently complex 
and challenging (Bingham, 2012; Klitzman, 2010) and how risk is communicated 
impacts patient perceptions of risk and subsequent decision making in response to 
risk (Ahmed et al., 2012; Dauer et al., 2011; Wagner, 2011).   
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Genetic testing to determine cancer risk is underpinned by the premise knowledge of 
genetic status will reduce cancer worry, prevent unnecessary interventions and allow 
interventions to reduce risk of disease development (Esplen & Bleiker, 2015; Nelson 
et al., 2014).  However, imparting information on cancer risk has been shown to both 
increase and decrease anxiety (Braithwaite et al, 2006; NICE, 2013), therefore people 
receiving information on risk incur benefits and losses depending on whether the 
result is favourable or not (Case, Andrews, Johnson & Allard, 2005; Nelson et al., 
2014).  Moreover, individuals receiving unfavourable results who experience an 
increase in anxiety may attempt to ignore the result in order to relieve inner tension 
(Case et al., 2005; Leydon et al., 2000) and hence may chose not to take part in 
suggested risk reducing interventions (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Turney, 2009).  
 
The extremely complex nature of genetic information (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Case et 
al., 2005; Hoskins et al., 2012) and growing body of knowledge on cancer genetics 
poses particular challenges in communicating risk (Eijzenga  et al., 2014; Evans & 
Howell, 2007).  In order to assimilate the information given, an understanding of 
genetics and the mathematics of risk is required (Case et al., 2005), but such an 
understanding is argued to be out with the scope of most people (Klitzman, 2010; 
Swanson, 2002; Tamir, 2010).  Statistical data is frequently complex and problems 
exist with health literacy (Hoskins, Werner-Lin & Greene, 2014) and the ability to 
access, interpret and act upon numerical and statistical data, is generally poor 
amongst the public (Turney, 2009) and indeed some health care professionals (Costa 
& Carneiro, 2011).   
 
In medicine, risk is viewed as a rigorous estimation of probability based on statistical 
models hence personal perceptions of risk are considered a form of bias, tainted by 
emotional, personal and cultural experiences (Lupton, 2000).  Personal over/under 
estimates of risk in comparison to the ‘official’ objective risk estimate are considered 
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confounding or distorting factors which may skew the data (Costa & Carneiro, 2011).  
Communicating risk may therefore be problematic because differences exist between 
scientific and lay understandings of risk calculations (Dauer et al., 2011; Paul et al., 
2014). Although genetic counselling has been shown to improve accuracy of risk 
estimation in BRCA-associated cancer (Nelson et al., 2014), women frequently over-
estimate their personal risk of cancer compared with the objective risk estimate 
(Hoskins et al., 2014; Nelson et al., 2014) and perceptions of risk may remain 
unaltered or inaccurate even when knowledge of genetics increases (Borzekowski, 
Guan, Smith, Erby & Roter, 2013; Braithwaite et al., 2006; Heshka et al., 2008).  This 
may occur because cancer anxiety can impact on the ability to assimilate genetic 
information (Hoskins et al., 2012) and because objective risk calculations do not take 
account of what people do with genetic information (Paul et al., 2014). Whereas 
biomedicine is concerned with diagnosing risk of disease, individuals are concerned 
with the impact of disease such as how severe it will it be (Paul et al., 2014) and the 
impact on families (Hoskins et al., 2012) and children (Eijzenga et al., 2014).  Hence 
the perceived impacts of are more important than the objective risk calculation in 
decision making around RRS (Hoskins et al., 2012; Tong et al, 2015; Witt, 2013).    
 
Overall then, a number of subjective indicators influence risk perception which models 
for calculating and communicating risk are unable to account for (Dauer et al., 2011; 
Paul et al., 2014; Wagner, 2011).  These include beliefs about inheritance and risk 
which may interfere with how risk information is assimilated (Finkler, 2000; Hoskins et 
al., 2012; NICE, 2013).  The presence of a family history of cancer may lead a person 
to believe personal risk is very high, even when the objective measure calculates risk 
to be low/normal (Klitzman, 2010) hence the objective measure may be interpreted by 
the individual as ‘wrong’.  The calculated objective risk is therefore arguably irrelevant 
to what a person perceives their risk to be.   
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One reason for this may relate to how complex risk information is interpreted (Ahmed 
et al., 2012; Dauer et al., 2011).  A difference exists between objective risk estimates 
based on statistical calculations and perceived risk estimates which incorporate 
individual experiences, cultural beliefs and societal practices (Davis, 2008).   The 
public at large are generally limited in their understanding of genetics (Klitzman, 2010) 
hence may find it difficult to interpret uncertainty and ambiguous results (Werner-Lin, 
2008), confuse probability with inevitability (Melzer & Zimmerman, 2002; Paul et al., 
2014) and in the case of HBOC, erroneously believe penetrance to be 100% (Novas & 
Rose, 2000).  Misconceptions about genetic data and statistical tests can also mean 
lay expectations are not in alignment with available knowledge regarding risk and 
certainty of disease development (NICE, 2013), which may lead to inappropriate use 
of risk reducing interventions (Klitzman, 2010).   
 
Framing effects, or how risk is presented and communicated, also influences 
interpretation of risk (Ahmed et al., 2012; Dauer et al., 2011; Wagner, 2011).  For 
example, the risk of death from an intervention looks very different when presented as 
the risk being 0.002 versus 0.001 compared with being presented as a 50% increased 
risk of death.  In cases where risk estimates are identical, those framed as a gain, for 
example, 200 lives may be saved, are more likely to be accepted favourably than 
those presented as a loss, for example, 200 lives may be lost (Costa & Carneiro, 
2011).  Similarly, individuals may experience difficulties interpreting population risk in 
terms of personal risk.  O’Doherty and Suthers (2007) illustrate using the following 
example: if a woman is identified as having a 60% lifetime risk of developing breast 
cancer, this means of 100 similar women, 60 will develop breast cancer, 40 will not.  
Whilst this information provides information on cancer development in populations, it 
does not provide the women with personalised information on risk.  Surgery may 
confer for example, a 50% reduction in risk in high risk populations, but each 
individual person will either develop cancer or not hence the individual risk is 0% or 
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100% (Costa & Carneiro, 2011).  Indeed Samerski (2006) argues the concept of 
personal risk is an oxymoron because by definition, statistical probabilities refer to the 
occurrence of events in a statistical population therefore it is simply not possible to tell 
an individual what they really want to know, which is if they will develop cancer or not 
and how severe the disease will be.  Using O’Doherty and Suthers (2007) example, 
when a woman is identified as having a 60% lifetime risk of breast cancer, she 
becomes a member of the high risk group yet there is still no way of knowing if she 
will develop the disease.  The high risk woman must therefore attempt to make sense 
of her personal risk of developing cancer using statistical data which ironically does 
not relate in any way to her personal situation.   
 
It is evident therefore, a difference exists between expert and lay understandings of 
risk which statistical and decision making models are unable to account for.  Whereas 
medical/genetic experts are likely to focus on ‘real’ objective risks and research 
findings, individuals experience risk as embodied owing to the potential risks to the 
body associated with certain procedures or events (Green et al., 2002; Ilkilic, 2009; 
Paul et al., 2014).  Thus for women contemplating RRS, individual perceptions of risk 
and the importance attached to different risks are likely to influence decision making 
more than objective risk estimates and evidence-based findings (Hoskins et al., 2012). 
The significance of the risk is captured not by the risk itself, but by the meaning 
attached to the risk.   
 
To sum, this literature review has examined various theoretical constructions of risk 
and the challenges presented by HBOC, cancer risk and effective risk communication.  
It can be concluded that personal perceptions and understandings of risk are 
influenced by a range of factors over and above the statistical models, risk estimations 
and outcome probabilities which underpin the medical pathway for RRS.  It is clear the 
decision to accept or say no to RRS is highly complex, multifaceted and deeply 
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personal therefore the stories of those who say no to RRS add a valuable and 
necessary dimension to current understanding of how people come to make decisions 
about RRS when faced with a BRCA1/2 mutation.   
 
Summary of literature review 
This section has reviewed literature pertaining to several areas of particular relevance 
to this study.  A review of research relating to breast/ovarian cancer, cancer 
predisposition and genetic testing outlined contemporary understandings of HBOC 
which underpin the medical pathway for managing breast/ovarian cancer risk.  Current 
risk reducing interventions were then discussed and an examination of the potential 
physical and psychosocial impacts of such interventions concluded that RRS was 
associated with a number of potentially positive and negative sequelae.  A critique of 
the concept of medicalisation suggested the experiences of women with BRCA1/2 
mutations take place within a discourse of medicalisation which constructs risk, breast 
and bodies as targets for medicine and permits radical surgical interventions on 
healthy bodies.  Finally, the concept of risk was examined from the perspectives of the 
natural and the social sciences with a focus on analysing how risk is presented, 
interpreted and understood at the level of both society and the individual.   
 
The literature review demonstrated a wealth of research has been conducted on RRS 
for HBOC despite it being a relatively modern phenomenon.  An emerging body of 
research which focussed on decision making around RRS was evident which 
appeared to focus primarily on two key areas: the identification and measurement of 
variables which may influence or predict decision-making in women facing RRS, such 
as age/parental status; and the potential physical and psychosocial impacts of RRS.  
The majority of studies have attempted to explore decision making around RRS and 
the impacts of RRS through quantitative means, with structured psychometric testing 
being the most common method employed.  While these studies are helpful in 
69 
 
uncovering relationships between variables which may influence decision making and 
in identifying adjustment issues associated with RRS, they do not allow an in-depth 
exploration of the meaning of risk or understanding of how risk is understood and lived 
by women who carry BRCA1/2 mutations.  No research was found which considered 
the experience of cancer in the woman’s family and key moments in the lives of those 
facing RRS such as the confirmation of a positive family history, receiving a mutation-
positive genetic test result and being offered and saying no to RRS.    This was 
surprising given the focus of the research is an inherited condition which manifests 
itself through the diagnoses of parents, siblings and other family members.  
Additionally, little research was found which attempted to situate the decision to say 
no to RRS within the framework of Western medical discourse, despite the 
prominence of medicine in outlining how women high risk women should attend to 
their breast/ovarian cancer risk.  
 
Hence, current research is unable to capture the human and very personal nature of 
deciding whether to accept or say no to RRS and fails to account for the entire range 
of influences on making decisions, conscious and sub-conscious, known and 
unknown, which are more than the sum of parts.  Despite extensive research, current 
knowledge is limited in terms of understanding of how high risk women come to make 
what appear to be ‘anti-health’ choices within Western medical discourse by saying no 
to RRS, despite conclusive evidence of its effectiveness in reducing cancer risk. This 
research is an attempt to address this gap.  
 
The following chapter introduces and discusses the methodological approach taken 
and its suitability for the study of high risk women who say no to RRS within the 
framework of Western medical discourse.   
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This chapter describes and justifies the research approach taken to explore the 
experiences of women identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer who 
say no to RRS. RRSO is estimated to confer an 80% reduction in ovarian cancer risk 
and a 50% reduction in breast cancer risk while RRBM confers at least a 90% 
reduction in breast cancer risk in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (Koskenvuo et al., 2013).  
Genetic testing and RRS are increasingly offered to high risk women (Hooker et al., 
2014).  This, in turn, may have led to an increase in the number of women 
experiencing complex psychological and emotional turmoil as a consequence of being 
labelled ‘high risk’ in terms of developing cancer (Lerman et al., 2002; Mahon, 2011) 
by the communal folklore of medicine.   
 
Contextualising the research approach taken in this study 
Advances in technology which enable the identification of women at risk for 
developing breast/ovarian cancer mean juxtaposition is created. Healthy women are 
advised to remove healthy breasts and ovaries against a backdrop of societal norms 
which dictate a particular female aesthetic and nurturing role as standard.   However, 
for a group of women, the risk of developing cancer may not be sufficient to agree to 
surgery.  These women are saying no to the removal of healthy tissue to deal with 
risk. 
 
The women in this study were disease-free, yet were offered radical disfiguring 
surgery to remove healthy breasts and/or ovaries. The dilemma experienced for these 
women, is individual and personal. In order to understand and give meaning to these 
experiences it is necessary to be cognisant that when individuals make a decision 
about their personal lives, they do so within the confines of a particular discourse 
(White, 2004).  Therefore, the decision to say no to RRS must be considered using a 
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research approach which allows the voice of these women to be captured within the 
context of the discourses used to make sense of their experiences. 
 
Traditional empirical research approaches which use quantitative methods such as 
clinical trials and psychometric tests (Polit & Beck, 2013) are unable to illuminate why 
these women decided not to undergo RRS which could potentially prevent cancer and 
ultimately save their life.  Quantitative approaches focus on ordering and rationalising 
lives (Denzin, 1989) and attempt to infer meaning about experience by analysing the 
number of responses to predetermined categories (Rowley, 2005).  The control, 
identification and measurement of criteria which are assumed to influence the 
phenomenon under examination take primacy (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008). Within this 
context, personal influences which impact on experience may not be elicited if they do 
not fit with the predetermined assumptions of what is important.  Szumacher (2006) 
contends traditional empirical approaches are limited in terms of understanding 
personal health decisions because of their quantitative nature and grounding in the 
dominant medical culture; such approaches are unable to capture the depth and 
complexity of women’s experiences in relation to being identified as high risk of 
developing breast/ovarian cancer and saying no to RRS.  These women needed a 
voice, prompting the need for a methodology which encouraged the women to tell 
their stories of how they experienced and perceived their bodies following a diagnosis 
of owning a BRCA1/2 gene mutation. 
 
Frank’s (1995) seminal work ‘The Wounded Storyteller’ contended that the experience 
of illness silences the voice of the individual but that this voice may be reclaimed 
through storytelling.  Potts (2000) claimed the voices of women, in particular, were 
often silenced and made invisible.  For this reason research pertaining to women 
should preserve their presence as central to the research to avert reducing women to 
objects of investigation.   In keeping with this position, Crotser and Dickerson (2010) 
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posited that the complexity of cancer genetics added a challenging dimension to the 
creation of meaning about the experience of being identified as high risk of developing 
breast/ovarian cancer, adding the use of stories provided a means through which 
women may express and communicate meaning about the experience.  Women’s 
stories of experience in relation to HBOC are, therefore, an important source of 
personal and collective meanings attached to what is a common and present reality in 
the lives of women in Western society.   
 
In contrast to empirical, quantitative approaches, qualitative approaches are rooted in 
the belief there is no single reality which can be discovered, but rather multiple, 
socially constructed realities exist (Denzin, 1989; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) which can 
be studied to produce divergent inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1986).  Moreover, qualitative 
methodologies and their underlying philosophical assumptions are appropriate for 
understanding the multifaceted and individual nature of personal health (Holloway & 
Wheeler, 2010), since they are based upon the belief that multiple realities exist within 
socially and mentally constructed individual realities (Bryman, 2004) and are 
applicable when the focus of the research is to  increase understanding of poorly 
understood phenomenon (Creswell, Hanson, Plano & Morales., 2007; Polit & Beck, 
2013). 
 
Qualitative research methodologies are inherently interpretive as they aim to make 
meaning of specific experiences (Creswell, et al., 2007; Denzin, 1989; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011; Holloway & Wheeler, 2010; Schwandt, 2000).  Research on social 
aspects of human existence has become increasingly concerned with meaning and 
interpretation resulting in a rising use of interpretive approaches (Harris, 2006; 
Sandberg, 2005).  Harris (2006) further claimed no action, behaviour, trait or object 
was inherently good, bad or neutral, rather meaning was indeterminate until it was 
ordered through social interaction.  Qualitative approaches take into account the wider 
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contexts of people’s lives and broader social, political and cultural frameworks in 
which life and experience take place (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Holloway & Wheeler, 
2010).   
 
Broadly speaking, an interpretive research approach seeks to describe and 
understand experiences of individuals and set these within the context of social, 
cultural and historical influences (Holloway & Wheeler, 2010). The aim therefore is to 
create meaning rather than uncover the ‘truth’, since no universal truth exists (Denzin, 
1989): only creation of meaning which is reflective of wider social, political, historical 
and cultural influences is achievable. In this study, the interpretive paradigm and 
underlying principles of research were utilised to enable an understanding of the 
experiences of high risk women which led them to say no to RRS, and place them 
within the context of historical and social constructs, as the experiences of these 
women can only be understood within the contexts of the worlds in which they live.   
 
The interpretive approach  
The ontological and epistemological assumptions which underpin the interpretive 
approach lie in the belief humans are constantly interpreting and re-interpreting the 
dynamic world in which they exist.  The roots of the interpretive approach are often 
attributed to the work of German sociologist Max Weber (1947 – 1964) which has 
subsequently been developed by other phenomenologists.  Many variations of the 
interpretive approach exist but shared by all is a phenomenological base which 
advocates humans are inextricably linked to their world through lived experience of 
that world (Sandberg, 2005).  Hence there is no objective or universal real world, only 
a world as experienced. 
 
Undertaking interpretive research requires the researcher to engage in a process of 
understanding the constructed realities of the research participants (Uzzell & Barnett, 
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2006) rather than impose meaning on the lives lived by others (Harris, 2006).  An 
interpretative approach rests on inter-subjective construction of meaning and 
understanding (Angen, 2000) and emphasises interpretation and understanding are 
unavoidably bound and, understanding of social action may only be achieved by 
relating to an individual or group empathically (Holloway & Wheeler, 2010).   
 
No ‘truth’ or single interpretation of reality can be judged as uniquely right or wrong 
because all claims to knowledge are open to multiple and differing interpretations and 
reinterpretations (Smith, 2008).  Therefore, the researcher must denote the processes 
involved in interpretation which lead to different views being expressed (Harris, 2006).  
Thus, researchers taking an interpretive approach reject ‘taken for granted’ and 
‘common sense’ notions of understanding the world and those who exist within it 
(Embree, 2009) and accept the reality of human experience is subject to an infinite 
number of variations and interpretations resulting in a “state of perpetual flux” (Oakes, 
1977, p. 12).  Knowledge is seen to be a construction of realities. Hence issues and 
events in societies are not unambiguous truths or facts but rather a collection of 
indistinct actions, events or problems which were aggregated by humans to create a 
social reality.   
 
This rejection of an objective, knowable reality external to human consciousness is 
reflected in the belief that creation of social reality will always be coloured by 
historical, cultural, ideological and gender-based constructs (Sandberg, 2005).   
Importantly, it follows then if reality is never fixed but is socially constructed, then 
language itself is also socially constructed because language is created within the 
societies in which it exists. It may be argued, therefore, that language is intrinsically 
context-bound and lacks any fixed meaning. In other words, language creates rather 
than describes reality, resulting in multiple differing interpretations of what reality is 
(Haralambos & Holborn, 2000).   
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Underpinning any interpretive research approach is the assumption that the story told 
is able to be articulated in language which will be understood by both teller and 
listener/researcher.  A central concept then in the interpretive approach is language 
as a conduit for social change. Language is the tool through which humans typify 
experience and meaningfully communicate it to others, resulting in shared 
understandings.  Language is not a representational system which reflects or mirrors 
objective reality, rather it acquires its meaning through the ways it is socially defined 
and used in differing social situations and practices (Sandberg, 2005).   
 
In this study, language is the medium through which high risk women meaningfully 
communicated their experiences regarding refusal of RRS.  Davis (2008) and Seale 
(2001) identified that the language used to discuss breast and other cancers was 
constructed in such a way to endorse a particular approach to dealing with cancer, 
namely fighting and winning the battle against the disease.  Additionally, Davis (2008) 
found breast cancer language incorporates personal, social and cultural meanings of 
disease.  Therefore, the women’s stories in this study reflect personal and societal 
views on how people with or at risk of cancer should speak, act and behave.   
 
Allowing the women’s stories to be shared in this way advanced an understanding of 
the experiences of saying no to RRS and situated the women’s lived experiences 
within personal, social, cultural and historical influences.  Moreover, the interpretive 
approach demanded the researcher interpret and re-construct the story making the 
process a biographical endeavour.  Notably biographical methods are particularly 
suited to understanding lives of individuals and/or key periods within them (Surr, 2006; 
Jones, Glintmeyer & McKenzie, 2005).  Thus, an interpretive approach encompassing 
a biographical method was appropriate in this study which aimed to create 
understanding of how high risk women came to say no to RRS.   
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The biographical method 
The roots of the biographical method can be traced back to the interpretive paradigm 
developed by the Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s, following research which 
was first to use biographical material to gain understanding of sociological issues, 
namely the lives of Polish migrants in Europe and America (Apitzsch & Siouti, 2007).  
Although then overshadowed by an upsurge of quantitative sociological research 
approaches, the biographical method began to increase in popularity again in the 
1970s (Apitzsch & Siouti, 2007; Denzin, 1989), in part spear-headed by feminist 
writers who argued social enquiry into the human condition was not possible without 
the biographical method (Johnstone, 1999). Denzin’s (1989) ‘Interpretive Biography’ 
further stimulated research using interpretive methods which aimed to illuminate an 
understanding of how individuals in society gave meaning to life and how researchers 
could capture those meanings in text.  
 
The term ‘biographical method’ applies to a range of research activities including 
narrative, life histories, autobiographies, storytelling, interpretive biography, 
reminiscence and ethnography (Bornat, 2008).  The diverse range of biographical 
methods which exist and the dynamic, personal and individualistic nature of 
biographical data add to the complexity of such a research process.  
 
Bornat (2008) suggests a structure for all biographical approaches based on four key 
themes.  Biographical data collection is a socially interactive process whereby 
researcher and participant engage in face to face dialogue.  A focus on expression of 
self encourages the emergence of feelings and emotions which provide insight into 
personal perceptions and understandings of experience and create subjective 
knowledge. Data collected will have an obvious or implicit structure comprising a 
beginning and an end and which can be connected to prior theory.  The accounts 
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created are contextual, that is, they are given meaning within frameworks of time and 
space and frameworks or agendas imposed by the researcher/interpreter.   
 
These themes were important in this study as they reflected the desire to create a 
safe environment whereby women were encouraged to share deeply personal 
experiences and created an account which was reflective of personal reality.  The 
nature of the situation; having a family history, being tested and then diagnosed with a 
genetic predisposition to cancer, being offered and then saying no to refusing RRS, 
meant the women’s experiences were necessarily temporal as they were drawn into 
that sequence of events.  Furthermore, dominance of medical and sexual discourses 
in Western society meant the women’s experiences could not be divorced from the 
social world therefore it was necessary to situate them within it.  
 
Irrespective of biographical method utilised, common to all approaches is the 
underpinning belief that an individual’s biography is a social construct (Apitzsch & 
Siouti, 2007), and as such is influenced by inner personal knowledge and experience 
and prevailing cultural patterns of the time.  Thus data obtained from the biographical 
method is viewed as historically, culturally and experientially bound and therefore 
open to multiple interpretations.   
 
The overall aim of the biographical method is to explore ways in which humans 
construct understanding about their lives and to determine how they influence and are 
influenced by significant life events (Jones et al., 2005; Surr, 2006).  Notably, Denzin’s 
(1989) interpretive biography allowed the researcher to construct an understanding 
and represent the lives of those whose experiences do not conform to dominant 
societal perspectives (Williams & Holmes, 2005).   Biographical methods construct 
documents of the “sociality of the individual” (Apitzsch & Siouti, 2007, p. 13) which 
allow analysis of how individual and societal influences impact on the creation of 
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identity.  Apitzsch and Siouti (2007), further argued this makes biographical 
approaches particularly suited to studies concerned with women’s experiences as 
biographies reveal aspects of personal and social influences on the construction of 
identity and gender. Further, biographical methods were particularly suited to this 
study because the experiences of women with a family history of breast/ovarian 
cancer were woven into stories and how they experienced and perceived their bodies.  
Denzin (1989) asserts that the point of origin for human life lies within the family; 
therefore biographical texts begin with a family history.   
 
The participants in this study had witnessed family members suffer and sometimes die 
from cancer and had said no to RRS despite conclusive evidence of its effectiveness 
in reducing cancer risk. It is argued that this refusal was at odds with Western medical 
discourse therefore using Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography allowed the women’s 
decisions to be considered in light of personal, social and cultural phenomena.     
 
Interpretive biography 
Key to the interpretive biographical approach is acceptance that societies, cultures 
and human experience can be inscribed and read as social texts.  Denzin (1989, p. 
11) defined interpretive biography as “(…) creating literary, narrative, accounts and 
representations of lived experiences.  Telling and inscribing stories”.  In other words, 
human experience can be represented by symbolic statements.  
 
The focus of interpretive biography is both on understanding how people give 
meaning to their lives, and how to capture these meanings in written, narrative and 
oral forms (Denzin, 1989).  A central assumption underpinning the approach is the 
meanings people attribute to their lives and experiences are socially constructed and 
arise from interpretations of their own and others’ behaviour.  Although people live 
independently in society and create personal history, society influences how a life is 
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lived. The interpretive process is fundamental to this method as it provides the basis 
for understanding and making-meaning of the experiences of others as created in the 
biography (Denzin, 1989).  Denzin (1989) further stated understanding is both a 
subjective and an inter-subjective, emotional process. That is, understanding involves 
drawing on both personal experience/the personal experience of others, and upon 
shared common experiences to construct shareable emotional feelings and cognitive 
understandings of the life experiences of another.  Thus biographical research is 
“interventionist” (Denzin, 1989, p. 82) and is able to give voice to those who are 
unable to tell their story or who are denied a voice to speak.   
 
Notably in Denzin’s approach, biographical data is gathered which captures 
“epiphanies or “turning point moments” which leave a mark on people’s lives (Denzin, 
1989, p. 17).  Epiphanies often relate to crisis moments and are fundamental to 
meanings people attribute to life and may have a positive or negative effect.  Meaning 
is attached to epiphanies retrospectively as the experience is re-lived and re-
interpreted in response to both the individual’s and others’ reactions to the 
experience.  Epiphanies consequently alter meanings associated with past 
experiences and bear influence on individual identity.  By studying epiphanies, the 
researcher is able to illuminate significant experiences in an individual’s life after 
which their life is irrevocably changed (Denzin, 1989).   
 
Owning a genetic mutation and being advised there is a high risk of developing cancer 
is an experience for some women. This experience constitutes an epiphany moment 
since life changes forever as women face a future bound to the gene fault (Finkler, 
2000).  However, human experience does not occur in a vacuum, but rather the 
experience is situated within broader historical, cultural and institutional milieu of an 
individual’s life (Williams & Holmes, 2005).  This supports Denzin’s (1989) view that a 
person’s life experience cannot be considered in isolation but rather is inextricably 
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interwoven into the entire fabric of the society, history and culture in which that 
individual exists: 
No self or personal-experience story is ever an individual 
production. It derives from larger group, cultural, ideological 
and historical contexts. To understand a life, the epiphanies 
and self-stories that shape that life, one must penetrate and 
understand these larger structures. (Denzin, 1989, p. 73) 
Epiphany moments are thus contextualised within social relationships and shared 
social and cultural norms (Jones et al., 2005), therefore a focus on epiphany moments 
attempts to make meaning of human experience within personal/individual and 
social/universal constructs.  In this study, the epiphany moments of high risk women 
were contextualised against the backdrop of a health care system which espoused a 
particular discourse (Filc, 2004) and a society in which existed a communal folklore of 
what a woman ‘is’ and should look like.  This approach valued everyday subjective 
experience as worthy of investigation and offered a unique insight into the 
experiences of women who had been identified as having a genetic predisposition to 
cancer yet had said no to RRS, and what this meant for them. 
 
Methods of gathering biographies 
Interpretive biography relies on oral and written accounts of experience which are 
interpreted and reconstructed to arrive at shared understanding and meaning. 
Essentially, a biography is a form of narrative study in which the experience of an 
individual’s life is captured in text (Creswell et al., 2007).  When a person’s life is 
written about, the story told may attempt to cover the life completely or partially, 
depending on the experiences deemed as important to the story (Denzin, 1989).   
 
Humans are essentially storytellers who use storytelling to make sense of life.   
(Moen, 2006).  Moreover, stories about life are embodied as they are about bodies 
and are told through bodies (Blix, Hamran & Normann, 2012).  Jarviluoma, Moisala 
and Villko, (2003) contended stories about personal experience cannot exist without 
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being gendered, as both teller and recipient of the story are embodied beings who 
interpret the story against personal and cultural perceptions of gender.  
 
Denzin (1989) used the terms self-story, personal narrative and personal experience 
narrative to describe differing biographical forms aimed at gathering accounts of the 
lives of individuals. All share similarities and differences as alluded to by Denzin 
(1989, p. 47) when he stated “every term carries traces of other terms” and that the 
methods are themselves defined by each other in terms of difference.  All are based 
upon an interpretive process which requires an individual to enter the emotional life of 
another and presupposes a life has been lived which can be studied, constructed, 
reconstructed and written about.  Thomas-MacLean (2004) similarly stated analysis of 
people’s stories created understanding of the meaning of ill health and how people 
related the body to the social world.   Cherry et al. (2013) reported exposure to the 
stories of women who had experienced types of RRS could help women considering 
it.  Stories are essentially re-constructions of experience and interpretation of stories 
may advance health professionals’ understanding of people’s health related 
experiences (Holloway & Freshwater, 2007).  This supports the views of Chapman 
(2002) who stated that the voices of those living with genetic conditions must be 
heard, as the debate arising from advances in genetic technology and testing 
continues.    
 
Personal experience narratives 
When a life is written about, it becomes a story of personal experience. In telling the 
story, the individual recounts events and experiences of past and present and may 
also anticipate future events yet to come (Liamputtong, 2009).  Stories have a 
chronological dimension as the sequence of life events are recounted, and a non-
chronological dimension which involves the construction of the whole story from 
smaller stories contained within (Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000).  Frank (1995) 
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explained that people tell stories whereas narratives are created when stories are 
analysed. Narratives are thus storied ways of knowing and communicating 
(Riessman, 2006).  During storytelling a teller engages in sharing and recounting an 
experience or event with a listener.  A narrative is created when meaningful events 
are identified, organised and linked together to create order (Gray, Fitch, Fergus, 
Mykhalovskiy & Church, 2002).  In research, narratives do not speak for themselves 
but rather require interpretation to be used as data (Riessman, 2006).  The narrative 
constructed is situated within wider social and cultural contexts and reveals personal 
realities and social structures and processes (Gray et al., 2002).    
 
In this study, the participants’ stories became personal experience narratives.  Simply 
put, personal experience narratives are stories people tell about personal experiences 
(Denzin, 1989; Dolby-Stahl, 1985) and describe events which exist independent of the 
telling, since the focus is on sharable experience.  The participants told stories as a 
way of making sense of the world and communicating thoughts, feelings and 
experiences in relation to being identified as having a genetic predisposition to 
developing cancer and subsequent related events.  The personal experience narrative 
was created by linking non-random events in relation to the women’s experiences in a 
meaningful way.   
 
Personal experience narratives are not primarily intended for sharing in social groups 
and may be told only to another listener, the sharing of which creates an emotional 
bond between the two (Denzin, 1989).  Dolby-Stahl (1985) referred to this as the 
creation of intimacy: a bond between two equals who have the capacity and skills to 
share aspects of life experience with each other.  It is the creation of intimacy which 
evokes a personal response from the teller and allows private folklore and personal 
meaning to be revealed.  In the research setting, intimacy develops between the 
participant (as story-teller) and the researcher (as listener) through realisation the 
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experience is mutually understood (Williams & Holmes, 2005). Similarly, Riessman 
(2001, 2006, 2008) argued that a co-construction between the teller, the audience and 
the told always exists when gathering narratives.  Data emerges from the relationship 
between the teller, researcher-as-listener and the context of the telling of the story 
(Riley & Hawe, 2005).  
 
Personal experience narratives describe a set of events which generally follow a 
linear structure, that is, they have a beginning, middle and an end (Denzin, 1989).  In 
this study, the life trajectory of the participants in relation to their turning point or 
epiphany moments up to completion of interviews provided the scope of the personal 
experience narrative gathered for data analysis.  This described a causal sequence of 
connecting events as the participant’s story unfolded through events in time.    
 
Notably, personal experience narratives, or stories, are constitutive of reality and 
personal identity (May, 2012). Therefore these narratives draw meaning from common 
understandings which exist within a group and may also express the “private folklore 
or meanings” (Denzin, 1989, p. 44) and parts of the “inner life” of the story teller 
(Dolby-Stahl, 1985, p. 47).  The examination of personal experience narratives allows 
the researcher to connect people’s meaningful experiences to the society in which 
they live and to larger institutions which shape society through ideological practices 
(Denzin, 1989).  Denzin (1989) advocated the analysis and subsequent interpretation 
of personal experience narratives was carried out using techniques of criticism.  One 
such approach is Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic method, discussion of which 
and application to this study now follows. 
 
Literary Folkloristic Methodology 
This study required a methodology which allowed the participants to tell their stories in 
relation to how they experienced and perceived their bodies within the discourse of 
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Western medicine.  The interpretive approach taken was consistent with social 
constructionist perspectives of society which advocate reality is a dynamic, socially 
constructed phenomenon and humans create social reality through their interactions 
with others and their resulting interpretations and understandings. The stories people 
communicate through language is one key way in which social reality is constructed 
by humans and represent the perceptions, values and experiences of the story teller.  
Moreover, personal experience narratives are literary productions because the teller 
continually engages in a process of selecting or rejecting what to say from an infinite 
number of possible things to say (Dolby-Stahl, 1989).  Literary folkloristic methodology 
allowed the in-depth analysis of these stories, as told from the view point of the story 
tellers (in this case the high risk women who had said no to RRS) and created an 
understanding of the experience of being identified as owning a genetic mutation and 
saying no to RRS.   
 
Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) methodological approach contends narratives of personal 
experience sit within the genre of folklore.  Folkloristic methodology seeks to both 
explain people’s beliefs and practices in their own terms and to contextualise these 
views socially, culturally and historically (Oring, 2004).  It has been argued that the 
study of folklore is central to our understanding of how human civilisation developed, 
since folklore study showed how cultures developed in the same way geology and 
palaeontology influenced Darwinian Theory (Trubshaw, 2003).   
 
The term folklore is a widely defined but arguably often misunderstood term.  Although 
frequently believed to concern uncorroborated myths, legends and fairy-tales, the 
term was first coined by the British historian William John Thomas in 1846, as a way 
of bringing together in one discipline the range of traditions, rituals, cultures and 
beliefs (lore) of different peoples around the world (folk) (Simpson & Roud, 2000).  
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The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
defined folklore as: 
Folklore (or traditional and popular culture) is the totality of 
tradition-based creations of a cultural community, expressed 
by a group or individuals and recognized as reflecting the 
expectations of a community in so far as they reflect its cultural 
and social identity; its standards and values are transmitted 
orally, by imitation or by other means. Its forms are, among 
others, language, literature, music, dance, games, mythology, 
rituals, customs, handicrafts, architecture and other arts 
(UNESCO, 1990, p. 239). 
Alan Dundes, a leading folklorist credited with establishing folklore studies as an 
academic discipline, proposed a simplified definition of folklore as being about ‘form – 
function – transmission’ (Trubshaw, 2004). Folklore was traditionally transmitted 
aurally between members of a folk group although more recently electronic media and 
forms of communication also transmit folklore (Trubshaw, 2004).  The transmission of 
folklore is contextual and establishes group identity through shared meanings and 
understandings which are reflective of larger shared understandings of the group but 
which may be unstated (Trubshaw, 2004).  Although folklore is originally created by 
group members, it ultimately serves to define and perpetuate group membership by 
excluding those who lack the shared understanding.  For these reasons, Trubshaw 
(2004) goes on to suggest Dundes’ definition be amended to ‘form – context – 
transmission’ to reflect the complexity and contextuality of modern society. However, 
not all communication transmitted between groups and between people would be 
considered folklore, therefore distinction must made between what folklore is and is 
not.  For Trubshaw (2004) the crucial difference was folklore was unedited or 
unmediated whereas other forms of communication such as those transmitted by the 
mass media and large organisations, governments and so forth was not.  This 
viewpoint is in keeping with the earlier work of Hufford (1998, p. 301) who defined 
folklore as “unofficial culture” in contrast to “official culture” which was associated with 
an office, post or other bureaucratic position. Comparison is made between this and 
Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) ‘communal folklore’ which described collectively held views in 
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populations or societies which are transmitted through informal communications and 
customary stories.  Common to all is acknowledgment of norms which are collectively 
but unofficially held by members of a group or society and which are communicated 
and perpetuated through membership.    
 
Hufford’s (1998) definition of unofficial versus official culture, highlights the description 
and interpretation of reality as transmitted through folklore and non-folklore 
communication is a political process in which social relations related to power and 
authority are influenced by dominant discourses.  The Marxist sociologist Gramsci 
(1971) used the term ‘hegemony’ to describe the rule of one class over another by 
using coercion or more subtle persuasion to ensure the ruled class accepted the 
ideologies, rules and laws of the ruling (hegemonic) class.  Again, this is similar to 
Hufford’s concept of official culture and is more likely to disperse ‘edited’ or ‘mediated’ 
communication to promote compliance.  Similarly Trubshaw (2004) linked folklore to 
political activity as it was a means of transmitting poems, songs and stories which 
could contest the hegemony and promote the emergent ideologies of other groups.  
The folk of contemporary folklore are described by Dundes (1980, p. 6) as: 
(…) any group of people whatsoever who share at least one common 
factor. It does not matter what the linking factor is – it could be a 
common occupation, language or religion – but what is important is that 
a group formed for whatever reason will have some traditions which it 
calls its own. 
 
Dolby-Stahl (1985) expanded the concept of folklore in her literary folkloristic 
methodology to distinguish between ‘communal’ and ‘private’ folklore: communal 
folklore represented the traditional stories and beliefs collectively held by the wider 
population, and private folklore represented what was exclusively shared by a sub-
group of the population and which was not necessarily publicly revealed.   Private 
folklore is revealed when intimacy is created between the willing participant and the 
researcher-as-listener during the interview process: “the teller teaches the listener to 
know him better” (Dolby-Stahl, 1985, p. 51).  For Dolby-Stahl, exploration and analysis 
87 
 
of private folklore contained within personal experience narratives was fundamental to 
creating meaning and understanding of the lives of people.  Like Denzin (1989), 
Dolby-Stahl (1985) acknowledged the challenges associated with understanding and 
creating meaning from the written and oral texts of others, since there can be no 
permanence of the original text: as soon as words are spoken, they disappear.  At 
most, the researcher can retain a written or taped copy of what was said for later 
analysis and interpretation. 
 
Central to Dolby-Stahl’s methodology is the concept of the “informed listener” (1985, 
p. 54).  It stands to reason that any individual can listen to the story of another and 
offer a response to that story.  This response may be valuable and meaningful to 
understanding the story, especially if the listener shares cultural commonalties with 
the teller.  However, Dolby-Stahl (1989, 1985) argued the contribution of the informed 
listener was potentially more valuable. An informed listener is one who not only 
shares aspects of the teller’s folk group, but also uses literary theory to critically 
deconstruct the text, discover hidden clues and identify themes and motifs, and 
crucially, takes full responsibility for translating what was heard (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  
This is of great importance, as in keeping with Denzin (1989) it is argued that one can 
never accurately replicate a life or life experience, therefore the focus is on the text 
created by the individual and not the individual per se. On hearing the story, the 
listener must create meaning along with the storyteller, and the listener is responsible 
for their response to the story.   Listening to the story is thus a creative act during 
which the listener brings their own store of personal and cultural perspectives to bear 
on the interpretation (Dolby-Stahl, 1985). 
 
Dolby-Stahl (1985) contended the most important feature of any interpretive project 
was the reader was able to see how the story was interpreted in the way it was.  It is 
essential therefore the researcher-as-listener demonstrates how responses evolved 
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and how interpretations were arrived at. Literary theory is used to critically deconstruct 
the personal experience narratives to identify themes, attitudes and allusions 
reflective of societal expectations which influence how a life is lived and experienced 
(Williams & Holmes, 2005).  Analysis of biographical data therefore requires an 
approach which makes sense of the teller’s life and understands the life from both a 
private and public perspective.   
 
Biographical analysis  
The methodological approach taken in this study combined Denzin’s (1989) 
interpretive biography with Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology to 
provide a method for gathering, reading and interpreting participants’ personal 
experience narratives.  This meant analysing the participants’ personal experience 
narratives for meanings of experience which could then be interpreted using the 
techniques of literary criticism.   However, neither Denzin (1989) nor Dolby-Stahl 
(1985) outlined any particular method for writing and reading biographical texts exists, 
rather it was argued a range of literary techniques may be utilised to analyse and 
communicate experiences connected to the life of the individual.   
 
Wide variation in biographical methods (Bornat, 2008) coupled with differences in how 
researchers employ the concept of personal narrative (Thorne, Kirkham & O’Flynn-
Magee, 2004) means diverse strategies of data analysis are associated with 
interpretive approaches. However, common to all is the requirement to construct texts 
for further analysis by organising the texts/data, creating field notes and/or choosing 
particular sections of the text for detailed inspection (Riessman, 2006).  Denzin (1989) 
acknowledged all data analysis techniques had inherent weaknesses in them since 
the study of human experience was inevitably fraught with contradiction and 
ambiguity.  Data analysis is an intuitive process when conducting interpretive 
biographical research therefore specific analytic techniques are rarely prescribed nor 
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the steps taken clearly articulated (Bryman & Burgess, 2002).  Thus the process of 
data analysis in interpretive studies eludes a methodological orthodoxy and instead 
employs techniques which fit best with the research aims and overall epistemological 
and ontological assumptions of the study.  
 
It is generally agreed the most appropriate tool for analysing biographical data is that 
which suits the focus of the research (Surr, 2006), addresses the study aims (Creswell 
et al., 2007) and allows the researcher to make sense and create understanding of 
the participants’ significant life experiences (Liamputtong, 2009; Thorne et al., 2004). 
The favoured approach to data analysis will reflect the researcher’s epistemological 
assumptions, values and cumulative experience (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  Thus there are 
no fixed or mandatory procedures associated with biographical analysis, rather 
justification for the particular data analysis approach taken must be provided.  Bornat 
(2008) however cautioned against over-explaining analytical procedures when 
undertaking interpretive biography as this suggests the researcher (as interpreter) is 
in a position of authority and control which can serve to eclipse the participants’ 
responses.  
 
Consensus exists that data analysis in biographical research is an intuitive process 
(Bryman & Burgess, 2002) which involves separating the chronology of events from 
the meanings individuals attach to them (Bornat, 2008).  The focus of data analysis 
remains on uncovering meaning of significant experiences of people and relationships 
between experiences (Gültekin, Inowlocki & Lutz, 2003). The researcher sets out to 
make connections between the participants’ past, present and future experiences and 
reveal influences and contexts which may have shaped experience which participants 
may or may not be aware of (Bornat, 2008).   
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The interpretive biographical approach taken in this study is dependent upon analytic 
induction, a process which seeks understanding of phenomena which illuminates 
characteristics, patterns and structures in a theoretically useful way (Thorne et al., 
2004). This allows understanding of an individual’s inner world to be created and 
shared with those outside that world (Fraser, 2004). Notably, this analysis reveals 
knowledge of experiences or events considered threatening or traumatic to people 
(Gültekin et al., 2003) such as those associated with being identified as high risk of 
developing cancer.  Additionally, analysis may include reference to folk sayings and 
proverbs (Aronson, 1995) and reveal aspects of the participants’ private and 
communal folklore (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).   Data analysis is a complex process however 
as references to such events and experiences are threaded throughout the text, 
revealed in various ways, hidden or glossed over, therefore the analysis seeks out 
explicit and hidden meaning in the text (Bornat, 2008).   
 
In this study, the aim of data analysis was to generate understanding of the 
participants’ experiences of being identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian 
cancer and saying no to RRS in order to create knowledge which may be applied in a 
theoretically meaningful way.  Additionally, the study aimed to understand the public 
and private folklore of the women so that their life experiences could be understood 
within the context of personal, social, cultural and historical influences.  Narrative 
analysis was particularly suited to this study as it allowed the systematic study of 
personal experience and meaning (Riessman, 2001, 2005).  Narrative analysis 
facilitates a focus on events, emotions, feelings, meanings and explanations 
contained within the participants’ stories (Liamputtong, 2009), and so makes visible 
what was important about an individual’s experience.  Narrative analysis can make-
meaning of turning point moments (Riessman, 2001, 2005), or what Denzin (1989) 
referred to as epiphanies, which change an individual’s biography.   
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Burck (2005) argued that narrative analysis illuminates ways in which people 
construct themselves within groups and societies and how people position themselves 
in relation to dominant notions of self.  Riessman (2001, 2006) described this as a 
way in which individuals construct and claim personal identity. The participants’ 
stories in this study were analysed from the perspective of how personal identities 
were formed against a backdrop of dominant social and cultural discourse and 
ideologies.   
 
Narrative analysis is an umbrella term for various theoretical approaches to 
interpreting stories (May, 2012; Riessman, 2006; Stephens & Breheny, 2013).  The 
approach taken is dependent upon the study aims and theoretical orientations of the 
researcher (Shi, 2008).  However, all approaches provide a way of systematically 
analysing personal experience narratives and share a common tactic: the analysis 
takes the stand point of the storyteller as its starting point (Riessman, 2001, 2005, 
2006; Riley & Hawe, 2005).   Riessman (2005, p. 2) contends different approaches to 
narrative analysis reflect whether the study focus is on “the told” or “the telling” and no 
one approach is superior to another.  Approaches to interpreting stories thus differ on 
questions relating to why and how stories are told (Riley & Hawe, 2005).   Riessman 
(2001, 2005) described various approaches but highlighted the approaches are not 
mutually exclusive and different approaches may be combined in one study.    
 
In this study, Riessman’s (2005, 2006, 2008) thematic narrative analysis informed the 
data analysis process.  Thematic analysis is the most commonly utilised method of 
narrative analysis and is frequently used in health care research to increase 
understanding of people’s experiences of illness and disease (Riessman, 2005, 2008) 
and has been used widely in folklore studies (Riessman, 2008).   
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When using thematic analysis, the researcher seeks ideas, themes and clues from 
within the participants’ stories and compares these across stories. Importantly, rather 
than breaking the personal experience narratives down into coded segments, 
thematic analysis keeps the story intact and interprets and compares each 
participants’ story as a whole.  The sequence of the narrative is preserved and large 
sections of the text are presented in some detail to illustrate themes (Riessman, 
2008). Comparing the narratives against each other as a whole reveals broader 
contexts which shape personal experience. In contrast to other forms of narrative 
analysis, thematic narrative analysis focuses less on form and narrative devices used 
to construct stories and more on content and themes (Riessman, 2005, 2008). Thus 
the focus is on what was said not how it was said or the purpose of telling.  A focus on 
content produces a chronological account of experience which is then evaluated for 
the meaning attached to events and experiences (Elliot, 2005).   
 
Language is viewed as a resource for communicating experience rather than the 
primary object of investigation, maintaining the focus on the personal experiences of 
the storytellers.  Nonetheless, particular word choices, metaphors and references to 
folklore may be exposed and investigated in terms of their function within the text and 
the meanings they carry (Riessman, 2008).  Thematic analysis therefore facilitates a 
focus on the told which comprises reports of events and experiences and how these 
were lived and experienced (Riessman, 2008).   From this, an awareness of the 
individual in society is gleaned which allows an understanding of social and cultural 
groups and structures and relationships between them (Elliot, 2005).  This is in 
keeping with Denzin (1989) who asserted that to understand a life, consideration must 
be given to the wider social and cultural structures which shape human experience.   
 
In thematic analysis, data is interpreted in light of thematic elements developed by the 
researcher in accordance with the research aims, a priori knowledge, emergent theory 
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and the data produced (Riessman, 2001, 2008).  Providing explanation of and 
rationale for chosen categories allows the researcher to exhibit transparency in the 
research process and affords the reader an opportunity to reflect on the logic 
underpinning the analysis (Fraser, 2004). This is an important aspect in this study, 
because it was reasoned it was incumbent on the researcher to be transparent 
throughout the research process and provide rich, substantive accounts of 
participants’ experiences which demonstrated how a particular interpretation was 
arrived at.   
 
Thematic narrative analysis has been criticised on the basis it assumes a common 
language exists which will be understood by all (Riessman, 2006). Such criticism 
could however be extended to any analytic research approach as all involve language 
in all its ambiguity and instability.   Hence, the approach taken in this study 
acknowledged the challenges inherent in the study of human experience but 
contended accepting and negotiating these was integral to understanding the 
experiences of the participants.  The application of narrative analysis in this study is 
described in Chapter 4.  
 
In summary, analysis of personal experience narratives reveals knowledge of and 
about the individual concerned.  However, biographical researchers are only ever able 
to “create the subject in the text that is written” despite the subject (person) having 
lived a ‘real’ life with ‘real’ experiences (Denzin, 1989, p. 23).  The participants in this 
study were real people who existed independently of the text, but for the purposes of 
this research, the participants were created as subjects in text within particular 
discourses and historical periods. The subjectivity of personal experience narratives 
used to capture the participants’ biographies was acknowledged as strength because 
it is this subjectivity which creates human reality (Denzin, 1989).  The participants told 
stories of their lives and their experiences of being identified as high risk of developing 
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cancer and saying no to RRS.  However, the stories told were one of a number of 
stories which could have been told hence biographical methods used to construct 
lives in text are literary productions and accordingly, are open to multiple, differing 
interpretations.  The subjectivity of personal experience narratives therefore also lays 
the approach open to criticism because of their ambiguous, temporal and shifting 
nature.  Accordingly, the next section discusses the ambiguous nature of truth and 
how this was negotiated in this study. 
 
Truth, validity and evaluation in interpretive research 
Designing and undertaking effective and meaningful research is the goal of all 
researchers (Angen, 2000: Holloway & Wheeler, 2010) therefore it is essential all 
research irrespective of the approach taken presents the findings from research and 
the subsequent interpretation of data in some credible way (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008; 
Major & Savin-Baden, 2010).  The overall aim then of all data analysis is to transform 
raw data into a clear and credible account of the research findings (Fossey, Harvey, 
McDermott & Davidson, 2002; Liamputtong, 2009).  Extensive epistemological debate 
exists as to the most useful and appropriate way to achieve this, notably in relation to 
what constitutes ‘the truth’, ‘truths’ and ‘truthfulness’ (Major & Savin-Baden, 2010) and 
whether or not research is able to identify a true version of reality (Cohen & Crabtree, 
2008; Smith, 2008).   
 
Traditional criteria for evaluating research are rooted in the positivist paradigm and 
presuppose an objective measurable reality exists independent of the interests of the 
researcher (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).  The standard 
conventional criteria used to assess the quality of the research are validity, reliability 
and generalisability.  Internal validity is the extent to which a data collection instrument 
measures what it intends to measure while external validity relates to how far the 
study results can be generalised to other populations (Polit & Beck, 2013).  Reliability 
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refers to the consistency of an instrument and is a measure of how well the instrument 
produces the same or similar results if administered under the same or similar 
conditions (Parahoo, 2006).  Establishing validity and reliability are important factors 
in generalising the study findings: drawing broader inferences from particular 
observations through the demonstration of cause and effect relationships.  Traditional 
research approaches attempt to produce an objective description of reality in order to 
make predictions about how individuals will act in that reality, or respond to a 
particular intervention, on the basis consistency of response (Cohen & Crabtree, 
2008).  In contrast, the methodological approach taken in this study was grounded in 
the belief humans are constantly interpreting and re-interpreting the dynamic world in 
which they exist in order to make meaning of experience. The approach taken was not 
preoccupied with a search for ‘the truth’ thus traditional criteria for evaluating research 
were not applicable.  The interpretive approach utilised in this study rejected the 
notion of an objective, knowable reality external to human consciousness and instead 
argued multiple realities exist within socially and mentally constructed individual 
realities.  Hence the experiences of high risk women who say no to RRS were 
considered in light of social, cultural and historical influences which shaped human 
experience and consented to certain ways of speaking and behaving.  Rather than 
searching for objective truths and explanation, the focus of this research was on 
understanding and meaning-making (Denzin, 1989; Dolby-Stahl, 1985). 
 
Denzin (1989) claimed that positivist epistemologies directed the research process in 
a search for absolute truths and turned the subject of the biography into an object.  
However, humans are not objects and are exposed to a wide range of influences on 
behaviour (Crossan, 2003).  Research carried out in the interpretive paradigm 
presupposes reality is fluid and co-constructed.  Knowledge is gained through 
negotiation between the researcher and the participants (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1986).  In this study, distinction was drawn between objective 
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markers of experience and the subjective meanings attached to them by individuals 
(Denzin, 1989).  Undertaking biographical research requires acceptance of the 
ambiguous nature of truth and reality notwithstanding real people living real lives with 
real experiences.  Denzin (1989) explained this stance by referring to different 
standards of autobiographical truth.  Facts are events which occurred (or which will 
occur) and are able to be corroborated, such as being identified as owning a genetic 
mutation which increases a woman’s risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer.  
Facticities are how these facts were lived and experienced by individuals, for 
example, the subjective experiences of women diagnosed with owning a genetic 
mutation.  Fiction is a narrative account which deals with facts and facticities, real or 
imagined, and may therefore be true or false.  A true fiction is one which is faithful to 
facts and facticities attempting to represent these in accordance with how they existed 
and were experienced, creating verisimilitude (Denzin, 1989): demonstration of the 
appearance of truth (Major & Savin-Baden, 2010).  Accordingly, the personal 
experience narratives of the women in this study represented a version of reality 
which appeared to be faithful to facts and facticities and which reflected what was 
important to how the experience was constructed, understood and made sense of at 
the time.   
 
Personal experience narratives are “temporal productions” (Denzin, 1989, p. 73): 
stories of the past, told in the present and only one of a number of stories which could 
have been told.  Moen (2006) similarly discussed the fictional nature of personal 
experience narratives, drawing distinction between the lived life and the life 
experienced.  The lived life comprises the events which occurred and are able to be 
corroborated.  A life experienced comprises feelings, values, sentiments, thoughts, 
inflections and all forms of meaning known to the individual whose life it is.  Capturing 
the life told creates a personal experience narrative shaped by cultural conventions 
inherent in telling the story, social contexts and audience responses (Moen, 2006).  
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Another distinction exists between the story told and the story heard (Denzin, 1989).  
The story is told through language, itself a symbolic, metaphoric and changing 
medium which influences how the story is shared and heard.  Different perspectives 
and interpretations are brought to bear upon the story from the differing biographical 
positions of teller and listener. Differences between teller and listener merge to form a 
collective version of the story told, at a point in time.  In this sense, just as there is no 
one truth about the lives of others, similarly there is no one truth or single 
interpretation researchers are able to make regarding the life experiences of others 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).   
 
It may equally be argued empirical/scientific data are open-ended temporal 
productions.  For example, as recently as September 2012, scientists uncovered new 
‘facts’ about breast cancer which were previously unknown (Cancer Genome Atlas 
Network, 2012).   Breast cancer is now ‘known’ to comprise four genetically distinct 
types, one of which shares genomic similarities with a particular type of ovarian 
cancer.  This new information has been interpreted in Western medicine as 
knowledge likely to re-shape scientific understanding of cancer, paving the way for 
more therapeutic interventions and cures.  The revelation of new knowledge and 
subsequent contemporary understanding about cancer and treatment accentuates the 
shifting nature of science and the impermanence of scientific truths.  Indeed the 
Human Genome Project itself is evidence of the impermanence of scientific 
knowledge par excellence, as knowledge of the causes of disease prior to the 
mapping of the human genome is now called into question and re-examined in light of 
new genetic information.  This in itself is not surprising, nor is it unexpected.  It stands 
to reason treatment for cancer will change as scientific discoveries continue to reveal 
previously unknown information about the disease and its manifestations.  The key 
point however remains: no permanent, time or value-free criteria exist for determining 
what knowledge is true (Denzin, 1989; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) and no special 
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research methods exist which automatically and inevitably lead to ‘the truth’ (Smith, 
2008).  
 
The line between fact and fiction is blurred in biographical texts and true stories are 
those which are believed in (Denzin, 1989).  Any storyteller can construe facts about 
his or her life and no-one can know what is true and what is false on every occasion.  
All storytellers chose what to divulge and what to keep hidden (Dolby-Stahl, 1985, 
1989; Thorne et al., 2004) therefore the personal experience narratives of the 
participants in this study reflect a personal understanding of reality. Social, cultural 
and ideological conventions guide what people in society feel able to say and not say 
at any given time, hence what is presented is an edited version of reality (Denzin, 
1989).  However, what is shared is what was important to how experience were 
constructed and what sense women made of experience at the time.  If the storyteller 
deliberates that their experience was real and believes in its existence, then the story 
told is authentic.  The importance of the story is that it describes the experienced 
reality as opposed to the real reality (Bate & Robert, 2007).  This is the essence of the 
interpretive approach.  
 
For Denzin (1989) and Dolby-Stahl (1985, 1989), preoccupation with validity, reliability 
and generalisability is set aside in favour of a concern for meaning and interpretation. 
In this study, interpretive biographical techniques of literary criticism were used to 
understand participants’ subjective experiences rather than accumulate facts about 
their lives (Green & Thorogood, 2009).  Denzin (1989) said that subjectivity creates 
rather than distorts reality.  Similarly, Riessman (2001, p. 696) affirmed that 
subjectivity is a strength of the interpretive approach rather than a weakness: “the 
approach does not assume objectivity; rather, it privileges positionality and 
subjectivity”.  Blix et al. (2012) confirmed that temporality and impermanence of 
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personal experience narratives were not problematic but rather an opportunity for 
obtaining a deeper understanding of the human condition. 
 
The interpretive approach has been criticised on the basis it lends itself to an 
‘anything goes’ approach to research and suggests any claim to knowledge is as 
worthy or valuable as any other (Smith, 2008). Interpretivists however counter-argue 
all any individual can do is describe and justify knowledge on criteria which are 
historically and temporally shifting. For both researcher and participant, the story is 
constructed around the interests and intents which make the story meaningful.  
Consequently it is not possible to achieve a neutral or an unbiased opinion since 
humans are unable to negate or eliminate a priori knowledge and influences from past 
experiences (Smith, 2008).   
 
From the above discussion, it is evident a key challenge in this study was reconciling 
the desire to capture, understand and make-meaning of the experiences of high risk 
women who said no to RRS with recognition that there can never be one true or 
precise representation of a woman’s life.  For researchers using biographical analysis, 
the tension between relativism and material reality must be addressed.  If one accepts 
biographical methods are able to capture and represent the life of the person in text, 
how does the researcher deal with the lack of any objective truth or reality and present 
findings which will be accepted and evaluated as credible and worthwhile? 
   
Attempts to define evaluation criteria more in keeping with epistemological 
assumptions underpinning qualitative research approaches have been made.  In their 
seminal work, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 290) acknowledged the need for qualitative 
research findings to be presented in a credible and meaningful way: “how can an 
inquirer persuade his or her audience that the research findings of an inquiry are 
worth paying attention to?”  Lincoln and Guba (1985, p .299) argued traditional 
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positivist criteria for evaluating research were based on assumptions of “naïve 
realism”, a belief in unchanging, tangible truths which served as benchmarks against 
which study findings could be reliably measured against.  However as previously 
argued, the theoretical standpoint taken in this thesis contended what constitutes 
knowledge, and by extension ‘the truth’, is impermanent and only ‘true’ within the 
historical, cultural and societal contexts in which it was produced and maintained.  
This study was a study of human experience.  It did not seek to make context-free 
truthful statements about experience or seek to identify cause and effect relationships 
which could allow the findings to be generalised.  Rather the study aimed to provide a 
credible account of how the participants came to say no to RRS by offering 
interpretations of how multiple, interacting factors, events and processes shaped 
experience.  Traditional ways of claiming knowledge which are based on objectivity 
and freedom from bias in research studies were thus incongruent with the 
methodological approach taken in this study. 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed alternative criteria to validity, reliability and 
generalisation for demonstrating rigour and trustworthiness in qualitative inquiry.  In 
particular, Lincoln and Guba (1985) rejected the value of validity: if no one true reality 
exists, there can be no claim to ever completely accurately represent someone else’s 
reality through the research process.  Furthermore, since reliability is a precondition of 
validity, it follows the concept of reliability is equally extraneous in qualitative inquiry 
(Butler-Kisber, 2010).  Instead, Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed the concept of 
‘trustworthiness’ in qualitative research which has four main criteria.  Credibility is 
used in place of internal validity and refers to the level of congruence between the 
researchers’ findings and the participants’ realities, or the truth value of the research.  
The concept of transferability is used in place of external validity and relates to the 
degree to which the study findings can be applied to other contexts or other 
populations.  Reliability is replaced by dependability which concerns evidence of how 
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likely the study would yield the same or similar findings if repeated on a similar 
population in a similar environment.  Confirmability is suggested in place of objectivity 
and is a means by which the researcher demonstrates the findings were produced by 
the focus of the study and not as a result of any biases on the researcher’s part.   
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) also suggested a range of techniques which could be 
utilised to demonstrate rigour and establish the trustworthiness of the research.  Ways 
of increasing credibility include member checking, peer review, negative case analysis 
and prolonged engagement in the field.  The use of thick description to present the 
findings in such a way so others can determine if relevant to their setting facilitates 
transferability.  For dependability and confirmability, the use of an audit trail which 
clearly links the findings and interpretations to the original data sources and ensures 
the researcher’s processes are logical, traceable and acknowledged is advised.  
However, others have argued such ‘checks’ on accuracy of data interpretation still 
assume an objective reality exists which can be accurately measured to uncover truth 
and are therefore incongruent with an interpretive approach (Cohen & Crabtree, 
2008).  Similarly, Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olsen & Spiers (2002) argued such concepts 
were not relevant to all types of qualitative research including feminist approaches 
and those utilising critical theory, such as in this study, where the researcher’s 
interpretations form part of the data.    
 
Further work of Lincoln and Guba (1986, 1989) sought to extend the debate on 
evaluative criteria for qualitative inquiry.  It was acknowledged the concept of 
trustworthiness, and its accompanying criteria, were initially devised to parallel 
conventional criteria in the absence of other measures.  Although trustworthiness was 
proposed as an improvement on the traditional criteria, Lincoln and Guba (1986, 
1989) nonetheless acknowledged the inherent misnomer in devising new criteria 
which were analogous to the rejected positivist criteria.   Devising equivalent criteria 
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suggested the issues of importance were the same for both approaches and diverted 
attention away from devising suitable interpretive alternatives.  To this end, Lincoln 
and Guba (1986, 1989) proposed an additional criterion of ‘authenticity’ as a means of 
demonstrating the quality of qualitative research.   Holloway & Wheeler (2010) 
summarised the components of authenticity thus: fairness refers to the extent to which 
a range of different realities, or constructions of reality, are presented by the 
researcher.  The research findings should raise consciousness of and develop new 
insights into the phenomenon under investigation (ontological authenticity) and 
increase understanding and appreciation of the views of others (educative 
authenticity).  Authentic research also stimulates action (catalytic authenticity) and 
empowers others to act (tactical authenticity).  Thus the concept of authenticity 
appeared to address issues of importance in qualitative research such as 
understanding of different realities/multiple interpretations, mutual understandings, 
ethical research and empowering others, and therefore was more responsive to the 
needs of qualitative researchers (Fossey et al., 2002).    However, despite extensive 
theorising by Lincoln and Guba and many others, no one set of criteria with which to 
gauge the quality of qualitative research has yet been devised (Fossey et al., 2002; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Holloway & Wheeler, 2010).  Widespread debate remains 
evident in the literature regarding the value of specific criteria for evaluating utility and 
worth of interpretive and other types of qualitative research.  The drive for a single set 
of evaluative criteria suggests a uniformity amongst qualitative approaches which 
does not exist.  
 
The use of criteria relevant to qualitative research however, facilitates a focus on 
exploring human experience in relation to social, cultural and historical contexts rather 
than objective scientific data.  There is general agreement further critique of what 
constitutes quality criteria in qualitative research is needed (Fossey et al., 2002; Guba 
& Lincoln, 1994).  However, irrespective of the labels attached, researchers must 
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demonstrate their research has truth value which requires consistency in the 
language, concepts and methods used (Fossey et al., 2002; Holloway & Wheeler; 
2010).  To this end, a general consensus on fundamental criteria for evaluating 
interpretive research exists (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008) which informed the approach 
taken in this study.   
 
The research should be ethical, important and be clearly and coherently articulated.  
Rich, substantive accounts of participants’ experiences should be presented which 
illuminate subjective meanings and reflect multiple ways of seeing a phenomenon 
(Cohen & Crabtree, 2008).  There must be transparency throughout the research 
process and discussion of issues such as the positioning of the researcher and power 
relationships must be made explicit (Caelli, Ray & Mill, 2003).  The interpretive lens of 
the researcher must be visible and accessible during the course of the research 
(Thorne et al., 2004) and researchers must demonstrate self-reflection and explain 
how a particular interpretation was gleaned (Angen, 2000; Holloway & Wheeler, 
2010).  The researcher must also take steps to outline his or her stance in relation to 
the participants, methodology and method and demonstrate honesty and consistency 
between methods and researcher (Fossey et al., 2002; Major & Savin-Baden, 2010).  
In this study, these steps have been addressed in several key ways: by making 
explicit reference to these criteria when describing and justifying the study design and 
processes; by presenting the participants’ stories in their own voice through the use of 
substantive accounts of experience and thick description to support the interpretations 
offered and by the inclusion of a reflexive account (see Chapter 7) which discusses 
the ways in which the researcher’s subjectivities may have influenced the research 
process.  This study therefore is presented as a credible account of the experiences 
of high risk women who said no to RRS and the meanings the women used to make 
sense of their experiences. 
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Chapter summary  
The interpretive approach taken in this study provided a contextualised narrative of 
the life experiences of the study participants.  It was evident the women were folk and 
belonged to many different folk groups.  They were mothers, sisters, patients, 
daughters, friends, colleagues, neighbours, bosses and employees, to name but a 
few.  Additionally, as women in Western society, they were subject to communal 
folklore surrounding the female body, the breasts and ovaries, cancer and death and 
dying.  In particular, the women in this study had said no to RRS despite its 
effectiveness in reducing cancer risk in high risk populations and as such shared a 
private folklore which contributed to their decision to say no to surgery.   
 
The methodological approach taken acknowledged every interpretation contains 
subjective elements thus neither researchers nor participants are able to escape 
personal beliefs and ideologies, social circumstances and lived experiences.  
Interpretation therefore is a social and political endeavour rather than a purely 
cognitive act (Schwandt, 2000).  The most important feature of interpretive research is 
not whether the researcher accurately recounts the person’s life experience, but 
rather the reader is able to see how the story was interpreted in the way it was (Dolby-
Stahl, 1985).  It is essential therefore for biographical researchers to make sense of 
the lives of participants whilst recognising the resulting texts will be reflective of 
personal ideologies (Williams & Holmes, 2005).  Analysis of biographical data 
therefore required an approach which made sense of the teller’s life and understood 
the life from both a private and public perspective.   
 
This study used a synthesis of Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography and Dolby-
Stahl’s (1985, 1989) literary folkloristics as a framework for gathering, reading and 
interpreting the stories of the study participants (Williams & Holmes, 2005).  Denzin’s 
interpretive approach informed the gathering and reading of biographical data which 
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was analysed and interpreted using the literary folkloristic method.  This strategy 
provided a contextualised narrative of the life experiences of high risk women who 
said no to RRS and is represented in Figure 5 below.  While the research process has 
been kept intact, this has been presented here rather than at the beginning of the 
chapter as it represents how this approach was arrived at by the author as part of the 
process of using literary theory within the biographical method.  Application of this 
approach is presented in the following chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Overview of methodological approach taken in the study. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE METHOD 
Introduction 
In this study, Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology was used within 
Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biographical approach as a framework for the analysis of 
participants’ personal experience narratives.  Dolby-Stahl (1985) stops short of 
prescribing a particular method by which to undertake this process but does however 
offer guidance on prerequisites which researchers should attend to when utilising the 
literary folkloristic method: 
(1) an acknowledged “documentary” frame; (2) clear allowance for the 
individual  response of the listener; (3) commentary by an audience-interpreter 
whose relevant “folk group” is the same as the storyteller’s; (4) identification of 
an audience-interpreter who knows the conventions of literary criticism…[ ]; (5) 
an audience interpreter willing to accept full responsibility for the act of 
interpretation. (Dolby-Stahl, 1985, p. 53) 
From this, Hendricks (1999, p. 91) proposed an eight step process for conducting a 
literary folkloristic inquiry which was used to guide this study: 
1. Locating the participants within a given social category 
2. The identifying of salient themes and experiences in the participant’s life. 
3. The connecting of the subject’s life history and life story to larger social 
meaning, including communal and private folklore. 
4. Understanding that the subject’s life story reflects a set of meaningful 
experiences which, when told create an emotional bond between the teller 
and the listener. 
5. Realising that the private, inner meanings of these experiences to the 
subject can never be fully illuminated. 
6. Interpreting the materials by sharing in the world of the experience of the 
subject. 
7. Bringing the interpretive approaches of literary theory and criticism to bear 
on the life story materials. 
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8. Acknowledging that the researcher creates the document that is 
interpreted.  
This provided a method which guided the study and through which the participants’ 
stories could be gathered, read and interpreted.   
 
Step 1: Locating the participants within a given social category. 
Use of Dolby-Stahl’s (1985, 1989) literary folkloristic methodology required study 
participants belong to an identified social group which shared an exclusive private 
folklore.  This step therefore involved gaining access to BRCA1/2 mutation positive 
women who had said no to RRS.    
 
Genetic testing identified the study participants as being at high risk of developing 
breast and/or ovarian cancer but they were asymptomatic, ‘pre-disease’ individuals 
who had chosen not to undergo RRS and were therefore not ‘patients’ in the 
traditional sense of the word.  Although the number of women undergoing genetic 
testing for breast/ovarian cancer and having RRS continues to rise, the number of 
women who are offered then refuse RRS is not known.  It may be women who say no 
to RRS are in effect rejecting medical intervention and may therefore be unwilling to 
continue medical observation and thus may be hard to reach participants.  
 
Gaining access to participants 
Women who had tested positive for a BRCA1/2 gene mutation but had said no to RRS 
were invited to participate in the study by placing advertisements (Appendix 1) in local 
newspapers in different regions of Scotland over a 12-month period.  Initially this led 
to a sample of six women. A further two women were referred to the researcher by 
two of the initial participants who knew the other women to be high risk. One of these 
participants also lived in Scotland and one lived in the North of England.  An initial 
telephone conversation was carried out with the potential participants to confirm 
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eligibility and willingness to take part in the study and arrange a mutually convenient 
place and time for interview to take place.  Most interviews took place in the woman’s 
home although two women requested to be interviewed elsewhere to avoid family 
members being aware of the interview: these interviews took place in a friend’s house 
and a private room in a local library.  A Patient Information Sheet (Appendix 2) was 
also posted at this point to allow the women to make an informed decision about 
participation.  
 
In the end, six interviews were completed and used in the study as two potential 
participants withdrew at short notice.  Qualitative research aims to collect data which 
is rich, meaningful and contextualised to create understanding rather than 
demonstrate statistical significance, making smaller sample sizes both sensible and 
practical (Morgan, 2008).  This number of participants is appropriate when the aim of 
the research is to explore a shared perception, belief or experience amongst a 
relatively homogenous group (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006) and when analysis 
relies upon the in-depth interpretation of data from a small number of sources 
(Morgan, 2008) since larger samples may dilute the relative importance of each 
participant’s responses (Lloyd et al., 2000).  
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethics in research became prominent following the abuse of human rights under the 
guise of research including Nazi experimentation and led to a number of ethical codes 
being formulated and adopted by those involved in research (Preissle, 2008).  
Although the purpose of research is to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on 
a given topic, the research process may result in the disclosure of information about 
individuals which is not already known (McHaffie, 2000), consequently the entire 
research process is subject to a number of ethical considerations from the choosing of 
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the research topic through to the dissemination of the findings (Bryman, 2004; 
Preissle, 2008).   
 
Ethical issues raised by this study included the vulnerable nature of the participants, 
participants’ autonomy, informed consent, potential harm to participants and issues of 
confidentiality and anonymity, all of which are interlinked.   
 
Respect for autonomy 
Autonomy is defined as “the ability of an individual to make reasoned decisions about 
issues which affect them” (Royal College of Nursing, 2009, p. 6) and can be 
threatened when research participants are vulnerable (National Health and Medical 
Research Council, 2007). The participants in this study could be considered 
vulnerable as they had been identified as having a BRCA1/2 mutation which 
predisposes to cancer but had said no to refused RRS.  It was essential potential 
participants received adequate information to allow an informed decision on whether 
to participate to be made.  Thus potential participants were provided with a Patient 
Information sheet (Appendix 2) which contained explicit information to protect patient 
autonomy namely: 
 The aims and objectives of the study. 
 Why their participation was being sought. 
 Participation was entirely voluntary. 
 The participants themselves would not directly benefit from the study. 
 The participants could withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice. 
 The study findings would be made available to others with an interest in the 
subject. 
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Informed consent 
Informed consent is inextricably linked with autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013) 
and in addition to the measures outlined above, participants were given time to 
consider participation and have any outstanding concerns addressed prior to the 
interview commencing.  Polit & Beck (2010) stated to respect participants’ autonomy 
and ensure informed consent is obtained, the right to decline participation at any time 
and without prejudice should be apparent.  Written consent was gained from 
participants (Appendix 3) confirming they understood the nature, purpose and 
possible consequences of taking part in the study and that they were free to withdraw 
at any time.   
 
Potential harm to participants 
The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are applied in research to ensure 
the risks of research do not outweigh potential benefits (Duffy, 2008; Polit & Beck, 
2010).  Non-maleficence and beneficence are important concepts in the research 
process in part owing to the unpredictable element of discovery embedded in 
research (Orb, Eisenhauer & Wynaden, 2001).  However, it could be argued it is 
impossible to eliminate all potential physical and emotional harm from the research 
process therefore the most important issue is the researcher strives to promote non-
maleficence and beneficence.   
 
There was no potential for physical harm in this study although it was possible 
emotional upset or distress could occur as a result of discussing sensitive issues in 
the interviews.   Participants were provided with contact numbers for reputable 
support services (Appendix 4) in order they could access support were it required.  It 
was also possible a participant could have, in the course of telling their story, re-
considered the decision to refuse RRS.  Although none articulated such a desire, the 
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researcher clarified participants were aware they could contact their General 
Practitioner or Genetics Clinic for further discussion if necessary.   
 
Confidentiality/Anonymity 
All research participants have the right to privacy (Duffy, 2008; Polit & Beck, 2010) 
and the concepts of confidentiality and anonymity are used to safeguard privacy.  To 
ensure confidentiality, participants’ identities and the information they provided will not 
be displayed publicly without prior consent.  The patient information sheet made 
participants aware the study findings may be presented at conferences and/or 
published but all information provided would be anonymised.  Anonymity is the 
process of separating data from provider, and may be full or partial (Ogden, 2008). 
Full anonymity occurs when no-one (including the researcher and the participants) 
can identify who provided the data.  In this study, partial anonymity was achieved by 
using pseudonyms on the interview transcripts so only the researcher was be able to 
link data with participant (Ogden, 2008).  Furthermore, data obtained was edited to 
ensure the participant was not identifiable from other means such as age, occupation 
or distinguishing features (Redsell & Cheater, 2001). 
 
In accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council guidelines on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC, 2007), electronic data was stored on a 
password protected computer and hard copies of data stored in a locked cabinet.  
Participants’ details were kept separate from their responses at all times by use of 
identification codes and the data collected was enough to answer the research 
questions but not excessive.  The data will be held until the study is completed and 
published then destroyed in accordance with the NHMRC (2007) guidelines and Edith 
Cowan University policy. 
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Gaining Ethics approval  
Ethics approval was obtained from the Edith Cowan University Ethics Committee and 
the researcher was required to submit an annual report to maintain the currency of 
ethics approval. 
  
Inclusion criteria 
 Identified genetic predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer. 
 Offered and declined RRS more than six months prior to recruitment. 
 English speaking Western Caucasian women. 
 Age > 18 years. 
 
Exclusion criteria 
 Significant co-morbidity which may shorten life outside potential cancer diagnosis. 
 
Justification for inclusion/exclusion criteria 
The inclusion criteria were necessary to ensure participants were able to provide the 
data required for the study.  A period of at least six months between saying no to RRS 
and study recruitment ensured participants had time to live with the decision.  Non-
western, non-Caucasian women were excluded to avoid cultural influences which may 
impact on decision making, body image and health beliefs and whilst important, were 
not the focus of this study.  Women who had significant co-morbidity and/or a 
potentially life-limiting illness may have attitudes and beliefs which influence health 
behaviours which are not the focus of this study.   
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Step 2: The identifying of salient themes and experiences in the participant’s 
life. 
This step involved the gathering and recording of the participants’ stories of being 
identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer and saying no to RRS. 
Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biographical method contends biographical texts begin 
with a family history and collate a chronological sequence of experiences and events 
in relation to turning point or epiphany moments in the individual’s life.  These turning 
point moments equate with what Dolby-Stahl (1989) referred to as themes or ideas 
within the text and are a means through which the teller of the story reveals personal 
values and character traits.   
 
Dolby-Stahl (1989) posited themes which emerge from personal experience narratives 
often represent items of folklore and cultural norms. In this way, the salient themes 
reflect societal expectations which influence how a person experiences life and tells 
their story (Williams & Holmes, 2005).  In this study, the participants drew from 
communal and personal folklore to try to make sense of their experiences.  For 
example, beliefs about what a woman should look like often conflicted with beliefs 
about how women, especially mothers, should respond to the threat of cancer.   
 
The participants were asked to tell their story, recounting events and experiences 
relating to realising there might be a history of breast/ovarian cancer in the family, 
being identified as having a genetic predisposition to developing breast/ovarian 
cancer and saying no to RRS.  This required the participants to re-live and re-interpret 
certain experiences (Denzin, 1989) and revealed themes and turning point moments 
related to the meanings women attributed to those experiences and attempts to make 
sense of them.   
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Data collection process 
Semi-structured interviews were used to gather biographical data for analysis and 
interpretation.  This was an appropriate method of data collection as it provided a 
focus in terms of the data to be collected but allowed flexibility in terms of the wording 
and sequencing of questions, and clarification of participant responses at the time of 
interview (Parahoo, 2006). An interview guide (Appendix 5) which contained open-
ended questions pertinent to the areas of interest (Bryman, 2004; Polit & Beck, 2010) 
was developed which allowed the researcher to capture the world through the eyes of 
the participants. The interview guide was carefully constructed to gather data which 
would address the study aims whilst avoiding leading and/or ambiguous questions 
and jargon (Bryman, 2004).  The questions whilst open-ended also ensured the 
participants remained focussed on the aims of the study (Polit & Beck, 2010).  The 
final question allowed participants the opportunity to add anything important not 
already covered (Bryman, 2004).  The interviews were tape-recorded for later 
transcription with participant permission.   
 
In keeping with the methodological approach underpinning this study, it was important 
the participants were able to tell their story freely to an interested listener to ensure 
the story told reflected what was important to them and what sense was made of the 
experience at the time.  However, it was also important the data collected was able to 
address the study aims. Consequently the interview guide was used only when the 
participants required prompting and to keep the focus on the experiences related to 
the study aims.  The interviews varied in length from approximately 55 minutes to 90 
minutes. 
 
Field notes 
Field notes are a record of concomitant observations collected by the researcher 
during the conduct of qualitative research (Thorpe, 2008), and facilitate a deeper 
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understanding of the phenomenon under study (Polit & Beck, 2013).  Field notes 
contribute to the construction of an account of personal meanings of experience which 
can be reflected upon at various points during the research study.  
 
In this study, preliminary field notes were completed immediately following the 
interview to avoid disturbing the participant or obstructing the flow (Holloway & 
Wheeler 2010; Polit & Beck, 2013). These were added to when the audio-recordings 
of the interviews were listened to and again when the transcripts were read.  The field 
notes included commentary on but not limited to, the creation of intimacy, the 
participant’s demeanour and mannerisms, initial thoughts, feelings and assumptions, 
participants’ non-verbal communications, any surprising findings/feelings and personal 
reflections of the researcher.  In keeping with Denzin (1989) and Dolby-Stahl (1985), 
they also included reference to what emerged as turning point moments for each 
participant.   
 
The field notes were useful in contextualising the participants’ experiences and for 
collecting evidence of what was not said in their stories.  For example, the 
participants’ were generally reticent about discussing the mastectomised bodies of 
other women in a negative way, but their body language and non-verbal 
communications suggested they held negative views about this.  One participant for 
example, when discussing her sister’s mastectomy, did not say how she would look if 
she lost her breasts but rather said; “I would think I looked [pause] you know?” whilst 
making a squeamish face.   
 
Data analysis 
Following collection and transcribing of the interview data, the participants’ stories 
were analysed for significant events, ideas in the text, themes and categories of most 
concern to the teller and researcher (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  The resulting personal 
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experiences narratives were created by linking non-random events in relation to the 
participants’ experiences in a meaningful way (Denzin, 1989).   The first significant 
cancer death in the family or realisation there might be a family history of cancer in the 
family marked the beginning of the personal experience narrative.  Since the presence 
of a gene fault which predisposes a woman to developing cancer is a permanent 
biological marker, the life trajectory of the participants in relation to turning point or 
epiphany moments up to completion of interviews provided the scope of the personal 
experience narratives. 
 
Key steps in narrative analysis (Blix et al., 2012; Fraser, 2004; Liamputtong, 2009; 
Riessman, 2008) were then applied within the framework of Denzin’s (1989) 
interpretive biographical method as follows.  Following transcription, the audio 
recordings of the participants’ personal experience narratives were listened to so the 
stories were heard and the emotions of the participants experienced.  Simultaneously, 
the transcribed texts were read to immerse the researcher in the data.  Field notes 
were consulted and a reflexive journal maintained to describe feelings and emerging 
thoughts and considerations.  The transcripts were then read again carefully line by 
line and points of interest, importance and significance highlighted on the transcripts.  
The researcher worked with one personal experience narrative at a time, isolating and 
ordering relevant episodes into a chronological biographical account.  Attention was 
paid to the types and directions of the personal experience narratives and any conflict 
and contradictions present.  Individual personal experience narratives were analysed 
for themes, ideas, epiphany moments, underlying assumptions, what was 
emphasised, what was glossed over, pauses, gaps and silences and what these 
suggested.  The overall focus was on illuminating patterns of meaning and 
experience.  Following this, a process of interpretation took place to make sense of 
the participants’ experiences by illuminating larger cultural contexts and ideological 
forces which shaped experience (Denzin, 1989).  Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary 
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folkloristic methodology was applied using the techniques of Foucauldian, Marxist and 
Feminist literary criticism.  This process is discussed in Step 7.  
 
Step 3: The connecting of the subject’s life history and life story to larger social 
meaning, including communal and private folklore. 
In this study, the participants told stories about their experiences of being identified as 
having a BRCA1/2 mutation then being offered and saying no to RRS.  However, a 
personal experience narrative is not an independent production:  the woman’s story is 
emitted outward when told but is taken inward into a social group where it acquires 
structure, meaning and context (Denzin, 1989).   
 
Barnett (1998, p. 194) described personal experience narratives as “embedded texts 
that connect the social and the private”.  This compares with Dolby-Stahl’s (1985, 
1989) concepts of communal and private folklore.  Communal folklore is that which is 
shared in the social world while private folklore is that which is exclusively generated 
by a particular group, in this case, the high risk women who said no to RRS.  
Communal folklore is identified within texts as representations of traditional ideas 
which symbolise ideas, values and themes which are widely held in the 
cultural/societal group and thus allow creation of a social reality (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  
Communal folklore serves as a form of “collective memory” (Trubshaw, 2002, p. 43) 
which delineates how people function in society and how women should look and act.  
However, high risk women who say no to RRS may develop private folklore as a 
result of their shared experiences.  Private folklore concerns deeply personal and 
idiosyncratic values and ideas which create meaning in a text but are usually excluded 
from communal folklore (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  Thus searching for private folklore 
embedded in the participants’ stories facilitates the creation of meaning of the inner 
life of the teller.  Inherent in this is acknowledgement the participants’ experiences 
although personal, occurred within Western society and must, therefore, be 
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interpreted in light of social structures and ideologies which shape and influence how 
a life is lived and experienced (Denzin, 1989).   
 
Women are social beings who translate signs into meaning to make sense of the 
world.  Personal stories and those inherited from others are brought to bear on 
experience to create order and make sense of experience (Denzin, 1989; Frank, 
1995; Rosenbaum & Roos, 2000).    The participants in this study created their own 
stories but also inherited stories from others in society in relation to the breasts, 
ovaries, cancer and surrounding folklore.  On the one hand, the breasts and ovaries 
symbolise femininity and womanhood and Western society expects women possess 
these organs (Ehlers & Krupar, 2012).  Simultaneously, Western discourse demands 
women keep themselves healthy, nurture the family and generally conform to what is 
expected of the female role (Acero, 2012; Gibbon, 2006).   This study argued that 
these conforming standards included being compliant with Western medical discourse 
which constructed RRS as a utilitarian option for staying healthy.  To understand the 
decision to say no to RRS, one must understand the wider societal discourses and 
communal folklore which permeate Western society. 
 
Personal experience narratives then are created from stories which are both learned 
and told in cultural and social groups (Denzin, 1989) reflective of the discourses and 
power relations of the time (Riessman, 2008).  The participants’ experiences of their 
disruptive life events and the telling of them are contextually bound to social, cultural 
and historical milieus.  To understand the life of the woman and the experiences 
contained within it, one must seek to understand these larger structures which impact 
upon how a life is lived and experienced (Denzin, 1989).  In this study, this step 
involved connecting biographies and lived experiences including epiphanies, to the 
groups, conventions and social, cultural and historical relationships which surround 
and shape people’s lives (Surr, 2006).  Accordingly, the participants’ personal 
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experience narratives and the epiphanies contained within them were contextualised 
against a backdrop of social, gender and medical discourses which define what 
women look like, how women behave and how women respond to the threat of 
cancer.  Linking the participants’ stories to wider social meanings involved 
consideration of how dominant discourses and social conventions shaped the 
interpretive framework for understanding the personal experience narrative (Fraser, 
2004). Their personal experience narratives were cultural productions which mirrored 
and reflected characteristics, values and beliefs which are shared in the society which 
produced them (Lewis, 2010).   Dundes (1980) advocates such cultural productions 
are lore and should be contextualised within the social and cultural constructs of the 
folk who produce them and their shared cultural background.  
  
Dolby-Stahl (1989) proposed eight key folk groups which shape a storyteller’s life and 
provide understanding of their social world: family, ethnic, religion, place, age, sex, 
social network and occupation.  Of particular relevance to this study, these folk groups 
typically generate and maintain folklore in relation to gender, heritage, familial ties, 
relationships and kinship.  Communal folklore equates having two breasts and ovaries 
with femininity and womanhood and constructs women as self-sacrificing, nurturing 
individuals who put the needs of the family first (Acero, 2012).   Simultaneously, 
cancer folklore conveys everyone to be at risk of cancer and a taken-for-granted 
assumption medicine is the assumed solution to cancer (Clarke & Everest, 2006).  
This communal folklore is reinforced by the medicalisation of women’s bodies which 
positions the doctor as expert over women and suggests sensible women do 
whatever it takes to stay healthy for the sake of the family.   In this study, it was 
argued larger societal meanings acquired through discourse, ideology and communal 
folklore transmitted conflicting messages to women at high risk of developing 
breast/ovarian cancer.  This highlighted the conflict and contradiction which may exist 
between cultural/societal and personal realities therefore it was not surprising high risk 
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women who said no to RRS developed a private folklore to make sense of their 
experiences and explain their behaviours.  
 
In summary, in order to understand the decision to say no to RRS, it was necessary to 
understand the experiences of the participants which led them to the decision to 
refuse surgery, and to contextualise these socially, culturally and historically.  Allowing 
the participants to tell their stories illuminated the reality of these women’s lives and 
exposed the disunity between societal expectations and real life experiences and 
between communal and private folklore.  
 
Step 4: Understanding that the subject’s life story reflects a set of meaningful 
experiences which, when told create an emotional bond between the teller and 
the listener. 
A central assumption of Dolby-Stahl’s (1989, 1985) methodological approach is 
personal experience narratives are replete with private folklore and express aspects of 
the inner life of the storyteller.  The revelation of private folklore was a crucial step in 
understanding the experiences which led to the decision to say no to RRS.  Dolby-
Stahl (1985) further contended since private folklore is selectively rather than widely 
shared, it will only be revealed during the research process when intimacy is present 
between the teller and the researcher-as-listener.  The creation of intimacy is thus a 
pre-requisite for uncovering meaningful experiences, epiphanies and private folklore.   
 
For Dolby-Stahl (1985), intimacy is the creation of an emotional bond between two 
people who are considered to be of equal status and is essential if authentic 
interpretations of the text are to occur.  Intimacy develops between the participant and 
the researcher-as-listener because there exists a shared body of knowledge and 
realisation the experience is mutually understood (Williams & Holmes, 2005).  
Moreover, the creation of intimacy guarantees the value and importance of the 
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participants’ responses and avoids the participant feeling devalued in the research 
process (Williams & Holmes, 2005).  This is particularly relevant in studies where 
participants struggle to have their voice heard because their actions are at odds with 
dominant discourses and communal folklore, such as the participants in this study.  
 
The creation of intimacy was an explicit aim in this study and the researcher took 
steps to facilitate emotional bonding with the participants prior to and during the 
interviews.  Participants initially responded to an advertisement placed in local 
newspapers which was carefully worded to reach out to women using plain language 
and requested an initial telephone contact from the women to a named researcher 
(the Principal Investigator).  A separate mobile phone was used for this purpose and 
the researcher took care during the initial contact to sound friendly and gently outline 
the study aims.  A balance was struck between creating intimacy and ensuring the 
participants gave consent freely. The researcher explained her interest in the study 
and what she aimed to achieve by collecting the participants’ stories.   
 
The interviews were arranged at a mutually convenient time and place, mostly in the 
participants’ homes.  Those who requested to be interviewed out-with the home were 
easily accommodated by arranging a quiet, private room in a local library or 
interviewing in a friend’s home.  The researcher was mindful to make this process as 
straightforward as possible to build a bond with the participants and facilitate the 
creation of intimacy.  It was also necessary to ensure the participants knew that the 
experience was mutually understood as intimacy develops when the researcher 
shares aspects of the teller’s folk group (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  This was achieved 
through a short explanation of the researcher’s interest in their stories and through an 
exchange of information about shared aspects of life such as children, employment 
and general life experiences.  
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Dolby-Stahl (1985) also argued that people who choose to tell their stories to an 
interested listener seek the creation of intimacy as a way of sharing private folklore.  
The creation of intimacy was therefore an aim of both the teller and the researcher.  It 
is precisely this desire for intimacy which motivated the participants to engage in the 
storytelling process in order that private folklore and personal meaning were unveiled: 
“without apology, the personal narrative makes a gesture toward intimacy” (Dolby-
Stahl, 1985, p. 48).   
 
It was apparent the participants in this study were eager to tell their stories and 
grateful for the opportunity to be listened to.  This suggested that the participants 
enjoyed the experience of intimacy through telling their story to an interested listener 
who did not judge them or attempt to persuade them otherwise.  All participants 
commented they had, at times, felt unable to discuss their experiences with people 
close to them for fear of causing distress or being misunderstood.   
 
In summary, the creation of intimacy and the telling of the story to the researcher-as-
listener drew the researcher into the teller’s world and allowed illumination of 
epiphanies and turning point moments which shaped the teller’s life and contributed to 
the story told.  Focussing on the researcher’s desire to tell the participants’ stories and 
to shape understanding of their experiences, meant the participants felt listened to 
without being judged and all expressed gratitude at being able to tell their story to an 
interested listener.   
 
Step 5: Realising that the private, inner meanings of these experiences to the 
subject can never be fully illuminated. 
Utilising literary folkloristic methodology requires the listener to enter the world of the 
teller and perceive the world through the teller’s perspective (Hendricks, 1999; 
Williams & Holmes, 2005). The creation of intimacy (Dolby-Stahl, 1985) draws the 
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researcher-as-listener into an intersubjective agreement with the participant-as-teller 
as to how the participant’s experience was.  The stories told covered a section of each 
participant’s life including epiphany moments in their life trajectory, which were offered 
as legitimate accounts of experience.  The participants were recognised as experts of 
their own experiences (Grassley & Nelms, 2009); however, the role of the 
audience/listener in applying their own interpretation to what was said and heard was 
equally acknowledged (Gray, 2007).  Thus personal, social, cultural and historical 
influences on both teller and listener shape the story told and heard, making the entire 
process an interactive and creative act (Dolby-Stahl, 1989) open to multiple 
interpretations (Denzin, 1989). 
 
In this study, the participants were asked to tell their stories for a purpose: to address 
the research aims, allow the researcher to make-meaning of their experiences and 
communicate this meaning to a wider audience.  The participants’ personal 
experience narratives were literary productions because the story-teller continually 
deliberates on what to say and what to keep silent (Dolby-Stahl, 1985) depending on 
the cultural and societal conventions of the time (Denzin, 1989; Thorne et al., 2004).  
Moreover, the participants in in this study communicated their stories through 
language from which literary texts, in the form of personal experience narratives, were 
created.  
 
Integral to this study then is how the teller uses language to tell the story and how the 
language/story is interpreted by another (Bornat, 2008; Williams & Holmes, 2005), in 
this case, the researcher.  Language is recognised as a socially constructed medium 
which creates rather than describes reality (Haralambos & Holborn, 2000) and which 
acquires meaning through time and context bound social practices (Sandberg, 2005).  
Thus language is not abstract but rather confers meaning within particular discourses.  
The unstable, ambiguous and changing nature of language mean a number of 
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differing interpretations of what reality is potentially exist (Denzin, 1989; Haralambos & 
Holborn, 2000).  This in turn means a straightforward representation of reality is 
unachievable as the ‘truth’ of any story is dependent upon future readers’ 
interpretations of it (Frank, 1995; Gray, 2007).  In keeping with Denzin (1989), the 
researcher’s aim was to present a credible interpretation of the personal experience 
narrative, one which demonstrated verisimilitude, whilst acknowledging it is one of 
many which could have occurred.   
 
The approach in this study held that the literary texts produced by the participants 
were reflective of personal, social, cultural and historical influences on the life lived 
and contained reference to communal and personal folklore.  Their stories were 
interpreted through the use of language and by the researcher actively drawing out 
meaning and understanding not necessarily articulated in the texts (Bornat, 2008).  
The telling of the story to an informed listener (Dolby-Stahl, 1985) was a joint 
enterprise which utilised shared interpretive practices (Bornat, 2008).  However, 
although the participants were exposed to communal folklore and shared aspects of 
private folklore, each participant’s story was different; therefore an overall depiction of 
one universal reality was not possible (Gray, 2007).  Additionally, the act of telling a 
story to a listener requires the teller to re-live and re-interpret the experience in 
response to their own and others’ reactions to it (Denzin, 1989).  Rich (1972, p. 18) 
referred to this process as “re-vision”: a process whereby storytellers look back at 
experience through fresh eyes as new insights into experience are gained through 
revisiting the story.  Consequently, the inner experiences of the study participants can 
never be fully illuminated as there are multiple un-ending numbers of possible stories 
which could have been told.  Moreover, the subjective nature of language and plurality 
of the text means there can be no final or fixed meaning located in the participants’ 
stories.  This was acknowledged by Denzin (1989) and Dolby-Stahl (1985) who 
conceded it is not possible to become the person telling the story therefore it is not 
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possible to know everything the teller knows: the most the researcher can do is 
present a credible interpretation of the participants’ experiences whilst accepting other 
interpretations of experience and the meanings attached to them were possible and 
may yet occur in the future. 
 
Step 6: Interpreting the materials by sharing in the world of the experience of 
the subject. 
Dolby-Stahl (1985) described an informed listener as one who shares aspects of the 
participants’ folk group and takes steps to become as fully informed about the 
phenomenon under investigation as possible.  Likewise, Denzin (2001, p. 67) used 
the term “informed reader” to describe someone who knows the language used in the 
participant’s story; knows at least partially the biography of the teller; is able to take 
the teller’s perspective and shares some of the experiences of the teller.  The 
informed reader also accepts meaning is created through the response to the story 
and takes steps to secure an interpretation which is faithful to the storyteller’s 
perspective.   
 
In this study, the researcher was motivated by a genuine desire to enter into the 
worlds of the participants, to create understanding of their experiences and to make 
meaning of the decision to say no to RRS.  The researcher is a woman in Western 
society and as such, shared aspects of the participants’ folk group and was exposed 
to the same dominant discourses and ideological influences which impact on how a 
life is lived and experienced.  Through the creation of intimacy and immersion in the 
participants’ stories, the researcher was able to come to know the biographies of the 
tellers and take the participants’ perspectives in the stories told.  The researcher was 
well informed about the phenomena under investigation through completion of a 
comprehensive literature review on topics relevant to the study.  The researcher also 
drew upon prior experience working with women having genetic counselling for HBOC 
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and both affected women and high risk women undergoing breast/ovarian surgery.  
This provided prior understandings which were incorporated into the interpretation of 
the participants’ experiences to create new understanding (Denzin, 2001).  Finally, the 
researcher acknowledged the interpretation provided is one of many possible 
interpretations which could have been made of the participants’ experiences.  
 
Step 7: Bringing the interpretive approaches of literary theory and criticism to 
bear on the life story materials. 
Dolby-Stahl (1989) argued personal experience narratives were literary works since a 
single truth cannot be presented; rather the listener actively interprets the story being 
told in a literary process. Moreover, whilst anyone can listen to a narrative or story and 
offer an account of what they believe it to mean, an informed listener (Dolby-Stahl, 
1985) is able to interpret the story in such a way as to make it collectively meaningful 
through the application of the techniques of literary interpretation and critique (Denzin, 
1989).   An informed listener uses literary theory to deconstruct stories of experience 
and offer an interpretation in light of social, cultural and historical influences thereby 
demonstrating how their particular interpretation came about (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  
Such literary techniques, therefore, capture the spoken word as text which may be 
later analysed and interpreted to create understanding of certain life experiences, or 
as Dolby-Stahl (1985) suggested, provide a means by which the teller can teach the 
listener to know her/him better.   
 
Integral to this is the connection of biographically meaningful experiences to the 
society in which the participants lived and to larger social, cultural and historical 
structures which influence how a life is lived and experienced (Denzin, 1989).  The 
literary nature of personal experience narratives and the resolve to uncover folklore 
involves the use of an interpretive framework based on various literary theories, an 
approach which enables the researcher to make sense of the personal experience 
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narratives in light of both communal and personal folklore (Williams & Holmes, 2005).  
In this study, Foucauldian, Marxist and Feminist literary theories informed the analysis 
and interpretation of the personal experience narratives and allowed an interpretation 
which was both culturally and personally grounded (Hendricks, 1999).  The following 
section describes and justifies the application of these literary theories in this study. 
 
Overview of Literary Theory 
Literary theory is defined as “the systematic account of the nature of literature and the 
methods for analysing it” (Culler, 2011, p. 1).  Literary theory informs literary criticism 
which Newton (1990) contended is concerned with interpretation, highlighting 
distinction must be drawn between reading written works and understanding and 
interpreting same works.   Literary theory can be understood as a tool used in the 
practical reading of the text (Brewton, 2005) to understand the many different ways of 
interpreting text (Eaglestone, 1999).  Contemporary literary theory creates a 
relationship between the author, the literary work and the reader and allows 
examination of the ways in which race, gender, class and so forth are represented in 
literature and may influence the author’s perspective (Brewton, 2005).   Literary theory 
therefore provides a lens for the study of literature and also for the analysis of cultural, 
historical and social influences which both create the text and influence how it is 
interpreted.  
 
Various schools of literary theory exist, each with a set of assumptions or theoretical 
positions which allow critics to offer an interpretation of the text in relation to aspects 
or characteristics of the work considered most important (Culler, 2011).  Culler (2011) 
cautioned against treating these schools as competing approaches because they 
share similarities as well as differences: all focus on how the reader responds to the 
text.  Thus literary theory is most useful when it is used to problematise social and 
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cultural assumptions as this allows an exploration of how meaning is created (Bertens 
2008; Culler, 2011).  
   
The birth of modern literary theory is attributed to the nineteenth century German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of knowledge and his theory facts only 
existed after they had been interpreted (Brewton, 2005).   Nietzsche’s (1873) 
influential essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral Sense” presented a persuasive 
thesis on language and literature, and contended no text speaks for itself: meaning is 
only acquired through an interpreting reader.  More recently, the 1930s School of 
Formalism took a structuralist approach which was concerned with literary form and 
focussed on the structures of language rather than thoughts, feelings or subject 
matter within the literary text (Eagleton, 1996).  The Formalist approach was criticised 
on the basis literary devices found in the ‘special’ language of literature were also 
found in everyday language, and it failed to consider the context in which the 
language/literary work was produced (Eagleton, 1996).  This criticism came to be 
seen as a serious flaw as the world changed socio-economically and politically and 
poststructuralist critical approaches which focussed on social, cultural and political 
contexts took centre stage (Bertens, 2008; Eagleton, 1996).  
 
Poststructuralist approaches consider literature in light of social, cultural and 
ideological influences on what was written and how it could be interpreted (Eagleton, 
1996).  Language is considered as process rather than structure as it is the means 
through which literary productions are communicated. Language is purposeful: it is 
constructed and employed for a reason hence rather than representing reality, 
language effectively creates reality because what is said and heard acquires meaning 
through language and the social conditions in which it is defined and used (Holcombe, 
2007; Sandberg, 2005).  Hence there can be no single truthful interpretation of an 
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experience: interpretation was temporary and only applicable to the discourse in 
which it was produced (Denzin, 1989; Dolby-Stahl, 1985).   
 
In keeping with Denzin’s (1987) and Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) methodological approach, 
application of poststructuralist literary theory was therefore appropriate in this study.  
The participants in this study communicated their stories of experience through 
language which was then converted into a literary text.  They told a story, one of many 
which could have been told: an edited version of reality which shared what was 
important to the participants’ and how they made sense of experience at the time.  
The participants’ stories and the meanings attached were acknowledged as temporal, 
plural and open to multiple interpretations.  This was of great importance, as one can 
never accurately replicate a life or life experience; therefore, the focus was on the text 
created by the individual and not the individual per se (Denzin, 1989).  Therefore, 
participant’s personal experience narratives were analysed for specific purposes and 
enabled a focus on meaning in the text from which an understanding of their private 
folklore was created.  The following sections discuss and justify the literary theories 
utilised in this study namely Marxist, Foucauldian and Feminist literary theory.  
 
Marxist Literary Theory 
Introduction 
Marxist literary theory is a form of critical inquiry which interrogates all societies and 
their texts in relation to shared attitudes within a culture and specific issues including 
class, gender and race (Bertens, 2008).  It contends subconscious drivers determine 
how individuals perceive and situate themselves within society:  “it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness” (Marx 1859, cited in Bertens, 2008, p. 63).  In other 
words, an individual’s social circumstances determine his or her life.  This in itself is 
not controversial: for example, a relationship exists between poverty/wealth and the 
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development of certain diseases, or life opportunities.  However, Marxists are 
sceptical of the belief individuals could alter personal life circumstances through 
education, employment or such, arguing instead capitalist society is structured in a 
way to maintain power in the hands of the ruling classes.   
 
Marx postulated society’s base determined its superstructure (Bertens, 2008): 
economics is the base upon which the superstructure of social, political and 
ideological realities are built.  Education, the Arts including literature, culture, religion, 
institutions such as medicine and the legal system and values and beliefs are 
contained within the superstructure and as such are primarily influenced by economic 
drivers (Bertens, 2008).  Marxist literary theory contends the way in which society is 
organised drives the production of literary texts: literature is a production of capitalist 
society not a reflection of it (Tyson, 2015).  Literary texts are analysed for themes 
which illuminate ‘hidden’ messages which identify and maintain the position of the 
ruling classes.   
 
The methodological approach taken in this study presupposed living occurs within a 
construct, therefore to understand the participants’ decisions to say no to RRS, one 
must understand the social, cultural and historical milieus which led to that decision.  
Since Western society is a capitalist society in which ideology shapes human 
experience (Denzin, 1990), Marxist literary theory provided a useful means of 
examining the participants’ stories for themes in relation to beliefs about gender, 
sexuality, the family and other social and cultural influences relevant to the study.   
Several key areas of Marxist thought are particularly relevant to this study and a 
summary of these now follows. 
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Ideology 
The concept of ideology and its importance in organising and controlling human 
behaviour is central to Marxist literary theory. In its broadest sense, ideology is a 
belief system (Tyson, 2015).  Eagleton (1996, p. 13) defined ideology as a “concealed 
structure of values which informs and underlies our factual statements” and explained 
ideology encompasses an individual’s unconscious images of themselves and others. 
Marx argued ideology created a “false consciousness” (Bennett & Royle, 1999, p. 
161), a false representation of society, for example, that disease is caused primarily 
by lifestyle choices as opposed to economic and social deprivation.  This false 
consciousness existed subliminally and persuaded individuals of the rightfulness of 
the class/capitalist system, directed people in how they should live their lives and 
prevented recognition of the true society which repressed them (Bennett & Royle, 
1999; Tyson, 2015).   
 
The French Marxist Louis Althusser (1918 – 1990) expanded Marx’s concept of 
ideology to include a critique of the ways in which systems and structures in society 
maintained and reproduced ideologies. Sawyer (2002) views Althusser’s concept of 
ideology as an extension of Gramsci’s (1971) original notion of hegemony. That is the 
State exerted power over its inhabitants through both coercive and subtle means of 
control: ideology is a form of invisible power which acts as a social regulator.  
Althusser (1971) used the term ‘ideological State apparatuses’ to describe key 
agencies involved in maintaining ideological control of the population including the 
Church, the media, political parties, the family, schools, medicine and cultural 
agencies such as the Arts, literature and those associated with sport.  Distinction was 
drawn between repressive State apparatuses which sat in the public domain and 
included the police, penal system and the army, and ideological State apparatuses 
which sat in the private domain, such as those identified above.  Althusser (1971) 
further argued although separate entities, repressive and ideological State 
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apparatuses were interlinked and neither entirely excluded the other: although 
medicine is a form of ideological control, it has certain rules which can exclude and 
curtail, for example being removed from a General Practitioner’s patient list or being 
denied a particular treatment if certain symptoms cannot be proven to exist.   
 
The most successful ideologies are those which appear natural or given (Bennett & 
Royle, 1999; Tyson, 2015) which perpetuates their legitimacy and influence (Kroska, 
2007).  For example, gender ideologies serve as unconscious drivers for taken-for-
granted beliefs about male and female behaviours in relation to the family (Davis & 
Greenstein, 2009), including the woman’s role as carer, nurturer and homemaker 
(Acero, 2012; Kroska, 2007; Mikkola, 2012; Warner & Procaccino, 2004) and 
responsibility for the health of families Acero, 2012; Ferguson & Kasper, 2000).   The 
natural authenticity of ideology validates individuals as free, that is outside ideology, 
when in reality they are within ideology.  Thus ideology effectively denies its own 
existence.  Althusser (1971, p. 175) explains this paradox thus:  
That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by 
definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is 
the practical denegation [original emphasis] of the ideological 
character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, “I am 
ideological”. 
Althusserian theorising of ideology has been criticised for suggesting ideology was 
oppressive to the point of subjugation (Eagleton, 1976) thus leaving little room for 
ideological struggle.  However, it could equally be argued that Althusser’s theory does 
allow for ideological struggle to be analysed since it contends all humans are 
inherently ideological (Bennett & Royle, 1999) and thus define themselves as 
individuals through ideology.  Herein lies the crux of Althusser’s argument: individuals 
create personal ideologies whilst ideology simultaneously creates individuals as 
subjects.  Hence, ideology is both an internal and an external driving force leaving 
scope for individuals to create personal ideologies which challenge or resist the 
dominant externally driven ideological forces.   
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To sum up, the concept of ideology is central to Marxist literary interpretation and 
critique.  Ideology functions as a means of social control because what appears 
natural or given is intended to maintain the power of the ruling classes in capitalist 
society.  A Marxist critique is therefore concerned with the ideological function of 
literary texts and seeks to reveal underlying social and political significances 
concealed within the text which perpetuate the reproduction of social power.  The 
following section explores the ideological function of literature in more depth. 
 
Literature as an ideological tool 
A Marxist critique contends literature is a product of socioeconomic and ideological 
conditions rather than a reflection of such, since authors are humans and humans are 
products of ideological and cultural conditions (Tyson, 2015).  Tyson (2015) further 
argued the critique of literature can encourage a robust examination of historical and 
material conditions and ideologies hence literature is inextricably linked to historical, 
social and cultural practices which influence both its production and how it is read.   
 
From this, an understanding of literature as an ideological tool in Western society is 
achieved.  Literature produces and is produced by ideology (Bennett & Royle, 1999), 
reflects “the ideology from which it is born” (Althusser, 1971, p. 222) and functions to 
allow individuals to see what the ruling classes allow to be seen (Eagleton, 1996).   
Eagleton (1996) further contended literature became an agent for the reproduction of 
ideology when religion began to lose its pacifying influence on the working classes in 
Victorian times.  Religious ideology demanded individuals lived a meek life, 
conformed to social norms, were self-sacrificing and generally worked hard to achieve 
an ‘honest’ living which created the “social cement” (Eagleton, 1996, p. 20) in society.  
However, as religion began to lose appeal and the working classes began to demand 
more, ‘English literature’ emerged as an academic subject through which desirable 
morals, values and behaviours were promoted which allowed individuals to 
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understand what a ‘good citizen’ was and how one should act in society.  Qualities 
such as generosity, patriotism, heroism and tolerance were identified as timeless 
truths which individuals should seek to exhibit, thus distracting the working classes 
from socio-economic issues such as low wages, poor housing and working conditions 
and ill-health (Eagleton, 1996).  Literary texts were therefore considered as sites of 
ideology production and reproduction.  The text was not a passive reflection of 
ideology but rather a site of conflict and difference, where values, prejudices, beliefs, 
knowledge and social structures were produced and transformed (Bennett & Royle, 
1999).   
 
Macherey (1978) further proposed literary works were tied to ideology as much by 
what they did not say as by what they did.  The presence of ideology is also felt in the 
significant silences, gaps and absences in a text because some things are 
“ideologically forbidden” (Eagleton, 1976, p. 32) thus unable to be said.  These gaps 
are unintentionally omitted from the author’s text and imply the text is always 
incomplete, because there is always something else which could have been said, had 
it not been silenced by ideology (Eagleton, 1976).  A Marxist critique aims to make the 
silences speak and reveal the unconscious content which resides behind the 
expressed text to expose the conflict between the spoken and unspoken text and the 
text’s relationship to ideology (Abrams & Harpham, 2009).  Thus, understanding of a 
text requires the reader to consider both what is present and what is not; the unsaid, 
the glossed over and the ignored, and to link these to social, cultural and historical 
influences on the production of the text.  Accordingly, examining gaps in the 
participants’ personal experience narratives exposed what women may have felt 
unable to say because it conflicted with ideology.  It may be postulated that the 
participants’ narratives revealed gaps and significant silences which may represent 
resistance to the prevailing dominant ideologies and which were reflective of individual 
ideology and private folklore.    
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Medicine and ideology 
A Marxist critique of Western medicine identifies medicine as an ideological tool which 
mirrors society’s class structure and maintains patterns of domination (Waitzkin, 1984, 
1989).  Waitzkin (1984, 1989) contended Western medicine’s authority to determine 
who was fit to work exposed medicine as an institution of social control and medical 
encounters as sites for the transmission of ideological messages.   Waitzkin’s (1984) 
seminal research examined transcripts of medical encounters and found the doctor-
patient interaction contained ideological themes and messages which reinforced 
existing patterns of domination and relations of economic production.   
 
Of particular note, Waitzkin (1984) found a key way in which medical social control 
occurred was through support for the institution of the family.  From a Marxist 
perspective, the relationship between the family and successful economic production 
in capitalist societies is paramount. The role of the female in both economic 
production and sexual reproduction places women central to the maintenance of a 
healthy productive workforce.  Women function as the ‘gatekeepers for health’ (Acero, 
2012; Warner & Procaccino, 2004) and take primary responsibility for the family’s 
health (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Lerner, 2000). Patterns of sexuality, child rearing 
and stereotypical roles including the female as mother, homemaker and nurturer, 
sustain the population’s acquiescence and participation in economic production 
(Waitzkin, 1984, 1989).  Women who disregard health messages in relation to 
breast/ovarian cancer development are therefore putting not only themselves, but also 
the institution of the family at risk.  
 
Ideological messages communicated through doctor-patient interactions are endorsed 
by other ideological state apparatuses including the education system and the media 
and legitimised by the symbolic impact of medical science (Waitzkin, 1984).  Again, 
these messages assume a willing patient who shares the societal (ideological) view 
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sensible people do what is expected of them to stay healthy and fit for work. 
Moreover, a ‘good’ patient is accepting of their illness or condition, compliant with 
medical instructions and acquiesces to the requirements of the medical institution 
(Ferrie, 2010). Barry, Bradley, Britten, Stevenson and Barber (2000) also found 
doctor-patient consultations were generally conducted in the “voice of medicine” (p. 
1250) and patients behaved in consultations as they were expected to behave rather 
than how they would have liked to behave. It was further reported the actions and 
beliefs of doctors influenced what patients said in consultations again suggesting 
medical ideology acts as a form of social control.  Similarly, Martin (2014) contended 
the voice of medicine remains dominant in medicine because it is doctors who control 
the consultation and because both doctors and patients are socialised into particular 
ways of acting in medical consultations.  This may occur because in medical 
discourse, the voice of the doctor is seen as factual, objective and active whereas 
patients’ voices may be reduced to emotional and subjective qualifiers (Davis, 2008).  
The use of medical jargon and an emphasis on disease processes and specific body 
parts rather than the person further normalises medical techniques and endorses 
medical ideology about what is best for the patient (Bunton & Burrows, 1995; Martin, 
2014).  
 
Importantly, normalising medical techniques according to Bunton & Burrows (1995) 
reflected a change from medicine as care of the sick, injured and diseased to an 
institution which targeted the general ‘healthy’ population.  Nettleton and Burrows 
(1998, p. 156) further identified a general consensus existed within medical literature 
that medicine had entered a new paradigm and was “generally governed by notions of 
surveillance or risk”.  Risk has become an increasingly prominent feature of modern 
medicine and popularisation of the language of risk is linked to ideological notions of 
health and health promotion (Peterson & Wilkinson, 2008).   
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Webster (2002) argued health surveillance, notions of risk and the capability to 
identify what conditions an individual is genetically predisposed to have blurred the 
boundaries between health and ill-health, increased the extent of the medical gaze 
and created patients without symptoms, occupying a “therapeutic limbo” (Webster, 
2002, p. 445) which triggered more, rather than less uncertainty for these individuals.  
Western medical ideology is increasingly concerned with the ideology of “genetic 
determinism” (Finkler, 2000, p. 4) which in effect creates a breakdown of the body’s 
boundaries and allows medicine to enter into the lives of people who are not yet 
diagnosed with disease but rather are at risk of developing disease. Finkler (2000) 
contended women who belonged to breast cancer families were transformed from 
active beings to passive patients as a result of medical ideology of the genetic 
inheritance of disease.   This is supported by Earle, Foley, Komaromy and Lloyd 
(2009) who drew attention to the changing nature of surveillance medicine and an 
increasing concern with health surveillance, biotechnology and geneticisation, issues 
which directly impact on the participants in this study and their families: the presence 
of a gene fault means women who are disease-free are also expected to fulfil the 
ideology of the compliant patient.  
 
A Marxist analysis was necessary to illuminate the dominant ideological forces which 
impacted on the study participants and which created and maintained social order and 
processes.  Ideology is sustained through various institutions, including the institution 
of medicine, and is reproduced in literary texts.  Gendered divisions of labour in 
capitalist society situate women as nurturer and primary carer for the family and 
encourage women to make health decisions based on what is best for the family.   
 
The success of capitalism is dependent upon a highly commodified society (Irvine, 
2002). Capitalist ideology transforms goods, services and even the human body into 
commodities (Gerstein Pineau, 2011) which can be exchanged in the market 
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economy.   In modern Western society, health care is no exception. Moody (2011) 
argued health care commodification occurred in tandem with the development of the 
modern hospital.  Furthermore Moody (2011) claimed that the nature of contemporary 
medicine means hospitals compete for demand for health care services.  
Consultations, diagnoses, treatments and medical interventions are all argued to be 
commodities which have an associated value or price in return for improvements to 
health.  Health care thus has an exchange value, that is, profit is able to be created 
because medicine has a use-value which people are willing to pay for, such as good 
health, freedom from disease and longevity.  Health care becomes an act of exchange 
in the market system irrespective of the directness of payment whether it be direct-to-
consumer payment, payment through health insurance schemes such as in Australia 
(Cancer Australia, 2015) or through ‘single payer’ schemes such as the UK NHS 
system (Moody, 2011) where the State is effectively the consumer, purchasing health 
services for its citizens.  Particularly germane in the context of this study are issues of 
commodification of women, their bodies and genes, a critique of which now follows. 
 
Commodification, genetics and the HBOC journey 
The concept of the commodity is an important strand of Marxist critical theory.  The 
term commodity pre-dates Marx and was used to refer to any entity considered useful 
or which satisfied human needs (Sammond, 2007).   Marx developed the concept of 
commodity in relation to capitalism, arguing the market concealed the true nature of 
the production of goods by commodifying labour and the products of labour.  A 
commodity is “an economically valued good within a relationship of exchange” 
(Hanson, 1999, p. 268).  Marx used the term ‘commodity fetishism’ to describe the 
process whereby commodities are endowed with enigmatic and emblemic qualities 
which made them appear to be of value in themselves rather than for any utility or 
use-value (Jenkins, 2011).  The usefulness of a commodity is determined by its 
physical properties whereas the value of a commodity is constituted by its social worth 
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(Thomas-Pollei, 2008).  The value of a commodity is thus measured not only in 
monetary terms, but also for its exchange value.  People come to desire and 
subsequently consume commodities, even when they have little use for them.  The 
nature of capitalist society requires this because when commodities are fetishised, or 
fixated upon, people are prevented from seeing the reality of exploitation upon which 
capitalism is built (Sharp, 2000). 
 
Lock and Nguyen (2010, p. 1711) define commodification as “the production or 
conversion of ideas, knowledge and objects into items which are considered useful 
and/or have exchange value”.  The success of capitalism is dependent on the 
generation of profit so increasing commodification is an essential feature of capitalist 
societies (Allan, 1998).   In the capitalist society, commodification of individuals occurs 
as people are reduced to objects with an associated monetary value in terms of ability 
to produce goods or social status.   
 
A key requirement of commodification is alienation; “the capacity of a given 
commodity, and specific classes of commodity, to be physically and morally separated 
from their sellers” (Castree, 2003, p. 279).  If a product or service is not able to be 
alienated, it is protected from market forces and the marketplace.  This concept raises 
questions regarding the ownership of human bodies and body parts, including an 
individual’s genetic material (Andrews, 2006; Hanson, 1999, 2002).  From this, until 
relatively recently, genes in particular were protected from market forces since they 
were unable to be alienated, or separated from their ‘owners’.  However, advances in 
genetic and biotechnology now allow human genes to be isolated, cloned, copied and 
used for commercial purposes (Hanson, 2002; Thomas-Pollei, 2008) and therefore 
commodified.   
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Biotechnology is described as the science of using living things to produce goods and 
services (McCormick & Kautto, 2013).  Parry (2008) concurs with Radin’s (1987) 
seminal work which claimed the biotechnology-aided global marketplace for human 
body tissue and parts required a new conceptual framework for understanding 
commodification.  Parry (2008) claimed such biotechnologies transformed body parts 
into artefacts which were able to be exchanged for money or other forms of currency 
such as academic prestige gained through biotechnological research.  
Biotechnologies are said to be transforming the bioeconomy; economic relations 
created through the latent value in biological materials (Birch, 2012).  In contemporary 
Western society, biotechnologies are acknowledged and promoted as a significant 
source of new growth and wealth (Birch & Tyfield, 2013) and no more so than in the 
area of genomic medicine.  
 
Although body commodification is not a new phenomenon (Sharp, 2000), 
contemporary definitions of commodification encompass previously unreachable 
areas such as cells, genes and genetic material and constitute an “alienation of 
inalienable goods” (Ryan, Team & Alexander, 2013, p. 471).  Purdy (2001) contended 
commodification facilitated health care consumerism by creating new markets for 
medical products, services and technologies.  Moreover, the creation of a new 
commodity, in this case genetic material, is a key tenet of capitalism (Birch & Tyfield, 
2013; Zones, 2000).  The commodification of ‘new’ pathologies thus creates potential 
new markets and generates further profit for corporate interests (Pryce, 2002; 
Thomas-Pollei, 2008).   
 
The majority of breast/ovarian cancers occur for reasons other than inherited gene 
faults yet most current focus is on genetic causes (Conrad, 2005).   A Marxist critique 
contends the focus on genetic causes of disease to the relative exclusion of other 
causes is necessary to justify the vast resources given to genetic endeavours 
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(Rosser, 2000).  The technical ability to separate body organs, tissues, fluid and other 
appendages right down to a sub-cellular level effectively allows body parts to be 
isolated as objects, constructed as commodities and creates new potential sources of 
wealth for biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries (Acero, 2012; Baird, 2002; 
Cahill, 2001; Hanson, 1999, 2002;  Thomas-Pollei, 2008; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; Rose, 
2007).  A critique of commodification from a Marxist stance was particularly relevant to 
this study since it raised questions about the relationship between commodification 
and nature and the effects of commodification on human experience.   
 
Commodification of entities considered nature is not a new concept, for example, 
genetic engineering in agriculture has existed for some time (Cahill, 2001).  
Commodification of the human body in medicine likewise has a long history, from 
Burke and Hare’s ‘body snatching’ of corpses for teaching human anatomy in the 19th 
century through to modern organ transplantation techniques (Lock & Nguyen, 2010).  
Similarly, the role of genetics in human disease has been explored using genetic 
technologies for some time (Baird, 2000).  However, biotechnological advancements 
create a tension in health care (Hanson, 1999) because although individuals may 
benefit, such advancements are primarily developed for economic gain (Birch, 2012).      
 
The Human Genome Project and subsequent gene sequencing technology has 
increased the scope of medical interventions in the form of genetic tests, gene 
manipulation and genetic therapies for the treatment of disease (Hanson, 2002).  A 
significant part of this enterprise concerns testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations, 
one of the first genetic cancer tests to be widely marketed.  This was not without 
substantial controversy owing to the patenting of these genes which led to the 
company Myriad Genetics gaining a monopoly of rights to genetic testing and 
therapeutic uses of the BRCA1 and 2 genes, essentially allowing ownership of these 
genes (Thomas-Pollei, 2008).  The patenting and marketing of genes provides power 
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over the use of the genes and gives the patent holder exclusive rights to commercial 
exploitation (Thomas-Pollei, 2008).  This raises important questions on who owns 
genes and genetic material (Castree, 2003) more so because the genetic industry is 
generally led by commercial interests who fund research and genetic services (Cahill, 
2001).  
 
Furthermore, since genes are essentially the most basic units of human life, the 
patenting of genes implies the ultimate commodification of human life (Hanson, 2002).   
From a Marxist stance then, genetic technologies and BRCA1/2 genes are able to be 
understood as marketable commodities which are protected through ideologies of 
empowerment and personal responsibility for health which trigger demand for wealth-
generating medical services (Paul et al., 2014).   Although the patent for BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes was eventually invalidated by the US Supreme Court in June 2013 
(American Civil Liberties Union, 2013), the case nonetheless highlights the tension 
between the biological and non-biological identities of individuals and the question of 
who owns life.  
 
The female body and commodification 
Marxists argue commodification in capitalist society means people or objects are not 
valued in terms of what they can do (use value) but rather in terms of money or other 
commodities for which they can be exchanged (exchange value) or the status 
conferred by them (sign-exchange value) (Tyson, 2015).  Since capitalist society 
depends upon consumerism, exchange and sign-exchange value are promoted as 
appropriate and natural ways of relating to the world.  Tyson (2015) further explained 
capitalism promotes insecurity in order to promote consumerism and cites the 
increase in cosmetic surgery in the Western world as a symptom of this.  Turner 
(2008) argued modern capitalist societies are essentially narcissistic and grounded in 
personalised consumption, under the guise of self-development and fulfilment.  Self-
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actualisation and increased self-esteem are able to be pursued through the purchase 
of commodities (Frank, 2002) which transcend materiality as a result of the hidden 
social meaning attached.  People feel compelled to have the latest fashionable items, 
the whitest teeth, ageless skin, perfect breasts and such to feel good and worthy.   
Not only are these ideals sold to individuals, but individuals also feel the need to ‘sell’ 
themselves to be successful and to fit in to modern society (Tyson, 2015).    
 
Cox (2011) contended capitalism produced normative notions of females and 
femininity which then became commodified and sold in the marketplace.  The 
gendered structure of capitalism disproportionately targets and commodifies women 
who are then compelled to fit in with the idealised stereotype and thus “participate in 
their own objectification” (Cox, 2011; p. 20).  In Western society, women are 
frequently reduced to descriptions of their bodies, a demeaning process which 
constructs women as objects rather than people and promotes a particular aesthetic 
in line with the patriarchal gaze (Twigg, 2000).  The commodification of women and 
notions of normative gender fail to account for women who do not fit with the ideal 
aesthetic, either through choice or as a result of illness, disease or accident.   
 
In relation to this study, it is reasoned that the female image is a marketable 
commodity and the image of the female as a product sells the concept of what is 
considered ideal female looks and behaviour.  Moreover, the emphasis on the female 
breast as a symbol of femininity in Western society (Crompvoets, 2012; Davis 2008; 
Emilee, Ussher & Perz, 2010) accentuates the role breasts play in being a woman 
and reifies the importance of perfect breasts (Filc, 2004).  The negative implications of 
this are illustrated by Ferguson (2000) who identified the 1980s saw the inception of a 
new disease of ‘micromastia’, or small breasts.  Women with this ‘disfiguring’ condition 
could be ‘cured’ by cosmetic surgery which created breasts in keeping with the 
gendered ideal.  Furthermore, the costs of breast augmentation may be subsidised by 
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the State through National Health Care plans, if women were psychologically 
distressed as a result of having small breasts, or viewed by surgeons as deviating 
significantly from the ‘normal’ breast size (Wilson, 2002) which again promotes 
commodification in relation to the female body and demonstrates medicine fulfils an 
ideological role. 
 
More recently, Boulton and Malacrida (2012) highlighted the increasing normalisation 
of cosmetic breast surgery in Western culture, a culture which rewarded women who 
conformed to the image of idealised femininity and censured those who don’t.   
Cosmetic surgery allows women to pay for breasts which conform to the Western 
ideal, the image of which can be sold literally and figuratively.  For example, it may be 
asserted that there is no intrinsic good in surgically enlarging women’s breasts: breast 
augmentation is undertaken purely to fulfil a socially constructed idealised body state 
and because idealised breasts are able to attract other values.  A certain social status 
and “cultural valuation” (Ferguson, 2000, p. 83) is attached to having the ideal 
body/breasts and those not conforming to this ideal, including those who undergo 
mastectomy, have reduced sign-exchange value: in other words, the social value or 
worth of the female is assigned by humans in a particular given context.  Hence when 
bodies and breasts are commodified, market forces permit interventions on the body 
to be undertaken not on the basis of inherent good, but to satisfy consumer demand 
based on socially and culturally constructed body ideals.  Commodification and 
ideological practices coalesce here to allow this to happen because women have the 
financial means to fund surgery and surgeons are willing to insert foreign objects into 
women’s bodies under the guise of personal autonomy and freedom of choice.   
 
The prominence of breast reconstruction in definitions of breast cancer treatment 
further commodifies the breasts (Ferguson, 2000).  From a Marxist perspective, 
ideologies of sexuality and femininity frame breast reconstruction as essential 
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following breast loss and allow the commodification of breasts to be expressed 
through the consumption of reconstructive surgery, hence is a significant source of 
wealth generation for some.  Reconstruction is presented in ideology as an essential 
step in recovery from breast loss however equally it may be purported to be a process 
of commodification which aims to close the gap between the ideal and the actual body 
of the consumer.  Frank (2002) reasoned this in itself was not problematic as all 
societies and cultures have within them a dominant body aesthetic of the time.   The 
key issue, therefore, was a form of commodification which required the body to be 
fragmented so that different body parts can be incrementally improved through 
consumer activity in the form of reconstructive surgery. 
 
To conclude this section, applying Marxist literary theory allows the text to be 
considered in terms of social, historical and cultural contexts which reflect the author’s 
ideologies as well as those which are dominant in society.  In this study, the Marxist 
concepts of ideology and commodification were particularly useful in constructing an 
understanding of the lives of high risk women as both construct understanding of the 
world and expose ways in which the HBOC journey is ideologically driven.  From a 
Marxist perspective, medicine provides a service to women identified as high risk of 
developing breast/ovarian cancer by offering various interventions to diagnose and 
manage risk.  Hence, a Marxist interpretation exposed ways in which HBOC acted as 
a source of economic gain for some by supporting ideologies of risk and offering 
surgery as the best approach to deal with the risk of cancer.   
 
Foucauldian Literary Theory 
Introduction 
Foucault’s work is complex, often controversial and at times obtuse.  Although 
Foucault did not intend his work to be considered literary criticism, it impacted greatly 
on literary theorists owing to his argument power was located within language 
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(Bertens, 2008) making language one of the most significant forces in shaping human 
experience (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000).  Since literature is essentially 
language, it is not difficult to see why Foucault’s work was of such importance to 
literary theorists.  Bertens (2008, p. 123) further referred to the “hegemonic power” of 
language, including literature, underscoring Foucault’s position that language was the 
site of social rather than textual power. In other words, power was not a result of the 
cleverness or accuracy of the text produced by novelists, doctors and the like, but 
rather was a result of the discourse created by them and to which they themselves 
claimed expertise (Culler, 2011). 
 
An understanding of Foucault’s theoretical and methodological contributions to 
modern literary and social theory highlights that Foucault did not attempt to provide an 
orthodoxy which scholars could apply to a particular area of concern to uncover the 
‘truth’.  Rather, Foucault’s influence encourages thinkers to question and problematise 
a situation, ideology, discourse or opinion in order new points of view may be created: 
to question what was considered as given or natural and seek solutions in the form of 
varying responses.  Of particular relevance to this study is Foucault’s critique of 
modern medicine and in particular the concepts of power and discourse and their 
associated techniques, since it was argued the participants in this study were involved 
in a process of negotiating competing dominant discourses and connected power 
relations in Western society which shaped and influenced experience, and ultimately 
decision making in relation to health.  To this end, the following sections, elaborate 
upon key areas of concern in Foucault’s work pertinent to this study.   
 
Power, modernisation and Western medicine 
The concept of power was central to much of Foucault’s work because power 
relations were argued to be the means through which individuals in society were 
subjected, regulated, controlled and potentially emancipated (Lynch, 2011).  
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Foucault’s theorising on modernisation and the rise of modern medicine 
conceptualised medicine in terms of power.  In earlier sovereign states, classical 
forms of power were exercised through the right (of the King) to take life or let live 
(Taylor, 2011).  Power forms were legislative, prohibitive and censoring and were 
wielded when individuals in society transgressed (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014). However, 
the modernisation of Western society saw the emergence of the modern State as a 
political structure concerned with the needs of its people (Lynch, 2011).  The modern 
State sought to admonish life rather than take life away hence in contrast to the 
sovereign state, power was the right to make live or let die (Taylor, 2011).  Power in 
modern states then was less violent and coercive and more about the State’s 
attempts to administer the welfare of its citizens (Murphy, 2003; Simons, 2013).  For 
Foucault this represented a shift from sovereign power to biopower: the technologies 
developed during the eighteenth century in the new human sciences for managing 
populations (O’Farrell, 2007). Biopower can be understood as a form of life power 
which is exercised through techniques and technologies of and on the body which 
exert control though the interlocking and overlapping practises of discipline, 
surveillance and knowledge production (Klawiter, 2008).  Biopower allows bodies to 
be disciplined at a societal level through managing the life and death processes of the 
population including births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses (O’Farrell, 2007).   
 
Rabinow and Rose (2006) contended Foucault’s concept of biopower originally 
polarised biopower into separate anatamo-political and biopolitical strands which dealt 
with disciplining and regulating of the body respectively.  However as with other 
aspects of Foucault’s work, there is ambiguity in terms of whether Foucault 
considered these strands as distinct, overlapping or inclusive of each other at different 
times in his writing.  In general, there is consensus biopower is operated through the 
State whilst disciplinary power is operated through the institutions of the State (Taylor, 
2011).  Thus biopower can be understood as the task of governing entire populations 
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(Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014) and within this, disciplinary power can be understood as 
targeting individual bodies (Taylor, 2011).  Disciplinary power is therefore incorporated 
within the mechanisms of biopower (O’Farrell, 2007) the overall aim being to 
maximise the potential and outputs of the body (Hoffman, 2011; Rabinow & Rose, 
2006).  Central to this are ways of knowing the body hence medicine is understood to 
take a prominent role in disciplinary power through its ability to expertly read and 
produce knowledge of the body.  
 
Disciplinary power and Western medicine 
Disciplinary power is a non-violent, non-coercive form of social control which utilises a 
range of power techniques and operates through various societal institutions including 
medicine, the family and education (Gutting, 2008).  The overall aim is to produce 
obedient, capable citizens who can contribute effectively to the economic and political 
functions of the State (Gastaldo, 1997).   Western medicine provides guidance on how 
people should understand, regulate and experience their bodies (Lilja & Vinthagen, 
2014; Lupton, 1997), therefore disciplinary power operates through persuading people 
certain ways of being and acting are desirable to achieve good health.  Part of this 
guidance relates to how women at risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer should act 
to prevent disease.  Within Western medical discourse, this guidance leaves little 
scope for those who make decisions inconsistent with the aims of disciplining the 
body, such as high risk women who say no to RRS. 
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, disciplinary power is able to be effected in medicine 
through three interlinking controlling techniques of hierarchical observation, 
normalisation and examination (Gutting, 2008; Hoffman, 2011).   In this study, these 
techniques of disciplinary power were reasoned to be operating at both the macro and 
micro level as a result of the Human Genome Project.  Widespread testing for genetic 
variation and disease opens up the body to a level of hierarchical observation and 
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scrutiny never seen before, adding a molecular gaze to the medical arsenal aimed at 
maximising body potential.  The identification of gene faults which predispose 
individuals to certain forms of cancer (and other conditions) and the ability to test for 
them, has resulted in the development of guidelines for the classification and 
management of individuals based on the likelihood of disease development, including 
breast and ovarian cancer.  These guidelines normalise the process by which women 
with a gene fault are targeted, classified and managed.  The dominant medical 
discourse establishes how ‘normal’ women engage with the process and sets out the 
expected norms.  This includes subjecting women and their bodies and genes to the 
medical examination so the truth about their particular situation can be uncovered 
thus securing future health.  Data is collected on the outcomes from preventative 
interventions such as RRS, chemoprevention and ongoing screening for disease 
which adds to the growing body of expert knowledge about breast/ovarian cancer and 
further allows regulation and disciplining of bodies.   
 
Attempts to influence individual behaviour and discipline bodies in relation to RRS can 
be understood as a part of the project of government which aims to protect the current 
and future health of the population.  Biopower and disciplinary power are organised 
around normalising techniques which produce self-governing individuals and 
populations and persuade people of the sensibility of health interventions such as 
RRS for cancer risk.  The power of medicine lies in the ability to take charge of the 
practices through which individuals seek to regulate and improve their health and 
consequently their daily lives.  Moreover, the effects of disciplinary power are 
productive because knowledge of individuals is produced which is directly linked to 
‘official’ knowledge, or “discourses of truth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93) produced by the 
Human Sciences.  In other words, disciplinary power exists in medicine because 
medicine knows ‘the truth’ about disease and how to avoid it.  Foucault’s analysis of 
power thus exposes the relationship between power relations, the production of 
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knowledge and the transformation of certain forms of knowledge into ‘truths’ which 
maintain disciplinary power.  The next section elaborates on this relationship and 
draws attention to medical knowledge, power and ‘the truth’ and ways in which these 
regulate and discipline bodies in relation to cancer risk. 
 
Power/knowledge and the ‘truth’ 
Foucault argued against the notion of fixed absolutes awaiting discovery by experts 
and labelled as the ‘truth’.  Despite the connotations associated with the word ‘truth’, 
truth is not neutral, out-with or without power (Goldstein, 2003).  Rather, the ‘truth’ is a 
product of power relations: “(…) truth is not by nature free - nor error servile (…) its 
production is thoroughly imbued with relations of power” (Foucault, 1978 p. 60).  
Importantly, since power relations exist within discourses, there can be no power 
without a discourse:  
(…) in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, 
there are manifold relations of power which permeate, 
characterize and constitute the social body, and these 
relations of power cannot themselves be established, 
consolidated nor implemented without the production, 
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There 
can be no possible exercise of power without certain economy 
of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis 
of this association. We [sic] are subjected to the production of 
truth through power and we [sic] cannot exercise power except 
through the production of truth. (Foucault 1978, p. 93) 
 
Foucault’s argument power, knowledge and truth are inextricably linked and the 
individual- as-subject is created within this knowledge-power relationship is clearly 
articulated above. On this point, Foucault concurred with earlier work of Nietzsche 
(1873), who problematised the objectivity of truth and held it was power, as opposed 
to knowledge, which shaped the truth.  Power and knowledge have the same goal: 
simply, knowledge means power and power allows one to know.  The positive 
potential of power is also identified because once knowledge is known; one has the 
power to act.   
151 
 
Foucault further theorised on power/knowledge and truth in relation to medicine in The 
Birth of the Clinic (1973) in which he constructed an historical and critical analysis of 
the development of modern medicine.  Foucault argued the focus of medicine shifted 
with the emergence of clinical medicine in the late 18th century.  Modern medicine had 
the power to look deep inside the body, look beyond the symptoms of disease and 
develop new understandings of how the body functioned in health and disease.  
Foucault used the term “medical gaze” (Foucault, 1973, p. xiv) to describe the 
dehumanising separation of the body from the person (identity) (Kendall, 2011) which 
resulted from the search to uncover truths about the body.  Increasingly, modern 
technologies can be understood as expanding the medical gaze through genetic 
testing for presymptomatic disease such as HBOC.    
 
Foucault did not deny there were verifiable truths which could be found within the 
natural sciences, nor that medical knowledge lacked scientific validity, rather he 
opposed the ways in which (scientific) knowledge and expertise led to a privilege 
which became power: power of experts over non-experts arising from an acceptance 
scientific knowledge was somehow more truth-like and superior to other forms of 
knowledge.  The creation of scientific knowledge propagated as ‘truths’ or ‘facts’ about 
the human body enabled the body to be disciplined and the population to be studied 
and regulated by ‘experts’. In contrast, Foucault believed that knowledge of the body 
was unstable and humans were too complex to be isolated into separate parts for 
investigation thus no legitimate, decisive ‘truth’ about the individual could ever be 
gained (Foucault, 1968).  For Foucault, ‘truths’ were historical events, not absolutes 
awaiting discovery (O’Farrell, 2007).   
 
The medical gaze not only constructed the body and body parts as objects of 
knowledge, it also allowed the knowers of such information to be constructed in a 
particular way (O’Farrell, 2007).  Foucault argued the medical gaze was supported by 
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an increasingly sophisticated language which conferred a growing knowledge of facts 
and truths about the human body and thus allowed the creation of a “scientifically 
structured discourse about an individual” (Foucault, 1973, p. xiv).  The discourse 
which supported the medical gaze was of crucial importance because power is 
fundamentally discursive (Lynch, 2011). That is, power operates through what people 
say as much as what they do.  This leads on to the next section in this thesis which 
introduces Foucault’s concept of discourse and how discourses give rise to power 
relations through the creation of knowledge and truths about objects of concern in 
Western society.    
 
Foucault’s concept of discourse  
Foucault’s work on discourse has been described as his most significant contribution 
to critical inquiry (Vighi & Feldner, 2007).  In the Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault 
(1972, p. 107), proposed discourse is “a group of statements which belong to a single 
system of formation”.  A statement is not the words themselves, but rather the rules 
which make the words meaningful: in other words, provide discursive meaning.  
Statements are thus the basic units of discourse and create relationships with other 
statements which provide context for the discourse (Danaher et al., 2000).  Systems of 
formation refer to a “complex group of relations that function as a rule” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 74) and relate to a collection of institutions, social groups and relations 
between discourses.  Significantly, the system of formation is not external to the 
discourse but rather resides within it and in effect, it creates its own existence. 
 
For Foucault, there existed a difference between what could be said using appropriate 
logic and language, and what one actually says: “(…) discourse is constituted by the 
difference between what one could say correctly at one period [under the rules of 
grammar and logic], and what is actually said” (Foucault, 1968, p. 63).   In other 
words, conversations reflect what people feel can and cannot be said under particular 
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conventions, thus Foucault was able to speak of a clinical discourse, an economic 
discourse, a psychiatric discourse and so forth.  For example, it would be logical and 
grammatically correct to say to a woman ‘please remove your clothes from the waist 
up’.  However, it is unlikely such a statement would be acceptable during social 
discourse, whereas it may form part of a patient examination in medical discourse.  
Discourse then is identified as an activity or practice, bound by certain rules and which 
co-exist in a world of other (competing) discourses.  Multiple discourses exist within 
modern societies but some discourses are dominant to others.  Dominant discourses 
are those which operate through established institutions such as medicine, the family 
and the law and although dominant, are under constant challenge owing to the 
unstable nature of knowledge (Manias & Street, 2000).   
 
In relation to this study, a cancer discourse exists (Armstrong, 2007; Davis, 2008; 
Harrington, 2012; Reisfield & Wilson, 2004) which establishes how people should act 
when faced with cancer and gives consent to certain ways of speaking about the 
disease.  Although fear and uncertainty are acknowledged, the cancer discourse 
reflects the dominance of the medical perspective as the only appropriate way of 
managing the disease (Clarke & Everest, 2006).  Notably, the cancer discourse is 
replete with metaphor which may influence the experience of the disease (Davis, 
2008; Harrington, 2012; Reisfield & Wilson, 2004).  War/military metaphor (Clarke & 
Everest, 2006; Cobb & Starr, 2012; Grant & Hundley; 2008; Haines et al., 2010; 
Reisfield & Wilson, 2004), sporting metaphor (Grant & Hundley; 2008; Seale, 2001) 
and journey metaphor (Harrington, 2012; Reisfield & Wilson, 2004) are commonly 
applied which promote a certain way of talking about cancer and confer an accepted 
set of underpinning values and expectations (Davis, 2008).  These dictate people 
exhibit a positive outlook, fight the disease, engage with treatment interventions, win 
the war on cancer and become cancer survivors (S. King, 2004; Sulik, 2012).  Doubts 
about the efficacy of treatment, refusing treatment, pessimistic thoughts and generally 
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‘lying down’ or giving in to the disease are not viewed as worthy attributes and are less 
likely to be verbalised (Davis, 2008).  It is a discourse of encouragement, consent and 
cooperation which imposes a moral imperative on the person with cancer (Sulik, 2012; 
Wilkinson, 2001). In particular, Crabb (2006, p. 103) described the breast cancer 
discourse as a “discourse of responsibility” which obliges women to partake in health 
practices such as breast cancer screening in order to create health benefits for 
themselves, their families and the wider community.  Hence, discourse creates a 
“culture of conformity” (Jones et al., 2005, p. 378) in which the patient is unquestioning 
and compliant.  The cancer discourse suggests patients who do not conform to this 
ideal are uninformed, mistaken or foolish (Crabb, 2006; Davis 2008).   
 
Discourse provides the means by which knowledge about a particular topic at a 
particular time in history can be spoken.  For Foucault, discourse creates meaning 
therefore knowledge of anything is only meaningful within a discourse (Hall, 2004).  
Furthermore, dominant discourses, such as the medical discourse, are those which 
determine what knowledge is considered important and of value (Manias & Street, 
2000).  For example, although cancer is an organic disease, it only exists meaningfully 
within a discourse about it: it is the discourse, not the disease itself, which produces 
knowledge of it.  In other words, breast and ovarian cancer exist but only take on 
meaning when they become objects of knowledge within a discourse.  The dominance 
of medical and genetic discourses ensures the authority of genetic, medical and 
scientific knowledge and statistical data in relation to breast/ovarian cancer risk, 
effectively equating risk of disease with inevitability of disease (Armstrong, 1995; 
Crabb, 2006).  Women with a positive genetic test are described by statements such 
as ‘high risk’, gene carriers’, ‘genetically pre-disposed to developing cancer’ ‘faulty 
gene carriers’ and the like.  RRS is constructed in medical discourse as not only a 
reasonable option for high risk women (Crabb, 2006) but is put forward as the primary 
intervention for reducing risk and securing a disease free future (Ingham et al., 2013).  
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The medical discourse thus sets out a problem and a proposed solution which serves 
to organise and regulate women with a family history of breast/ovarian cancer. 
 
Hall (2004, p. 347) further contended knowledge and ‘truth’ were “historicised” by 
Foucault’s position that knowledge or ‘truth’ about anything only applied within a 
specific historical context.  Moreover, from a Foucauldian perspective, the fluidity of 
discourse is more to do with power than logic as change occurs because those who 
create the discourse also have the power to make it true.   
 
This highlights the temporality of discourses which Foucault (1972) believed were 
shaped by the ‘episteme’ or ‘world view’ in which they existed.  The existence of the 
rules of discourse and historical and cultural affiliations mean discourse both creates 
and sustains social norms by establishing knowledge or ‘truth’.  This is expressed 
through language and governs how individuals should behave within a particular 
discourse; therefore, it is a form of power. In other words, discourse is the site at which 
truths and power relations are produced (Foucault, 1968).  Moreover, discourse 
creates the means by which the body can be socially controlled, disciplined and 
regulated.  In keeping with this analysis, Crabb (2006) argued the analysis of 
discourse allowed a critique of ways in which individuals were constructed and talked 
about in discourse.  Thus, both body and mind are governed by hidden historical and 
culture-bound rules which determine what is said (or not) and how it is said within 
discourses.  Foucault (1972, p. 49) referred to these as discursive practices which 
“systematically form the objects of which they speak”.  
 
Discursive practices 
Discursive practices are rules which constitute how discourses are formed (Manias & 
Street, 2000).  These practices are ways of talking which serve as collective 
organising tools, sanctioning certain actions and compelling individuals to behave in 
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certain ways within discourses.  Power is a direct result of discursive practices which 
are created within a discourse (Bertens, 2008).   
 
Foucault’s notion of discursive practices was influenced by the work of Heidegger 
(1889 – 1976) regarding the interpretation of everyday practices (Dreyfus, 2004; 
Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).  In Heidegger’s notion of being, humans are seen to be 
formed within certain cultural and historical conditions which provide a contextualised 
background against which humans interpret everyday life and become socialised 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).  Importantly, those existing and functioning within these 
shared practices are unaware of them unless made aware through the actions or 
words of others.  Similarly, Foucault argued social and official institutions and 
associated discourses support discursive practices which created accepted norms and 
legitimised subjects and behaviours, against which individuals unknowingly interpreted 
their everyday lives (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).   Thus, discourses are power relations 
and discursive practices ensure order by directing humans to do what is expected in 
given situations.   
 
In Western medical discourse, power operates through discursive practices which 
compel individuals to act in certain ways to protect health.  Crabb (2006, p. 175) 
referred to discursive practices as “rhetorical devices” which constructed certain 
preventative strategies, including RRS, as good, responsible and rational actions 
which indicated to high risk women what is expected in their given situation.  Similarly, 
genetics can be understood as a discursive practice which reinforces the medical gaze 
and subtly persuades individuals to engage with risk reducing interventions in order to 
self-regulate and protect health.  From a Foucauldian perspective, self-regulation is 
more effective than coercive techniques in controlling people as resources or policing 
are not required and resentment is avoided.  
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To sum up then, discursive practices enable power relations because power is 
asserted through language and the ways things are spoken about.  However, the 
nature of power is such that discursive practices both enable and inhibit, because 
what constitutes the truth is unstable and contingent.  
 
Power and resistance 
The centrality of power in Foucault’s work was introduced earlier in this section.  
Foucault argued the individual-as-subject could not be separated from the complex 
power relations within which the subject is placed (Foucault, 1982).  Central to 
Foucault’s argument is power is not a thing, and power does not exist until it is put into 
action.  Rather, power is a relation, a way in which certain actions modified others: 
“[power is] a set of actions upon other actions” (Foucault, 1982, p. 789) therefore 
power is exercised rather than possessed (Manias & Street, 2000). This is an 
important concept because it underscores power as relative and dynamic hence 
Foucault was able to defend against critics who posited his analysis of power was 
suffused with pessimism and rendered the subject repressed and impotent.   
 
Foucault rejected conceptualisations of power which supported the futility of 
resistance (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014) and posited power dynamics mean different 
responses to power were available hence resistance to power was not only possible, 
but inevitable.  Power and resistance are allied rather than oppositional because 
resistance is shaped by power relations and power relations are also, paradoxically 
reinforced through resistance (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014). If resistance was not possible, 
if there existed only one way of acting, power could not be exercised and would not 
exist.  For Foucault, freedom was a condition of power: “freedom must exist for power 
to be exerted” (Foucault, 1982, p. 790).  Thus individuals are constituted as subjects 
through power relations but are also capable of deliberate self-transformation through 
resistance to power relations (Allen, 2008).  Individuals may resist power through 
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marginalised discursive views which disrupt dominant discourses hence power can be 
both repressive and productive (Manias & Street, 2000; Simons, 2013).  Foucault 
(1982) maintained that resistance to power was thus a legitimate and sensible basis 
for understanding what power relations exist, where they exist, when they exist and 
how they function.  
 
If one accepts Foucault’s definition of power as being a relation and a set of actions 
upon other actions, then one sees all societies have power relations embedded within 
them.  Not only from legal, constitutional or institutional perspective, but also from a 
social perspective since living in a society necessitates the actions of an individual 
can and do modify the actions of other individuals.  For example, in the medical 
encounter, the actions of doctors bring about actions in patients as a result of power 
relations supported by a dominant of medical discourse which is internalised and 
acted upon (Lupton, 1997). Thus, power is not something held by one group and 
exerted over another: rather, it is a relationship in which all take a role, making power 
an intrinsic and omnipresent feature of human societies.  It is the power relations in 
everyday life which categorises and transforms individuals into subjects (Allen, 2008).  
In this study, the power relations in which the participants took a role and ways in 
which the participants yielded to or resisted such relations are exposed.  This created 
an understanding of how the participants negotiated power relations and created 
individual subject positions, often at odds with the dominant discourse. 
 
To conclude this section, Foucauldian literary critique encourages researchers to ask 
questions of the text in order to problematise the taken-for-granted, the given and the 
ostensible so that alternate points of view may be offered to illuminate a broader 
understanding of society. To understand Foucault’s contribution to literary theory, one 
must deliberate his views on power and power relations.  Foucault’s key concern was 
the culture of the self and how individuals come to constitute themselves as subjects 
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in society.  Foucault’s focus was the relationship between power relations and the 
production of knowledge, and the transformation of certain forms of knowledge into 
‘truth’ which led to power and subjectification.   
 
Foucault’s analysis of power articulates historical forms of power from pre-modern 
coercive and often violent modes of power to modern modes of power including 
biopower and disciplinary power which regulated and disciplined bodies.  Power is 
relational because power/knowledge regimes differ in their application and 
effectiveness. Power and knowledge are irrevocably intertwined because knowledge 
allows an authoritative truth to be presented and simultaneously validates itself as the 
truth.  Medicine is understood as a discourse which is deployed as an instrument of 
power which disciplines the body because the medical discourse is expert and lays 
claim to knowledge of the truth about the body.  Despite the authority of the medical 
discourse, the unstable nature of knowledge/power means power relations are able to 
produce both positive and negative actions, truth and error hence resistance to 
medical authority is possible.  
 
In relation to this study, application of a Foucauldian critique was useful in 
understanding how dominant discourses about women’s bodies combined with 
accepted health care practices allow medicine to define what is good for the bodies of 
women at risk of cancer.  Problematic to this approach is it fails to account for those 
who do not share the common goal, or those for whichever reason, demonstrate 
resistance to the dominant Western medical discourse who were the focus of this 
study.  The participants in this study were seen as being non-compliant however it was 
contended they are only non-compliant within the construct of the dominant medical 
discourse and that other discourses are available to help shape understanding of their 
experiences. 
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Feminist Literary Theory 
Introduction 
The methodological approach taken in this study posited the experiences of high risk 
women who refuse RRS cannot be divorced from social, cultural and historical 
influences on the experiences which influence the decision to say no to surgery.  A 
central premise was the female breast is symbolic of the idealised female body in 
Western society, a society which “exults in breasts” (Crompvoets, 2006, p. 79) and 
which is “breast obsessed” (Thomas, 2006, p. 350).   Western values and traditions in 
relation to the breasts serve to oppress women because such messages imply without 
breasts, women are not whole (Thomas, 2006).  Similarly, the female ovaries are the 
fundamental symbol of womanhood (Gubar, 2012) and as such are associated with 
femaleness, femininity and sexuality.  Ovarian loss is associated with negative effects 
on body image, gender and personal identity (Hallowell et al., 2012) and may induce a 
feeling of being an incomplete woman (Fry et al., 2001a).  Moreover, it was contended 
Western society is a patriarchal society in which all human social experience is 
gendered (Landman, 2006), therefore the participants’ stories could not be voiced 
without reference to the dynamics of gender (Thomas, 2006).   
 
The patriarchal nature of Western culture is both causative and symptomatic of the 
gendered text therefore using feminist literary theory allowed an analysis of the text 
and the world in which it was read.  Potts (2000) argued a feminist analysis gives 
voice to women in relation to the experience of cancer, threat or actuality, and 
exposes the socially constructed meanings attributed to breast/ovarian cancer which 
impact on all women’s lives in Western society.  Research examining decision making 
in relation to cancer management has largely failed to take gender differences into 
account despite the distinctiveness of women’s health problems (Szumacher, 2006).  
Szumacher (2006) further claimed the unique nature of breast cancer and breast loss 
meant studies examining decision making in this arena must address the issue from a 
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female perspective.  Consequently a feminist literary approach was applicable in this 
study and allowed an examination of ways in which women are constructed in 
Western society which can impact on health related decision making (Thomas, 2006). 
Taking a feminist perspective lent itself to an examination of the public and private 
folklore of the study participants to understand their life experiences within this 
context.   
 
Overview of feminist literary theory 
At the simplest level, feminist literary theory poses questions relating to power 
relationships in literature and other cultural productions to gain a clearer 
understanding of the social reality of women (Allen, 2014).  The text is analysed for 
textual constructions of gendered meaning (Keating, 2005) which reveal power 
relationships which impact the lives of women (Brizee, Tompkins & Chernouski, 
2011).   
 
Feminist literary theory is complex and draws on a range of other critical theories 
including psychoanalysis, Marxism and post-structuralism (Keating, 2005). However, 
common to all is the aim to challenge forms of domination and power which 
subordinate women and all seek to give women more control over their own lives 
(Easton, 1996; Willard, 2005).  Millet’s ‘Sexual Politics’ (1970) is credited with being 
the first widely read book of feminist literary criticism.  It included a critique of 
capitalism and patriarchy and ways in which both sought to control women.  Millet 
(1970) distinguished between ‘sex’ as biological and ‘gender’ as socially constructed, 
hence ‘feminine’ characteristics were products of culture rather than biologically 
determined.  More recently, Klinge and Bosch (2005) also distinguished between the 
biology of ‘sex’ and the socially constructed ‘gender’, arguing both concepts are 
equally important in health-related research.   
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The following sections elaborate on feminist literary theory in relation to key areas of 
concern in this study.  Notably, ways in which Western values and traditions in relation 
to the breasts and ovaries serve to oppress and control women are explored by 
focussing on social constructions of the female role/femininity and breast/ovarian 
cancer.  The patriarchal nature of Western medicine is also considered and the 
feminist concept of resistance is discussed with reference to power struggles and 
ways in which resistance to normalising strategies and regulations is possible through 
the body. 
 
The female role and femininity in Western society  
A key focus of feminist literary theory is how the female role, femininity and 
womanhood are constructed in Western society.  A feminist stance contends female 
characteristics are socially constructed rather than biologically determined: 
“masculinity and femininity are not predetermined by the body itself, but are 
constructed within culture” (Warhol-Down & Herndl, 1997, p. xi).  Adopting a feminist 
stance then challenges biological conceptions of female identity which define women 
according to reproductive physiology (A. King, 2004) and suggest a woman’s primary 
role is as mother and caregiver (Willard, 2005).  Instead, ways in which male and 
female genders are socially constructed and the privileging of the male gender are 
critiqued and challenged (McAfee, 2014; Tyson, 2015). 
 
A feminist stance reasoned the participants in this study were exposed to gender 
ideologies and heteronormative values in Western society which assign certain 
attributes and roles to women and men.  Gender is argued to be a powerful method of 
social control which both produces and restricts bodies (A. King, 2004).  A. King 
(2004) further claimed women’s bodies are disproportionately judged and valued for 
appearance hence women are subjugated through their bodies.  Women are 
socialised into a particular role in Western society through ideological messages 
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transmitted from an early age (Thomas, 2006; Tyson, 2015) which convey how 
women should conform to Western notions of beauty and sexual attractiveness and 
be maternal (Ferguson & Kasper, 2000).   Women are expected and encouraged to 
be the object of the male gaze hence experience of breast loss is necessarily tied to a 
cultural emphasis on the breasts as objects of male sexual interest (Szumacher, 
2006).    
 
Considerable effort has been devoted to examining the role the breasts/ovaries play in 
defining femininity.  The female breast in particular symbolises sexuality, femininity 
and motherhood in Western society (Ehlers & Krupar, 2012; Lantz & Booth, 1998; 
Thomas, 2006; Schulzke, 2011). Influential social anthropologist Margaret Mead 
referred to the female breast as “the primary source of female identity” (Mead, 1949, 
cited in Thomas, 2006, p. 363) in Western culture and having breasts serves as a 
public display of femininity (Chan, 2010; Hallowell, 1998, 2000; Saywell, Beattie & 
Henderson, 2000; Spadola, 1998). Similarly, ovaries symbolise womanhood and as 
such are associated with femininity and sexuality (Hallowell et al., 2012; Gubar, 2012).  
Overall, women largely define themselves in opposition to traditional male 
characteristics (Ferguson & Kasper, 2000) as a result of essentialist ideology which 
reinforces the biological differences between genders (Sischo, 2008; Tyson, 2015).   
 
In relation to this study, cultural norms impose standards of femininity onto women 
and give ‘feminine’ characteristics a natural authenticity, one of which is having two 
breasts and ovaries.  Women who appear to have diseased breasts/ovaries or no 
breasts/ovaries may be viewed as ‘unfeminine’ (Emilee et al., 2010) or ‘abnormal’ 
(Crompvoets, 2012).  Mastectomy has been described as a “violation of femininity” 
(Saywell et al., 2000, p. 38) and oophorectomy as an “insult to femininity” (Ferrell, 
Smith, Juarez & Melancon, 2003, p. 253) highlighting the key role these organs play in 
defining femininity in Western society.  Breast loss in particular is consistently referred 
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to as disfigurement and mutilation (Szumacher, 2006), therefore it is not surprising 
loss or potential loss of the breasts and/or ovaries can invoke great turmoil in women 
as they seek to understand their altered bodies which contrast with societal norms.   
 
It has also been claimed prosthesis use and post-mastectomy reconstruction 
endorses and maintains gendered norms which subordinate women (Báez-
Hernández, 2009). Reconstruction is framed in medical and public discourse as an 
essential procedure following breast loss on the grounds it can help women adapt to 
surgery (Crompvoets, 2006; Guillem et al., 2006; Haines et al., 2010; Sulik, 2012).  
Rubin and Tanenbaum (2011, p. 407) used the term “pinkwashed” to describe a 
breast cancer culture in which prosthesis-wearing or post-mastectomy reconstruction 
is mandatory in order to avoid appearing radical or oppositional to societal norms 
about how women should look.  In relation to breast loss and reconstruction, women 
in Western society face a paradox:  non-reconstructed women may be viewed as 
desexualised and oppositional whereas those who do undergo reconstruction face 
further surgery, pain and discomfort and ironically may be viewed as supporting 
women’s objectification by complying with dominant heteronormative notions of 
femininity (Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011).  Failure to adequately place breast 
reconstruction within its cultural and social contexts helps reproduce oppressive 
normative standards for women because the ‘need’ to have reconstruction goes 
largely unchallenged.   
 
Drawing on feminist insights therefore highlighted the conflict and contradictions 
women in Western society face with respect to the loss of the breasts and ovaries.  
On the one hand, these organs symbolise femininity and womanhood and Western 
society expects women to possess them.  Simultaneously, Western discourse 
demands women keep themselves healthy, nurture the family and generally conform 
to what is expected of the female role (Gibbon, 2006).  Such contradictions have been 
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discussed by various scholars.  Kasper (1994) stated discrepancies existed between 
societal expectations of women imposed by dominant cultural processes and 
women’s own definitions of self gained through life experience.  Women facing breast 
loss face a dilemma because taking control of cancer risk through RRS exposes 
women to other significant losses including perceived loss of self-identity, femininity 
and sexual attractiveness (Hallowell, 2000).  Szumacher (2006) drew attention to the 
paradox experienced by women facing breast loss who were expected to conform to 
cultural standards of beauty yet maintain autonomy over their bodies when making 
health-related decisions.  Thomas (2006) similarly identified societal contradictions 
often made it difficult for women to distinguish between personally and culturally 
embedded feelings about their breasts.  These contradictions were spoken and 
unspoken, revealed and hidden and emanated from a variety of sources including the 
media, parents, peers partners, the medical system and Western society in general.  
Thomas (2006, p. 367) used the term “ring of silence” to describe these contradictory 
messages.  Thomas (2006) contended these functioned as oppressive norms which 
distorted definitions of womanhood and influenced women’s decision making with 
regard to participation in breast health initiatives.   
 
Thus an analysis of the social construction of femininity and the female role in 
Western society provided insight into some of the covert influences which may impact 
women’s health related behaviours particularly in relation to their breasts and ovaries.  
The next section explores the social construction of breast/ovarian cancer from a 
feminist literary stance and discusses the potential impact of this on women 
diagnosed with a high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer.  
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Social constructions of breast/ovarian cancer and its management: a feminist 
perspective 
In this study, it was argued a significant social investment in the female breasts and 
ovaries existed which allowed others a legitimate say in what happened to these 
organs. This is reflected in research which found decision making in relation to 
surgery for breast/ovarian cancer and cancer risk is frequently framed within the 
context of the woman’s personal/sexual relationships and familial obligations (Crabb, 
2006; Gibbon 2006; Sheppard & Ely, 2008; Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011; Weiner, 2011; 
Zagouri et al., 2013) and the consequences of treatment on others, for example 
children and partners (Acero, 2012; Howard et al., 2011; Lloyd et al., 2000; Rowley, 
2005).  This research underscores how women are expected to consider the needs of 
others when making health related decisions in relation to cancer risk.  In this sense, 
the breasts and ovaries of high risk women can be understood as belonging not only 
to the women themselves, but also to their significant others vis-à-vis their obligations 
to stay healthy for the sake of others by having their breasts/ovaries removed.   
 
A feminist perspective contends historically women’s bodies have been invaded, 
possessed and occupied by others as a result of enduring patriarchy in society 
(Acero, 2012).  Ownership of the female breasts has been appropriated by agencies 
other than the women to which they belong (Szumacher, 2006).  Spadola (1998) 
described the breasts as the most public of private parts, as manifested by initiatives 
such as breast screening programmes, breast feeding programmes and indeed in 
initiatives surrounding RRS for HBOC.  Women’s breasts are also argued to be 
subject to a greater degree of public scrutiny and evaluation than any other body part 
(Chan, 2010) emphasising their importance in social discourse.  It is this prominence 
in Western society of the female breast and to a lesser extent the ovary, as signifiers 
of femininity, sexuality and womanliness which add a complex layer to decision 
making around RRS.   Moreover, such social constructions situate decision-making in 
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response to cancer risk as both within and out-with the medical arena.  Although the 
medical discourse outlines what to do in response to cancer risk, social constructions 
of the disease and its management bear significant weight for women identified as 
high risk. 
 
Social constructions of breast cancer shape the way women experience breast cancer 
including decision making in response to therapeutic interventions (Szumacher, 2006; 
Thorne & Murray, 2000).  In this study, this extended to women diagnosed with a high 
risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer because these women were exposed to 
images and constructions of breast/ovarian cancer which were influenced by cultural 
and societal contexts. Integral to these were perceptions of female norms and 
femininity.  Breast/ovarian cancer threaten such perceptions by assaulting the female 
body physically and emotionally to the extent women facing breast cancer may fear 
the loss of the breasts more than loss of life (Davis, 2008; Ferguson & Kasper, 2000).  
In Western society, breast cancer is often depicted as a cosmetic rather than physical 
crisis because breast loss is constructed as an emotional loss (Rubin & Tanenbaum, 
2011) and a loss of sexual attractiveness (Szumacher, 2006). Indeed the threat to life 
caused by breast cancer is often overlooked in favour of the threat to female identity, 
sexuality and body image (Thorne & Murray, 2000) which paradoxically endorses 
gendered norms about how women should think and be.   
 
Studies examining the representation of breast/ovarian cancer expose the unstable 
and potentially oppressive nature of the breast/ovarian cancer discourse.  The 
majority of work has focussed on how breast cancer is represented (Crompvoets, 
2006; Thomas, 2006).  Earlier studies in Australia (Lupton, 1994) and the USA (Lantz 
& Booth, 1998) revealed breast cancer was consistently constructed as a disease of 
epidemic proportions caused by ‘lifestyle’ factors such as alcohol consumption, 
obesity, use of oral contraceptives, delaying pregnancy and abstaining from breast-
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feeding.  The link between oestrogen exposure and breast cancer development was 
acknowledged; significantly, Lupton (1994) and Lantz and Booth (1998) expressed 
concern at the way this association was linked to female social behaviours to create 
an image of breast cancer as epidemic and a crisis situation.  The authors posited the 
emphasis on a woman’s role in engaging is such ‘risky’ lifestyle ‘choices’ resulted in 
victim-blaming and drew attention away from other potential causes of oestrogen 
exposure which may promote cancer development.     
 
More recent work suggests an oppressive and punitive discourse persists in relation 
to breast cancer.  In addition to blame attributed to women through risky lifestyles, 
discourses of positivity, silence and concealment place a moral imperative on women 
to conform to normative standards which are oppressive and can lead to victim-
blaming (Wilkinson, 2001).  Cultural configurations of breast cancer have changed 
significantly over the past four decades from a stigmatised, private disease to a 
disease of epidemic proportions requiring public and political debate (S. King, 2004).  
Mass media attention to selected aspects of breast cancer presents a skewed reality 
which promotes an overly optimistic focus on survivorship and leaves little room for 
those who do not engage with the dominant discourse.  S. King (2004) further claimed 
this was problematic as it diverted attention away from other significant issues such as 
the continuing number of women dying from breast/ovarian cancer, lack of universal 
health care and lack of research on environmental causes of the disease.  Likewise, 
Sulik (2012, p. 16) found themes of victim-blaming persisted through survivorship 
ideology which allowed blame to fall on women who failed to adopt the “she-ro” role 
necessary for bravely battling the disease and accompanying disfigurement.    
 
Although lifestyle factors still feature heavily in breast/ovarian cancer discourse, 
increasingly genetic causes of disease take precedence (Conrad, 2005; Finkler, 2000; 
Lemke 2002; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; Riska, 2003; Wills, 2005).  One might argue the 
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emphasis on genetic causes of disease rather than lifestyle ‘choices’ suggests 
breast/ovarian cancer occurs for reasons outside  a woman’s personal control.  
However, the prominence of genetic causes appears to have done little to negate the 
victim-blaming messages so frequently attached to breast/ovarian cancer discourse 
(Silverman et al., 2001; Szumacher, 2006; Wilkinson, 2001).   One reason for this 
relates to the ascribed female role in Western society as discussed earlier in this 
section.  Women are constructed in dominant discourse as carers and nurturers 
(Gibbon, 2007; A. King, 2004), who are responsible for the health of the family (Acero, 
2012; Kasper & Ferguson, 2000; Szumacher, 2006).  A key part of this role then is 
staying healthy for the sake of others.  Responsibility for the disease is also placed 
onto women through their requirement to engage with interventions to detect and 
manage the cancer (Griffiths et al., 2010).  Hence whilst women may not be held 
responsible for owning a genetic mutation, personal responsibility for risk is 
embedded within medical discourse (Ilkilic, 2009; Lupton, 2006; Robertson, 2000) and 
it is likely women will be considered culpable when action to reduce the risk of cancer, 
such as RRS, is refused (Hallowell & Lawton, 2002; Resnik, 2014).    
 
A feminist critique suggests common to all social constructions and cultural 
configurations of breast/ovarian cancer is an underpinning ideology that non-
compliance with the traditional female role is instrumental in the development of 
breast/ovarian cancer in women.  Social constructions of breast/ovarian cancer are a 
conduit for communicating ideas, values and fears and reflect broader messages 
about social boundaries and power in society generally (Acero, 2012; Lantz & Booth, 
1998).  From this, an understanding of the ways in which power emerges and is used 
and misused is gained (McAfee, 2014) because women are required to make 
decisions in response to breast/ovarian cancer risk within a discourse of medical 
hegemony and its accompanying power structures (Szumacher, 2006).   
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The next section focuses on an analysis of the institution of medicine from a feminist 
perspective and exposes ways in which genetic/risk ideologies and gender biases in 
medical discourse coalesce to construct power relations which may oppress high risk 
women facing RRS. 
 
Western medicine, patriarchy and power 
The institution of medicine has been central to feminist theorising since the body is the 
site of most gendered interaction (Bilton et al., 2002; Turner, 2008). Throughout 
history, women’s bodies have been relegated in medicine, the reproductive organs in 
particular considered intrinsically pathological (Tyson, 2015; Wilkinson, 2001).  In 
Victorian times, the uterus was considered the controlling organ of the female body.  
Disorders of the female reproductive system were believed to cause a range of 
conditions including insanity, dyspepsia, rheumatism, cardiac inadequacy and the 
frequently diagnosed ‘hysteria’ (Thorne & Murray, 2000).   
 
A feminist critique of modern Western medicine draws attention to the scientific, 
empiricist roots of the biomedical model (Willard, 2005; Wylie et al., 2012).  Francis 
Bacon (1561 – 1626) is commonly credited with being the founder of modern science 
and is said to have believed the mind to be masculine and nature to be feminine 
(Darlington, 2010).   Medicine is therefore able to be understood as the (male) power 
of the mind/medicine over (female) nature (A. King, 2004).   Moreover, the biomedical 
model of medicine is underpinned by the assumption all illness is secondary to 
pathological disorder or disease, therefore removal or amelioration of disease will 
return the person to health (Wade & Halligan, 2004).  The focus of the biomedical 
model is the body in disease rather than the well-being of people and their bodies. 
 
Medicine reflects and reinforces gender divisions in Western society by positioning 
women in terms of their ability to fulfil the traditional female role of homemaker and 
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nurturer (Gibbon, 2007; Kennedy & Kennedy, 2010).  Medical literature also has a 
tendency to classify medical issues by gender (Griffiths et al., 2010).  For example, 
depression, anxiety and insomnia are regarded as problematic in women whereas 
industrial and sporting injuries are associated with men (Bilton et al., 2002).   The 
objective medical gaze positions women as subjects in the system of medicine (Gray, 
2007) and has medicalised normal female events including menstruation, pregnancy 
and childbirth (Purdy, 2001; Riessman, 1983; Willard, 2005; Wylie et al., 2012). This 
has created the means to control women’s sexual expression and reproductive 
capacity through the regulation of women’s bodies (Bilton et al., 2002; Lerner, 2000). 
 
A feminist analysis of Western medicine highlights other patriarchal practices which 
serve to oppress women.  Prior to 1994, women were largely excluded from clinical 
trials to assess the safety and efficacy of new medicines which meant medicines 
prescribed for women had only been tested on men (Holdcroft, 2007; Tyson, 2015).  
So-called women’s symptoms have been trivialised in medicine which has generally 
neglected health issues of concern to women (Klinge & Bosch, 2005).  With regard to 
treatment for breast cancer, less mutilating alternatives to the radical mastectomy 
were not explored until relatively recently in part owing to the prestige afforded to 
surgeons who carried out the technically complex yet debilitating surgical procedure 
(Löwy, 2010). Löwy (2010) further claimed the use of RRS to remove healthy breasts 
and ovaries in some ways represented a return to the type of surgical radicalism for 
cancer risk as exemplified by the radical and grossly debilitating Halsted mastectomy.   
Medicine is also a key stakeholder in the surgical modification of women’s bodies 
through cosmetic and reconstructive techniques (Sulik, 2012), notably those 
performed on women’s breasts in order to conform to socially constructed ideals of 
women’s bodies (Crompvoets, 2012). 
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Feminist perspectives on the prominence of genetic medicine are also valuable 
because genetics raises issues of significant concern for women including 
reproduction, embodiment, choice and agency (Ettorre, Katz Rothman & Steinberg, 
2006).  Within the biomedical model, the genetics discourse reduces high risk 
women’s bodies to faulty genes.  Medical intervention thus takes primacy and social, 
cultural and individual perceptions and circumstances which influence the experience 
of ill-health are largely considered irrelevant.    Genetics and risk discourses thus give 
medicine power over women’s bodies because risk comes to be located in the 
woman’s body and able to be modified primarily through interventions on the body 
(Lim, 2011; Robertson, 2000).  Such a critique does not deny some women are at 
increased risk of developing ovarian/breast cancer and that RRS can reduce this risk, 
rather  the ways in which genetic and medical discourses represent women’s bodies 
in ways which make them more accessible to medicine and medical interventions is 
problematised (Happe, 2006).   
 
A feminist analysis suggests genetic medicine is particularly oppressive to women at 
risk of breast/ovarian cancer since women are disproportionately targeted because 
women bear offspring.  Although offspring receive half of their DNA from each parent 
and men also carry and pass on BRCA1/2 mutations, the burden of genetic 
responsibility falls primarily to women (D’Agincourt‐Canning, 2001; Nycum, Avard & 
Knoppers, 2009).  Genetic information pathologises women’s breasts and ovaries in 
the absence of disease and expands medicine’s jurisdiction over women’s bodies 
(Finkler, 2000, 2003; Happe, 2006). Genes become a tool of female oppression 
because genes decide who has children, who gets surgery and perhaps even who 
gets married, creating an “enslavement to risk” (Samerski, 2006, p. 206) which calls 
upon women to become risk managers of their lives and the lives of others.  
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To sum, a feminist perspective contends medicine is a site of power where freedom 
has been historically denied to women. However a critique using feminist literary 
theory highlights not only is power in medicine potentially an oppressive force, it also 
acts as a potential form of empowerment (Allen, 2014; A. King, 2004) through the 
possibility of resistance to power.  The next section discusses the feminist concept of 
resistance further.  In this study, feminist resistance was a means of interpreting high 
risk women’s decisions to say no to RRS by problematising the competing and 
conflicting discourses which surround and permeate HBOC and its management.     
 
Feminist concept of resistance 
A central tenet underpinning feminist literary theory is forms of domination and power 
which subordinate women must be challenged to give women more control over their 
everyday lives (Easton, 1996; Tyson, 2015).  Although the concept of power per se is 
not always articulated in feminist critique, it is none-the-less critiqued in three key 
ways: as a form of domination, as a resource to be (re)distributed and as a form of 
empowerment (Allen, 2011).   
 
A wide variety of feminist perspectives on power exist.  For example, socialist 
feminists support traditional Marxist accounts of power in so much as power is 
understood as a form of domination grounded in class inequality and economic 
essentialism (McAfee, 2014). However, Marx’s concept of power is criticised for being 
gender-blind and for failing to take account of women’s unpaid and reproductive 
labour (Allen, 2011).  Allen (2011) further explained post-structuralist feminist 
approaches favour an interpretation of Foucault’s concept of power because it 
illuminates an understanding of the conflict and contradiction in everyday discourses 
which provide women with the potential for resistance to dominating forms of power.   
Although some feminists have criticised Foucault’s work for being largely gender-
neutral (A. King, 2004), a convergence between Foucault and Feminism is 
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acknowledgement of the body as a site of power relations and both underscore the 
importance of discourse in creating hegemonic practices and power relations which 
normalise and control (Armstrong, 2005).  A. King (2004) argued the female body was 
a particular target of disciplinary power and that femininity was a discipline which 
produced bodies and hence was a means of controlling women.  A feminist critique 
therefore extends Foucault’s work on power relations to create meaning of the nature 
and cause of female subordination (Wylie et al., 2012).   
 
Foucault (1980) claimed the potential for resistance to power existed wherever there 
was normalisation and domination.  In relation to this study, it was purported that 
dominant discourses permit and support practices of normalisation in relation to what 
is considered worthy attributes in women including stereotypes of femininity, sexuality 
and notions of the selfless woman who does whatever it takes to stay healthy.  It was 
the very nature of these competing and, at times, conflicting discourses which allowed 
the female body at risk of cancer to be understood as a site of contested control.  In 
keeping with Foucauldian theorising, a feminist critique of power supported the notion 
where power exists, so too does resistance. Influential feminist writer Judith Butler 
summarised this notion: “(…) the subject is neither fully determined by power nor fully 
determining of power, [but significantly and partially both] (…)” (1997, p. 17).   Thus 
power is wielded on but also wielded by people, giving scope for resistance and 
redistribution of power.  Saying no to RRS was able to be understood as an 
expression of resistance to power relations which potentially denied women a voice 
and instead provided scope for a woman’s personal aspirations to be heard. 
 
Gotfrit’s (1991) seminal work “Women Dancing Back” progressed a feminist concept 
of resistance through fighting back against forms of female subordination. Gotfrit’s 
(1991) work was an exploration of sexuality and the female body in relation to 
nightclub dancing practices.  The rituals associated with women dancing in nightclubs 
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and the accompanying female/male expectations and behaviours illuminated an 
understanding of how women can both reproduce and resist dominant ideologies and 
discourses in Western society.  Although an exploration of resistance through 
dancing, Gotfrit’s (1991) analysis exposed ways in which oppressive stereotypes of 
femininity and sexuality were developed, tolerated and even came to be expected in 
Western society.   
 
Gotfrit (1991) argued sexuality and women’s bodies were sites upon which the social 
regulation of women in contemporary culture took place.  Within this framework, the 
construction of the female breast as a potent signifier of femininity/sexuality comes to 
be understood as an ideology which attached a particular social meaning to women’s 
breasts and bodies.  However, forces of social regulation are many and often 
contradictory hence women’s bodies were a site for both oppression and potential 
empowerment.   
 
In Gotfrit’s (1991) analysis, dominant ideologies about female breasts and bodies 
were both resisted and reproduced by women through ways in which their bodies 
were presented to or concealed from the male gaze. In relation to breast cancer, a 
discourse of concealment (Wilkinson, 2001) exists which requires women to hide the 
physical signs of breast loss (O’Neill, 2013; Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011).  
Concealment through prosthesis use or reconstruction is the assumed routine 
response to breast loss (Cobb & Starr, 2012; Crompvoets, 2012) and from a feminist 
perspective reflects the importance placed on meeting the male gaze which serves to 
disempower women facing breast loss (Collie & Long, 2005). Points of resistance 
emerge from the conflict and contradictions permeated by and through competing 
dominant discourses. For example, owning a BRCA1/2 mutation and accepting RRS 
to save life is juxtaposed with dominant ideologies of sexuality and femininity which 
require women to have two breasts and ovaries.  Saying no to RRS is understandable 
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within the discourse of femininity yet it is a decision which is ‘anti-health’ in the 
discourse of medicine. 
 
A final point from Gotfrit’s (1991) work is that resistance is more than the nebulous 
rejection of imposed regulation and normative practices.  Resistance is a specific 
action which challenges underlying institutions and power relations which support the 
subordination of women.  Under any paradigm there will be non-compliers and those 
who reject the dominant way of thinking.  It was resistance to the severely debilitating 
Halsted radical mastectomy which paved the way for less mutilating alternatives in 
treating breast cancer (Lerner, 2000).  Resistance is thus understood as a means of 
empowerment and a practice through which women come to be aware of the conflict 
and contradictions in everyday discourses and seek to create alternate discourses 
and meanings which make sense of their experiences.  
 
In this study, analysis of women’s experiences of owning a BRCA1/2 mutation and 
saying no to RRS challenged taken-for-granted assumptions about how people 
respond to cancer risk in Western society.  Medical discourse with its emphasis on 
genetic faults and risk estimates for breast/ovarian cancer fails to acknowledge the 
social, personal and political components of risk and of HBOC and consequently, 
accompanying discourses are bound to conflict with women’s lived experiences of 
living with cancer risk.  In this respect, medicine was unable to articulate the truths 
women come to know as a result of their personal experiences, lived in the social 
reality of multiple, competing discourses. 
 
An examination of resistance thus offered possibilities for understanding the 
experiences of high risk women and the meanings attached to saying no to RRS.  
Within medical discourse, genetic information aimed at high risk women which 
assumes universal responses and actions in response to cancer risk creates the 
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conditions for the construction alternate discourses which do not marginalise or isolate 
women who say no to RRS.  The feminist concept of resistance hence connected the 
stories of high risk women who say no to RRS to the communal folklore and signified 
the emergence of private folklore to make meaning of experience.  
 
In summary then, utilising feminist literary theory in this study allowed an examination 
of ways in which the female role and femininity are constructed in Western society 
and how social constructions of breast/ovarian cancer lead to conflict between socially 
imposed themes and the participants’ personal meanings.  Reading the personal 
experience narratives through the lens of feminist literary theory allowed expression of 
issues important to the participants which medical discourse has not recognised. A 
feminist stance identified the challenges faced by high risk women arose at least in 
part as a result of the status imposed on female breasts, and to lesser extent ovaries, 
in Western society.  Application of the concept of resistance created new ways of 
understanding high risk women’s decisions to say no to RRS. While many women 
undertake RRS and find the experience positive and empowering, some do not: these 
are the stories of the women in this study. 
 
To an extent, this section unites themes presented in the previous two analytic 
sections.   Consequently, the convergence between feminist, Foucauldian and Marxist 
theorising is acknowledged. Reasons for this are threefold.  First, all three literary 
critiques provide as Dolby-Stahl (1985, 1989) argued, a means to critically 
deconstruct the personal experience narratives of high risk women in order to expose 
themes, attitudes and allusions reflective of societal expectations which influenced 
how the women’s lives are lived and experienced.  Second, all highlight power and its 
unequal distribution in society as a result of seemingly rational or natural ‘givens’ 
which structure everyday life.  Finally, feminist, Foucauldian and Marxist positions all 
recognise the body as a site of power relations in Western society and contend power 
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is something which is both exercised upon and able to be exercised by high risk 
women thereby revealing the possibility for resistance to power relations.   
 
Step 8: Acknowledging that the researcher creates the document that is 
interpreted.  
The overall aim of this study was to capture the meanings the participants attributed to 
their lives in written texts (Denzin, 1989).  The personal experience narratives of the 
participants were constructed from one version of potentially many stories which could 
have been told.  Rather than seeking to uncover true and false stories, the 
biographical researcher’s task is to understand the story constructed, as stories are 
always influenced by wider social, cultural and historical contexts which influence and 
determine standards of truth in particular groups and societies (Denzin, 1989).   
 
The participants’ personal experience narratives were “structures of representation” 
(Denzin, 1989, p. 8) which provided the study data for analysis and interpretation.  
Stories are told and heard in groups and societies therefore the telling, hearing and 
interpretation of stories will always be subjective and influenced by an individual’s 
personal values, beliefs and experiences (Frank, 1995).  In biographical research, the 
researcher creates the life which is written about in the same way the teller creates 
the story which was told thus the subject is created in the text written (Denzin, 1989).  
In this study, this subjectivity is viewed as a privilege rather than a restriction since the 
focus is on creating a shared understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, a preoccupation with validity, reliability and generalisability 
is set aside in favour of a concern for meaning and interpretation (Denzin, 1989; 
Dolby-Stahl, 1985) and presenting a credible, believable account.   
 
The personal experience narratives of the participants in this study demonstrated an 
attempt to document reality (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  Whilst the researcher used literary 
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theory to develop an understanding of the experiences contained within the personal 
experience narratives, the interpretation was from the researcher’s perspective 
(Hendricks, 1999; Williams & Holmes, 2005) and was therefore individual.  It was 
therefore essential the researcher took full responsibility for the act of interpreting and 
translating what was heard during the act of storytelling (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  
Additionally, since “a life or biography is only ever given in the words that are written 
about it” (Denzin, 1989, p. 7), the focus of the interpretation was on the text of the 
individual and not the individual as such.  The researcher acknowledged each 
personal experience represented the words of the woman not their underlying 
philosophy or stable identity (Dolby-Stahl, 1985) as these can never be known.  By 
accepting responsibility for the interpreted document, the researcher absolved the 
participant from any ‘blame’ should any discomforting information emerge during the 
research process (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).  Similarly, the researcher’s primary obligation 
was to the people under study hence the promise of privacy was afforded to those 
who shared their stories and permitted an insight into their most personal experiences 
(Denzin, 1989).  The researcher acknowledged she created the document which was 
interpreted and therefore provided a reliable method which safeguarded the 
psychological privacy of the study participants (Dolby-Stahl, 1985). 
 
In summary, the approach taken in this study blended Denzin’s (1989) interpretive 
biography with Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology to unravel and 
interpret the personal experience narratives of high risk women who said no to RRS 
within the framework of Western medical discourse and made possible the discovery 
of the private folklore of this group of women.  The chapter to follow comprises the 
analysis and discussion chapter. The participants’ stories are interpreted through the 
lenses of Marxist, Foucauldian and Feminist literary theories.  In particular, the Marxist 
concepts of ideology and commodification, Foucault’s theories on discourse and 
power, and the feminist concept of resistance are used to focus on the aspects of 
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experience considered most important: the participants’ experiences of being 
identified as owning a BRCA1/2 mutation which predisposes cancer development, 
and how these experiences led to the decision to say no to RRS.     
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CHAPTER 5:  THE STORIES OF SUSAN, ANN, PAULINE, ROSIE, MARY AND 
JACQUI 
This section introduces the study participants and describes how intimacy was 
established with each participant to facilitate the uncovering of meaningful 
experiences, epiphanies and private folklore.  Following this, the participants’ 
biographical timelines with family histories and epiphany moments are presented.  
The participants’ names and those of others were changed to protect anonymity.   
 
Establishing intimacy with Susan 
Susan was 35 years old, divorced with one daughter (Emma) aged 14 years.  She 
worked as a classroom teaching assistant in a local high school.  Susan was first to 
respond to the newspaper advertisement seeking study participants. When she 
telephoned, she seemed undecided about participation and asked several questions 
relating to the purpose of the study and what would happen with the study findings. I 
briefly explained the study aims and explained my experiences of working with women 
facing familial cancer had made me aware of the difficulties faced and I was keen to 
understand these difficulties to better inform support for these women.  I reiterated 
participation was voluntary and she could give it some thought and get back to me if 
she decided she wished to participate.  However, she stated she was keen to talk 
about her experiences in the hope they might help others and we arranged to carry 
out the interview the following week at her home.   
 
On arrival at Susan’s home, she appeared welcoming but anxious.  I complimented 
her on her home and accepted an offer of coffee.  As the coffee was being made, we 
chatted about my work and I asked her about her work as a classroom assistant at the 
High School.  I explained I had two teenage children myself and joked I did not envy 
her spending prolonged periods of time with lots of teenagers which she laughingly 
agreed was challenging at times.  Susan then explained she too had a teenage 
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daughter and being a divorcee, felt guilty she had said no to RRS and worried she 
would not be around to see her daughter grow up. I acknowledged this must be 
difficult for her and as a mother myself, I could see where she was coming from.  I 
asked her if she was happy to commence the interview and she stated yes and she 
was actually looking forward to sharing her thoughts with someone who had some 
insight into what she had been through and who was not there to question the 
decision she had made or persuade her otherwise.   
 
Establishing intimacy with Ann 
Ann was 47 years old, married with a daughter aged 16 and a son aged 11 years. Ann 
and her husband Ken had inherited the family business, a bakery, from Ann’s father, 
who had died from prostate cancer, and she fulfilled the role of book-keeper for the 
business.  Ann responded to one of the early newspaper advertisements and 
appeared keen to participate from the outset. When she initially contacted me, she 
asked about the background to the newspaper advert, and wondered if the research 
was to inform the writing of a book.  When I briefly explained the study aims, she 
immediately articulated she was keen to be involved as she felt it was an area of 
concern for her family and for women generally.  I thanked her for responding, briefly 
outlined the study aims and arranged to carry out the interview five days later in her 
home.   
 
Ann lived in an affluent area of town and on arrival at her home it was evident family 
was very important to her.  Throughout the hallway and into the siting area, the walls 
were adorned with many pictures of her children and other family portraits.  I 
commented on how nice her house was how lovely the pictures looked.  She thanked 
me for the compliment and offered me tea and biscuits, which I kindly accepted.   I 
thanked her again for her willingness to take part in the study and asked if she had 
any questions or if there was anything she needed me to explain.  She stated no but 
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inquired into my motivations for the research.  I explained how my interest in familial 
breast and ovarian cancer developed when working as a Breast Care Nurse as I had 
witnessed first-hand the challenges and dilemmas faced by women and their loved 
ones.  I offered my view the management of hereditary breast/ovarian cancer was 
increasingly the focus of much research and I believed it was important women 
affected were given the opportunity to contribute to research by telling health care 
professionals about their experiences.  
 
Ann went on to tell me she had herself been doing her own research about hereditary 
breast cancer because every day she worried she had made the wrong decision in 
saying no to RRS.  However, she had found newspaper and magazine articles one-
sided: their focus tended to be women who had accepted surgery.  Similarly, she had 
joined an online forum but again, almost all other members of the forum felt accepting 
surgery was the best option. I said I would be interested to hear more on her thoughts 
about this and asked permission to commence the interview to which she agreed, 
thanking me for the opportunity to tell her story.   
 
Establishing intimacy with Pauline 
Pauline was aged 33 and lived with John, her partner of 12 years, and her two 
children: Ross aged 9 and Eva aged 6.  She was the youngest participant to respond 
to the newspaper advertisements and appeared anxious from the outset.  When she 
initially contacted me, Pauline inquired if there was any payment for taking part in the 
research.  I explained there was not and briefly outlined the purpose of the study.  She 
seemed hesitant and said she would give participation some thought and get back to 
me at a later date.   I thanked her for responding and stated I would be happy to 
answer any questions she had or address any concerns.  It was another week before 
Pauline phoned again saying she was willing to be interviewed.  Pauline did not want 
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me to come to her home therefore the interview was arranged for the following week 
and took place in a private room I reserved at the local library. 
 
When we met the following week, Pauline remained anxious about participation.  I 
suggested we had a coffee in the library café beforehand to allow her to have her 
concerns addressed prior to the interview.  Over coffee, she explained to me she was 
nervous about saying the wrong thing and although she felt she wanted to talk about 
her experiences, she wasn’t sure she would be able to answer all my questions or if 
her answers would be the ‘right’ answers.  I described the study aims in a little more 
detail and explained it was her story and experiences I was interested in hearing 
about therefore there were no ‘right or wrong’ answers.  She asked me why I was 
interested in her situation and I explained my clinical background and work as a 
Breast Care Nurse and my interest in women’s health and cancer genetics generally.  
Pauline asked if I had children and I told her I had a son of 14 and a daughter of 11.  
She then told me she also had a son and daughter, and we discussed our children 
and shared anecdotes for a short while. Pauline was quite animated when talking 
about her children and she appeared more relaxed.  I then asked if she would be 
happy to carry out the interview, to which she responded yes, and we finished our 
coffees and headed to the reserved room. 
 
Establishing intimacy with Rosie  
Rosie was 39 years old, married to Tom with a son aged 14 called Neil.  When Rosie 
initially contacted me, she seemed anxious and asked several questions regarding the 
purpose of the study and what participation involved.  I explained my interest in the 
subject matter and what I hoped to achieve by doing the research.  Although she 
stated she would be willing to discuss her experiences, she was concerned her family 
would find out as she did not want them to know.  I explained protecting participants’ 
privacy was an important issue in the study and any information she gave would be 
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anonymised and at no time would her identity be revealed.  I also explained the 
interview could take place somewhere other than her home but stressed participation 
was voluntary and she could withdraw from the study at any time.  In view of her 
anxiety, I suggested she think further about participation and call me back if she was 
certain she wished to take part.  She agreed to do so and called me back the following 
day, stating she wanted to take part as she believed her experiences to be important 
and she felt people should know about the difficulties surrounding genetic testing. 
Owing to Rosie’s request to keep participation private from her family, we arranged to 
carry out the interview at the home of a friend (Jane).  
 
When we met at Jane’s house on the day of interview, Rosie was friendly but still 
appeared anxious.  Jane was present while we had coffee and Rosie explained her 
friend had been a source of support and comfort during her experience whereas she 
had felt unsupported by her family and hence had not wished the family to know of her 
participation.  Rosie again asked about my motivation for undertaking the research 
and I explained familial cancer was an area I had always been interested in since my 
time working as a Breast Care Nurse because I had cared for women facing difficult 
decisions about familial breast and ovarian cancer.  I also explained my interest in 
women’s health generally, both as a woman and a researcher, and my view health 
care professionals needed to know more about the experiences of women in 
breast/ovarian cancer families. Her friend Jane agreed this was important and my 
research sounded very useful.  I again thanked Rosie for her participation and offered 
I would be interested to hear more about her experiences.  At this point, Rosie’s friend 
Jane excused herself and the interview began. 
 
Establishing intimacy with Mary 
Mary was 37 years old and married to Robert.  She had two daughters aged 21 and 
16 years.  Her oldest daughter lived with her partner and had a child of 3 months 
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whilst her youngest daughter lived at home.  Mary was a member of the same online 
support group as Ann and contacted me after discussing the study with her.  Like Ann, 
Mary had found herself in the minority with regards to saying no to RRS, as most 
members of the support group were planning or had undergone surgery.  
 
When Mary first contacted me, she explained Ann had discussed taking part in the 
study with her.  She stated she thought my study sounded very interesting and she 
felt it was important people understood how difficult the genetic testing process was 
and decision making around RRS was not easy.  I thanked her for her interest and 
explained I would need to tell her more about the study and give her some time to 
carefully consider participation.  I explained the study aims, what I hoped to achieve 
by undertaking the study, what she would be required to do and she stated she would 
consider taking part.  She called back a few days later and we arranged to carry out 
the interview at her home the following week. 
 
Mary was friendly and welcoming when I arrived at her home.  We spent some time 
chatting and having tea and biscuits.  I had previously discussed my nursing 
background with Mary when I was explaining my interest in women’s health and 
familial breast cancer.  Mary talked about her work as a care assistant in an elderly 
care home and how much she enjoyed the role.  She explained she had fallen 
pregnant at an early age (16) and had therefore left school without completing her 
education.  This was of some regret as she had always wanted to become a nurse but 
had been unable to do so.  We talked about nursing and health care generally, and 
the many changes which had taken place in our lifetime.  This led on to a discussion 
about cancer and genetics and Mary talked about how different health care had been 
when her mother had first been diagnosed with and treated for breast cancer.  I then 
suggested we commence the interview and Mary agreed. 
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Establishing intimacy with Jacqui 
Jacqui was 40 years old, married to Paul with two children: a daughter aged 17 and a 
son aged 15.  Her son had mild autism but attended main stream school and 
appeared to be doing well. Jacqui was the final participant to be recruited following 
one of the later newspaper advertisements.  She had not seen the newspaper advert 
herself but a relative had pointed it out to her.  When Jacqui contacted me, she was 
bright and cheerful and keen to find out more about the study.  I explained the study 
aims and what I hoped to achieve by doing the research and encouraged her to ask 
questions if there was anything she was unsure of.  She said she had no questions 
but was very interested in telling her story as she believed her experiences could help 
other women in a similar position.  I thanked her for her interest and explained what 
would be required of her.  Since she lived some distance away, we agreed to meet for 
the interview four weeks later to allow me time to plan travel arrangements.   I advised 
her should any questions arise during this time, she could call me for clarification.  I 
also asked her permission to call her the day before the interview was scheduled to 
confirm she still wanted to participate, prior to me travelling to her home town.  She 
happily agreed to this and I once again thanked her for her willingness to take part 
and stated I looked forward to hearing her story when we met. 
 
Jacqui was friendly and welcoming when I arrived at her home to carry out the 
interview.  As she made coffee, she enquired about my train journey and asked me a 
little about where I lived as it was a part of the country she had never been to.  I briefly 
described my home town and explained I had visited the town she lived in as a child 
as it had been a popular seaside holiday destination when I was growing up. Jacqui 
was younger than me but remembered being a child and the many tourists who came 
to the town, commenting the numbers had declined over recent years.  We talked a 
little about how things changed generally and how different things were for children 
growing up now.  Jacqui informed me she had two children aged 17 and 15 years and 
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stated she worried about the world they were growing up in, especially her son with 
his autism.  I offered I was also a mother of two and agreed how challenging bringing 
up children could be at times.  Jacqui then talked about her additional worries about 
her children as a result of her cancer family history.  I acknowledged her worries and 
asked if she felt comfortable to commence the interview.  She re-iterated she was 
keen to tell her story and the interview began.  
 
In keeping with Denzin’s (1989) approach, the participants’ biographical timelines are 
diagrammatically presented next.  These represent the life trajectories of the 
participants in relation to their family histories and turning point moments up until the 
time of interview. 
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Susan’s biographical timeline
 
 
Ann’s biographical timeline 
 
 
1989 
• grandmother's death from bilateral breast 
cancer 
• remembers her own mother's distress 
Nov 2003 
• mother diagnosed with ovarian cancer 
• conscious of mother's mortality  
• fear of cancer, fear of death 
• cancer was bad luck 
Oct/Nov 2007 
• aunt diagnosed: breast cancer 
• aunt undergoes genetic testing 
March 2008  
• aunt reveals positive test result 
• result of test forced upon Susan 
• whole family affected 
June 2008 
• Susan undergoes genetic testing 
• problem becomes real 
• realisation of seriousness of situation 
March 2009 
• Susan receives positive test result 
• inevitablity of disease/death 
• fear for child 
May 2009 
• family receive negative test results 
• unfairness of situation 
• family relationships strained 
July 2009 
• conflict and contradictions surrounding 
surgery 
• Susan says no to RRS 
• fatalistic outlook 
April 2011 
interview 
 
 
• uncertainty about life 
• Susan wishes she had never been tested 
• living with a timebomb 
 
 
 
 
1970s 
 
• paternal grandmother's death from breast 
cancer 
• secrecy surrounding diagnosis 
1988 
• mother's death from gastric cancer 
1990 
• father's death from prostate cancer 
• shock 
• being strong for siblings 
1992 
• paternal aunt diagnosed /died from breast 
cancer 
• cancer more than bad luck/familial link 
• deadliness of cancer 
Feb 2007 
• sister diagnosed with breast cancer 
• realisation of seriousness of situation 
Nov 2007 
• sister tests positive for BRCA2 mutation 
• further evidence of familial link 
• inevitability of cancer 
March 2008 
• Ann undergoes genetic testing 
Oct 2008 
• Ann receives mutation-positive test result 
• no escape from cancer/death sentence 
• relief for sibling/concern for children 
March 2009 
• Ann says no to RRS 
• bodily concerns 
• fate/destiny 
May 2011 
interview 
• negative impact of testing 
• concern for children 
• constant threat of cancer 
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Pauline’s biographical timeline
  
 
Rosie’s biographical timeline
 
 
1980s 
• maternal grandmother's death from 
breast cancer 
2002 
• mother diagnosed and treated for breast 
cancer 
Aug 2003 
• mother's death from stroke 
June 2007 
• sister diagnosed with breast cancer 
Jan 2008 
• sister has disease recurrance in affected 
breast 
• sister undergoes mastectomy and 
genetic testing 
2008 
• sister tests BRCA2 mutation-positive 
• sister undergoes risk reducing 
mastectomy 
November 
2008 
• Pauline has genetic testing  
• complexity of testing process evident 
• Pauline struggles to understand 
• relationship with partner strained 
August 2009 
• Pauline receives mutation-positive test 
result 
• can of worms opened 
Dec 2009 
• body image concerns  
• fears over impact of 
surgery/menopausal symptoms 
• Pauline says no to RRS 
June 2011 
interview 
• negative impact of testing 
• relationships with friends changed 
• personal interventions to reduce cancer 
risk important 
 1980s 
• maternal grandfather dies 
• breast cancer suspected but no clinical 
diagnosis 
1999 
• maternal aunt's death: breast cancer 
June 2006 
• mother diagnosed : ovarian cancer 
Sept 2006 
• twin sister diagnosed : breast cancer 
• sister refuses testing 
March 2007 
• mother undegoes genetic testing 
• family relationships strained 
Dec 2007 
• mother receives  mutation-positive test 
result 
• Rosie  uneasey but obligated to be 
tested 
July 2008 
• Rosie undergoes genetic testing 
Feb 2009 
• Rosie receives mutation-positive test 
result 
• result brings fear 
• relationship with husband strained 
Nov 2009 
• body image concerns 
• belief in fate/religious faith 
• Rosie  says no to RRS 
Oct 2011 
interview 
• regrets being tested  
• opening Pandora's box 
• living in fear of cancer 
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Mary’s biogrpahical timeline  
 
Jacqui’s biographical timeline 
 
May 
1997 
• Mary's mother dies from secondary 
breast cancer 
• mother's death is a devastating loss 
2002 
• maternal aunt diagnosed with breast 
cancer 
• first realisation of familial link 
 
2008 
• maternal cousin diagnosed with 
breast cancer 
• familial link now 'official' 
• fearful situation 
January 2009 
• maternal cousin receives  mutation-
positive test result 
• Mary reluctant to undergo testing 
but is persuaded by family 
• testing is 'tempting fate' 
August 2009 
• Mary undergoes genetic testing 
• concerns regarding implications of 
testing for daughters 
May 2010 
• Mary receives mutation-positive test 
result 
• uncertainty about the future 
• body image concerns  
Sept 2010 
• Mary says no to RRS  
• feels some relief with decision 'back 
to me' 
March 2012 
interview 
• fatalistic outlook 
• wishes test not available 
• concerns for children and 
grandchildren  
 
Oct 1994 
• Jacqui's mother dies from secondary 
ovarian cancer 
Jan 2006 
• Jacqui's father dies from lung cancer 
• fear of cancer as a fatal illness 
2006  
• sister diagnosed with breast cancer 
• realisation of familial link 
2009 
• sister treated for second primary  
breast cancer 
• sister tests mutation-positive 
Aug 2009 
• testing appears sensible option 
• Jacqui undergoes testing 
• realisation of implications dawns 
Nov 2009 
• Jacqui receives positive test result 
• world falls apart 
• feels a different person 
Jan 2010 
• younger sister receives negative test 
result  
• conflicting emotions 
• negative impact on family dynamics 
• Jacqui feels sense of isolation  
Feb 2010 
• Jacqui says no to RRS 
• difficulty understanding own decision 
• bodily concerns  
May 2012 
interview 
• fatalistic outlook 
• fears for daughter 
• no-win situation 
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction  
The previous chapters justified the approach taken in this study and presented a 
detailed description of the method used to gather the data.  This chapter provides an 
analysis of the data based on the biographical method.  The analysis is written around 
what Denzin (1989) referred to as epiphanies or turning point moments and what 
Dolby-Stahl (1985) referred to as themes.  The most significant epiphany was testing 
positive for a BRCA1/2 mutation.  The analysis here stems from this and incorporates 
other epiphany moments as outlined in the participants’ biographical timelines.  The 
following sections analyse, interpret and discuss these biographical events as captured 
in the participants’ texts in relation to the three identified literary theories.  While Dolby-
Stahl (1985) uses the term ‘narrative’ and Denzin (1989) uses ‘personal experience 
narrative’, the remaining thesis will refer to the participants’ stories.   
 
This study utilised Riessman’s (2001, 2006, 2008) thematic analysis as the 
underpinning framework for analysis of the participants’ stories. The stories have been 
“cleaned up” (Riessman, 2008, p. 57) to remove the researcher’s utterances, 
dysfluencies in speech and generally edited to make the excerpts more readable and 
to ensure the passages presented are contextualised in relation to the issues of 
concern.  Ellipses (…) are used to indicate omitted words such as repetition and false 
starts.  Clarification of meaning and explanations of local dialect and vernacular are 
provided in square brackets where necessary.  The names of the participants and other 
individuals referred to have been changed to protect anonymity.   
 
An interpretation through the lens of Marxist Literary Theory 
This study explored women’s experiences of being identified as high risk of developing 
breast/ovarian cancer and saying no to RRS. Women’s breasts and ovaries carry 
distinctive social and cultural meanings in Western society therefore surgery to remove 
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them, particularly in the absence of disease, presented participants with a dilemma.   
Understanding a woman’s choice to say no to the removal of healthy breasts/ovaries 
required their decision to be considered within social, cultural and historical world views 
which allowed interpretation of their experience. This chapter applies a Marxist view 
which contends Western society is a capitalist society in which dominant ideologies 
shape human experience in relation to gender, sexuality, work, the family and other 
cultural ideals (Denzin, 1990).  
 
The analysis and discussion to follow drew on two important and interlinked concepts 
in Marxist literary critique. That is, ideology and commodification. Both Marxist 
conceptual tools were useful for deconstructing participants’ experiences. Ideology 
influences beliefs and perceptions in daily life and forms the basis of understanding 
reality. Ideology also promotes commodification of gender, sexuality and the breast 
presenting each as an essential and natural component of social life and allows the 
commercial exploitation of HBOC. Commodification is the process, whereby, people 
and the products of labour are transformed into objects considered useful and/or which 
have exchange value (Lock & Nguyen, 2010).  A Marxist interpretation exposed 
ideological conflict and contradiction in relation to HBOC and how these confirmed or 
undermined the decision to say no to RRS, creating ambivalent experiences for the 
participants and providing scope for the creation of personal ideologies which resisted 
the dominant, externally imposed ideological forces.   
 
Gene mutations as cancer genes 
A recurrent and striking feature of the participants’ stories was the continual referral to 
BRCA1/2 mutations as ‘cancer genes’.  Every participant referred, in some way, to 
having ‘the’ or ‘a’ cancer gene and argued this ownership in terms of something found 
in their body, but not in the bodies of other women.   
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Susan explained how her family first became aware of the presence of hereditary 
cancer as a result of her affected aunt’s mutation-positive genetic test result: 
We found out about the gene only after Auntie Helen got her testing 
done (…) when she was in hospital getting chemotherapy.  They said 
she could get tested to see if she had a breast cancer gene which could 
maybe be passed down the family.  
 
Susan’s family were unaware her aunt was being tested until her aunt revealed the test 
result during a family meet-up, which had led to some disquiet at the time: 
So it kicked off a bit when we got there [during a visit to her Aunt’s 
home] and she says she’s got something to tell us and then just comes 
out with it, saying she’s had this test and she’s got a cancer gene and 
we’ve all to see a specialist [be]cause we might have it too. This was in 
front of Emma [Susan’s daughter] too. She didn’t give us the chance to 
say “right, get the weans [children] out the room while we talk about 
this”. It was really just sprung on us (…) we weren’t given any option to 
not hear about it.   
 
Prior to testing, Mary had hoped she would not have “the gene” and Jacqui admitted 
being afraid because she had “inherited the cancer gene” which might shorten her life.  
Ann also believed she owned a cancer-causing gene which could be passed on to her 
children and discussed her fears this might be the case: 
Sometimes I look at her and her friends, all young and full of life and 
vitality and all so beautiful, then it pops in my head she might be 
carrying the gene and have her life turned upside down.  I feel so guilty 
sometimes when I think I might have passed it on to her. 
 
There appeared to be a perception only high risk women carried BRCA genes, despite 
these genes being part of every human’s genetic makeup, passed on to all offspring 
(Arden-Jones et al., 2008). No participant differentiated between the gene itself and 
inherited mutations which are associated with cancer development (Rosenthal et al., 
2012).  Instead, there was a belief people either had a cancer-causing gene or not, as 
illustrated by Rosie who explained her position of risk of cancer in such terms: 
But when they actually found the gene in me, they knew my risk was 
much much higher than it would be normally, if I didn’t have the gene.  I 
am higher than her [sister] because I’ve got the gene and she doesn’t.   
 
Similarly, although Ann understood most women who develop breast/ovarian cancer do 
not have an inherited gene mutation (NICE, 2013), this was expressed in relation to 
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having the gene or not rather than having a mutation or not. Ann explained:  “more 
women without the gene get cancer than those with it”.  These statements typified how 
the language used to discuss gene mutations created an understanding breast/ovarian 
cancer was primarily caused by genes found only in high risk women; an erroneous 
belief which is not in keeping with most cancer development.   
 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 are genes located on chromosomes 17 and 13 respectively and 
are found in all human DNA (Yoshida & Miki, 2004), therefore in every person.  Certain 
deleterious mutations in these genes are associated with an increased risk of 
developing breast/ovarian cancer, hence the labelling of the genes as BRCA1 (breast 
cancer susceptibility gene 1) and BRCA2 (breast cancer susceptibility gene 2), 
(Lodder et al., 2002).  Whilst one may reasonably argue this represents no more than a 
shorthand way of referring to mutations on chromosomes which predispose 
breast/ovarian cancer, a Marxist interpretation suggests that the labelling of the gene 
faults as ‘BRCA1 and 2 genes’ can be understood as an ideological practice which 
proposes medicine has discovered why women develop breast/ovarian cancer and 
belies the reality of limited medical knowledge.   
 
More than 1000 different mutations in these genes have been identified (Antoniou & 
Easton, 2006) and much fewer are known to be deleterious (Antoniou et al., 2003).  
Current evidence suggests BRCA1/2 mutations account for at most 10% of all breast 
cancers and 15% of all ovarian cancers (NCI, 2014).  Scientific understanding of the 
genetics of hereditary breast/ovarian cancer predisposition remains largely unexplained 
(Snape, et al., 2012; Tamir, 2010) and further research is needed to understand the 
clinical implications of different gene mutations (Kurian, Sigal & Plevritis, 2010).   As 
Werner-Lin (2008, p. 114) pointed out, “genetic testing for HBOC is predictive, not 
prophetic” because science is not able to say who will develop cancer and who will not.  
The vast majority of breast/ovarian cancers occur for reasons other than BRCA1/2 
196 
 
mutations, yet these genes are continually referred to as ‘the breast cancer genes’ in 
professional journals, the media and cancer charity literature.   Only on one occasion 
was there acknowledgement of an inherited mutation in the BRCA1/2 gene as being 
the cause of increased risk when Mary said: 
(…) they [genetics staff] said with the gene fault the risk of cancer is 
really high. They can’t always tell for everyone and it depends on what 
one [mutation] you’ve got, what the actual risk will be but they do know 
there is a risk.  They told us the gene fault I had meant my risk of getting 
cancer was 80%.    
 
Interestingly, Mary’s cognisance of a mutation rather than the gene itself as being 
responsible for increased risk was couched within her discussion of how her risk status 
was communicated by the geneticist:  Mary herself referred to “the cancer gene” when 
presenting her personal perceptions of risk: 
When you first find out you’ve got the cancer gene, it takes a while to 
sink in, even though I was half expecting to have it with my family’s 
history, I thought it would be the case we had a cancer gene in our 
family but it still took a while to accept. I think maybe the shutters just 
come down, like a survival instinct. I was really emotional for a while (…) 
angry because I had the gene and my risk being so high because of it.       
 
Consequently, the participants’ stories revealed a ‘reality’ about hereditary 
breast/ovarian cancer has been perpetuated through the ideological use of language 
and the labelling of gene faults as ‘cancer genes’.  Such an ideology suggests some 
people carry a cancer-causing gene whereas others do not, which explains ‘who gets 
cancer’. 
 
Interpreting the participants’ experiences through the lens of Marxist Literary Theory 
(MLT) revealed the labelling of gene mutations as ‘cancer genes’ commodified risk and 
allowed gene faults to be constructed as a form of biocapital (Franklin & Lock, 2003; 
Rose, 2007).  Biocapital refers to the use of living organisms or life forms to generate 
income and occurs when biotechnology becomes primarily a source of market value 
(Rajan, 2006).  Helmreich (2008) argued advancements in biotechnology allow 
biological materials including human genomes to be increasingly capitalised upon and 
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used to underpin projects aimed at profit generation. Life and life forms including genes 
as biocapital thus become objects of exchange in the capitalist system and a significant 
resource for the joint generation of health and wealth (Acero, 2012).   
 
The construction of BRCA mutations as biocapital is exemplified by the patenting of the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes by Myriad Genetics in 2001.  Myriad was able to secure a 
monopoly of rights to genetic testing and therapeutic uses of BRCA1/2 genes which 
gave power over the use of the genes and exclusive rights to commercial exploitation 
(Hanson, 2002), generating billions of dollars of profit for corporate interests (Thomas-
Pollei, 2008).  
 
The labelling of particular gene faults as ‘cancer genes’ also supports what Birch 
(2007, p. 85) referred to as a “logic of morbidity” which allowed medicine and science 
to create economic yield.  It is the creation of new morbidities, in this case ‘cancer 
genes’ which generate economic opportunity and allow economic value to be attached 
to risk reducing interventions (Birch & Tyfield, 2013).  Gene faults essentially allow a 
diagnosis of risk to be made which in turn permits the production of new drugs, 
technologies and professional services and thus new markets for these services (Löwy, 
2010). 
 
Moreover, the material embodiment of risk as residing in one’s ‘cancer genes’ means 
people become indistinguishable from their genetic code, since genes are culturally 
associated with the essence of life (Thomas-Pollei, 2008).  If one is identified as 
owning a ‘cancer gene’, other causes of cancer external to the body are discounted or 
relegated; and, genetic causes of disease take centre stage.  This in turn creates and 
sustains market demand for expensive genetic technologies to diagnose and manage 
cancer risk.   Jacqui revealed how her new-found genetic knowledge caused her to call 
into question why people develop cancer: 
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When you think of all the cancer in the family, well its common sense 
really isn’t it? I mean, my mother and father both smoked and they both 
got cancer. He [father] got lung cancer and her, it was ovarian.  Smoking 
and cancer, well that’s been known for ages but you think now maybe, is 
it smoking?  Maybe he [father] had something [genetic] too (…) maybe 
that’s why people who don’t smoke like Beth [sister] still get cancer and 
how lots of heavy smokers seem to be okay.   
 
Jacqui questioned smoking as a cause of cancer, and instead identified genetic causes 
as being “common sense”.  This reflects the findings of Finkler (2000) who also found 
people stated it was ‘common sense’ that cancer was a result of genetics.  Likewise, 
the other participants and their families almost entirely attributed cancer to the singular 
cause of ‘the cancer gene(s)’.  This reductionism represents an “ideology of genetic 
essentialism” (Finkler, 2000, p. 2) whereby cancer becomes a product of genes, 
ensuring women without disease are dependent upon medical expertise to reduce risk 
and stay healthy.  Owning a BRCA1/2 mutation thus comes to be understood as a 
threat to life, as explained by Susan: 
I mean I was pleased for her, really I was honestly, but it wasn’t fair 
because she [(sister] had been the one really trying to get me to go, to 
persuade me saying we all need it done, then she’s escaped and I’m left 
knowing I could have this thing that could kill me.  And she’s not even 
got any kids. God you must think I’m horrible, but I just felt really hard 
done to I suppose, why me, and worried about Emma (…) I mean, no 
one wants to be faced with what might kill them.   
 
Here Susan’s story shows how she interpreted her genetic status as a threat to life, 
referring to it twice as something which could kill her, equating her cancer risk with her 
mortality.  This happens in part owing to the cultural significance of the word ‘cancer’ 
and a collective worry about cancer.  Susan said:  
So she was okay but it hit me hard (…) when you see your mum in 
hospital with all the tubes and stuff and more so when you hear the ‘c’ 
word [cancer]. I am thinking “okay so they say she’s been lucky, but I 
mean its cancer” [said with emphasis].   
 
Susan’s response to her mother’s diagnosis reflects the fear of cancer which is almost 
unrivalled (Clarke & Everest, 2006; Harrington, 2012; Vrinten et al., 2014) because 
cancer ideologies ensure society takes for granted cancer is deadly and the ultimate 
threat to life, a risk to be removed at all costs.   A MLT lens proposes that the word 
199 
 
‘cancer’ is a potent ideological tool, and the risk of carrying BRCA1/2 gene mutations 
creates the need for an industry to manage the risk through genetic testing and 
maintains medical power as the overseer of these tests.  Cancer risk, as an ideological 
tool maintains that those deemed in this category respond in a desired way and that 
cancer risk is communicated and perpetuated in society as intended by key agencies 
involved in maintaining ideological control of the population.  Ann, in particular, 
frequently referred to “the ‘c’ word”, describing it as “your worst nightmare” and “the 
one word you never want to hear”.  Jacqui also alluded to the cultural significance of 
the word ‘cancer’ when she explained:  
Common sense tells me there’s something in every family, you know, 
something’s got to get you (…) but to have cancer in your family, that 
has to be the worst thing you can have, to be told you are a cancer 
family.  Everyone knows cancer is a killer, even the treatment, the 
radiation and the chemo[therapy], well they’re not pleasant.  Beth [sister] 
had a terrible time with her treatment, it nearly finished her off. So the 
thing about having cancer in the family is, well it’s the issue with the 
cancer but also the treatment (…) it’s like a double whammy if you have 
cancer.  
 
Similarly, Rosie summarised the fear associated with cancer:  
You don’t need to be a doctor to know cancer is one of the worst things 
you can get, especially when it spreads, there’s not usually much they 
can do about it.  Plus even having surgery can be risky. Once they open 
you up, anything that’s in there can spread.  That’s what happened to a 
woman my sister knew.  She went in for surgery on the bowel and then 
within two months, it had spread to her liver and she was dead (…) but 
before the operation, the scans were okay, it was the operation, made it 
spread.  
 
These findings submit that a belief in the presence and destructive power of a cancer-
causing gene which serves as an ideological force.  A Marxist perspective, therefore, 
contends ‘cancer’ is ideologically empowered to mean death. Hence, cancer risk is an 
ideological tool which creates and sustains fear.  However, this is not to deny cancer is 
a disease which causes significant mortality and morbidity, nor that genetic mutations 
exist which make cancer more likely.  Rather, from a Marxist stance, it is argued that 
ideologies of fear permeated through cancer and risk discourses exploit the emotions 
and worries of high risk women and permit ideological control for economic gain.   
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The creation of BRCA1/2 mutations as ‘cancer genes’ adds to their value as biocapital 
and effectively places a monetary value on cancer fear.  The ideology of fear obscures 
the vast wealth generated through genetic technologies and what goes unnoticed is 
that most breast/ovarian cancers occur for reasons other than BRCA 1/2 mutations.   
 
To sum, interpreting the participants’ stories through the lens of MLT submits that the 
labelling of certain genetic mutations as “the breast cancer genes” is an ideological tool 
which endows risk with a material reality.  The deadliness of cancer generates a level 
of fear which compels individuals to take steps to stay healthy and simultaneously 
supports medical intervention for dealing with cancer risk.   The next section turns to an 
analysis of the participants’ stories in relation to ideologies of treatment for risk and 
ways in which risk was constructed as something which could be dealt with through the 
consumption of a number of medical technologies.  Again, conflicts and contradictions 
were inherent in the influences of ideologies which diffused uncertainty and both 
consented and silenced resistance to the dominant medical pathway for HBOC risk.  
 
Ideology, genetic responsibility and consumerism 
The stories of Susan, Rosie, Ann, Pauline, Jacqui and Mary revealed the stressful and 
enduring pressure exerted upon them which obligated them to attend to the threat of 
cancer.   There was strong belief no woman could ignore a family history of 
breast/ovarian cancer or a mutation-positive test result.  Despite current focus on 
genetic testing as a key step in managing risk of breast/ovarian cancer, analysis of the 
participants’ stories revealed testing was not always keenly initiated by the participants 
but rather there was often a degree of ambivalence around testing.  Susan described 
her initial uncertainty about genetic testing thus: 
When we were first told we needed testing, I wasn’t really sure I was 
going to have it done.  I’m a bit superstitious really (…) the more you talk 
about something the more likely it is to happen. But everyone else, they 
were all like, think about Emma [Susan’s daughter], you need to do it for 
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her, you need to know if you’ve got it or not. I don’t know, maybe I was 
just trying to bury my head in the sand.  
 
Mary also stated she was initially cautious about entering the genetic testing process 
but discussions with others had made it clear knowledge of genetic status was 
something which could and should not be ignored: 
I was never keen for the testing.  Angela [Mary’s cousin] was keen to 
have it done because she thought it would help everyone get protected. 
I think it’s different when you’ve already got cancer, the testing is like 
finding a reason for it.  An explanation of ‘this is why I got it’ [cancer].  
But when you don’t have cancer (…) to me it was like tempting fate. 
Getting it done. But there was a lot of pressure on me, from people who 
said “how can you not get it done, you need to know, how can you get 
sorted if you don’t know”, that kind of thing. 
 
These excerpts show Susan and Mary had initial reservations about genetic testing but 
were subjected to pressure from others in the family to uncover their genetic status.  
Lock and Nguyen (2010) argued reluctance to undergo genetic testing is a plausible 
response in nature of the potential negative consequences of being identified as 
owning a genetic mutation which predisposes cancer.  However, what this study 
illustrates is ideologies around cancer risk and prevention strategies direct how one 
should respond to the threat of cancer, namely by submitting to genetic testing.   What 
is omitted from cancer and medical ideologies is the option to avoid knowledge of 
genetic status by declining genetic testing.   As the participants’ stories revealed, any 
reservations an individual might have held regarding testing and finding out one’s 
genetic status were likely to be quickly quietened, even condemned by others, on the 
basis knowledge of genetic risk is paramount.  Ann described how her cousin’s refusal 
to be tested had been met with incredulity by others: 
There was a lot of cancer in our family. We were all already worried 
about it, being in the family. (…). Christine’s [sister] test wasn’t a 
surprise, she already had cancer and at a young age. (…) there was an 
understanding after Christine’s diagnosis we would be tested, all of us, 
because of the history.  When my cousin said she wasn’t interested, 
there was (…) a huge intake of breath. (…). I don’t think anyone quite 
believed what she was saying. (…)  I have to admit I was at first 
anyway, shocked.  Assumed she would.  Of course I see where she’s 
coming from now but at the time, no.  I think she was put under the 
spotlight, “why are you not having it?”  Her husband was really off with 
her, got the kids to speak to her.  It was all really unpleasant.   
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Medicine provides a service to women with a family history of breast/ovarian cancer by 
offering interventions to diagnose and manage risk.  Medical technologies and 
pharmaceuticals are then able to be consumed by health care professionals and at risk 
individuals in the quest to modify risk and prevent cancer.  Genetic medicine has 
resulted in a globalised industry which generates substantial profits for pharmaceutical 
and biomedical technology companies (Baird, 2000; Birch & Tyfield, 2013, Hanson, 
2002; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; Zones, 2000).  The Human Genome Project is estimated 
to have cost $3billion (UK Parliament, 2012) and genetic testing is now a multi-billion 
dollar industry with spending on genetic testing set to reach $25 billion dollars in the 
United States of America by 2020 (United Health Group, 2012).  In the UK, more than 
£5 billion pounds annually has been allocated to genetic science and research 
programmes as part of what the government describes as a $100 billion synthetic 
biology marketplace (UK Parliament, 2012). In Australia, the current spend on human 
genetics Research and Development is estimated to be in the region of $795 million 
dollars per year (The Centre for International Economics, 2013).    
 
A Marxist interpretation contends ideologies about breast and ovarian cancer create 
fear and fuel demand for genetic testing and risk reducing interventions.  High levels of 
cancer fear are necessary to ensure people, or by proxy the State, are prepared to pay 
the costs of genetic tests.  A key way in which the fears of Susan, Rosie, Ann, Pauline, 
Jacqui and Mary were exploited through such ideologies related to their concerns for 
their families, especially children.  The participants’ stories revealed the obligation to 
uncover one’s genetic status was experienced as an individual’s responsibility to 
themselves and to their families.  Pauline explained her sister’s first reaction to being 
confirmed as mutation-positive was to request testing for others in the family:  
Because she [Pauline’s sister] got tested when she was still getting 
treated, it didn’t seem to take long.  We weren’t really thinking about the 
test until it came back and it was positive but it was to be expected 
really.  Her first reaction was for me to get tested. She asked the doctor: 
“can my wee [younger] sister have it done”? Her first concern was for 
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me really. We’ve always been close but after mum died and then she 
got cancer, well we were even closer as it was just the two of us.  They 
had told her before-hand if she was [mutation] positive, they might be 
able to test the others in the family if they wanted it (…) to be honest I 
think that was one of her reasons for getting it done, to see if it would 
help me find out my risk.   
 
Here, Pauline believed her sister underwent testing in order to help others in the family 
find out their risk of cancer.  Not only does this highlight her sister’s obligations to the 
family, it also appears to have influenced Pauline’s decision to have testing: 
Of course when it came down to it, of course I would have it done 
[testing].  I couldn’t not have it done could I? What would that say to 
Sarah [Pauline’s sister]?  It would have been a right slap in the face after 
what she’d gone through. And then of course there was Ross and Eva 
[children] and John [partner] to think about.   
 
Hallowell (1999) and Rowley (2005) reported women undertaking genetic testing for 
hereditary cancer often did so because of promises made to afflicted relatives which in 
turn reinforced their obligations to others and influenced their risk management 
decisions.  Pauline   exhibited a deep responsibility to her sister and her partner and 
children to undergo testing.  The use of the words ‘of course’ appears three times in the 
short excerpt above and reveals a certainty about Pauline’s decision to undergo 
testing, but a certainty brought about through her responsibilities to others rather than 
personal need to find out.  Although Pauline did not explicitly outline her obligations to 
others, her decision to undergo testing was entirely framed with reference to her sister, 
partner and family and the refusal of testing was considered almost an abuse of others 
in the family.  Pauline alluded to the possibility of not being tested but ruled this out 
because of responsibility to her sister who had been treated for cancer.  Familial 
obligations thus emerged as an important motivator for engaging in genetic testing and 
it was clear such obligations played an initial role in convincing participants to act to 
attend to cancer risk.     
 
Marxists view the institution of the family is part of society’s superstructure and key to 
maintaining a healthy, productive workforce (Waitzkin 1984, 1989).  This lends support 
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to claims the importance of the family and a woman’s role as protector of health is 
persistently endorsed in Western ideology (Acero, 2012; Lerner, 2000; Warner & 
Procaccino, 2004).  The nature of genetic medicine inevitably implies medicine for the 
family (Geelen, Hoyweghen & Horstman, 2011; Novas & Rose, 2000) as the whole 
family is implicated through risk of disease (Kenen, Ardern-Jones & Eeles, 2003).  
Accordingly, decision-making on risk reducing interventions is argued to be best taken 
within the context of a family clinic (Zagouri et al., 2013).  This has implications for 
women at risk of HBOC who may be ideologically consigned to making decisions in the 
best interests of the family.   Ann’s story also displayed how her fears for her children 
influenced her decision to find out her genetic status and her subsequent feelings once 
a gene mutation was identified: 
Well as a mother, your first thoughts are always for your family, your 
children and what it means for them.  You need to find out things, you 
need to know, like, am I going to be around for them?  Will they get it? 
And of course it wasn’t just Gillian [daughter] to worry about because it 
looked like our gene came from my grandmother through my father (…) 
so Jack [son] was also at risk of cancer, well more at risk than normal, 
which was really hard to believe at first, men could get breast cancer. I’d 
never heard of it in men so I didn’t really think about Jack until later on 
when I had more counselling and it came up.  So I was really worried for 
both of them, and how to broach the subject with them. 
 
Like Pauline, Ann framed her decision-making vis-à-vis genetic testing in the context of 
family responsibilities and explained her decision was influenced by her role as a 
mother and the need to find out the implications of her genetic status for the sake of 
her children.  Ann’s first concerns were not for herself, but for her children; would she 
still be alive for them and would they develop cancer.   
 
The analysis here supports previous work which suggested women at high risk of 
developing cancer made decisions in response to risk in part due to feelings of 
responsibility for the health of the family (Bottorff et al., 2002; Bruno et al., 2010; 
Foster, Watson, Moynihan, Ardern-Jones & Eeles, 2002; Hallowell, 1999, 2000; 
Hamilton, 2012; Rowley, 2005).  Being a parent is reported to be a significant predictive 
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factor for uptake of RRS (Fang et al., 2005; Karp, Brown, Sullivan & Massie 1999; 
Meijers-Heijboer, et al., 2000). This is perhaps not surprising when caring for the family 
is central to the breast cancer discourse (Blackstone, 2004) and the value of female 
nurturing is promoted and endorsed through medical encounters (Gibbon, 2007).  
Thus, ideology has the potential to impact women’s decision making in ways which put 
the needs of others first.  The family complete with nurturing mother, is key in Western 
society and is endorsed through medical discourse which situates women as the 
gatekeepers of family health and guides women to undertake interventions to reduce 
the threat of cancer.  Likewise, a Marxist perspective emphasises that a stable 
relationship between the family and successful economic production in capitalist 
societies is crucial; therefore, protection of the female (mother) as homemaker and 
nurturer is essential to the maintenance of a healthy productive workforce (Althusser, 
1971; Waitzkin, 1984).   
 
HBOC is viewed as a threat to economic stability because it threatens the lives of 
women and their ability to produce and reproduce.  Official guidelines on the 
management of HBOC such as NICE (2013) recommend that women preserve their 
ovaries until childbearing is complete further endorsing the importance of women’s role 
to reproduce in Western society.  Women who say no to genetic testing and risk 
reducing interventions may be construed as putting not only themselves at risk, but 
also the entire ideological framework underpinning capitalist society because of the 
covert linkage between the family and successful economic production (Waitzkin, 
1984).  The application of MLT, in this study, thus contended that the nature of genetic 
medicine conveniently strengthened the ideological impact of the family and allowed 
the transmission of subliminal messages through medical encounters to reinforce 
dominant social patterns in relation to health behaviours, the family and women’s 
responsibilities to themselves and others. Jacqui said: 
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When she [sister] got the second breast cancer, she was referred to a 
bigger hospital and she saw a specialist (…) he was the first to ask 
about the family’s history and bring up the genetics.  He said it was 
important to think about testing because with the situation with my mum 
and Beth and if it was in the family we would need to think about it 
because the whole family could be affected.  Beth was really poorly at 
the time but she thought it was something she could do for us.    
 
Given the above, it is not surprising that the analysis of the participants’ stories 
revealed decision-making around genetic testing and RRS were often framed as moral 
endeavours.  Susan, Rosie, Ann, Pauline, Jacqui and Mary were exposed to a barrage 
of opinions from others and at times felt coerced into action through comments which 
induced both blame and guilt.  Pauline revealed a friend had suggested not having 
RRS was akin to not loving her family: 
Everyone finds it strange I decided not to [have the surgery].  Some 
people have been right nasty. I had one friend tell me I was selfish. If I 
loved my family I would have it [surgery] for them (…) quite the expert 
on what I should and shouldn’t be doing.  (…) as if I was a bad mother 
for not [having surgery].  Well she’s not a friend anymore!  I cut her right 
out.  Others have been more nice about it but I can tell they struggle to 
understand. It’s hard for me to explain to them, they seem to think I’m 
mad or something.   
 
Ann also explained how friends and family used various techniques to persuade her to 
undergo RRS and how she struggled to explain her decision to say no to surgery to 
others:  
When I said I wasn’t going to have surgery, everyone wanted to know 
why and they would try and talk me round, tell me it was a no-brainer as 
it would stop me getting cancer.  I even had friends quoting statistics to 
me (…) it was hard for them to understand as they saw it as the most 
obvious and sensible thing to do.  Even my cousin said I should have it 
[surgery]. Now that really [raised voice] pissed me off because she 
refused to even be tested!  So it felt like a constant battle to try and 
explain why I didn’t want the surgery. I could barely explain it to myself 
but I just couldn’t do it.  But there is a lot of pressure, it almost seems 
like a moral dilemma.  People at the end of the day mean well but they 
don’t understand and they don’t help (…) you can feel like you are 
drowning.  You just want to scream “shut up” at the top of your voice to 
make them just listen and not talk. 
 
It was clear Ann was perceived by others as taking the wrong route with regards to her 
genetic status. Interestingly, Ann’s cousin had refused genetic testing yet still proposed 
Ann should undergo RRS in light of her BRCA2 status, which served to highlight the 
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complexity surrounding genetic testing for familial cancer.   Likewise Susan explained 
how other people’s reactions caused her to feel guilty;  
People also always make you feel dead [really] guilty for not having it 
[surgery] done (…) as if you don’t care about your child. My mum said “if 
you can’t do it for yourself at least do it for Emma, you need to be here 
for her”, as if I didn’t know. 
 
Susan demonstrated how her decision to refuse RRS was perceived by others to be 
uncaring and a decision which failed to take into account Susan’s duty to her daughter 
by staying alive for her.  Mary also explained how she was made to feel guilty and 
reminded of her duty to safeguard others, especially children; 
(…) but other people were sometimes not so nice.  I did get the old guilt 
trip (…) people with their opinions again about how I was crazy, avoiding 
something which could save my life.  The guilt trip about the kids and 
the grandwean [grandchild], staying alive for them.    
 
The analysis in this section supports an emerging body of literature on genetic 
responsibility (Acero, 2012; Douglas, Hamilton & Grubs, 2009; Hallowell, 1999; 
Hamilton, 2012; Konrad, 2005; Novas & Rose, 2000; Lemke, 2004; Raz & Schicktanz, 
2009; Resnik, 2014; Steinberg, 1996; Taylor, 2004; Weiner, 2011) which permeates 
genetics and provides a means for shaping responses to genetic risk in terms of moral 
negotiation and how risk is managed (Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi & Clarke, 2008). Weiner 
(2011, p. 1760) defined genetic responsibility as “the responsibility to know and 
manage one’s own genome for oneself and the sake of others, focussing particularly 
on responsibilities to family and kin”.   In keeping with this, the findings from this study 
suggested high risk women shoulder a substantial genetic responsibility to their 
families as a result of gendered ideologies and women’s special status as nurturers 
and gatekeepers of family health.  It is not difficult to understand why a woman might 
wish to act to protect her family nor is it difficult to understand why concerned relatives 
might wish to encourage women to do whatever is perceived as necessary to prevent 
cancer.  However what this study shows is the health choices of high risk women may 
be constrained by an ideology of genetic responsibility which surpasses personal 
choice.   
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Reading the stories of Susan, Ann, Jacqui, Pauline, Rosie and Mary through the lens of 
MLT allowed genetic responsibility to be understood as a tool through which medicine 
maintains control of the population and supports technologies which unite health with 
wealth (Acero, 2012; Birch & Tyfield, 2013; Novas & Rose, 2000).  Although genetic 
responsibility emphasises particular values and moral actions, it is expressed through 
demand for genetic testing and risk reducing interventions (Lemke, 2006) because 
genetic status cannot otherwise be known or attended to.  Genetic responsibility thus 
ensures high demand for genetic medicine and associated biotechnologies which are 
able to be marketed and consumed (Acero, 2012) and is therefore effective in securing 
the huge economic gains which can be realised through biotechnologies.   
 
The participants’ stories also revealed that genetic responsibility was enacted through 
the responsibility to communicate knowledge of risk to others.  Rosie’s twin Sheena 
was diagnosed with left-sided breast cancer while her mother was also undergoing 
chemotherapy for ovarian cancer.  Sheena had refused genetic testing which Rosie 
explained had led to her mother being pressurised to undergo testing so others in the 
family could exercise their right to know her genetic status. Rosie described the 
reaction from her other sister Julie and Julie’s husband when Sheena said no to 
testing; 
They’ve got three girls themselves and they were both like, “you’ve got 
to have this done Sheena, it’s not fair, we have a right to know if it’s 
going to happen to us”.  (…) saying I had the right to know as well 
because I could be affected too and might need treatment, one way or 
the other for Tom [husband] and Neil’s [son] sake (…).  But even then I 
wasn’t sure I would want to know but Julie just couldn’t get her head 
round it (…) me not wanting to know.  She wouldn’t even discuss it. As 
far as she was concerned it was the only right thing to do so we could 
be prepared (…) and mum and me were caught in the middle really.  
Then Julie took it upon herself to speak to the genetics people and when 
she told them about mum and Aunty Sue, they said mum could get 
tested to see if they could find the gene in her.  So that’s what 
happened.  Julie really made mum get it done. She didn’t ask her, just 
told her she was to go because the rest of us had a right to know if it 
was in us (…) so my mum did it and of course, it came back positive.  
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Genetic accountability is increasingly used to support agendas which purport an 
entitlements-based discourse of rights (Cahill, 2001; Faulkner, 2012; Novas & Rose, 
2000) where beliefs about an individual’s right to know, right to decide and right to 
treatment dominate.  Rosie’s excerpt above highlighted how knowledge of genetic 
status was perceived as both a right and a necessity by others, even when the affected 
individuals did not necessarily wish to know their status.  Ann also referred to her 
estranged brother Rob’s right to know the family’s genetic status which placed a 
responsibility on her to facilitate this; 
Then there was also Rob [Ann’s estranged brother] to think about if men 
can get it. Rob had some problems years back and we’ve not had 
contact from him for quite a while but it has made me think maybe I 
should be trying to find him.  I mean he’s got a right to know about this 
gene and for all I know, he could have daughters too which is even more 
of a worry (…) so I’ve been trying to track him down but with no joy as 
yet. 
 
The ‘right to know’ genetic information is underscored by medical discourse which 
assumes knowledge of risk factors improves health outcomes (Crabb, 2006; Paul et al., 
2014) because people can then do what is necessary to reduce risk (Griffiths et al., 
2010; Press et al., 2000) and gain protection from potential future harms (Lock & 
Nguyen, 2010; Tamir, 2010).   Finding out and communicating genetic information is 
thus not only sensible, but the hallmark of a loving, caring family relationship.  This was 
eloquently captured by Mary who explained how her love for her children influenced 
her decision to be tested but also the negative impact her test result had on her and 
her family: 
This whole nightmare is not something I would wish on my worst enemy.  
I really don’t see the point in everyone knowing what’s ahead for them.  I 
mean, who really wants to know what they are going to be struck down 
with, what bad things might happen to them. Maybe I shouldn’t have let 
them talk me into it [genetic testing] but you are really caught, torn in two 
really.  You love your kids yeah, so you want to do everything for them, 
everything possible to protect them but really you can’t protect them 
from this.  There is no protection [be]cause you’re damned if you do and 
damned if you don’t. But everyone’s going on, they’ve got a right to 
know, and you love them so you get tested, for them as much as 
yourself.  (…). And now my lassies [daughters] are faced with the same 
problem because I’ve got the gene, they have to wait and watch and see 
if it [cancer] happens to me, and they’ve got to think about testing.  My 
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oldest doesn’t talk about it but then she’s got a toddler to keep her 
occupied and she works too. She’s the type to just ignore things and 
hope they go away.  Not like Lisa [youngest daughter].  She is always 
going on about it, what if she’s got it. She’s even saying if she gets 
tested and has it, she’s not having children in case she passes it on 
which makes me feel real bad.  I’ve passed it on to her if she does get it 
(…) well it feels like it’s my fault.  If we had never had the tests, we’d be 
none the wiser (…) I wish I didn’t know. 
 
Mary was clearly reluctant to uncover her genetic status yet was “talked into” finding 
out through pressure from others.  Here we see a tension between Mary’s genetic 
responsibility to others and her own autonomous decision making.  Ultimately, despite 
her own misgivings, Mary was persuaded to be tested because others had a right to 
know her genetic status and because she bore a genetic responsibility to them, a 
decision she now appears to deeply regret.  Mary stated she wished she did not know 
her genetic status. However, the rights discourse which underscores an individual’s 
genetic responsibility to others ensures risk is communicated to facilitate risk reduction 
(Lemke, 2006; Paul et al., 2014).  Consequently, the right not to know and hence not to 
engage with risk reducing strategies, does not enter into ideology.  Somewhat 
paradoxically, the right to know genetic information also serves to deny the right not to 
know (Paul et al., 2014). Susan said:  
But she didn’t tell anyone [she was having a genetic test], not even 
Elaine and Claire, they’re her girls, my cousins. She says now she didn’t 
want to worry anyone and you can see where she’s coming from but 
they were really bealing [angry], they were raging she didn’t tell them.  I 
mean, it’s a big thing isn’t it? It affects them too well it affects us all 
really. (…) I told her I wasn’t happy at the way it was done.  We didn’t 
get any warning or anything.  I wasn’t sure I wanted to know but she just 
told me “don’t shoot the messenger” and made out it was information we 
had to have, so we could do what was needed to keep us safe from 
cancer. 
 
Susan’s experience illustrated how there was no prior discussion about genetic testing 
before being informed her aunt carried a BRCA mutation.  Instead, her aunt 
constructed herself as the transmitter of important genetic information which the family 
had a right to know to protect them from cancer, effectively denying Susan the right ‘not 
to know’.  From a Marxist perspective, the rights discourse ensures knowledge of risk is 
widely communicated and supports an ideology of risk in which individuals are able to 
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modify their risk of cancer through the consumption of medical and pharmaceutical 
interventions. Simply put, doing nothing in response to cancer risk does not generate 
economic yield. Thus it appears ideologies of genetic responsibility and people’s right 
to know take primacy in decision making around genetic testing and risk reducing 
interventions.  Moreover, the stories of Rosie, Ann, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline 
show how the ideology of genetic responsibility encompassed doing ‘the right thing’ in 
response to risk in order to protect others.  The participants were often reminded of 
their autonomy in decision making, but at the same time, there was a perception some 
decisions were more acceptable than others.  Jacqui explained: 
I really did think I would go for it [surgery].  You know it’s the right thing 
to do. (…). Beth [sister] pleaded with me, told me I was crazy, making 
the wrong decision. She said look how bad she had been when she had 
cancer and I had the chance to avoid it and I should do everything I 
could, take what they offered.  She said I was playing Russian roulette 
and it was not fair on any of them, she didn’t want to watch me go 
through what she went through (…) what about my children, all that 
stuff. Paul [husband] wasn’t much better. He would just say ”it’s your 
decision, do what’s right for you”, but at the same time, I always felt he 
wanted me to do what they [health care professionals] wanted, which 
was to be a good girl and take the surgery.  
 
The emotional conflict experienced by Jacqui is evident here: she acknowledges RRS 
as “the right thing to do” because it could potentially protect her and her children from 
the experience of cancer, yet ultimately she was unable to go through with surgery.  
Her sister tried to influence her decision whereas her husband emphasised her 
autonomy with regards to RRS.  However despite this, Jacqui’s perception was her 
husband thought she should have RRS because he perceived it to be medically 
necessary.  By describing those who accept surgery as ‘good’, Jacqui consequently 
identified herself as ‘bad’ as she said no to RRS.  
 
The usefulness of Marx’s concept of ideology is exemplified in the ways in which 
genetic responsibility directs high risk women down a particular course of action to deal 
with the risk of cancer.  In Western medicine, ‘good’ patients are those who accept their 
illness or condition and acquiesce to the requirements of the medical institution (Ferrie, 
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2010).  Medicine is the legitimate caretaker of establishing sickness and how it should 
be managed (Bilton et al., 2002; Conrad, 2005), therefore the ‘right’ health choice is 
one which conforms to medical discourse and treatment ideologies for the 
management of risk.   
 
Pauline, Ann and Rosie also at some point referred to genetic testing and RRS as the 
‘right thing’ either in terms of their own perceptions or the perceptions of loved ones.  
Rosie explained: 
(…) so it seemed like the right thing to do [genetic testing]. (…) when 
your results come back, family and your friends all seem to think the 
only option is to have the surgery (…) you’d be mad not [said with 
emphasis] to have it and you should just do the right thing (…) for the 
sake of your family I’ve had people say to me I’m lucky,[said with 
emphasis] lucky [raised voice]! Lucky I can do something about it. Well if 
it is luck it’s all bad!   
 
In this excerpt, the dominance of treatment ideologies for cancer risk is evidenced 
through Rosie being constructed by others as ‘lucky’ for knowing she is high risk of 
developing breast/ovarian cancer because she could now undergo RRS in response to 
risk.  The framing of RRS as the only rational option underscores it as the right course 
of action.  Saying no to surgery is therefore the wrong course of action, construed as 
madness and clearly not in the interests of Rosie or her family.  Paradoxically, to act 
autonomously is to attend to cancer risk by doing ‘the right thing’, a phrase which 
effectively functions as a colloquial idiom which indicates a particular acceptable action.    
 
Women are not held personally accountable for their genetic material but are held 
responsible for the actions taken or avoided to manage genetic risks (Hallowell & 
Lawton, 2002; Lemke, 2006; Press et al., 2000; Resnik, 2014).  Refusing medical 
intervention was seen as an irrational rather than an autonomous choice (Bishop & 
Yardley, 2004; Resnik, 2014).  Simply put, the autonomous choice becomes the 
rational choice, but ideology ensures that the rational choice is never free from external 
influence.  The rational choice is that which is ideologically sound and which 
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acquiesces to the institute of medicine.  Hence the responsible/moral subject becomes 
the economic/rational subject (Lemke, 2006) because irrational actions are non-
acceptable behaviours which threaten the State and the prevailing rational order (Lim, 
2011). Problematic to this is that such constructions fail to consider underlying 
structures of exploitation for commercial gain (Thomas-Pollei, 2008).  Interpreting the 
women’s stories through the lens of MLT then illuminated the relationship between the 
ideology of genetic responsibility, autonomy and the rights discourse in relation to 
HBOC and reasoned this was necessary to ensure growing demand for wealth 
generating risk reducing interventions.   
 
In summary, MLT analysis suggested a number of enabling ideologies existed which 
influenced and constrained the participants’ decisions in relation to HBOC.  The 
language of cancer genetics was understood as an ideological tool which endowed risk 
with a material reality and suggested medicine had discovered why women develop 
breast/ovarian cancer. An ideology of genetic responsibility ensured women were 
directed to respond to cancer risk in the desired way and ensured the rights of others to 
attain genetic information to attend to risk were also addressed.  This mesh of 
ideologies allows the commercial exploitation of cancer fear and ensures demand for 
biotechnologies and risk reducing interventions which maintain and expand the cancer 
industry.  However, despite the dominance of treatment ideologies for dealing with 
cancer risk, Rosie, Mary, Pauline, Jacqui, Susan and Ann said no to RRS.  It was, 
therefore, necessary to explore the participants’ stories for the influence of other 
dominant discourses and ideologies which shape human experience in Western 
society.   
 
To this end, the next section turns to an analysis of participants’ stories using Marx’s 
concept of commodification. Participants revealed the ways in which their breasts and 
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bodies had been turned into commodities to be sold to medical technologies that 
confirm or deny their experiences in relation to being at high risk of developing HBOC.   
 
Breasts, ovaries and commodification 
Ideologies of cancer risk and fear are important drivers of health care consumerism 
and the resulting commodification of women’s bodies,  since risk makes body parts 
disposable (Ettore et al., 2006).   Additionally, breasts and ovaries hold special status 
in Western society prompting an analysis of the participants’ stories for the effects of 
dominant discourses of sexuality, femininity and female attractiveness which objectify 
and commodify women’s bodies through the creation of normative standards to which 
women are expected to conform (Crompvoets, 2012; Emilee et al., 2010; Peterson, 
2007).  
 
The usefulness of Marx’s ideas of commodification was exemplified in the ways in 
which women’s bodies were constructed to create an image of an idealised female 
body which served as a marketable commodity.  To this end, images of the idealised 
female body are used to sell everything from shampoo to chain saws, cars to bottles of 
beer (Kilbourne, 2012).  Rosie was aware that ‘sex sells’ and the omnipresence of 
women’s bodies in the marketplace: 
Everywhere you look it’s all ‘tits ‘n’ ass’, sex sells, doesn’t it?  So there’s 
the whole thing with how you look, as a woman (…) which sounds like 
you are putting your looks before your health. I couldn’t explain to 
people though, they wouldn’t understand would they?  But how would 
they feel if they thought they were going to look, you know, no breasts, 
like that? (…) I couldn’t face the thought of it. 
 
Rosie explained the importance of her breasts to how she saw herself as a woman, but 
also acknowledged women are commodified through the use of particular body parts 
(in this case breasts and buttocks) to sell goods in consumer culture.  The concept of 
the idealised female body is integral to consumerist ideology in Western society 
(Peterson, 2007).  Consequently, capitalism promotes normative gender ideologies 
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which define what is considered attractive and appealing in the female gender (Cox, 
2011) and subsequently endorse a particular aesthetic in relation to how a woman 
should look (Adams, 2010).  Hence, it was not difficult to understand why Rosie was 
acutely aware of the importance of her breasts in how she measured up to the ideal 
woman.  Rosie’s unquestioning acceptance of the commodified, idealised female 
image resulted in a tension between protecting her breasts and her health because the 
thought of breast loss was so worrying.  Similarly, Susan revealed the prominence of 
an idealised female image and how such images impacted on her thinking at the time:  
At the start when I was thinking of going for surgery, well it really hits 
home what is being asked of you, removing your breasts, it’s massive, a 
massive thing to do.  I was separated at the time, on my own, but even 
still.  It was like they [breasts] were suddenly everywhere.  Wherever 
you are, they’re all over the place (…) women’s breasts, boobs selling 
cars, Wonderbra adverts, all that sort of stuff.  It’s like a constant 
reminder of what you are giving up.  There’s massive pressure on 
women to look sexy, to be like a certain way, isn’t there?  It’s bad 
enough when you have them [breasts] so I can’t imagine how sh*t it 
must be for those poor women without them. So, well, why would 
anyone want to be without them?  
 
In this excerpt, Susan tied being breasted to sexual attractiveness and as a result, the 
thought of breast loss through RRS was inconceivable.  Like Rosie, Susan was aware 
‘sex sells’ (Kilbourne, 2012) and the highly visible images of idealised women’s bodies 
and breasts resulted in her feeling compelled to look a certain way.  A mastectomised 
body is inconsistent with what Susan took to be a socially acceptable female body as 
verified through imagery in her everyday life.  
 
How women should look is implicit in everyday discourses (Cox, 2011; Gallagher & 
Pecot-Hebert, 2007) and women are confronted with idealised images of commodified 
female bodies on a daily basis through advertisements, the media and art (Piot‐Ziegler, 
Sassi, Raffoul & Delaloye, 2010).  Ironically, Haines et al. (2010) found idealised 
images of the female body were also emphasised in breast cancer literature with 
sexualised images comparable to the imagery used in commercial advertising 
predominant.   Likewise Wilkinson (2001) drew attention to breast cancer awareness 
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publicity campaigns which used images of conventionally attractive models with 
mastectomy scars super-imposed onto their torsos, rather than images of ‘real’ women 
with breast loss.  Such idealised images reinforce the physical differences which occur 
through breast loss and invite comparisons to sociocultural norms in relation to the 
female body.  Mary explained:  
After my test results, I wasn’t sure what I was going to do.  Surgery was 
an option and I swithered between yes and no.  But then, the idea of 
surgery was hard, there was some self-pity if I’m honest, a lot of “why 
me”? I don't want to. So it’s really hard.  It didn’t help that everywhere 
you look there’s these, you know adverts and stuff, with beautiful, 
perfect women and their perfect breasts. It hurt to see them. Even now I 
get quite angry when I see them.  You see them everywhere and it 
makes you think about things differently.  It’s hard to explain. Deep 
down it’s always been like that, but when you think you might not have 
breasts anymore, it’s like a crushing realisation, you suddenly become 
hyper aware (…) over sensitive about your breasts, and really want to 
hold onto them [breasts].  
 
Like Susan and Rosie, Mary was acutely aware of idealised images of the female body 
which were commonplace in everyday life and served as an indication of what was 
socially expected from a woman’s appearance.  The prominence of idealised bodies in 
the media, advertising and popular culture reduces the body to a commodity with an 
aesthetic exchange value (Peterson, 2007). Viewed through the lens of MLT, 
commodification opens the female body up to commercial exploitation.  Radin and 
Sunder (2005) argued that the marketplace was a key site for the transmission of 
cultural and social ideals with those who control the terms of commodification securing 
their position as a society’s ruling class.  Consequently, representations of women’s 
bodies are never objective but rather grounded in ideologies and hegemonic ideals 
which support the interests of the powerful in society (Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert, 2007).  
 
When women’s bodies take on commodity status, they are held to socially prescribed 
and highly gendered standards of attractiveness and sexuality (Gallagher & Pecot-
Hebert, 2007).  The importance placed particularly on breasts in Western society 
emphasises the outward appearance of the female body (Haines et al., 2010; Piot‐
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Ziegler et al., 2010) and constructs the body in objective and visible terms 
(Crompvoets, 2012).  Body parts such as breasts are then able to be used to sell the 
ideal.  Body commodification thus links women’s breasts problematically to societal and 
cultural expectations of attractiveness.  Jacqui explained how the thought of breast loss 
was particularly difficult and distressing because it would radically change her outward 
appearance and perceived attractiveness:   
Sometimes it was the little things what set me off.  You would put it 
[surgery] to the back of your mind and be going (…) getting about 
everyday life as normal as possible then something would trigger it.  I 
remember having a total meltdown one night before a do [party] we 
were going to just because of my dress.  It was what some might say 
quite revealing but I thought, well it made the best of my chest, you 
know? I looked really good in it.  I always got compliments wearing it.  
But putting it on that night, I couldn’t get it back off again quick enough.  
I couldn’t look at it, I hid it away at the back of the wardrobe.  It was just 
thinking, I couldn’t deal with how different I would be, looking down and 
not having them. Never being able to be proud about them again.   I 
know there’s more to life, to me, I’m not stupid but at the same time, I 
just couldn’t bear to be without them.    
 
Jacqui valued her breasts and took a certain pride in her appearance as a result.  This 
pride is corroborated by comments from others in terms of compliments about her body 
because of her cleavage.  Grubs, Parker & Hamilton (2014) argued individuals build 
self-identity in light of characteristics important to them, in this case having ‘good 
breasts’.  Hence, good breasts can be understood as assets which allow women to 
conform to socially defined expectations of the ideal female body.  Indeed, idealised 
breasts are colloquially referred to as ‘good assets’.  For Jacqui, to lose her breasts 
was to lose an asset from which she took pride and pleasure at social events.  Jacqui 
acknowledged she was more than her breasts but none the less, she found the thought 
of breast loss unbearable because it would effectively de-valued her outward 
appearance.  Thus the loss of her breasts/assets constituted the loss of a socially 
valued sign of femininity (Schulzke, 2011). Jacqui’s story continued as she revealed 
how her feelings about her breasts influenced her decision to say no to RRS:  
I just couldn’t go through with it.  Too drastic. I mean your breasts are 
part of you, part of being a woman and I am not over the hill yet, you 
know (…) and there was nothing wrong with them [breasts], they still 
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look fine. If I’m honest I was scared of losing them.  Paul [husband] was 
always a breast-man, always liked the big ones, so they [breasts] were 
important to me, to us.  Every woman wants to think she’s desirable I 
suppose (…) and my breasts made me feel desirable.  
 
For Jacqui, her breasts were also important in terms of what was considered to be 
male expectations of attractiveness.  Ann also discussed the value of her breasts in 
both her perceptions of how she looked and also the meanings attributed to her 
breasts: 
Ken has aged really well, he looks better now than he did when we got 
married [laughs], so I do like to look good for him. He used to say I had 
great breasts (…) he was first attracted to me because of my figure and 
he’s always been a boob man, how ironic.  And even after having 
children, mine were still quite good, not droopy or saggy, they’ve aged 
quite well. My friend said I am more worried about my looks than living 
but I don’t see it like that. She doesn’t understand how important they 
[breasts] are to me, as a person, as a wife.   
 
Ann benchmarked her physical appearance against her perception of what was valued 
physically in a woman.   Like Jacqui, Ann constructed herself as being attractive and 
hence valuable because of her breasts and it was clear she also perceived her 
husband to value her because of her breasts.    Ann and Jacqui also acknowledged a 
particular type of breast was privileged and normalised; ‘good’ breasts which were not 
‘saggy’ (Emilee et al., 2010) which added to their value as an asset. To this end, 
interpreting the participants’ stories through an MLT lens made visible ideologies which 
constructed women, their bodies and breasts as objects with an associated value in a 
system of exchange.   
 
Female breasts are important signifiers in Western society and serve as a visible 
indication of femininity, motherhood and sexuality (Ehlers & Krupar, 2012; Piot‐Ziegler 
et al., 2010) hence are subject to intense public scrutiny and evaluation (Chan, 2010; 
Spadola, 1998). The value attached to breasts is reflected in the relationship between 
women’s bodies and breasts and socially determined standards of femininity, beauty 
and attractiveness in Western society (Cobb & Starr, 2012; Thomas, 2006).  Simply, 
breasts are ‘exchanged’ for an acceptable body image and certain social status.  This 
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means the potential loss of breasts through RRS poses a devastating threat to high risk 
women.   
 
Commodifying body parts in terms of their value fragments the body and constructs 
body parts as objects of variable worth which are then able to be accentuated or 
disregarded (Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert, 2007).  Although differences existed in how 
participants discussed their bodies, all constructed particular body parts as assets.  
Rosie explained; 
I’m not even that bothered about them [breasts], mine are really small 
and not really what I would say my best feature, not a lot more than 
nipples really, but they are still there.  Tom always said he was more of 
a leg man, they were my best feature.  It was more about losing my 
ovaries as to me, that’s what makes you a woman. I mean, men have 
breasts don’t they, but they don’t have ovaries.  So for me, having 
ovaries was what made me a woman.  Without them, I wouldn’t feel like 
I was a woman.  I’d be like, well like a non-woman [be]cause I wouldn’t 
be a man and it wouldn’t be natural, like the menopause. So yeah, it 
was more about the ovaries really.   
 
Here several references to body parts and their value as assets are evident.  Rosie 
appeared ambivalent about the value of her breasts because they contrasted with the 
ideal in so much as they were ‘really small’ hence not her ‘best feature’. Rosie 
constructed her legs as valuable assets because they were her best feature and 
source of attractiveness to her husband Tom.   Rosie framed her ovaries as assets 
because they were the essential defining feature of womanhood, therefore to lose 
one’s ovaries was to become a ‘non-woman’.   The ovaries hence play an important 
ideological role in defining women because women’s bodies are valued for their 
reproductive potential (Sharp, 2000), symbolise womanhood and as such are 
associated with femininity and sexuality (Gubar, 2012).   Pauline also discussed 
concerns about the removal of her ovaries:  
The thought of the menopause and all the side effects, getting fat, night 
sweats, growing a moustache, losing your sex drive then add in, you 
become a moody cow, for a while anyway, so everyone’s got to put up 
with that too.  So you look hellish, you feel hellish then to top it all, 
there’s depression and all sorts maybe going on too.  I was worried it 
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would make me look and be old, maybe vanity you might say (…) but no 
thanks.   
 
Pauline articulated ways in which ovarian loss would damage her physical and 
emotional health.  Oophorectomy and resulting oestrogen deprivation are known to 
change women’s bodies (Bresser, 2009) negatively impacting on physical and 
emotional well-being (Bonadies et al., 2011; Fry et al., 2001b; Guillem et al., 2006; 
Hallowell et al., 2012). However Pauline constructed these potential impacts as being 
in opposition to the idealised female body image in Western society: a slim, hair-free, 
youthful body (Ashikali & Dittmar, 2012; Jones et al., 2005) and an upbeat disposition 
(Wilkinson, 2001).  This is further evidence of how women and their body parts are 
commodified and constructed in terms of assets which increase or reduce the social 
value of a woman.   Breasts and ovaries signify femininity, sexuality and womanliness 
and are thus a form of currency which can be exchanged for social acceptance and 
desirability (Parry, 2008).  By constructing certain body parts as assets of varying 
value, Jacqui, Ann, Pauline and Rosie could be argued to be complicit in their own 
commodification.  From a Marxist perspective, this occurs because the gendered 
structure of capitalism disproportionately targets and commodifies women (Adams, 
2010; Cox, 2011) in order to promote body insecurities (Peterson, 2007), stimulate 
consumerism (Crompvoets, 2012) and create profit (Allan, 1998).  Moreover, so-called 
‘common sense’ beliefs about how women should look conceal ideologies which draw 
on normative notions of womanhood, femininity and sexuality and thus appear natural 
and given (Bennett & Royle, 1999).  Susan explained: 
The main issue I think is how you would look after [mastectomy]. It just 
seemed so drastic to have so much surgery when there’s nothing wrong 
with you. It changes everything.  Every woman wants to think she looks 
good.  No-one wants to think they are not attractive do they?  And like it 
or not, as a woman your breasts are a big part of that, so it’s really a 
terrible position to be in. 
 
Susan’s story reproduced two key ideological influences.  First, breasts are inherently 
and essentially tied to female attractiveness.  Second, women innately strive to be 
attractive to others.  It is the very ‘naturalness’ of such ideologies which encourage 
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women to internalise socially determined acceptable standards of beauty and sexual 
attractiveness in Western society (Coco, 1994; Cox, 2011; Riessman, 1983; Serdar, 
2006; Thomas-Pollei, 2008) and to value themselves accordingly.   
 
The participants, in this study, assessed their value as a woman largely in terms of the 
presence and condition of their breasts and ovaries.  Marx’s ideas of commodification 
were useful in understanding breasts and ovaries as assets which gave value to a 
woman’s body or through ways in which women were constructed as being less 
valuable without breasts and ovaries (Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert, 2007).   It is not 
surprising, therefore, potential breast/ovarian loss caused Rosie, Ann, Pauline, Jacqui, 
Susan and Mary to question how valuable their post-surgery bodies would be and how 
the loss of their ‘assets’ might impact on their lives.  All voiced concerns breast and/or 
ovarian loss would negatively impact on how others saw them and damage current or 
future sexual relations.  Rosie discussed her fears related to the removal of her 
breasts:   
Tom and me, well without going into the gory details, we were still very 
sexual in our relationship (…) still enjoying that side of things at the time.  
With Neil being a teenager, we had been having a bit more freedom that 
way [sexually] again with having the house to ourselves a lot.   If I had 
(…) [points to breasts and makes cutting off gesture]), every day I would 
be thinking, “I’m not a whole woman, it’s not me”.  Tom said it wouldn’t 
bother him but it would bother me [said with emphasis]. I wouldn’t be 
able to let him see me, look at me again, I don’t think. 
 
Rosie believed breast loss would impact negatively on her body image to the extent 
she would have to shield her post-surgery body from her husband, despite his 
reassurances to the contrary.  Mary also described her belief breast loss would 
diminish how attractive she was to her partner: 
Robert [husband] of course said it wouldn’t matter to him what I looked 
like, but a man is going to say that isn’t he?  I mean, he wouldn’t be 
much of a man if he said, “don’t you dare have them off, I won’t fancy 
you after”.  No-one’s going to actually say it. But it’s how I would feel, I 
wouldn’t feel fanciable. I wouldn’t feel like a woman.  
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Like Rosie, Mary questioned the reassurance offered by her husband.  Self-image was 
so closely bound to perceptions of what makes a woman attractive, they thought they 
would be less sexually attractive following breast loss.  Rubin and Tanenbaum (2011) 
found that breast loss in particular was equated with a loss of sexual identity and 
attractiveness.  Studies also show women often wrongly assumed their partners would 
be repulsed by their mastectomised bodies (Sheppard & Ely, 2008; Sulik, 2012) and 
continued to harbour negative thoughts even when partners offered reassurance this 
was not the case (Bertero, 2002).  Gallagher and Pecot-Hebert (2007) contended 
culturally determined standards of attractiveness encouraged women to define 
themselves in relation to their relationships with partners and male expectations of 
appearance and attractiveness, therefore a perceived loss of attractiveness was likely 
to be translated as a failure to meet male expectations.  Susan, a single parent at the 
time of interviews, explained such perceptions thus:  
At first I was going to have it done, the mastectomies and the ovaries 
because Emma is my priority and I’m not really wanting any more 
children, don’t have a man anyway [laughs], and no-one would want me 
with no chest anyway. I mean it’s not a priority for me by any means, but 
you never know, Mr Right might be waiting round that corner and if he 
is, well, it wouldn’t be a very good start would it?  Nothing down there 
[points to chest].  I wouldn’t be much of a catch with no women’s bits, 
would I? [laughs] 
 
Although Susan laughed as she discussed not being a good ‘catch’, her story 
demonstrated how the social value of women may be reduced as a result of 
breast/ovarian loss.  Susan’s perception of her post-surgery body was problematically 
linked to her perceptions of male expectations of attractiveness hence she constructed 
her changed body as unfit for consumption in the marketplace for attracting a partner.   
 
The significance of the male gaze was captured in the stories of Rosie, Ann, Pauline, 
Jacqui, Susan and Mary.  Women facing breast loss fear their bodies will shock 
partners and experience doubt about submitting themselves to the male gaze 
(Szumacher, 2006), describing their breastless bodies as hideous, undesirable and 
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monster-like (Piot‐Ziegler et al., 2010).  Drawing from Marx’s concept of 
commodification, not only are breast/ovaries commodified as assets of varying worth, 
but consequently women without these assets are constructed as ‘damaged goods’.  
Jacqui explained her thoughts on breast loss in the context of her relationship with her 
husband:  
I know he [husband] loves me and it feels stupid even saying it, of 
course he would, but I needed reassurance we would be okay and he 
would love me boobs or no boobs, because you know he loves you but 
it doesn’t stop the voice in your head going on and on. You’d be different 
somehow, incomplete. Not the woman he married. 
 
Here, it was apparent Jacqui’s breasts and what they symbolised formed an important 
part of her self-image (Hallowell et al., 2012). To lose her breasts meant she would 
become a different woman, an incomplete woman.  Numerous studies have identified 
women facing breast loss worry about being perceived as damaged goods (Esplen, 
Stuckless, Berk, Butler & Gallinger, 2009; Grubs et al., 2014; Hamilton, 2012; Hoggan, 
2014; Karp et al., 1999; MacDonald, Sarna, Weitzel & Ferrell, 2010; Robinson & 
Lounberry, 2010; Sadeh-Tassa, Drory, Ginzburg, & Stadler, 2000; Spiegel & Classen, 
2000).  Women facing breast loss construct post-surgery bodies as unattractive, 
abnormal or damaged (Crompvoets, 2006; 2012); ugly (Bertero, 2002), handicapped or 
incomplete (Piot‐Ziegler et al., 2010) and disfigured or deformed (Freysteinson et al., 
2012).   
 
The concept of ‘damaged goods’ is made possible through a Marxist  interpretation and 
links between women’s concerns about becoming breast-free and the value placed on 
retaining   breasts are evidenced.  When breasts are commoditised as body ‘assets’, it 
stands that bodies which lose assets are damaged.  Pauline touchingly outlined the 
impact being damaged could have on her life:  
Our ‘thing’ is to have a bath together and take a bottle of wine in (…) it’s 
how we relax or what we do if we get a night away together and it would 
be out the window. A really special thing for us and it would be totally 
ruined.  Sarah [sister] has told me she feels the same, she doesn’t feel 
attractive any more, even though her husband is trying to be supportive 
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about it. (…) John said I should do what I want and he wouldn’t mind but 
I know he would. What man wouldn’t?  And even if he didn’t mind, I 
would mind and I would lose all confidence in myself. I would never be 
undressed in front of him again.  
 
Pauline subliminally framed herself as damaged goods when she explained she would 
no longer feel attractive to her husband should she lose her breasts.  She was 
therefore forced to call into question aspects of her relationship with which she was 
previously confident of, as a consequence of the anticipated bodily changes incurred 
through RRS.  A perception of the body being damaged goods was also evident in the 
ways participants referred to the bodies of others.  Although not always openly 
acknowledged, mastectomy in particular was perceived as damaging the body.  Rosie 
explained: 
I’ve seen Sheena’s [sister] [points to breast area] and I don’t like saying 
this, but it’s not pretty.  I couldn’t cope with looking [shrugs shoulders], 
you know, if I didn’t need to. It would be different if I actually had cancer.  
(…) I don’t like saying this because it’s saying something bad about 
other women who have had to have it [mastectomy] done, which I don’t 
mean, but I would think I looked [makes ‘squeamish’ face], you know? 
 
Rosie had trouble articulating her thoughts about how she might look following RRS 
although it was clear from her silences and body language the thought of breast loss 
was almost too difficult to imagine.  In this next excerpt, Jacqui shared an experience 
from her childhood which poignantly revealed how a woman with breast cancer was 
rather cruelly reduced to a description of her mastectomised body: 
I remember being at high school and there was this teacher, she taught 
home ec [economics], everyone used to call her rubber tit and wooden 
tit.  She had breast cancer. God I cringe now when I think about it (…) 
what terrible, nasty things. The boys used to throw toilet roll at her, you 
know, sniggering and saying behind her back to stuff her bra.  We all 
laughed but, well I didn’t really know what they meant, it was older kids. 
Then someone told me (…) but even then, I was only about 13, I 
suppose I just shrugged it off. Then when Beth [sister] had to have her 
breast off, for some reason I remembered back, Miss Wilson, and I 
could weep for her, for what happened.  It must have been hideous, 
having cancer, losing your breast then having to cope with that sh*t. I 
just couldn’t think of myself like that (…) looking that [said with 
emphasis] way. I don’t even like to think about being like that.    
 
Jacqui’s fear of breast loss arose in part from a negative experience of a 
mastectomised body from her childhood, and like Rosie, she was unable to imagine 
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her own body in this way.  Although Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Mary 
recounted different meanings and understanding of their experiences of facing breast 
loss, all saw their post-surgical body’s as ‘damaged goods’ in some way.     
 
The participants’ stories revealed high risk women’s responses to breast and ovarian 
loss are multiple, conflicting and complex.   Marx’s ideas on commodification provided 
a useful framework for interpreting the participants’ stories within the context of 
everyday discourses in Western society which shape and influence human experience.  
Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Mary’s conscious reflections on the fear of 
breast/ovarian loss support gender and sexual ideologies but contrast with medical 
ideologies which position breast/ovarian loss as a necessary and somewhat pragmatic 
step in dealing with cancer risk.  However, medical ideology does also attend to breast 
loss, and the premise of the perfect female form by offering breast reconstruction as a 
necessary procedure to repair damaged bodies following mastectomy.  The next 
section explores this notion in detail and situates breast reconstruction within wider 
frameworks of understanding which expose ways in which reconstruction is 
ideologically and economically driven and how the institution of medicine is complicit in 
the commodification of women’s breasts. 
 
Commodification and breast reconstruction 
In the previous section, an interpretation of the participants’ stories through the lens of 
MLT suggested breasts and ovaries are commodified as bodily assets hence bodies 
without these assets are able to be constructed in ideology as damaged.  Accordingly, 
breast reconstruction following RRM, herein referred to as ‘reconstruction’, can be 
understood as a means of repairing damaged bodies.  Furthermore, this interpretation 
contends that reconstruction is a manifestation of commodification since it is the means 
through which bodies at risk of cancer can be rendered safe and repaired through the 
procurement of reconstructed breasts in exchange for high risk breasts.  Simply, 
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commodification of the female body/breasts is expressed through the consumption of 
reconstructive surgery.    
 
Reconstruction is inextricably embedded in medical ideology (Gallagher & Pecot-
Hebert, 2007; Sulik, 2012) and participants were encouraged to consider 
reconstruction as part of the package of cure for cancer risk.   Mary described being 
“sent” for counselling and her perception surgery was the assumed outcome following 
the testing and counselling process: 
Early on I considered it [surgery] and you get sent to see a counsellor 
and a breast care nurse, so you talk through lots of things, about coping, 
losing your breasts and ovaries, the menopause and things.  I think 
when they send you for counselling, at this point it’s assumed you are 
going through with it (…) the surgery talk is ramped up, the choices of 
implants or expanders, all about that.  Not having surgery didn’t appear 
to be even on the radar.  
 
Although Mary was still undecided about RRS, the potential for reconstruction was 
introduced early on in her HBOC journey.  Mary recalled seeing various health care 
professionals and being offered information about different types of reconstruction 
surgery on the assumption she would undergo RRS hence reconstruction to replace 
breast loss would be necessary.   
 
The essential nature of reconstruction after breast loss is apparent in public, 
consumerist and health-related literature (Crompvoets, 2006, 2012; Haines et al., 2010; 
O’Neill, 2013; Sulik, 2012; Wilkinson, 2001).   Reconstruction is framed as something 
all women want (Crompvoets, 2006) and calls are made by plastic surgeons for the 
‘under-utilisation’ of reconstruction to be addressed through policy and fiscal measures 
(Alderman, Storey, Nair & Chung, 2009).  Official guidelines such as NICE (2013) state 
reconstruction must be made available to all women facing mastectomy.  
Reconstruction is framed as an inherently positive offering and a “beacon of hope” 
(Crompvoets, 2006, p. 76) in a woman’s journey of recovery following breast loss. The 
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only reasons for not undergoing reconstruction are purported to be financial or the 
presence of co-morbidities.      
 
All participants referred to reconstruction in some way and it was evident that 
reconstruction was presented to participants as another key step in the management of 
HBOC.  Susan revealed that reconstruction was offered to her during preliminary 
medical consultations: 
They said my risk of breast cancer was higher but because mum had 
ovarian cancer, to think about that too.  You need to see a plastic 
surgeon, and a psychologist.  And if you have surgery you need 
implants, or I think they said there was other types [of reconstruction], 
using your own (…) fat from your stomach type of thing.   
 
In her own words, Susan framed the option of reconstruction as a necessity: she 
‘needed’ to see a plastic surgeon and would ‘need’ an implant or some other form of 
reconstruction if she accepted surgery.  Like Mary, Susan acknowledged 
reconstruction as something women facing breast loss must be concerned with to 
repair the body following surgery.  
 
From a Marxist perspective, the commodification of women’s breasts and bodies is 
enabled through reconstruction ideology which reifies its importance in facilitating 
recovery from breast loss.  In fact, it is generally framed as the only means through 
which women can overcome the assumed negative self-image following breast loss 
(Crompvoets, 2006).  To this end, this discourse implicitly and explicitly constructs 
reconstruction as potentially disparaging of breastless bodies.  Breast loss is presented 
as a disabling abnormality (Crompvoets, 2012) which creates a gender crisis (Báez-
Hernández, 2009) and causes a loss of femininity, sexuality and (Emilee et al., 2010).  
Moreover, breast loss is branded as so personally and publically alarming, it must be 
camouflaged (Báez-Hernández, 2009; Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011) or hidden from sight 
(O’Neill, 2013; Wilkinson, 2001) so that women appear unaffected and unchanged by 
surgery (Schulzke, 2011).  Crompvoets (2012) further argued that the construction of 
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breast loss as abnormal and disabling and something which must be concealed is 
heavily marketed by various stakeholders in restoration technologies and taken up in 
consumer and public discourse.  Thus, the need to exhibit a ‘normal’ appearance which 
disguises breast loss is continually presented to women, albeit very subtly at times: 
But the family all seemed to think I would jump at the surgery.  Ken was 
really good but I could tell he thought I should have it [surgery] even 
though he said he would support whatever decision I made, but you can 
just tell. He would make comments about people who had the surgery 
[mastectomy] and say how good they looked. He would never have said 
anything before.  I remember Kylie Minogue had been treated for breast 
cancer and Ken was talking about how good she looked, and “you would 
never know” (…) if she was ever on television. (Ann) 
 
Although Kylie Minogue did not undergo mastectomy but lumpectomy, Ann’s 
husband attempts to offer comfort to Ann by suggesting women can be treated for 
breast cancer and still maintain a normal, attractive outward appearance.  
Reconstruction is presented and reinforced as a means through which women 
facing breast loss can repair their damaged bodies and look ‘normal’, bestowing 
reconstruction with an aura of necessity.     
 
Evidence suggests RRM with reconstruction is becoming increasingly prominent 
with almost 70% of women having RRM also having reconstruction (Semple et al., 
2013).  Mary also discussed the considerable effort women facing breast loss take 
to attend to their post-surgical bodies: 
I went online to ask other women about it [experiences of surgery].  
There were umpteen stories about tissue expanders, implants, nipple 
reconstructions and tattoos.  Unreal. On one website there was even 
pictures women had put up to show their new boobs.  (…) everyone 
seemed to be getting it done. I was the only one who wasn’t too keen I 
think.  It was all a bit weird if I’m honest (…) some of them, it was like 
they were showing off a bit, you know, “check me out, how great do I 
look”.  Well not to me you don’t. (…) sure it was probably their way of 
coping but, no, it wasn’t for me.   
 
Mary discussed the commonality of reconstruction and positioned herself in the 
minority amongst a majority of women for whom reconstruction had been accepted and 
essentially embraced.  The increase in the number of women undergoing 
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reconstruction following prophylactic mastectomy may in part reflect improvements in 
reconstructive surgical techniques which make surgery more appealing (Peled et al., 
2013) such as nipple and areolar-sparing techniques which give an improved cosmetic 
result (Spear et al., 2011).  However, an alternative position  is offered by Cobb and 
Starr (2012) who drew parallels with the cosmetic surgery industry in so much as both 
cosmetic and reconstructive breast surgery are socially mandated but medically 
unnecessary procedures, making them both aesthetic practices which generate 
significant profit.   
 
In the same vein, Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert (2007) argued that a makeover culture 
which normalised and glamorised cosmetic surgery in the name of self-improvement 
existed which now also served as a mode of reference for women facing breast loss.  
In contemporary culture, reconstructive surgery for breast loss is now strongly affiliated 
with cosmetic surgery, itself a routine and acceptable means of achieving self-
improvement and self-image (Löwy, 2010).   Susan recounted: 
But everyone tells you it’s a no-brainer. Take the surgery, get the 
implants and you’ll probably look better than you did before.   It’s as if 
it’s no big deal, like you are some sort of celebrity, getting your boobs 
done (…) like out of choice or something. Thanks very much!  There’s 
nothing wrong with mine [breasts]!   
 
In this excerpt, Susan explains how RRS and reconstruction was constructed as a 
straightforward procedure from which she could potentially gain body improvement.  
Although Susan was satisfied with her natural breasts, she was encouraged to think 
her breasts could be better with implants, a perception which appeared to reflect the 
increasing prominence of breast augmentation in popular culture.  Rosie similarly 
explained how her sister suggested she might consider RRS with reconstruction as 
an opportunity to enlarge her naturally small breasts: 
(…) [reconstruction is] a good thing for some women, it would be a 
comfort, to know, you know that you wouldn’t be left with nothing (…) 
you’d still have something there, a proper shape.  But it didn’t really 
bother me too much with mine [breasts] only being little, double As, it’s 
never been a big deal for me, how I looked up top.  But then, you don’t 
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want to have nothing at all.  Mind you, Sheena [sister] did say I could go 
bigger, so it could be a good thing, getting implants.  But it wasn’t about 
that for me. I was happy the way I was.   
 
Cobb and Starr (2012) also proposed the discourse surrounding reconstruction is 
comparable to that of cosmetic surgery.  They  built on Ehrenreich’s (2001) seminal 
work ‘Welcome to Cancerland’ which contended contemporary culture demanded 
women facing breast loss exhibit a particular type of experience and participate in 
the experience as a form of makeover and self-improvement from which they can 
emerge prettier, sexier and more feminine.   The makeover discourse exploits body 
insecurities and promotes improvement through the consumption of lotions, creams, 
cosmetics, cosmetic procedures and ultimately through the consumption of 
reconstruction following breast loss (Crompvoets, 2012).   
 
The integration of the makeover discourse exposes HBOC as a market driven 
industry of survivorship (Sulik, 2012) in which reconstruction can be consumed by 
women facing breast loss so they can regain their value in Western society.  This 
was useful in interpreting the ways in which participants’ bodies and breasts were 
frequently framed in medical encounters as potentially enhanced following 
reconstruction.  Mary said:  
The surgeon I saw was very upbeat about it to be honest. I think he 
thought he was being positive but it bugged me a bit. I was thinking 
“you’re a bit cheery about this, how would you be like if someone 
wanted to whack your nuts off”?  He was like, “you’ll be back to normal 
in six months” like I will I ever [said with emphasis] be normal again.    
He showed me before and after pictures and made comments, some 
women look better after. Well I didn’t see anything that looked better 
after.  
 
Mary explained here how her surgeon suggested some women’s natural breasts were 
in need of medical repair by framing reconstructed breasts as potentially looking 
‘better’.  Also, by suggesting reconstruction offers ‘normality’ in six months, Mary’s 
recovery is centred primarily on her restoring her outward appearance, a claim 
vehemently rejected by Mary who felt she would never again achieve ‘normality’.  
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Similarly Jacqui outlined a discussion with her GP following her genetic test during 
which the GP had suggested reconstruction could improve her natural breasts; 
He [GP] was really good, understanding (…) he signed me off [work] 
straight away (…).  He was very sympathetic and you didn’t feel, like 
you were being, over-reacting or anything.  He was asking if I knew my 
options but it was too early.  Then he goes “oh well, it’s not like years 
ago.  They can do so much now and you never know, you might end up 
with a better pair than before”, or words to that effect.  It was a bit off 
putting if I’m honest. I didn’t know quite how to take it.  I just laughed 
and said “yeah maybe”.    
 
Mary and Jacqui’s excerpts indicated that there had been times when health care 
professionals were complicit in the commodification of their bodies and breasts by 
presenting reconstruction as a routine intervention which could even be considered a 
‘bonus’ in terms of improving their breasts.  Like Susan and Rosie, Mary and Jacqui 
were encouraged to think of breast removal with reconstruction as a package not only 
to render their risky bodies safe again, but to consider the process as a package of 
improvement which could upgrade their bodies.  The makeover discourse suggests 
women at risk of cancer are in a win-win situation: remove cancer risk whilst 
simultaneously restoring the body to its former glory or even achieving a better body 
than before.  There is, as Löwy (2010, p. 215) found, a promise of “new breasts for the 
old” which supports the overly optimistic claims attached to reconstruction post-breast 
loss. 
  
Additionally, it is notable such ‘improvements’ to the body are universally considered in 
terms of a socially constructed ideal breast which fits a particular aesthetic.  The notion 
of the ‘perfect breast’ is highly prevalent in Western society and reinforced by 
consumer and medical literature which suggests a particular type of breast is ideal 
hence desired by women (Mallucci & Branford, 2014; 2012).   Decades ago, Morgan 
(1991) argued elective cosmetic surgery was becoming normalised to the extent 
women not having surgery would come to be viewed as stigmatised and deviant.  More 
contemporary literature reaffirms this and suggests not only is cosmetic surgery 
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normalised, but also glamorised (Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert, 2007) and routinised as a 
staple feature of modern life (Adams, 2010).  Adams (2010) further contended 
cosmetic surgery could be understood as a form of commercial medicine which 
aggressively markets itself to consumers through a mandate of surgical self-
improvement.   Accordingly, if surgery to correct and improve aged, pendulous, small, 
unequal, sagging, stretched or any other breast imperfection is routine, then surgery 
when breasts are removed or missing is likely to be deemed obligatory.     
 
Medical and public literature on breast loss provides little discussion of women deciding 
not to have reconstruction.  A culture of survivorship and optimistic outlook emphasises 
restoration of the body to ‘normality’ through reconstruction and denies women the 
chance to mourn their changed bodies and express anger and fear (Sulik, 2012).  No 
attention is paid to the potential normality of the mastectomised body (Crompvoets, 
2012) and the option of not concealing breast loss is unavailable to women (Rubin & 
Tanenbaum, 2011; Wilkinson, 2001).  Instead, women facing breast loss are 
continually presented with options all of which require a renegotiation of the body in 
relation to the outward appearance (Báez-Hernández, 2009).  The prospect women 
might not want or feel the need for reconstruction rarely, if ever, enters the debate.  
The market potential of breast cancer is increased through a survivorship culture and 
reconstruction ideology.  From a Marxist stance, this is necessary to ensure a high 
demand for and consumption of reconstruction and wealth generating medical 
technologies.   
 
When women undergo reconstruction, ideology conceals the profit making potential 
available to various stakeholders as part of the way the body is commodified.  Thus as 
O’Neill (2013) contends, reconstruction is promoted as essential in recovery from 
breast loss but is economically tied to various health care providers.  Additionally, 
ideology conceals the human costs of surgery which include pain, numbness, scarring 
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and unacceptable physical changes (Rolnick et al, 2007) and failed reconstructions 
(Koskenvuo et al., 2013) which may require women to undergo numerous surgical 
procedures.  In contrast to the new, improved breasts promised through makeover 
discourse, reconstructed breasts are found by many to be unpleasant (Gopie et al., 
2013) and women report being unprepared for the lack of sensation in their 
reconstructed breasts (Hallowell et al., 2012).   
 
To conclude this section, an interpretation through the lens of MLT suggested 
reconstruction was sold as part of the package of cure for cancer risk.  Reconstruction 
effectively serves corporate interests which link ideologies of women’s bodies with 
recovery from breast loss (Crompvoets, 2012).  Reconstruction promises restoration of 
normality, femininity and sexuality (Cobb & Starr, 2012) hence breasts are further 
commodified (Sulik, 2012) for the corporate manipulation of what is a life threatening 
and feared disease (Selleck, 2010).  The analysis problematised the framing of 
reconstruction as essential and routine, and revealed the participants rejected the 
promise of reconstruction and instead perceived it as a risk to the body.  The 
participants’ stories accordingly exposed what is hidden in ideology: RRS potentially 
damages bodies and reconstruction is limited in what it can offer high risk women in 
terms of repairing their damaged bodies.  This was an important theme which emerged 
from the study and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Joining to the role of power in maintaining ideologies  
Marxist power is based on economics. However, an understanding of how ideological 
practices are sustained and exert power to maintain the dominance of certain 
discourses in relation to cancer and cancer-risk management is best understood by a 
Foucauldian interpretation of how power is spread through discourse and social 
relations. 
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Foucault was critical of the concept of ideology as false consciousness, something 
unknown or fake which obscured ‘true’ knowledge. Foucault disagreed with aspects of 
Marx’s ideology mainly in relation to the suggestion man has an innate consciousness 
which power acts upon.  Foucault focussed more on the effects of power on the body 
and argued there is no such thing as false or true consciousness: we are all the 
products of culture and history. For Foucault, truths were socially, historically and 
culturally bound positions which were fluid and ever changing depending on the 
dominant societal discourses of the time.   The next section provides an analysis of the 
participants’ stories from a Foucauldian perspective and reveals further the conflicts 
and contradictions which bind HBOC management and which influenced the 
participants’ decisions to say no to RRS. 
 
An interpretation through the lens of Foucauldian Literary Theory 
Foucault’s primary concern related to how individuals came to be constructed as 
subjects and conform to covert organising practices which constrain and control in 
modern societies. Foucault argued subjectification was facilitated by modes of power 
including biopower and disciplinary power which regulated and disciplined individuals in 
society (Taylor, 2011).  Biopower governs populations whilst disciplinary power targets 
the individual body through various non-coercive techniques and mandates the ways in 
which individuals exist and act (Hoffman, 2011).   Power, from Foucault’s perspective is 
intertwined with authoritative truth because power operates through what people say as 
much as what they do (Lynch, 2011).  Hence discourses create and maintain the rules 
and norms which define realities for women with BRAC gene mutations and give rise to 
power relations through the creation of knowledge and truths about why and how they 
should respond to their mutation-positive status. 
 
The stories of Susan, Ann, Mary, Rosie, Pauline and Jacqui are fraught with their 
responses to feeling powerless.  However, a Foucauldian lens provided an 
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interpretation of participants’ experiences in regards to concepts of power relations, 
discourse and how knowledge is constructed as power in the medical discourse.  A 
Foucauldian analysis to the participants’ stories disrupted taken for granted 
assumptions about how RRS is understood and exposed discursive elements and 
power/knowledge relations which shaped their experiences.  This approach illuminated 
the struggles the participants in this study faced as they followed a path at odds with 
the dominant discourses in which their experiences took place, but also highlighted the 
possibility for resistance to the dominant medical pathway for HBOC. 
 
Knowledge, truth and the medical discourse 
Foucault’s concept of discourse posits individuals in society are regulated and 
controlled through discursive practices which serve as collective organising tools within 
particular discourses (Bertens, 2008).  Discourse is the means by which knowledge is 
represented and validated as ‘truth’ hence discourse is intertwined with power since 
individuals are socialised within discourses (Seymour-Smith, Wetherell & Phoenix, 
2002) and therefore their experiences of owning a BRAC1/2 mutation acquire meaning 
through various discourses.    
 
The findings from this study revealed the effects of irrefutable truths about HBOC which 
disempowered those who did not conform to the accepted treatment norms and 
constructed them as aberrant.  The participants’ stories of medical consultation 
revealed that medical advice was significant in determining ‘the truth’ about familial 
cancer.  Mary, Ann and Pauline described prior experiences of family members with 
cancer and concerns cancer may have been ‘passed on’, only to have these concerns 
dismissed by relatives, friends or physicians.  However, once genetics was popularised 
and genetic testing revealed the presence of a BRAC1/2 mutation, their concerns were 
accepted without question.  Mary explained: 
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So what I had believed about it being a family disease, it was backed up 
by what the doctors were saying.  It made it all official (…) and real. I 
had been saying it for years and everyone said I was daft, being over 
dramatic.  So part of me felt, well not pleased, that’s not the right word 
(…) but a bit, I’d been proved right.  Didn’t make it any less scary though 
(…) more scary now it was official and not just me saying it. 
 
Mary’s words evidenced not only how knowledge of her family’s disease pattern was 
dismissed as foolish and melodramatic, but also the power of medical knowledge to 
determine truth and therefore risk of cancer and necessary actions to combat the 
genetic risk factor.  Ann’s story also provided evidence of how medicine determines the 
truth about cancer;  
For as long as I can remember, I’ve been expecting it to happen to me, 
so when she [sister] was tested and it came back positive, it really just 
confirmed what I had always known. (…) Before the test, Ken said it 
would be good to have it done, then we would know for sure one way or 
the other, we’d find out the truth.  I said I already knew but he said, …  
“well you don’t really, you just think you do, we need to find out the 
truth”(…) maybe that’s why I was shocked, him saying it made me really 
think maybe it would be negative and I’d be off the hook.  (…). Even 
though I had deep down knew it would be positive, it was still a shock, 
the finality of it.  
 
Although Ann felt certain she would be mutation-positive, others dismissed her 
knowledge as insufficient and it fell to medicine to authenticate this as the truth about 
her family’s cancer status.  Ann described her shock once this ‘truth’ was discovered 
through genetic testing, her use of the word ‘finality’ suggested an inevitability which 
was now unavoidable.  
 
Pauline also discussed how the concerns of women in the family were initially 
dismissed prior to genetic testing.  Pauline’s maternal grandmother was first diagnosed 
with breast cancer in the 1970s and subsequently died from the disease in the early 
1980s.  Her mother was diagnosed with breast cancer in 2002 but died shortly after 
from a stroke.  Her story showed how her mother’s request for RRS was denied 
despite her mother’s belief her cancer was familial: 
My mum’s mum, she was the first we knew of although after my mum 
died, it came out there had been others, as far back as the war they 
said.  When mum got hers [breast cancer], she said to the docs, “just 
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take them both off, just get rid of it”.  I think she knew then it might be 
something in our family (…) it really brought it all into focus in a way.  
They only took the one breast away and then of course she took the 
stroke and died, so we’ll never know if the cancer would have come 
back.  Mum really believed we were cursed by it [cancer], she used to 
say it was a curse, but back then it wasn’t treated the same. They said 
taking away her good breast was overkill.  I thought she should have it 
off too, you know, just wanting her to be okay (…) but they didn’t want to 
[remove the unaffected breast]. Then Sarah [sister] got it [breast cancer] 
too and it was a whole different ball game (…) right from the start they 
were asking about mum and gran and then bringing in me too and the 
rest of the family.  By then, they knew it was passed on through families.  
 
Pauline’s story shows how removal of the unaffected contralateral breast was 
described as ‘overkill’, highlighting how her mother’s knowledge was considered less 
important than medical knowledge at the time.  In medical discourse, concerns about 
hereditary cancer and requests for RRS were largely not taken seriously prior to the 
widespread availability of genetic testing (Hamilton, 2012; Happe, 2006).  Genetic 
mutations, as pathological entities, existed but were not branded as risks for disease 
until technology was developed which allowed mutations to be named, classified and 
responded to (Lerner, 2000).  Lay knowledge was thus dismissed until made visible 
and accessible through genetics then claimed by medicine as its own.  
 
Matloff, Bonadies, Moyer and Brierley (2014) found cancer genetics specialists’ views 
on genetic testing and RRS changed between 1998, when the speciality was in its 
infancy, and 2012 as more had become known.  Matloff et al. (2014) found as genetic 
testing became routine, specialists were more accepting of testing and RRS and more 
likely to accept these measures for themselves.  Removal of healthy breasts pre-
disease, once considered an “unthinkable step” (Thompson, 1994, p. 38) is now 
considered the principle primary intervention for reducing breast/ovarian cancer risk 
(Guillem et al., 2006; Ingham et al., 2013), despite much remaining unknown about the 
genetics of hereditary cancer (NICE, 2013) and how best to manage people with 
BRCA1/2 mutations (Kurian et al., 2010).  Similarly, contralateral prophylactic 
mastectomies in women affected with breast cancer, previously denied to women such 
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as Pauline’s mother are now common despite a lack of evidence regarding its efficacy 
(Newman, 2014).   From a Foucauldian perspective, the key point is no permanent or 
timeless criteria for determining the truth exists.  What is problematised is the discourse 
surrounding medical knowledge which constructs some information as facts which 
represent ‘the truth’ about breast/ovarian cancer while other information is relegated to 
the background.  Thus, medical discourse reflects a hierarchy of credibility around 
HBOC which privileges some types of knowledge over others and supports power 
relations which endorse RRS.   
 
Not surprisingly then, medical/genetic knowledge validated the women’s and their 
families’ concerns about familial cancer and was regarded as the official explanation or 
‘the truth’ about why people develop cancer.  Susan’s story revealed changing 
perceptions of the cause of cancer in her family from non-genetic to genetic reasons 
once testing had taken place; 
And I knew by then cancer had taken my granny so you do worry about 
someone dying from it.  The doctors did ask my mum about her mum 
but nothing was done about it so we just thought we were unlucky 
getting cancer twice in the family. (…) Plus they both smoked so we just 
assumed it was maybe the smoking brought the cancer on.  Then after 
my aunt got tested, that showed us (…) the cancer must have been 
caused by bad genes, probably not through smoking. 
 
Susan came to attribute her mother’s and grandmother’s cancers entirely to genetic 
causes, discounting other potential causes as unlikely now the genetic information was 
known.  Again, while this may be understandable given a deleterious mutation was 
identified in her family, it suggests genetic knowledge was accepted over other 
knowledge as ‘the truth’ about why people get cancer despite the greatest majority of 
breast/ovarian cancer occurring sporadically through non-heritable causes (NICE, 
2013).  There was some acknowledgement of non-heritable causes of cancer, for 
example, Pauline alluded to possible environmental causes when she said; 
I read on a web site about one woman like me, BRCA2 positive and not 
having the surgery. She talks about pollution and the environment and 
how it can cause cancer. (…) now I know [genetic status] I am watching 
239 
 
my diet and trying to be more healthy.  Doing things like, trying to avoid 
chemicals and stuff, things linked to cancer.  It’s my way of trying to get 
my risk down and do something positive myself. I think doing something 
about it yourself makes you feel better.  
 
Similarly Susan and Mary acknowledged there was a link between smoking and cancer 
but generally, the participants and their families appeared to adopt the genetics 
discourse as the most likely explanation for cancer.  This showed how BRCA1/2 
mutations are now normalised in public discourse to the extent they are increasingly 
considered a concomitant factor in non-inherited causes of breast cancer, reflecting 
what Ilkilic (2009, p. 140) referred to as a “cultural adoption of meaning”.   Ann likewise 
highlighted the primacy of genetic information as providing ‘the truth’ about cancer and 
its deadly consequences:  
(…) there had to be something that was killing us off.  We don’t just get 
cancer, we get terminal cancer so I guess it [gene fault] sort of explained 
it really.  All this cancer was down to our own bodies killing us, (…) an 
awful thought really.  
 
Foucault would argue that the uncritical acceptance of medical authority and an almost 
dogmatic belief in inherited genetic causes for cancer is symptomatic of the 
medical/genetics discourse which gives consent to particular ways of acting in 
response to cancer risk.  Mary said: 
When she [Mary’s mother] died (…) you didn’t really know much about it 
[breast cancer] back then. We didn’t have computers like you do now so 
you only had what they [health professionals] told you.  It was when her 
sister, my Aunt Yvonne got breast cancer too, well it seemed more than 
a coincidence.  Two sisters both getting it [breast cancer], well it was like 
lightening striking twice in the same place (…) then when Angela 
[cousin] got diagnosed too, the doctors seemed to get interested. (…).  
Of course hers [Angela’s genetic test] came back positive for the gene 
and (…) gave us concrete proof cancer was in our genes, running 
through our family.  
 
Here, Mary’s story reveals two key effects of discourse: the construction of genetic 
knowledge as ‘the truth’ or as Mary believed, ‘concrete proof’ of why cancer develops, 
and also the reliance on experts to legitimise concerns about health.  Thus, genetic 
knowledge as the truth is privileged and creates reliance on doctors as experts who 
regulate the body.   
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The issue of specialism  
Specifically, the medical discourse dictates what is considered the truth or facts about 
health and disease and who is allowed to speak legitimately about health matters 
(Stoddart, 2007).  From a Foucauldian stance, genetic information and how it is 
discussed may be understood and delivered as a discursive practice which defines the 
specialist nature of genetics. Pauline explained: 
You need to have quite a few sessions before they even test you. They 
tell you how they calculate your risk and things (…) it’s really specialised 
information they give you, very complicated. (…)  And some of the 
words they use (…) they give you booklets and web sites but it’s quite 
hard. Without being a medical person, it’s really difficult to understand.  
It was even harder to tell it to John [partner]. He kept asking me 
questions I couldn’t answer. Then he would get all angry, shout at me I 
needed to ask more if I didn’t understand. They didn’t let him in [during 
counselling] because (…) it’s privacy and to do with making sure I make 
my own decision and (…) be totally honest.  John got a bit stressed, 
made me feel a right idiot at times, not knowing. I think that’s why I was 
a bit scared with this [taking part in the interview], worried I wouldn’t 
know the right answers. 
 
Genetics counsellors were frequently referred to as ‘the specialists’ and there was a 
perception genetic information could not be challenged because of its ‘specialised’ 
nature. Susan said; 
At the [genetic] counselling, it’s not like seeing a normal doctor, it wasn’t 
like anything I’d ever experienced. You wait ages for an appointment 
which I understand, because they’re so specialised and there’s not a lot 
of them.  So I was (…) quite worked up when I went.  She [genetic 
counsellor] did her best to help (…) understand your risk and what are 
the chances you might get a tumour in the breast, but it’s not as easy as 
you might think. It’s not like they are telling you you’ve got a broken leg 
that needs a plaster (…) when it’s genes, it’s a different matter.  You 
don’t understand for a start, well I couldn’t really understand it all, and 
you are going in completely blind, knowing absolutely nothing except 
what’s happened to your family.  Genetics, well it’s not the type of thing 
the man in the street is going to know much about is it?  So I just 
thought, “who am I to disagree with what they’re saying”? 
 
It was thus evident those who were able to speak about genetics were constructed as 
experts who knew the truth about breast/ovarian cancer.  Unanswered questions as to 
why people get cancer are addressed in the genetics discourse.  However, the 
specialised and scientific nature of genetics means genetic information is a particular 
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type of information, the acquisition of which makes people dependent on and maintains 
the dominance of medicine as the expert authority.   
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, genetics can be understood as a particular form of 
medical specialism which supports biopower (Lemke, 2004).  Increasing specialism 
and rapid advancements in genetic technology has resulted in “overgenetization” 
(Willis, 2005, p. 152) and has cemented the importance and value attached to genetic 
information (Helén, 2005; Paul et al., 2014).  In Western society, genetics is hailed as a 
new frontier and a triumph of medical advancement (Finkler, 2000). A Foucauldian 
interpretation accordingly allowed genetics to be understood as an emergent discourse 
which maintains and reinforces medical prestige and power.  The language of genetics 
is important because it reinforces how specialised genetic information is, thereby 
potentially isolating non-experts, such as the people undergoing testing.  Jacqui 
discussed her isolation from the discourse thus: 
The genetics woman [counsellor] was really good (…) but there’s just so 
much to take in.  She went back over all the research and the statistics 
and tried to put my risk into understandable language but I still couldn’t 
quite take it all in.  (…). Every time they asked “do you have any 
questions?” I think I said something like “no, no, you’ve explained 
everything really well”, or words to that effect (...) you don’t like to ask 
too many questions, they’re the specialists after all, they’re the ones 
who know what they’re talking about. 
 
The participants’ stories show how discourse has the potential to both enable and 
exclude (O’Farrell, 2007).  Foucault (1973) argued medical discourse was supported by 
an increasingly sophisticated language which conferred a growing knowledge of facts 
and truths about the human body.   On the one hand, this is enabling because 
knowledge of cancer risk allows individuals to take action to reduce risk (Paul et al., 
2014). On the other, genetic information is extremely complex (Braithwaite et al., 2006; 
Hoskins et al., 2012) and requires knowledge of genetics and statistics (Case et al., 
2005) which is out with the scope of most people’s understanding (Ilkilic, 2009; Tamir, 
2010) and hence is largely unavailable to them (Tonkiss, 2012).  Like Susan and 
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Jacqui, Ann also revealed the challenge high risk women face when attempting to 
locate themselves within such a discourse; 
The first few meetings at the hospital [to discuss management options] 
seemed unreal. Looking back I think I sleep-walked through them. Ken 
had to take notes (…) because I could never remember the discussions.  
Even what I did manage to take in, it was not easy, not straightforward.  
I don’t think I am particularly thick but some of it was a struggle to 
understand. There is an enormous amount of information to be given 
and a lot of it is very complicated and you are trying to deal with it when 
all you can think of is, am I going to die, is this it?    
 
The analysis suggested the voices of those at risk may be lessened because the 
expert language of the discourse authorised certain speakers and excluded others 
(Tonkiss, 2012).  Whilst medical discourse defines HBOC and prescribes its 
management, the discourse of specialism which underpins genetic medicine conceals 
the persisting uncertainty about why people get cancer (Löwy, 2010) and that the 
information on which management guidelines are based is incomplete (NICE, 2013), 
temporary and open to multiple interpretations (Timmermans & Buchbinder, 2012).   
 
Applying a Foucauldian analysis then suggested breast/ovarian cancer is an object of 
interest in medical discourse which acquired different meanings in different historical 
contexts.  Accordingly, although an organic disease, the construct of breast/ovarian 
cancer is itself fluid and understandings of it are dependent upon what is considered 
rational and ‘the truth’ at a given point in time.  Somewhat ironically, as genetic 
technology continues to advance and new genetic knowledge emerges, inevitably risk 
estimations for some people will prove to be inaccurate and require revision (Lock & 
Nguyen, 2010).  Moreover, advancements in less mutilating techniques such as MRI 
screening are likely to offer survival rates comparable to RRS hence RRS may become 
less ‘routine’ (Kurian et al., 2010).  Despite this, women are undergoing irreversible, 
life-changing surgery; such is the strength of the current medical discourse.  However, 
as this study shows, resistance to the dominant discourse is possible, because as 
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Foucault contended, knowledge and ‘the truth’ are unstable constructs and hence are 
always open to challenge.   
The issue here is not whether genetic information is true or false/right or wrong, and 
there is no question owning a BRCA1/2 mutation increases the likelihood of developing 
cancer in high risk populations.  What the analysis in this study suggests is that the 
construction of genetic risk as ‘the truth’ about why people develop breast/ovarian 
cancer and the representation of those who are able to speak about genetics as 
experts who can accurately read, interpret and remedy the body, sustains a discourse 
which may exclude the very people it seeks to assist.  The issue of risk appears critical. 
The risk discourse has become significant because medicine was able to utilise the 
emergent genetics discourse to maintain dominance. A space was created within the 
medical discourse to encompass the risk of cancer as another way of controlling the 
body, enabled through genetic testing.  
 
This in turn highlights another effect of discourse evident in the participants’ stories: the 
conflation of risk with disease.  The next section presents an analysis of the effects of 
genetics, risk and cancer discourses which revealed a discursive matrix in which 
cancer risk was located in women’s bodies, generating fear and subjecting high risk 
women to medical intervention to control the deadly inheritance.   
 
Genetics, risk and the cancer discourse  
It was apparent being identified as owning a genetic marker for breast/ovarian cancer 
was a traumatic and frightening event for the participants and their families.  Although 
Susan, Rosie, Ann, Pauline, Mary nor Jacqui had a personal cancer diagnosis, their 
stories revealed epiphany moments around the realisation their relative’s cancer might 
be hereditary hence they and their own children might come to be afflicted with the 
disease.  Analysis of their stories revealed the effects of the medical/genetics discourse 
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which created hegemonic constructions of risk and influenced how risk status was 
perceived and negotiated.    
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, discourses around and about cancer construct and 
present cancer in particular ways and are supported discursively in the ways cancer is 
spoken about.   Specifically, discursive practices alert people to the seriousness of 
cancer through the language employed and the cultural connotations attached to that 
language.  Sontag’s (1979) seminal work exposed how military metaphors constructed 
understanding and experience of cancer and presented the body as under attack from 
a deadly invader, and such metaphors remain prominent in the cancer discourse 
(Clarke & Everest, 2006; Cobb & Starr, 2012; Grant & Hundley; 2008; Haines et al., 
2010; Reisfield & Wilson, 2004).  Analysis of the participants’ stories suggested this 
militaristic discourse has extended to the discourse on cancer risk.  Jacqui described 
an online discussion in which she had taken part when she was considering RRS: 
When I was first going through this thing (…) deciding whether to have it 
[surgery] or not, I looked on the computer quite a bit (…) research it 
myself.  I remember going on one of the self-help [web]sites (…) but 
everyone seemed to be having the surgery done.  I couldn’t see anyone 
who was not having it [surgery].  (…). There were some who were 
struggling [with the decision] but most seemed to want it [surgery] asap 
and couldn’t wait to get on with it.  Someone described their boobs as 
ticking time bombs and everyone agreed, it was, yeah, how they felt too, 
having them off was the best way to fight it (…) they felt different about 
their bodies now I suppose.  You feel out on a limb really, is my decision 
really so strange? It was like, feeling like a coward, running away and 
not facing up to it.  
 
Here we see how Jacqui has constructed herself as a coward as she has been unable 
to accept RRS to fight back against the threat of cancer.  Being cowardly and ‘running 
away’ by not accepting surgery contrasts with the heroic battler who fights to win the 
war on cancer so frequently depicted in cancer discourse (Davis, 2008; Sulik, 2012).   
This excerpt also shows how high risk women’s breasts were talked about as ‘ticking 
time bombs’, the suggestion being their breasts harboured a deadly threat which could 
devastate at any moment.  The use of the term ‘ticking time bombs’ clearly articulates 
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the life-changing and confronting impact genetic information may have on women and 
it is a phrase frequently encountered in research exploring BRCA1/2 carriers 
experiences (for example see DiMillo et al., 2013; Grubs et al., 2014; Hamilton, 2009; 
Karlan & McIntosh, 2007).  Rosie also referred to her breasts as ‘time bombs’ when 
she said; 
(…) when mine [genetic test] came back positive, I was just totally in 
shock. I think I had persuaded myself I’d be okay, you know, negative 
(…) strange logic really but I was thinking because my mum, aunt and 
sister all had it [cancer], then maybe the chances were the gene had 
skipped me. They say one in three get cancer then our three had 
already been used up. (…) So to say I was devastated was an 
understatement. It literally took the legs from under me.  When the 
specialist tells you you are really high risk of getting cancer, it’s really 
bloody awful.  You go from being a normal person to this, well, like going 
from being normal to having these time bombs attached to your chest.  
And there’s no way of knowing when they are going to go off (…) like 
you are sitting waiting on something bad to happen but you have no 
idea when. (…). I suppose you worry more because, well it’s a fear of 
the unknown.  It’s not like having arthritis or something like a skin 
condition. (…) [be]cause of course you still look the same on the outside 
but it’s what’s happening inside (…) what might be growing in there.  
 
These excerpts illuminate how cancer risk, as revealed through genetic testing, 
disrupted the previously held sense of self as ‘normal’ and instead constructed the 
body as defective and  dangerous.  Although none of the participants had cancer, their 
stories revealed the intensity of the emotional reaction to being identified as high risk of 
developing breast/ovarian cancer and confirmed the presence of significant levels of 
distress and anxiety which accompany this type of genetic information (DiMillo et al., 
2013; McLamara, 2013; Samson et al., 2014).  Mary also highlighted how women’s 
breasts come to be considered deadly as a result of carrying a BRCA1/2 mutation.  In 
this excerpt, Mary discusses an online conversation on a breast cancer self-help forum 
which she had taken part in shortly after her genetic test result: 
Some of the women had already had cancer in one breast and had the 
other one off [preventatively]. They all said if they’d known before and 
had them off sooner they wouldn’t have got cancer. One of them said I 
had to get rid of my killer boobs, not just for me but for my family (…) to 
stay alive for the sake of my kids. There was not really anything being 
said you might not get cancer (…) it was all very definite it would 
happen, it was when, not if. 
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Here, cancer was constructed as residing in women’s “killer” breasts, the removal of 
which was necessary to ensure survival.  Thus although BRCA1/2 mutation carriers are 
disease-free, their lives are effectively at risk because of the tendency to treat genetic 
risk as a disease in itself (Conrad, 2007). Risk is medicalised and represented as an 
empirical calculation and an objective marker which can be modified by engaging with 
risk reducing interventions such as surgery.  Moreover, although genetic risks are 
based on models of probability, they are constructed socially as certainties (Finkler, 
2000).  This was clearly articulated by Pauline who explained: 
Although my mum and granny had both had breast cancer, it was a 
major shock when Sarah was diagnosed because she seemed quite 
young to get it.  I don’t remember my granny much but my mum was in 
her late fifties when she got caught [diagnosed with cancer] which we 
were told wasn’t unusual really (…) but Sarah got her’s before the 
menopause which they [doctors] said was more unusual and with mum 
and gran (…) that’s the first we heard about familial cancer. We knew it 
[cancer] ran in families so the chances are someone would get it but we 
didn’t know about genes (…) cancer could spread from the mother to 
the daughter through the gene. 
 
Pauline clearly located risk within genes and equated genes with disease.  Thus, the 
risk of disease as determined by the presence of the genetic marker was equated with 
disease itself.  Notably, deviations in DNA are labelled as ‘mutations’, ‘faults’ and 
‘defects’ making the genetics discourse a “discourse of deficiency” (Gottweis, 1997, p. 
65) fostering a dependence on medicine to ‘repair’ broken bodies (Conrad, 1999, 2005; 
Lemke, 2004).  This was cogently articulated by Jacqui:   
When I got the letter, I just fell apart (…) it felt like the old me was gone 
and replaced with another faulty version.  I ended up going to my GP.   
(…) as I just couldn’t function. I couldn’t speak to anyone without 
breaking down. I shocked myself at how badly I took it (…) I thought I 
was stronger.   
 
It was clear Jacqui was devastated by her genetic test result to the point of her being 
unable to function and “falling apart”.  Like Rosie whose genetic status transformed her 
from ‘normal’ to a ‘time bomb’, Jacqui reconstructed herself as ‘faulty’, and was also 
forced to call into question aspects of self which were previously certain, in this case 
her strength of character, despite having no disease.   Samson et al. (2014) asserted 
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that genetics and risk discourses not only affected a person’s sense of the physical 
body, but also affected the sense of self, altering a person’s biography and creating a 
re-establishment of the self as ‘faulty’.  They also contended that these individuals had 
to re-negotiate a life transition as BRCA1/2 mutation carriers to actively create and 
adapt to new life realities.   
 
Genetics, risk and cancer discourses coalesce to construct a woman’s body as a site of 
risk and move cancer from the clinical arena into everyday life (Davis, 2008).  The 
conflation of risk with disease causes existential implications which require BRCA1/2 
mutation carriers to learn to live under Damocles’ sword (DiMillo et al., 2013; Samerski, 
2006).  Ann described her feelings following her mutation-positive test result: 
I remember being in a daze for ages, days and days, then waking up 
one day and thinking ‘where do I go from here, what do I actually do with 
this?’   It was all just so depressing really, so in-your-face, no escaping it 
and no way of putting it out of your mind.  I know this sounds really 
dramatic, but it was like getting a death sentence. 
 
Here, the notion of risk-as-disease is exemplified through Ann’s depiction of carrying a 
BRCA1/2 mutation as comparable to getting a death sentence.  In the same vein, 
Susan revealed how she initially equated her genetic test result with an impending 
terminal event: 
The day we got the results is imprinted on my brain for ever.    I 
remember feeling, “oh well, that’s it then, that’s me fekked [done for]”.  I 
did cry when I thought about Emma. How am I going to tell her her 
mum’s probably going to get cancer and die?  How do you tell your wee 
girl you might not be there to see her grow up? It was the worst possible 
thing (…) it just felt really bleak (…) you know, doom and gloom, finding 
out you could die young.  
 
This conflation of risk with disease goes some way to explaining the women’s and their 
families’ fearful reactions to a positive BRCA1/2 mutation test result.  Rosie, Susan, 
Pauline, Ann, Jacqui and Mary did not have cancer, yet in keeping with Samson et al. 
(2014) and DiMillo et al. (2013) their BRCA1/2 mutation status meant they experienced 
a raft of emotions including fear, anger, anxiety which left them feeling frightened, 
vulnerable and with a palpable fear of dying.  It was thus evident owning a BRCA1/2 
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mutation induced feelings similar to being diagnosed with cancer.  From a Foucauldian 
stance, this occurs because of the power of dominant discourses. The contemporary 
genetics/risk discourse on breast/ovarian cancer has reconstructed breast/ovarian 
cancer from something which happened to the body to something which happens 
because of the body.  Whereas previously cancer was seen to occur as a result of 
external factors, the increasing organisation of medicine around genetic causes of 
cancer supports a discourse which situates the cause of cancer as residing primarily 
within the body. Hence BRCA1/2 mutations take on the status of cancer: it is this 
conflation between risk and disease/death which makes genetic information potentially 
devastating.   
 
Evidence of the equating of risk with disease was also apparent through the depiction 
of those who tested mutation-negative as not at risk of cancer.  Susan somewhat 
derisively described her aunt’s relief about her cousins’ negative test results: 
My aunty Helen was over the moon Elaine and Claire’s were okay.  I 
can understand they were all really relieved, to know it [cancer] wasn’t 
going to happen to them, they were in the clear (…) but it felt like they 
were so busy celebrating I got a bit forgotten about.  And mum was 
really happy about Rhona [Susan’s younger sister], saying well at least 
Rhona’s going to be okay and she only needed to worry about me.  
Helen being all “yes, we’re alright, so glad we had it done, what a relief, 
everything’s rosy in our garden”, which was a bit off I thought really, 
considering mine [test result]. 
 
Susan’s story confirms that those who did not carry a BRCA1/2 mutation were 
considered ‘safe’ and perceived as being insusceptible to the disease.  Rosie also 
believed her sister and cousin were not at risk of cancer because test results had been 
mutation-negative:  
But looking back, as well as being devastated, I was also a bit peeved, 
well angry really it was me, the “why me?” They [sister and mother] were 
obviously really happy she [sister] was not at risk, and I was for her too, 
really, but it was ironic in a way (…) Julie [sister] was the one who 
wanted it [testing] so much and she was getting away scot-free. She 
was going to be okay and I was the one getting the bombshell.  I admit I 
did feel sorry for myself and my family. It was hard to look at Julie.  I 
really did feel happy for her but it did change things if I’m honest.  I didn’t 
like her feeling sorry for me and I think she found it hard to be happy 
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around me.  It’s a bit like someone you getting pregnant when your 
sister can’t (…) it’s the elephant in the room.  
 
Likewise, Jacqui discussed her sister Joanne’s mutation-negative result thus:   
When Joanne got the all clear, I was really chuffed for her.  She’s the 
baby of the family so I really did want everything to be okay for her. The 
three of us are really close, especially after losing both mum and dad, 
but at the same time I did feel a bit resentful she got good news and I 
didn’t.  (…).Beth [affected sister] genuinely thought the testing and the 
results were a great thing. Joanne was in the clear and I was now able 
to do something about it.  By then I was outwardly more calm but I didn’t 
feel it inside. I felt I had to stay positive for everyone else so it did drive a 
bit of a wedge between us if I’m honest. 
 
The labelling of those who tested negative for a gene fault as ‘not at risk’ or ‘in the 
clear’ conflicts with empirical risk calculations which confer the general population risk 
for developing breast/ovarian cancer to mutation-negative women (NICE, 2013).  
Medical risk calculations relate to high risk women with BCA1/2 mutations, but as many 
as 1 in 8 women will develop breast cancer regardless (AIHW, 2012).  A Foucauldian 
interpretation suggests this reflects the contemporary genetics discourse as the truth 
about why people get cancer.  What is hidden in this discourse is that non BRCA1/2 
mutation carriers may still develop cancer, or indeed, that BRCA1/2 mutation carriers 
might not.   
 
The dominance of the genetics discourse reflects what Conrad (2001, p. 225) referred 
to as “genetic optimism”: a belief that by studying genetic material causes for disease 
and ill-health can be identified, manipulated and rectified.  To a degree conflicting 
discourses are present because contemporary cancer discourse is paradoxically one of 
fear and reassurance (Crabb, 2006).  On the one hand, the equating of genetic risk 
with disease means owning a BRCA1/2 mutation is considered devastating and deadly.  
On the other, cancer/risk is an invader to be bravely battled against and people can win 
the war on cancer.  This means cancer is simultaneously presented as being deadly 
yet survivable if the afflicted individual takes appropriate steps to deal with the problem.  
The following discussion explores how dominant discourses coalesce to translate 
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beliefs about cancer risk into health actions through the operation of disciplinary power.  
Power relationships enacted through discourse show the subtle ways women are 
regulated through normalising practices in relation to HBOC but also reveal how 
women negotiate, confront and resist power.   
 
Disciplinary power and cancer surveillance 
In the previous sections, interpreting the stories of Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan 
and Jacqui through a Foucauldian lens illuminated a number of discursive practices 
which maintained the dominance of medical authority, namely genetics as ‘the truth’ 
about breast/ovarian cancer, the conflation of risk with disease and medicine’s ability to 
expertly read and attend to risky bodies.  In particular, Foucault’s concept of 
disciplinary power was useful in understanding genetics as a technique of biopower 
which targeted individual bodies in the quest to reduce cancer risk.   
 
The analysis of the participants’ stories revealed genetic testing was generally 
considered to be the most sensible action or indeed the only action to take when 
confronted with the threat of cancer.  Once a BRCA1/2 mutation was suspected or 
identified within the family, it was taken-for-granted and expected that family members 
would undergo genetic testing.  Jacqui and Pauline had accepted testing without 
hesitation, although interestingly both commented on the seeming simplicity with which 
their affected relatives had undergone testing which may have influenced their initial 
decision making.   Jacqui’s sister was identified as carrying a BRCA1 mutation whilst 
receiving treatment for breast cancer and her family’s main concerns had lain with her 
sister’s health therefore when testing was offered to Jacqui, she accepted without 
question:  
When they offered us testing, it seemed like the most obvious thing to 
do. I don’t think I really thought about the implications.  It’s like you are 
caught up in the emotion (…) you don’t really question, you just do.  
Unfortunately it soon struck me it was a bigger and more important 
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decision than I first thought (…) the implications.  I only thought about it 
after I got the letter with the results, which seems crazy now. 
 
Similarly, Pauline was also at the outset keen for testing to determine her personal risk 
of cancer and believed knowledge of her genetic status would offer control over her 
future health: 
So there was never any issue of me not having it [genetic testing]. I felt it 
was really important to know if I had it [gene fault] so I could do 
something if I did.  Looking back, I just never appreciated what it meant, 
what it involved (…) it was all new to us. I thought it would be a simple 
test then, well I would do what needed to be done, if it came back 
positive.  But of course, life’s not like that is it?   Once you are on the 
rollercoaster it’s hard to get off. 
 
Disciplinary power trains and controls individuals to think and act in similar ways by 
defining ‘the norm’ and constructing deviation from the norm as abnormal or aberrant 
(Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014).  In keeping with Armstrong’s (2007) contention, disciplinary 
power was reasoned to be operating through the genetics discourse through the 
positioning of genetic testing as the norm; a straightforward, routine procedure which 
was the only sensible action for women at risk of cancer.  Foucault (1977) argued the 
nature of disciplinary power was such that bodies were required to be docile and 
manipulable in order for non-coercive controlling techniques to be effective.  A docile 
body is one that “may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved” (Foucault, 1977, 
p. 136), making the body a site of regulation and both an object and target of power 
(Turner, 2008).  Observation, surveillance and control are key components in creating 
docile bodies (Forbat, Maguire, McCann, Illingworth & Kearney, 2009) therefore 
disciplinary power works to recruit those at risk of cancer into surveillance strategies 
aimed at maximising the body potential by attempting to control cancer risk.  
Accordingly, a Foucauldian interpretation contended knowledge of genetic status was 
not the end point; rather it permitted technologies to be performed on the docile body.  
For disciplinary power to achieve its objective, that is transformation of the risky body to 
the lower risk/improved body, knowledge of genetic status was the first step in allowing 
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‘something to be done’, namely RRS, to render the body safe. Here, Ann recounts her 
sister’s advice: 
(…) at least now we know what’s wrong, they [medicine] can do 
something about it. At least there’s stuff they can do to sort it.  I didn’t 
have the chance at first but you have the chance to get yourself sorted. 
You can beat it [cancer] before it even begins.  
 
Ann’s sister had breast cancer and had undergone mastectomy, contralateral 
prophylactic mastectomy and prophylactic bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, and whilst 
it was not explicitly articulated ‘what could be done’, it was clear Ann’s sister believed 
RRS would transform Ann’s body from risky to safe as Ann could ‘beat’ cancer before it 
developed.   
 
In this study, a Foucauldian interpretation suggested high risk women’s bodies may be 
rendered docile in medical discourse which convincingly constructs cancer surveillance 
and risk reducing interventions as strategies which control future health.  
Presymptomatic genetic testing for HBOC is predicated on the assumption it facilitates 
a comprehensive surveillance strategy and effective interventions which reduce risk 
and save lives (Esplen & Bleiker, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2012).  Such assumptions are 
endorsed through the official HBOC discourse as outlined in clinical guidelines such 
NICE (2013) and Cancer Australia (2011, 2015) which make recommendations for the 
management of BRCA1/2 mutation carriers.  However, applying a Foucauldian critique 
illuminated notions of surveillance which were particularly relevant to contemporary 
understandings of breast/ovarian cancer because unlike other forms of cancer 
surveillance such as mammography which detect the signs of disease, genetic testing 
is a form of medical surveillance which scrutinises people for the potential for disease.   
 
An effect of genetic testing is that it allows women who test positive for BRCA1/2 
mutations to be marked as “genetically at risk” (Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 486) and 
constructed as “asymptomatically ill” (Billings et al., 1992, p. 476), “pre-disease” 
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patients (Kreiner & Hunt, 2014, p. 870) and “patients-in-waiting” (Timmermans & 
Buchbinder, 2010, p. 409).  Accordingly, genetic testing can be understood as a 
modern form of surveillance for the asymptomatically ill.  For Foucault (1973), 
surveillance was a feature of modern medicine which expanded the medical gaze to 
include not only the sick, but the potentially sick.  The shift towards surveillance in 
medicine was supported by increasing technological advancements, or a “technology 
assisted medical gaze” (Griffiths et al., 2010, p. 7) which permitted the internal body as 
well as the external to be visualised, recorded and assessed.   
 
Genetic testing further extends the scope of surveillance down to the cellular level 
(Armstrong, Michie, & Marteau, 1998) and offers what Hoffman (2011) described as a 
multiplicity of gazes which opened more people up to scrutiny and extended 
disciplinary power.  In this study, a further effect of disciplinary power was that even 
those who initially resisted genetic testing were persuaded to submit to the medical 
gaze, as Mary explained: 
But I was worried about what it [genetic testing] would mean.  My 
youngest is only 16 and she might need a mortgage one day.  They said 
it shouldn’t affect it but you never know.  (…). It just seemed to me to be 
asking for trouble.  It was all a bit up in the air (…) the doctors couldn’t 
really answer the questions I had.  But in the end I let myself get talked 
into it.  They [friends and family] persuaded me it was the best thing, 
and in reality, part of me was really keeping everything crossed it would 
come back normal.  
 
Applying Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power proposes genetic testing is a 
surveillance practice which creates rhetorical modes of understanding and exposition 
which discipline risky bodies in support of the medical discourse for managing cancer 
risk.  Participation in cancer surveillance is a socially mandated behaviour presented as 
a rational act; therefore placing one’s body under surveillance is an expression of 
social responsibility and rationality (Willis, 2005).  Disciplinary power dominates when 
groups of individuals such as high risk women, are subjected to the same interventions, 
practices and outcomes irrespective of individual needs (McCarthy, 2005).  Genetic 
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testing appears to be a common-sense response to risk but from a Foucauldian stance 
is technique of power which controls bodies in the interests of the specialism and 
contributes to the regulation and government of individuals at risk of cancer (Lemke, 
2004), extending the authority of medicine over people with no disease. This enables 
disciplinary power to be discreet yet ubiquitous and provides the mechanism which 
persuades people of the need to surrender their bodies to the medical gaze and 
conform to normalising strategies as outlined by medicine (Armstrong, 2007; Crabb, 
2006; Happe, 2006).  Rosie also described how she came under the medical gaze: 
I was always a bit uneasy going for the testing but I kind of felt I had to 
do it for Tom and Neil, plus there was, well he [husband] sort of 
assumed I’d go, he didn’t even question it.  It was just assumed I’d go.  
No-one really forces you, but it’s there anyway (…) a pressure because, 
well it seems like you should go and (…) have it done.   Also, since mum 
had gone and got it done for us, it seemed a bit pathetic for me not to 
go. 
 
Rosie succinctly exposed the non-coercive, persuasive nature of disciplinary power: 
Rosie has not been ‘forced’ into testing but none-the-less felt she had to be tested and 
clearly her loved ones also assumed she would undergo testing.  Although not explicitly 
stated, the need to discipline the body and partake in surveillance permeates through 
discourse and is taken up as the desired response when faced with cancer risk.  This 
was further evidenced through references to family rifts and those who refused testing 
being rejected within the family unit.  Rosie’s affected sister (Sheena) had refused 
testing which had led to bad feeling and a falling out between her siblings: 
When we found out Sheena wasn’t going to have the [genetic] testing, 
there was a lot of drama, especially Julie [sister] and her man [husband], 
they were not happy bunnies!. They both flipped out because they 
wanted to know what were the chances of the rest of us having it, or 
spreading it on to our kids.  They were also on at me to put pressure on 
her to have it done which really upset me. (…) But Sheena was 
adamant she wasn’t getting it done so she stuck to her guns. They fell 
out about it in the end (…) Julie stopped visiting Sheena because she 
was so angry with her. 
 
Rosie’s sister’s refusal of genetic testing may be understood as resistance to 
disciplinary power, or a refusal to take part in self-disciplining practices (Lilja & 
Vinthagen, 2014).  The impact of this resistance was significant because in the case of 
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HBOC it extended to others in the family who may be denied access to the medical 
gaze to determine their own risk of cancer, leading to anger and upset.  Genetic testing 
produces new knowledge about individuals and functions as a “politics of truth” 
(Lemke, 2002, p. 8) hence those who resist genetic testing are especially problematic 
because others are denied the chance to uncover the ‘truth’ about their genetics and 
hence their own bodies.  Ann’s cousin Shona had also refused testing, which led to 
family discord and attempts at emotional blackmail to persuade her otherwise:  
She [cousin] got offered it even though her mum was dead because 
they were doing research on the cancer genes and her family history 
was so strong.  The genetics people said they might not find anything 
but would still do [test] her and keep it on file for later.  Shona said she 
didn’t see the point and it would do more harm than good (…). They 
[family] all said she had to go and find out.  She’d be mad not to grab 
this chance to find out with both hands and then we’d all know who 
needed what. My Uncle Stuart even said it was an insult to Jean’s 
[deceased aunt] memory as Shona had the chance to do something to 
avoid what happened to her mum. Shona was really angry at her dad, 
they didn’t speak for ages. 
 
In this case, refusal of genetic testing was perceived as unacceptable because it 
prevented the revelation of knowledge which could avert cancer and ultimately death.  
Resistance to testing consequently exposed the presence of disciplinary power in 
genetic testing because it challenged the mandate to take part in cancer surveillance 
and made visible other positions which were available (not being tested) but not 
desirable.  The above excerpt was also interesting in that it revealed what was 
otherwise hidden in surveillance discourse, namely the tension between docility and 
agency and the risks of surveillance.  
 
Viera (2011) contends surveillance strategies for pre-disease conditions only make 
sense when certain conditions met: the measures must have discriminating ability, that 
is, those identified as pre-disease must be significantly more likely to develop the 
disease than those not; there must be an effective intervention which prevents or 
reduces the likelihood of disease and the benefits of the intervention must outweigh the 
risks.  This may in part explain why Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui 
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submitted to genetic surveillance but said no to RRS.  The analysis suggested that for 
the participants in this study, Viera’s (2011) third condition was not met hence 
resistance to disciplinary power was possible because the risks of the intervention for 
the pre-disease condition, namely RRS, were too great. 
 
Lilja & Vinthagen (2014) argued resistance to disciplinary power can entail a form of 
reversed power in which the same technologies of power are employed but in ways 
which open up spaces for individuals to make their own decisions.  This is in keeping 
with Foucault’s (1980, 1982) stance that power is productive as well as repressive 
because power allows things to happen and permits positive transformation through 
the negotiation of power relations (Allen, 2008).  From this perspective, cancer 
surveillance strategies can be understood as providing a means through which high 
risk women renegotiate power relations in medicine by accepting interventions which 
allow them to self-regulate their risky bodies in ways which make sense to them.  
Although Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Jacqui and Susan discussed many challenges 
thrown up by their genetic test result, surveillance strategies, in particular 
mammography appeared to offer some promise of control over their future health.  All 
discussed personal or others’ beliefs mammographic surveillance offered an 
opportunity to detect early cancers which could then be successfully managed through 
medical intervention. Jacqui explained: 
(…) with my risk, going for the scans, the mammograms, well that’s 
really important now you know, because then if there’s anything starting, 
a tumour or even changes in the breast which maybe could turn 
cancerous (…) things like changes can be seen on the scans before it 
turns into cancer.  
 
Here Jacqui acknowledged her risk of cancer as high and appeared somewhat 
reassured that mammographic surveillance was able to detect precancerous lesions as 
well as early cancers.  High risk women may be reassured by surveillance because the 
body is under close observation (Hamilton, Williams, Skirton & Bowers, 2009; Kurian et 
al., 2005) and may therefore prefer to take part in surveillance (Griffiths et al., 2010; 
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Sabatino et al., 2004) despite limited evidence on the safety and efficacy of breast 
surveillance in high risk women (de Gonzalez, et al., 2009).  Rosie also articulated a 
belief in the value of mammographic surveillance:  
I know I should have scans as well but I don’t go anymore. (…) I went 
the first few times but it was horrible.  I know it’s stupid and deep down I 
should go and I’ve been on and off about going, although I do really 
know I should go.  But I am really going to try and go back. I should then 
if it does happen [cancer] at least they can catch it early (…) then I 
would take it [surgery], if I got cancer.  
 
Here it can be understood that Rosie was in a process of renegotiating her position in 
medical discourse: despite finding mammography deeply unpleasant and initially 
withdrawing from it, her belief in the value of surveillance meant she was willing to 
resume participation.  Likewise, although Pauline voiced some doubts, she was none-
the-less in favour of surveillance:    
Some people say cancer is either in you or it’s not. I read on a web site 
about one woman like me, BRCA2 positive and not having the surgery. 
(…) She also said she stopped having any tests or scans because they 
were making her so anxious she felt the stress would bring on cancer.  I 
think there is some truth, maybe but even still I am going for the 
mammos [mammograms] so they can catch it early. But not the ovary 
one as my risk is quite low and it [screening] doesn’t really work for 
ovary cancer anyway.  
 
Intensive surveillance may enable individuals to renegotiate power in the medical 
encounter by having their concerns listened to and acted upon (Forbat et al., 2009).  
Hence surveillance is both a technique of power and empowerment because taking 
part in surveillance is a means through which high risk women can have their risky 
bodies monitored and protected by medical intervention should a future cancer 
develop. This was evidenced across the participants’ stories through repeated 
intonations that ‘early detection saves lives’.  Like Pauline, Jacqui, Rosie and Ann, 
Mary and Susan also viewed surveillance as a means of protection rather than control: 
Living with this [gene fault], well it’s something you’ve got to contend 
with I suppose.  We are lucky in this county we get the NHS [National 
Health Service] and the mammograms with it, which means I might not 
get cancer at all (…) so I go and keep everything crossed it [screening] 
stops me getting it [breast cancer]. It’s [having mammograms] 
something I can do to help myself.  (Mary) 
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I just think, to lose your breasts and ovaries for something which might 
or might not happen? I am superstitious and I think, if it’s going to 
happen, it’s going to happen (…) if you are so high risk, then it’s 
probably going to happen anyway.   So I have opted to have screening 
so I get checked out more frequently so if anything happens it will get 
picked up quicker and (…) chances are it will still be able to be cured. 
(Susan) 
 
Again this reinforces Foucault’s position that power is not necessarily repressive but 
always contingent, creating the conditions through which individuals re-position 
themselves in medical encounters as holding power and directing medicine to attend to 
their bodies as required (Forbat et al., 2009).  Although Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, 
Jacqui and Susan said no to RRS, they renegotiated power through an acceptance of 
mammographic surveillance as a means of dealing with cancer risk and potentially 
securing future health.   
 
To sum, this section explored how ‘the truth’ about hereditary breast/ovarian cancer 
and RRS came to be and how the medical discourse came to dominate.  From a 
Foucauldian stance, the ‘truth’ about familial breast/ovarian cancer and how it should 
be managed cannot be known as it cannot exist.  What does exist, and what has been 
demonstrated in this analysis, are the conditions and discourses which prevail at any 
given time and make possible claims about familial breast/ovarian cancer and its 
management to be made.  The interpretation offered contended power operated 
through the HBOC discourse because high risk women were persuaded of the 
sensibility of certain ways of being and acting to avoid cancer and prolong life.  
However, as Foucault claimed, dominant discourses are effective in creating a range of 
subject positions because the creation of an ideal subject position invariably creates 
other subject positions at odds with the ideal, creating the space through which 
resistance to the dominant medical pathway for HBOC is possible.  The next section 
applies a Feminist analysis to the participants’ stories and illuminates ways in which 
Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline sought to make sense of their 
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experiences and have their voices heard.  A focus on their resistance to the medical 
pathway for dealing with breast/ovarian cancer risk extends the interpretations 
presented in the previous analytic sections in light of the convergence between the 
three literary theories utilised, as discussed in Chapter 4.   
 
An interpretation through the lens of Feminist Literary Theory 
Feminist literary theory poses questions relating to power relationships in societies to 
gain understanding of female social reality (Allen, 2014).  Key to this is the argument all 
human, social relations are gendered; therefore how women have been constructed 
and represented in society reflects power struggles at the individual and societal level.   
From a feminist perspective, female characteristics are socially constructed rather than 
biologically determined.  For example, men are constructed as strong, dispassionate 
and career-orientated whereas women are constructed as weaker, emotionally labile 
and nurturing (Mikkola, 2012).  While differences between males and females are 
acknowledged, the extent to which these differences are innate or socially constructed 
is problematised through the lens of feminist literary theory.  Analysis of how the female 
role, femininity and womanhood are socially constructed allows an exploration of the 
dynamics of gender and power relations which may subordinate women. 
 
 A feminist critique added a valuable perspective to this study as it concerned an 
important female issue: hereditary breast/ovarian cancer.  Although male breast cancer 
does exist and men can pass BRCA1/2 gene mutations to their children, women at risk 
of HBOC face exacting challenges because norms of feminine embodiment are 
fundamentally tied to female breasts hence breast loss is especially confronting for 
women (Ehlers, 2012).  Additionally, the unique positioning of women as the 
gatekeepers of family health in Western society (Acero, 2012; Warner & Procaccino, 
2004) exaggerates the moral component of health decision making and adds another 
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layer of complexity to the HBOC journey because women are also obliged to protect 
others from the threat of cancer.   
 
In this section, a feminist critique served as an analytical tool through which the 
participants’ stories were read by the researcher for ways in which Susan, Rosie, 
Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline sought to interpret, negotiate and make sense of their 
individual circumstances.  There was a focus on how their personal decisions to say no 
to surgery were not fully understood within the broader social and cultural frameworks 
which endorsed or denounced the decision to refuse RRS.   The rejection of the advice 
and cancer pathway offered by the official medical discourse on HBOC, and a decision 
which is argued to be ‘anti-health’ in the context of Western medical discourse, 
confirmed other discourses existed. The participants’ personal journeys and the ability 
to say no served as a potent signifier of competing discourses and multiple, conflicting 
ideologies which defined, described and directed HBOC and its management and 
underscored the vexing reality of women who found themselves living with this risk. 
 
The feminist concept of resistance provided the key focus of this analytic section.  To 
reiterate, resistance is understood as a means of fighting back against forms of 
oppression and dominant ways of thinking which support the subordination of women 
(Gotfrit, 1991).  Utilising a feminist critique aims to problematise and make visible the 
workings of hegemonic discourses which may oppress women by reframing the body 
at risk of breast/ovarian cancer as a potential site of resistance to such dominating 
practices.  A feminist perspective thus highlights resistance as a potential practice of 
empowerment which challenges taken-for-granted assumptions which may oppress 
women through an illumination of the conflict and contradictions present in everyday 
discourses (Allen, 2011).  Talbot, Bibace, Bokhour and Bamberg (1996) posited 
women’s narratives function as forms of resistance to master narratives and discourses 
which seek to hold individuals to culturally driven standards which define acceptable 
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behaviours, in this case, the dominant medical discourse.  In this study, resistance was 
a means through which high risk women became aware of the competing and 
conflicting discourses which surround HBOC and its management which led to the 
creation of alternative discourses which made sense of their experiences. Application 
of the feminist concept of resistance was a means through which the analysis 
connected the women’s stories to the prevailing communal folklore on HBOC and 
highlighted the creation of a private folklore in relation to saying no to RRS. 
 
This section examines the multiple resistances to dominant discourses and ideological 
practices which were discussed in the previous analytic sections.  This means some 
sections of narrative are referred to again when particularly useful in supporting the 
analysis. Additionally, owing to the relative paucity of research in this area, it was 
necessary at times to extrapolate from the wider literature relating to refusing 
conventional medical treatment. 
 
Many discourses, competing ideologies 
The analysis in the previous sections revealed high risk women may be conflicted by 
competing and contradictory messages on how best to attend to breast/ovarian cancer 
risk.   The dominant medical discourse lays claim to knowledge about the truth of 
HBOC and how best to manage cancer risk.  Being identified as high risk of developing 
breast/ovarian cancer places a genetic responsibility on high risk women to be active, 
concerned, patients-in-waiting and take affirmative action in the present to protect 
themselves and others from the future risk of cancer.  Simultaneously, ideologies of 
femininity and sexuality produce a persuasive discourse on how women and their 
bodies should be in Western society, a crucial part of which is having two breasts and 
ovaries.   
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In the stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline, there was 
acknowledgement of gendered discourses in Western society and ways in which 
women were confronted with idealised images of the female body in everyday life, 
particularly in relation to the female breast.  Rosie alluded to this when she said 
“Everywhere you look it’s all ‘tits ‘n’ ass’ (…) sex sells, doesn’t it?” and Susan 
acknowledged the prominence of an idealised female image when she explained 
“they’re all over the place (…) women’s breasts (…) boobs selling cars, Wonderbra 
adverts, all that sort of stuff.  It’s like a constant reminder of what you are giving up”.  
Susan’s words here highlighted the painful enormity of the decision to forfeit one’s 
breasts because of risk.  In many ways, Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui 
faced a no-win situation.  To attend to cancer risk as defined by the medical discourse 
results in a number of other risks to self, thereby creating an uneasy tension between 
the provision of risk reducing strategies which may protect women from cancer but 
which also strip them of socially mandated essential female characteristics.   
 
It was evident then societal and medical concerns about cancer risk generally and 
breast/ovarian cancer, in particular, were represented through various discourses and 
ideologies which surrounded HBOC.  Key stakeholders in HBOC discourse include 
medicine, biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, the media, patient advocacy 
groups, academics, scientists and researchers and the public at large, therefore it is 
not surprising different discourses and their attendant ideologies may conflict as each 
vies for ascendency.  However, the participants’ stories revealed high risk women can 
and do demonstrate resistance to such dominant discourses and ideologies.  
Resistance can be understood as a positive force which exposes the contradictory 
nature of conflicting ideological stances which burden high risk women with impossible 
choices.  Simply put, in Western society it is unacceptable for high risk women to fail to 
attend to breast/ovarian cancer risk yet it is also unacceptable to be breastless.  It is 
from this very contradiction that resistance emerges and it is resistance itself which 
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exposes competing ideologies and contradictions in discourse in relation to HBOC 
which may oppress women.   
 
A feminist interpretation suggested the potential for resistance emerged as high risk 
women became aware of ways in which dominant ways of thinking conflicted and 
diffused uncertainty, creating ambivalent and unpleasant experiences.  This was 
summed up expressively by Rosie when she offered her interpretation of making her 
decision regarding RRS: 
Well I say options but (…) I’m not sure of the right word, they’re not 
really options.   It’s like choosing between two forms of torture. Option 
one, get them [breasts] off, mutilate your body, option two, get cancer 
and die.  Not much of a choice!  (…) then they say “oh well, you know, 
it’s your decision”, like they expect you to be able to decide on the back 
of that?  Okay so you’ll be a survivor but at what cost?  Left half the 
woman you once were?  
 
Here, Rosie clearly articulated a ‘choice but no choice’ dilemma.  Although it appeared 
Rosie’s autonomy had been promoted, she did not articulate a feeling of freedom or 
empowerment in making her decision.  In cancer risk discourse, individual autonomy 
and choice are emphasised (Sato, 2012) and decision making around RRS is 
consistently framed within the context of rational decision making.  For example, Fry et 
al. (2001a, p. 584) noted “cancer worry seems to override a more rational consideration 
of costs and benefits of (risk reducing) surgery” while Lodder et al. (2002, p. 111) 
stated “ideally, it should be prevented that high anxiety would impede rationally 
weighing pros/cons of prophylactic mastectomy”.  More recently, Zagouri et al. (2013, 
p. 207) showed little has changed by stating “the decision for prophylactic mastectomy 
should be evidence driven and rationally guided by genetic testing”.    
 
The positioning of high risk women as autonomous decision makers in medical 
discourse exposes the inherent ideological conflicts and posits medical authority as 
problematic in the accounts of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline.  Bishop 
and Yardley (2004) claimed medical expertise was problematic in egalitarian societies 
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because the positioning of doctor-as-expert gives power over non-experts hence 
resisting medical authority is regarded as irrational rather than agentic.  Knowledge 
obtained through genetic testing is considered as Zagouri et al. (2013) and other 
researchers’ positions demonstrate, as knowledge which allows an individual to make a 
rational decision based on knowledge of the ‘facts’ about one’s genetic status.  Genetic 
testing leads to normative expectations on how to respond to risk (Paul et al., 2014) 
since the underpinning assumption is the consequences of risk are made avoidable 
(Ilkilic, 2009). The following quotes from three health care practitioners in Witt’s (2013, 
p. 117) study demonstrate how the importance of autonomy is embedded in medicine 
but also the restricted and narrow discourse within which decision making takes place: 
I would be very happy if all my patients who were at risk for ovarian 
cancer had oophorectomies. I wouldn’t want to push oophorectomies on 
them, but rationally it is the best way to manage that risk, but ultimately 
it’s the woman’s own decision. 
 
I mean we are very emphatic that surgery is the thing that we 
recommend. And that really, you know, if you are in your 40s and 
certainly if you are over 50, you should be having your ovaries out.   
 
Everyone of us has to die, but I feel very strong that women don’t have 
to die of ovarian cancer. It might [be] easier to have a heart attack.  
 
It is clear from Witt’s (2013) study health care practitioners held personal beliefs about 
what actions high risk women should take based on their positioning as experts who 
knew the ‘best’ way to respond to risk.  Health care practitioners are socialised within 
the dominant medical discourse (Martin, 2014). It is therefore not surprising to find 
ideologies consistent with this discourse namely ideologies of autonomy, self-
responsibility for health and surgical intervention for risk.  Other influencing contexts 
within which women make decisions may be acknowledged but are largely relegated 
over the expert view on what is the best way to respond to risk.  Managing cancer and 
by extension cancer risk, hence presents the potential for ideological conflict (Bishop & 
Yardley, 2004) because autonomy requires high risk women to be accountable for their 
own decisions but conflicts with the ideological mandate of medicine as best equipped 
to deal with the threat to health/life.   
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From a feminist perspective, ideological conflict bears particularly heavily on women 
because women are encouraged to take the path of least resistance and comply with 
societal conventions regardless of personal views, hence true autonomy is rarely 
available (Meyers, 2010).  This was reflected in Rosie’s story above and in the words of 
Jacqui who earlier explained how she was expected to make her own decision but “at 
the same time, [she] felt they wanted me to do what they wanted, which was to (…) 
take the surgery”.  In the same way, Susan acknowledged she was given information 
so she could make a personal choice but this was set against “being told in the first 
place [you have a gene fault] makes it seem as if you must have the op[eration], or else 
what’s the point [of testing]?”.   
 
These excerpts clearly demonstrated how decision making in response to 
breast/ovarian cancer risk was contextualised with a discourse of medical hegemony 
and its accompanying power structures (Szumacher, 2006) which may severely curtail 
the freedom to choose and restrict autonomy.  In research which examined some of the 
conflicts in obstetric medical decision-making, Abrams (2015) contended women’s 
autonomy was threatened when decision making frameworks which sought primarily to 
reduce risk were utilised.  While such frameworks were purported to actualise the 
women’s autonomy, Abrams (2015) provided a compelling argument this was an 
illusion because the decisions made by the women were taken entirely within the 
discourse of medical expertise and the primary necessity to reduce risk.  Whilst this 
was not problematic to women who aligned themselves to the medical discourse, it 
created normalising standards of behaviour which were problematic to those who 
resisted the dominant view, such as the participants in this study.  Within these 
contexts, decision making frameworks which outline women’s choices in attending to 
risk conceal the more limiting realities women face (Löwy, 2010).  
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It is important to acknowledge the requisite to undertake RRS to manage risk is not 
explicitly articulated in medical encounters and health professionals do not ‘tell’ high 
risk women what to do to lower cancer risk.  In keeping with contemporary approaches 
to health and social care, shared decision making models are emphasised in clinical 
guidelines for the care of women at risk of familial breast/ovarian cancer, for example, 
the NICE (2013) guidelines.  Implicit in such models is the belief decision making 
should take cognisance of what matters most to the patient with judicious use of 
professional knowledge and status (Greenhalgh, Howick & Maskrey, 2014).  However, 
as Abrams (2015), Martin (2014) and Bishop and Yardley (2004) highlighted, the 
provision of factual information and advice supports a medical discourse which directs 
health choices in prescribed ways which may serve to reduce autonomy.  In medical 
consultations, the risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer is calculable and 
quantifiable, able to be visually displayed in numerical data and in written texts.  For 
example, Jacqui explained how much her risk could be reduced through RRS: 
When they show you the statistics, how much surgery lowers the risk 
(…) my risk was said to be about 60 percent for breast cancer and 50 
[percent] for ovarian but surgery would take it down to less than 5 
[percent] [for breast cancer] and practically zero for ovary [cancer].  
 
Such statistical calculations suggest risk is able to be defined with certainty and RRS is 
constructed as offering a dramatic reduction in cancer risk for Jacqui.  What is not said 
in discourse is that these statistics apply to populations and therefore may not be 
representative of individual risk (Grossi, 2005; Samerski, 2006).  Hence whilst high risk 
women are given ‘choices’ or options with regards to managing risk, the decision to say 
yes or no to RRS is made within the dominant discourse and culture (Gotfrit, 1991) 
which in the case of HBOC means attending to risk through surgical intervention.   
 
In this study then, conflict was apparent in the participants’’ stories as personal 
autonomy was promoted but simultaneously challenged by the dominant understanding 
of RRS as the ‘cure’ for cancer risk.  This was evidenced in the participants’ stories 
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through references to RRS as a ‘no-brainer’, the obvious and logical action to take 
when one is identified as high risk of developing cancer.  It was, therefore, not 
unexpected the participants struggled at times to make sense of their decision to say 
no to surgery and to make their decision understandable to others.  Here, Mary 
explained how others found it difficult to accept her decision to say no to surgery: 
It felt like being in a dark tunnel with no light at the end.  Even though 
you are surrounded by people, your friends and family, and all the 
counsellors and the nurses and doctors and (…) they were all really 
good, but you still feel so alone because people can’t understand (…) 
and they can’t stop giving you their opinion.  Just stop with the bloody 
opinions [raised voice], you know what I mean?  
 
This excerpt illustrated how resisting the ideal subject position outlined in medical 
discourse was an isolating experience for Mary because her decision to say no to 
surgery was challenged by others who could not comprehend it.   
 
A feminist interpretation posited this was exacerbated through women’s subjected 
positioning in society and the legitimate say others had in determining what was right 
for high risk women (Szumacher, 2006).  The contingent positioning of women means 
concerned others such as family and friends are likely to advise high risk women to 
comply with medical convention rather than demonstrate autonomy (Meyers, 2010).  
The language of choice and autonomy which is integral to breast/ovarian cancer risk 
discourse is therefore not solely empowering but also serves to constrain because the 
discourse has already defined the right choice to make in response to risk (Hallowell & 
Lawton, 2002; Sato, 2012).   Ann also explained how her autonomy was severely 
restricted because her choices dissented to those around her: 
(…) it all rests on your feelings, how you feel inside.  I want to be worry 
free, to have a life without the stress of it all but at the same time I don't 
want the ops. I mean who would? I don't want the pain.  I don’t want lots 
of surgery to fix me up again after.   If I’m honest, I was worried about 
what I would be like (…) after.  How would I look?  Worried I wouldn’t 
look like me anymore. (…) But how can you explain these feelings to 
those who love you?  They just want you to be safe, to protect yourself 
so they just can’t see it (…) why you don’t just go for it [surgery].  
Eventually you give up trying [to explain].  
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Ann’s concerns about surgery were evident and it was clear she struggled to convey 
these concerns to loved ones who spoke in support of the medical discourse.  Although 
Ann ultimately said no to RRS, taking this alternate position was problematic as desire 
to be free from worry conflicted with the risks of surgery.  Previous research has 
identified BRCA1/2 mutation carriers experienced constant conflict between two 
threatening conditions namely the threat associated with being a mutation carrier and 
the risks associated with surgery (Dagan & Goldblatt, 2009).    On the one hand, RRS 
offers protection from risk (Guillem et al., 2006; Ingham et al., 2013), freedom from 
worry (Gopie et al., 2013; Hallowell et al., 2012; Lostumbo et al., 2010) and is therefore 
the obvious path for high risk women to take.  On the other, RRS potentially threatens 
female embodiment (Ehlers, 2012; Piot-Ziegler et al., 2010) and presents women with 
a number of negative physical and emotional impacts (Altschuler et al., 2008; Hallowell 
et al., 2012) and therefore may be understood as a risk in itself (Dagan & Goldblatt, 
2009).  Consequently, surgical interventions which aim to render the body safe from 
cancer may fail to mobilise high risk women because power and social relations 
embedded within discourse may conflict with or contradict personal perceptions of risk 
(Lock & Nguyen, 2010).  Hence, the participants’ stories exposed the complex and 
contingent positioning of high risk women and their bodies in Western society which 
created the conditions for resistance.  This section now focuses on an examination of 
the multiple resistances which emerged from the stories as the participants sought to 
negotiate the medical discourse and work out their position to and within it.    
 
Resistance to the risk discourse 
A fundamental issue for Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui was negotiating 
biomedical constructions of risk which created normalising responses on how to attend 
to the risk of cancer.  The analysis suggested risk discourse produced an ideal subject 
position in which the person at risk of cancer does whatever it takes to reduce or avoid 
risk.  The participants’ own knowledge and understandings emerged as signs of 
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resistance to this position, thereby challenging clinically hegemonic representations of 
how HBOC risk should be managed.  Highlighting the incompleteness of biomedical 
knowledge about breast/ovarian cancer risk created the space to assume an alternate 
subject position to that offered by the medical discourse.  The subtexts of the 
participants’ stories confirmed a fear of cancer which created persuasive arguments in 
favour of RRS but which failed to account for uncertainty.  Susan described attempts to 
justify her decision to say no to surgery to her mother who felt Susan should accept 
surgery so she could remain alive for her young daughter:  
I said “but mum, even if I get it done, I still might not be here for her, 
that’s life”. But she would just start crying again and, so, end of 
conversation.   I think in the end I just decided to take my chances.  If 
they could have given me a guarantee it might have been different. It 
just seemed so drastic, having all that done, when there’s nothing wrong 
with you (…) and not be able to say it definitely won’t happen. 
 
Susan articulated personal understanding of RRS as being a procedure which was 
unable to completely neither protect women from cancer nor ensure longevity.  Her 
position contrasted with that of her mother and evoked a strong emotional response, 
the implication of which was refusing surgery was akin to a premature death.  Likewise 
Rosie also demonstrated understanding of the uncertainty inherent in risk discourse in 
contrast to her significant others: 
(…) but I mean even with the surgery, there’s no guarantee I won’t get it 
[cancer] but no-one seems to understand. They talk as if you have the 
(surgery, (…) you will never get it, but you still can.  It’s not set in stone.  
There is a good chance you are having it all for nothing, who knows? 
 
Like Susan, Rosie’s story highlighted some high risk women express understandings of 
genetic cancer risk which differ to those in the dominant risk discourse. Susan’s story 
continued as she further problematised dominant constructions of risk:  
But the more they tell you the less you felt you actually knew.  It’s weird 
[be]cause I thought I was pretty sure at the time. I thought the doctors 
were sure but the more I found out, you find out no-one’s really sure. 
No-one could tell me what my [said with emphasis] risk actually was.  I 
asked straight out if surgery would mean there’s no chance of me 
getting it [breast/ovarian cancer] but they couldn’t answer that one.  I 
mean, they didn’t know. They don’t really know why [cancer develops]. 
So you can go ahead with it [surgery] and you still might get it [cancer]. 
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These excerpts confirmed how Susan and Rosie were conflicted as they came to 
understand knowledge of genetic status failed to deliver the promise of certainty 
alluded to in the risk discourse, namely RRS as protection against cancer.  Their 
stories also revealed suggested there was an acceptance that medical knowledge was 
incomplete, uncertain and changeable: Rosie described genetic information as not 
being ‘set in stone’ and Susan discussed her doctor’s inability to address all her areas 
of concern or explain why people get cancer.  Likewise Pauline acknowledged the 
uncertainty in risk discourse when she said: 
The surgery might be the right thing for some women (…) I couldn’t go 
through with it.  I feel like a bit of a coward but it’s a very, very personal 
choice and (…) the doctors don’t always get it right. Hopefully someone 
or something is watching over me and I’ll be okay. 
 
At this point, Pauline appears dissenting in her story.  Doctors-as-experts are credited 
in medical discourse with knowing the best way to manage breast/ovarian cancer risk 
hence by acknowledging doctors are not ‘always right’, Pauline resisted the authority of 
medicine to know what was best for her.  Ann too alluded to the limits of medical 
expertise when she stated “there is a lot they don’t know so they can’t answer all your 
questions”.  Grassley and Nelms (2009) reported on women’s accounts of 
breastfeeding and noted resistance emerged when women’s personal experiences 
differed to those of the expert view.  The limited ability of medical experts to address 
women’s questions or concerns, and conflicts between the expert view and personal 
experience, led to resistance and validation of personal explanations of why things 
happen as they do.   
 
Positioning oneself in opposition to medical discourse is one of the strongest positions 
of active agency people can make when deciding upon anti-cancer interventions 
(Bishop & Yardley, 2004) because those who decline may be labelled as ‘difficult’ or 
‘non-compliant’ rather than considered as active and informed (Frenkel, 2013).  Frenkel 
(2013) further argued personal values and beliefs influenced decisions about cancer 
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treatment more than medical evidence but that medicine was resistant to those who 
refused conventional approaches based on personal understandings.  Resistance 
emerges then when those who exhibit an opposing stance to the expert view draw on 
counter discourses to challenge the medical discourse and validate their individual 
understandings.  In this study, perceptions of medical knowledge as limited, uncertain 
and incomplete challenged the appropriateness of RRS as a strategy to manage risk 
and corroborated the decision to say no.  Ann’s story also exposed uncertainty, this 
time through acknowledgement owning a BRCA1/2 mutation did not make cancer 
inevitable:  
If I had cancer, then obviously I would not refuse surgery.  But I still 
might not get it [cancer]. Having the gene doesn’t make it 100% you will 
get cancer (…).  I guess I do believe in fate, what’s for you won’t go by 
you, yes I think it all comes down to the hand you’ve been dealt.   
 
The interpretation offered here posited Susan, Rosie, Pauline and Ann took an 
opposing stance to the contemporary public discourse on breast/ovarian cancer risk 
which is underpinned by a belief genetic knowledge is a means of providing certainty 
and control over cancer (Claes et al., 2005) because a person’s future can be defined 
and predicted (Paul et al., 2014) and appropriate steps taken to reduce risk (Ilkilic, 
2009).  To this end, the experiences of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline 
signalled a point of resistance to the dominant way of thinking about risk.  Their 
alternate understandings of what risk means reflected what Paul et al. (2014, p. 82) 
referred to as the “captious certainty” of genetic information.  Genetic knowledge has 
an aura of certainty but in reality it is similar to other forms of medical knowledge in that 
it is incomplete, changing and at times inconsistent.  The promise of certainty is 
therefore captious as it may lead to more rather than less uncertainty about one’s 
situation, as the participants’ stories showed.    
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Resistance to the dominant risk discourse was also demonstrated through ways in 
which the objective, factual nature of statistical calculations was challenged.   Pauline 
said: 
(…) eventually the result came back as BRCA 2 positive and they told 
me my chance of getting breast cancer was about 50% and for ovary 
cancer, about 15%, much higher than normal.  I feel a bit silly admitting 
this but I thought the risk would be higher, like 100%. So yes it’s higher 
than if I didn’t have the gene, but it’s still not 100%.  I thought if you had 
the gene, you got it [cancer] which was the first shock. Then I find out 
even having them take away your breasts and ovaries, you can still get 
cancer (…) and you are higher risk of other cancers like skin cancer.  It 
was like opening a can of worms.  They brought up stuff I hadn’t even 
thought about.  It was totally nerve-wracking. 
 
Like Susan, Rosie and Ann, Pauline articulated some uncertainty about what her risk 
meant.  She acknowledged RRS did not always prevent breast/ovarian cancer but she 
assumed a different subject position by framing her risk as being ‘not high enough’ to 
justify surgical intervention.  This demonstrated Pauline’s understanding of her risk was 
inconsistent to and challenged the level of risk assigned to her through objective risk 
calculation.   
 
Considerable attention has been paid to the importance of the meanings people attach 
to risk. There is compelling evidence that genetic knowledge does not necessarily alter 
personal risk perceptions (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Heshka et al., 2008) and perceived 
risk is more important than objective risk in decision making about RRS (Hoskins et al., 
2012; Witt, 2013).  In women newly diagnosed with breast cancer, Citrin et al. (2012) 
found refusal of conventional treatments was associated with a perception treatment 
was riskier than no treatment/non-conventional treatments, irrespective of the strength 
of supporting evidence.  Indeed the strength of medical evidence in support of RRS 
may be largely irrelevant to women because fear and worry can lead to an over-
estimation of risk which is more meaningful to women than objective risk (Rosenberg et 
al., 2013).  It is also widely acknowledged that differences exist between scientific and 
lay understandings of risk (Ahmed et al., 2012; Hoskins et al., 2014; Paul et al., 2014; 
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Wagner, 2011) yet in the medical arena, objective measures remain central to decision 
making and personal meanings of risk are largely ignored (Dauer et al., 2011; Ilkilic, 
2009; Wagner, 2011).  Certainly Pauline would be considered high risk in clinical 
guidelines for the management of HBOC (for example, NICE, 2013 and Cancer 
Australia, 2011) hence the personal meaning she attached to her risk appeared 
instrumental in allowing her to adopt an alternate subject position which resisted the 
need for RRS.  Mary also challenged dominant ways of thinking about risk: 
The other thing was, they said with the gene fault the risk of cancer is 
really high. (…). 10 times higher than for other people, which made me 
think “well if it’s so high, it might happen anyway”, and they couldn’t say 
“no, it won’t happen”.  So even with it [RRS] there’s no guarantee. 
Having this gene means there is a good chance of me getting cancer 
any way you look at it.  
 
Mary said no to RRS on the grounds of risk but from a different perspective.  Unlike 
Pauline who perceived her risk estimate as ‘not high enough’, Mary perceived her risk 
of cancer to be so high she was powerless to control it through RRS.  Mary’s story 
continued as she acknowledged the uncertainty attached to her life despite knowledge 
of her BRCA1/2 status: 
There’s no guarantees for any of us. I might get cancer or I might not.  
You might get it or you might not. I might have a stroke or get hit by a 
bus. (…) I think maybe because I smoke I don’t expect to live to a ripe 
old age anyway.  
 
Mary identified herself as being at risk through smoking and other risks to health which 
were for her, as meaningful as her cancer risk.  Thus, perceptions of risk were exposed 
as deeply personal and experienced in resistance to statistical, objective 
measurements.  It was evident Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline came to 
see genetic risk as uncertain and medical knowledge as unstable.  Their divergent 
meanings of risk suggested high risk women may be confronted by similar challenges 
but internal and external contexts mediate the meanings attributed to risk and how risk 
is personally interpreted and understood.  Although meanings differed, the participants’ 
responses to risk converged in that all resisted the dominant thinking of risk as 
controllable through surgical intervention.  
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Resistance to the risk discourse and the illusion of certainty which accompanies it was 
also exhibited through reference to other meanings of life and death.  The excerpts 
above showed how Ann believed her future was down to fate and ‘the hand she’d been 
dealt’.  Rosie, Susan and Mary all referred to the role of chance in determining whether 
they developed cancer or not.  Rosie also discussed her religious beliefs and how they 
may have influenced her decision to say no to RRS: 
I wouldn’t say I was overly religious, not really god-fearing (…) but we 
have been brought up as church-goers.  I don’t go [to church] now but 
my mum still does, every week.  So we were brought up believing God 
was looking down on us and God had a plan for us all (…) it [religion] 
affects you more than you think, I suppose I think it will happen [cancer] 
if it’s what’s meant for me, you will get it if God’s wish or whatever you 
want to call it.  What will be will be, you know? 
 
Earlier in this thesis Jacqui described how high risk women’s breasts were colloquially 
referred to as ‘ticking time bombs’, something she in part agreed with whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging non-genetic causes of cancer:  
The weird thing was, I felt a bit like it as well (…) but having them off 
doesn’t feel like the answer. There’s part of me thinks it’s all down to 
fate, it’ll either happen or it won’t.  It just comes down to luck. 
 
The analysis here illuminated ways in which Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and 
Pauline adopted alternate subject positions which resisted the dominant way of thinking 
about cancer as inevitable in BRCA1/2 mutation women and cancer risk as controllable 
through surgical intervention.   Their stories revealed understandings about disease 
and death exist which were as, or more, meaningful to high risk women as genetic 
knowledge, but which were unaccounted for in cancer risk discourse.  When medical 
knowledge is not seen as certain, unproblematic and fixed, high risk women may come 
to draw upon a number of alternate discourses to construct divergent subject positions 
even when these challenge the dominant way of thinking.  It is the conflicts and 
contradictions which emerge from dominant discourses in relation to HBOC which 
create the space for resistance.  Although various alternate positions were constructed, 
all participants questioned the necessity of RRS in the absence of disease.   
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A feminist interpretation contended saying no to surgery for cancer risk may be 
understood as an opportunity for high risk women to take actions other than those 
ascribed by the dominant medical discourse and to act in accordance with what was 
personally important.  In this way, Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline were 
active in redefining medical advice by claiming expertise over their own bodies and 
their embodied experiences.  The decision to accept or refuse RRS was more complex 
than medical discourse suggested (Hallowell & Lawton, 2002) and was not perceived 
as the solution to cancer risk.  By resisting the notion of risk-as-disease, the 
participants were able to create personal ideologies and modes of reference which 
made sense to them even when these conflicted with the dominant medical discourse.  
However, such resistance lays women open to accusations of irresponsibility (Bishop & 
Yardley, 2004; Frenkel, 2013) therefore high risk women must seek alternative means 
of demonstrating their sensibility.  Earlier Ann ascertained “If I had cancer, then 
obviously I would not refuse surgery”, a view shared by Rosie:  
So it just seems so drastic.  I don’t [said with emphasis] have cancer 
(…) but you are made to feel like you do.  Who is having a heart 
transplant because they might get a heart attack in 10 years? It just 
doesn’t make sense when you are still healthy. It would be different if 
you already had it [cancer].   
 
The subtext of Rosie’s story here implied surgery would be acceptable should she be 
diagnosed with cancer.  In this next excerpt, Jacqui also highlighted surgery as an 
appropriate response to the disease of cancer when referring to online chats with other 
BRCA1/2 mutation women: 
To be fair, some of them had cancer in one breast already so you could 
understand it, why they would want to be tested and have the other one 
off. I think it’s different then, you’ve no choice really. I can understand 
you would want everything away then.   
 
It was evident Jacqui was able to rationalise the ideal subject position when one has 
cancer but not for cancer risk, demonstrating the same surgery acquires different 
meanings according to personal perceptions (Press et al., 2005).  Risk discourse 
attempts to locate disease and death in women’s breasts and ovaries in the same way 
276 
 
the disease of cancer does (Piot-Ziegler et al., 2010).  When one has cancer, surgery 
is acknowledged as the appropriate response (Witt, 2013) however the participants’ 
stories show the framing of surgery as the solution for cancer risk is resisted by some 
high risk women.  The subtext ‘I would have surgery if I had cancer’ avoids accusations 
of irresponsibility and reinforces resistance to the discourse of medically managing risk 
by accepting the need for surgery should a diagnosis of cancer be made.  
 
In the same way, Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui‘s acceptance of more 
intensive surveillance for their risk can be understood as attempts to construct 
themselves as sensible by acknowledging the materiality of cancer whilst refuting the 
materiality of risk.  Hence, high risk women position themselves as active in accepting 
medicine’s ability to attend to the disease of cancer but negotiate medicine’s access to 
their bodies on the basis of risk of cancer.   
 
The stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline reveal how they attempted 
to make meaning of their experiences of risk even when discursive spaces were 
severely restricted.  Medical discourse defined risk as something measurable, 
calculable and reducible, giving risk a materiality and an almost tangible aura which 
conflated risk with disease.  Cancer risk-as-disease was a threat because cancer is 
deadly thus risk comes to mean premature death.  However, as the participants’ stories 
showed, risk is experienced as something out with its construction in medical 
discourse.   
 
To conclude this section, Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui were unable to 
situate themselves within a discourse which constructed the body as diseased because 
they resisted the conflation of the body-at-risk with the body-as-diseased hence the 
removal of body parts was unnecessary and incongruous.  A further point of resistance 
emerged through personal understandings of breast/ovarian loss which differed to 
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those outlined in the medical discourse.  In medical discourse, the loss of breasts and 
ovaries is routinely attended to through surgical and chemical restoration, offering 
women the opportunity to reduce cancer risk whilst maintaining the body.  In contrast, 
as the analysis in this study revealed some high risk women demonstrate resistance to 
the reconstruction/replacement discourse in HBOC management and create counter-
discourses which make sense in the context of their personal experiences.   
 
Resistance to the discourse of replacement 
In medical discourse, RRS is understood as a beneficial process which removes risky 
body parts and renders the body safe, like the bodies in biomedicine (Turner, 1998).  
Moreover, in contemporary HBOC discourse, the loss of body parts through RRS is 
able to be ameliorated through surgical and chemical means.  All the participants 
discussed breast replacement in the form of surgical reconstruction and most 
discussed the chemical replacement of ovarian function.  It was evident breast 
reconstruction was framed as a routine and necessary step for women facing breast 
loss.  For example, Susan said: 
You need to see a plastic surgeon, and a psychologist.  And if you have 
surgery you need implants, or I think they said there was other types [of 
reconstruction], using your own fat from your stomach, type of thing.   
 
The analysis revealed references to the make-over metaphor (Cobb & Starr, 2012) 
which permeates breast reconstruction and advocates women’s risky breasts can be 
replaced or even improved hence reconstruction is part of the package of cure for 
HBOC.  Susan, Jacqui, Mary and Rosie all discussed being told by others, including 
health professionals, their bodies could be improved through reconstruction.  Susan’s 
friends suggested she would “probably look better” after surgery and reconstruction, 
Rosie was encouraged to “go bigger” through breast reconstruction, Jacqui’s general 
practitioner joked she might acquire “better” breasts and Mary’s surgeon commented 
some women “looked better” after reconstruction.   
 
278 
 
In Western medical discourse, the consistent representation of high risk women as able 
to be ‘cured’ of cancer risk through RRS and their surgically modified bodies 
simultaneously ‘fixed’ through reconstruction offers women hope they can circumvent 
genetic destiny and gain reassurance of future health without compromising their body.  
What this discourse conceals is the potential for bodies to be further damaged through 
reconstruction.  A feminist interpretation revealed that collisions occur when personal 
meanings and experiences differed to dominant representations of reconstruction.  
Accordingly, it was evident Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline did not 
recognise their experiences within the discourse as presented.  Mary discussed 
potential negative physical impacts of reconstruction: 
There wasn’t one thing put me off the surgery, it was loads of things.  If 
I’m honest, I really did not want to lose them [breasts]. I wasn’t keen on 
implants because I imagine them as cold and hard.  But I think that is 
so.  I’ve spoken to women [with implants] and they’ve said as much. 
Cold, hard lumps with no feeling.  There’s no sensation with them.  But 
at the same time, I wouldn’t want to be left like an ironing board.  They 
said I couldn’t get the reconstruction with my own muscle because I’m a 
smoker and it probably wouldn’t take and I’ve got high blood pressure. 
 
Ann also discussed concerns about implants and reconstruction using tissue transfer: 
There are some safety issues with implants aren’t there?  Are they really 
safe? Why would they be trying to make new ones if silicone was safe?  
They did show me pictures of women who had reconstruction using their 
own skin and muscle but it made me squeamish just looking at them.   
 
These excerpts further illuminated the meanings Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and 
Pauline attached to breast reconstruction which were discussed earlier, and confirmed 
that the participants made meanings of breast replacement which differed to those 
outlined in the reconstruction discourse.  The dominant understanding of reconstruction 
as a solution to breast loss was resisted in favour of a stance which constructed it as a 
risk to the body, in keeping with research which found women’s experiences of 
reconstruction often differed to those presented in reconstruction discourse 
(Koskenvuo et al., 2013; Rolnick, et al., 2007).  The negative physical impacts of breast 
reconstruction are well recognised, the more significant of which include 
numbness/loss of sensation (Barton et al., 2005; Gahm et al., Hallowell et al., 2012; 
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Rolnick, et al., 2007), pain (Barton et al., 2005; Bresser, 2009; Gahm et al., 2010; 
Hallowell et al., 2012; Rolnick, et al., 2007) and infection (Barton et al., 2005; Gahm et 
al., 2010; Metcalfe et al., 2004).  A considerable negative impact on women’s lives can 
result owing to other adverse effects such as swelling (Metcalfe et al., 2004), lymphatic 
fluid leakage (Barton et al., 2005), limited arm movement (Barton et al., 2005; Hatcher 
& Fallowfield, 2003) and difficulty sleeping (Gahm et al., 2010; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 
2003).  Women also report experiencing their reconstructed breasts as ‘dead’ 
(Hallowell, 2000) and like Mary above, describe them as hard, cold objects (Löwy, 
2010). Post-operative complications mean many women require multiple interventions 
(Barton et al., 2005; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 2003; Koskenvuo et al., 2013; Zion et al., 
2003) hence it is not surprising women report feeling unprepared for the enormity of the 
impact of mastectomy/reconstruction (Hallowell et al., 2012; Lee, Hultman & Sepucha, 
2010; Rolnick, et al., 2007).   
 
In the discourse surrounding HBOC, it is not only breast loss which can be 
compensated though medical intervention.  A discourse of replacement surrounds 
ovarian loss namely chemical replacement of ovarian function to avoid or reduce the 
negative impacts of premature menopause.  In addition to understanding 
reconstruction as a risk to the body, Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline also 
perceived risk reducing oophorectomy to be a risk.  Mary said: 
(…) then if you have the ovaries out it’s an early menopause, which 
causes problems. They also talked about tablets for hormones but I 
can’t remember it all. Too much to take in.  I mean its life changing 
surgery.  Like I said, taking out the ovaries gives you the menopause 
early (…) which then means you then need to take HRT [hormone 
replacement therapy]. But then it can give you breast and womb cancer 
(…) so you have to worry about those too.  It’s too much to take in 
really.    
 
Earlier, Mary articulated her concerns about breast implants and her disquiet about 
chemical replacement of ovarian function was evident here.  It was clear the potential 
adverse impacts of both ovarian loss and hormone replacement therapy has been 
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outlined to Mary in medical consultations and she appreciated RRS is “life changing”.  
Similarly, Susan, Rosie and Pauline were also aware of the potential negative impacts 
on their bodies which might follow RRS: 
And if you have surgery you need implants and hormone tablets which 
can cause breast cancer (…) which was strange. How can they give you 
something to make you not get cancer then give you something which 
means you might?  (Susan) 
 
 
You can get HRT but then it is linked to other cancers. I just didn’t think 
it was right, for something you never know, might not happen [ovarian 
cancer]. It’s like sorting out one problem then bringing on a new one. 
(Pauline) 
 
 
I wasn’t planning any more [children] but at the same time we hadn’t 
ruled it out, it just hadn’t happened.  But I might have been a mother 
again.  I’m not even 40 yet. I didn’t want to turn into an old woman 
before my time.  Taking the ovaries away brings on the menopause and 
you get all those problems. The sweats, the weight gain, the hair 
thinning. I’m just not ready for it, especially when I don’t have cancer.  
(Rosie) 
 
Like RRM, the potential adverse effects of RRSO are well documented. Risk reducing 
oophorectomy is associated with potential serious impacts including urinary tract 
damage (Guillem et al., 2006; Kauff et al., 2002), bowel problems (Kauff et al., 2002), 
pain/discomfort (Fang et al., 2009; Madalinska et al., 2005; Michelsen et al., 2009), and 
vaginal atrophy (Guillem et al., 2006).  Following risk reducing oophorectomy, the 
abrupt decline in oestrogen gives rise to additional psychosocial impacts including 
sleep disturbances (Bonadies et al., 2011; Tollin, 2011), cognitive changes (Guillem et 
al., 2006; Taylor, 2001), weight gain and change in body shape (Bonadies et al., 2011; 
Hallowell et al., 2012).   Sexual activity may be negatively compromised as a result of 
vaginal dryness (Bonadies et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2009; Finch et al., 2011; Robson et 
al., 2003) and dyspareunia (Bonadies et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2009; Finch et al., 2011; 
Hallowell et al., 2012; Madalinska et al., 2005; Robson et al., 2003).  Oestrogen 
deprivation may also shorten lifespan because of an in increase in onset and incidence 
of cardiovascular disease (Guillem et al., 2006; Sharma, 2011) and osteoporotic 
fracture (Cohen et al., 2012; Guillem et al., 2006; Sharma, 2011; Taylor, 2001).   
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In medical discourse, further medical intervention in the form of hormone replacement 
therapy (HRT) seeks to alleviate the negative impacts of risk reducing oophorectomy.  
HRT is associated with a reduction in menopausal symptoms and confers benefits to 
cardiovascular and bone health (Bresser, 2009; Rebbeck et al., 2009).  However, 
evidence regarding the safety of HRT in high risk women is inconclusive.  Whilst some 
studies have reported an increase in breast cancer risk (Beral et al., 2011; Fournier et 
al., 2005) others have not demonstrated such an association (Challberg et al., 2011; 
Domcheck et al., 2011).  Additionally, there is no consistency in study design and no 
randomised trials hence the evidence to date is of varying quality (NICE, 2013) and 
remains inconclusive as to whether HRT in this group of women is beneficial or harmful 
(Madalinska et al., 2006; Rebbeck et al., 2009).   
 
The lack of robust evidence on the safety of HRT following RRS means NICE (2013) 
have not made specific recommendations but rather advise that all women facing 
premature menopause should be informed of the risks and benefits of HRT and 
decisions made according to individual circumstances.  Whilst it could be argued this 
facilitates autonomy and personal decision making, it could equally be argued this 
presents a dilemma to high risk women since as the participants’ stories showed, 
decision making on interventions which could harm is problematic when there is a lack 
of evidence to support their use.  Again attention is drawn to the point that these 
women have no disease, yet they are expected to submit to extensive and potentially 
harmful surgical and medical interventions, even when gaps exist in safety and efficacy 
data.   
 
The reconstruction discourse is significant in the experiences of high risk women as it 
presents reconstruction in ways which encourage acceptance.  The discourse is aimed 
at all women and promotes a particular vision which is typically viewed through a male 
lens (Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011) and bound to norms of feminine embodiment which 
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are fundamentally tied to female breasts (Ehlers, 2012).  Women’s bodies are 
reconstructed primarily in ways which appeal to the male gaze, as evidenced by a 
focus on a woman’s outward appearance (Báez-Hernández, 2009) and body symmetry 
(Piot-Ziegler et al., 2010) resulting in a need to “hide and fake” breast loss (O’Neill, 
2013, p.17).   Equally, oophorectomy is consistently referred to as more acceptable 
and less troublesome than mastectomy because it is less disfiguring (Claes et al., 
2005; Dagan & Goldblatt, 2009) despite the potentially serious negative physical and 
emotional impacts on women’s health.  A fixation on how women look rather than how 
women feel conceals the many meanings women attach to their breasts which are not 
addressed in reconstruction discourse.  Earlier, Jacqui explained the importance of her 
breasts in terms of how attractive and desirable she perceived herself to be.  Her story 
continues as she discusses another important meaning attributed to her breasts:  
I breast fed mine [children] and I loved every minute of it, not, not like 
some [women] who couldn’t take to it or find it too hard.  I just loved it, it 
made me feel like a proper mum, so it wasn’t like a big sacrifice or 
anything.  So they are important (…) they’re not just lumps of fat or 
whatever.   
 
The stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline serve as poignant 
indicators of the difficult decisions women at risk of breast/ovarian cancer face.  In 
medical consultations, the focus is on attempts to lower risk therefore much of the talk 
surrounds gene faults, statistical calculations, risk estimates, surgical procedures and 
reconstructive techniques.  In RRS consultations, talk centres mainly on the more 
tangible or technical aspects of surgery such as risk reduction and surgical options, 
with less emphasis on psychosocial impacts such as impact on sexuality, libido and 
body image (Bonadies, Myer & Matloff, 2011).   What may be lost in such consultations 
is the importance women place on their breasts and ovaries as essential parts of self-
identity (Hallowell et al., 2012).  Piot-Ziegler et al. (2010) found breast loss was a 
traumatising experience for women which led to a negative body transformation and 
challenged self-identity.  Reconstructed breasts were perceived as objects which 
allowed women to appear ‘symmetrical’ and outwardly ‘normal’ and hence to maintain 
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their social appearance, suggesting some comfort was taken in conforming to 
normative female standards.  Overall however, women experienced their reconstructed 
bodies as challenged, strange and lacking, because crucially, reconstructed breasts 
were not their own breasts.  Earlier Mary discussed her concerns breast implants 
would be ‘cold, hard lumps’ and that she was not a candidate for autologous tissue 
transfer.  Her story continued as she explained how her somewhat ambivalent feelings 
towards her breasts changed when confronted with breast loss:  
It’s funny in a way because I’ve had a thing about my boobs since 
[having] the kids.  They were huge when I was pregnant and they never 
really went down again.  I must have been a double G or something 
then and now they are still probably an E cup.  I’ve actually being going 
on for years before all this about a [breast] reduction.  Then of course 
when faced with surgery and the thought of losing them, suddenly they 
seemed okay, great even.  I became really attached to them.  You start 
to be very conscious (…) of them being there, a part of you.  Then 
knowing you won’t have them anymore, you really think about what a 
horrible loss it would be. 
 
Although Mary was dissatisfied with her breasts, she came to value her breasts as an 
important part of her self-identity, a part of her, and it was clear reconstruction did not 
offer a satisfactory solution to breast loss.   Rosie previously also articulated 
ambivalent feelings about her small breasts and in this section, her story revealed how 
she was advised reconstruction could enhance her body by providing her with bigger 
breasts.  Her story continued as she shared the primacy of her breasts to self-identity, 
equating breast loss with losing part of her personhood: 
When people ask me, they don’t anymore but at the time, why I decided 
not to have the surgery, there’s not one specific reason.  It was just 
something so, what they were suggesting, just felt a step too far.  I just 
couldn’t see myself with no female bits. They [breasts] don’t need to be 
big to be beautiful. I used to say, “small but perfectly formed”.  So I had 
nothing to lose outwardly, in a sense.  But I know you lose all sensation 
and I wouldn’t want that.  It’s more than how you look.  I had to get a big 
mole cut off once and I had wanted it off for ages, it kept catching on my 
clothes.  But when it wasn’t there anymore, that bit of me felt strange. 
Not bad strange, just different.  I would run my finger over my skin and 
think “it’s not there anymore”. And it was just a mole (…) I’d been 
wanting rid of.  And I thought, “Rosie if your body feels different after a 
mole, how are you going to feel with no breasts?” 
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Here Rosie emphasised how breast loss compromised body integrity and self-identity 
by drawing on her experience of losing a mole and describing breast loss as being 
more than ‘looks’.  Although the mole was bothersome and it was removed at her 
request, Rosie’s story suggests it left a space which made her body feel different; 
causing her to call into question her sense of embodiment should she lose her breasts.  
Hence, Rosie demonstrated an acute awareness of the biographically disruptive nature 
of RRS, because women experience being a body as well as having a body (Hallowell 
& Lawton, 2002). 
 
Applying a feminist lens, in this study, underscored the enormity and complexity of 
decision making around RRS and suggested as Rolnick et al. (2007) contended, 
reconstruction fails to deliver the promise of normality and wholeness women facing 
breast loss may anticipate.  Breasts were seen as more than aesthetics and were 
deeply connected to the sense of self and body awareness.  However, body 
appearance was also important and the stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and 
Pauline all reiterated the importance of breasts and ovaries as defining features of 
femininity and sexuality.  Ann referred to her husband as a ‘boob man’, explaining her 
breasts initially attracted him and her pride in her breasts which had ‘aged well’ and still 
looked good.  In this excerpt, Ann struggled with the illogicality of breast loss for risk 
and reaffirmed the importance of her breasts in her life:   
The whole surgery thing just didn’t sit well.  I just couldn’t imagine what it 
would be like to have no breasts when I didn’t need to. They were not 
cancerous (…) and I’ve never been a fan of implants. I would not like 
them [implants] but I wouldn’t want to have nothing.  (…). I’m not vain 
but I do worry about my looks and my breasts are an important part of 
how I look. I know he [husband] would still love me, he’s not like that, 
fickle, but I think losing them would really affect my confidence and our 
relationship because of how I would feel even if he was okay about it.   
 
Ann acknowledged she was more than her breasts but at the same time, she was 
unable to comprehend giving up her breasts for risk. Her perception she ‘didn’t need’ to 
lose her breasts suggested mastectomy may be ‘needed’ or logical should a woman 
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have cancer.   Interestingly, Pauline used very similar words to refer to the potential 
loss of her breasts: 
With the breasts you can get a reconstruction but even the good ones 
they showed me pictures of didn’t look very good. I know it sounds big 
headed but I think I have a really good figure for my age.  I like my body 
just as it is and I just wouldn’t feel right without breasts or with implants 
(…) having no breasts really scares me, I’m not afraid to admit it.  I am 
happy with me, I don’t want to lose a bit of me if I don’t need to. 
 
For Pauline, her breasts were important to how she looked and to her personhood,      
describing her breasts as a ‘bit of her’ and constructing her breasted body as a source 
of happiness and contentment.  Having no breasts threatened this sense of body 
wholeness and for Pauline, reconstructed breasts were not an acceptable replacement.  
Like Ann, Pauline constructed breast loss as something which was needed or not; 
indeed Pauline drew distinction between her position and that of her affected sister who 
had undergone mastectomy: “But the difference is she’s got cancer, she needs (said 
with emphasis) to have it done”, supporting the earlier discussion which framed surgery 
as necessary for cancer but not for risk.   Mary also alluded to a perception of surgery 
as unnecessary in the absence of disease, tying this to the uncertainty she 
experienced when making her decision:  
You’d ask one question and the answer would bring up loads of other 
stuff you hadn’t even thought about.  I swung from thinking, “I should 
have this done [surgery] because it will really lower my risk” to “this is 
mad, I’m having this done and there’s nothing actually wrong with me!”    
 
The inter-relatedness between risk and replacement discourses in the experiences of 
Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui was evident.  It may be some high risk 
women are unable to position themselves within the reconstruction/replacement 
discourse in part because they have already resisted the risk discourse.  When surgery 
is understood as a means of managing disease but not risk, 
reconstruction/replacement is unacceptable, even inconceivable, because surgery is 
‘not needed’.  In this case, the negatives of reconstruction/replacement are likely to 
dominate as there is no perceived gain from losing one’s breasts and ovaries.  Or it 
may be those who align with the risk discourse are more able to accept 
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reconstruction/replacement because of a perception of breast/ovarian loss as being 
‘needed’ to manage risk.  A third position may be those who are able to position 
themselves within the reconstruction/replacement discourse and perceive their bodies 
as potentially improved through reconstruction, are more able to rationalise surgery as 
a suitable solution to cancer risk.  It is not possible to say which of these positions is 
most likely for high risk women however what was evident is multiple resistances 
emerge as a result of competing discourses which play out in the contested landscape 
of HBOC management. 
 
The stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline revealed that whilst high 
risk women’s breasts are constructed in HBOC discourse as risky, the qualities of 
breasts as a source of femininity, sexuality, nurturing and self-identity were equally or 
more important to women.  By emphasising the personal importance of breasts and 
rejecting reconstruction/replacement discourse, the participants resisted a discourse 
which advocated their treasured body parts were easily replaced and exhibited an 
alternate position in which they were free to keep their bodies intact.   Resistance was 
possible because these women wanted to keep their breast and ovaries in spite of their 
cancer risk hence their experiences contrasted with the usual sequence of events 
outlined in medical discourse.   
 
From a feminist perspective, fighting back (Gotfrit, 1991) against the dominant way of 
thinking about RRS represented a strength in high risk women to challenge the 
dominant discourse and keep their still-healthy bodies intact.  However, this was 
juxtaposed against the opportunity to undergo a procedure which may prevent cancer 
and free a woman from worry, hence resistance presents a dilemma.  The strength of 
dominant discourses in Western society and the conflicts and contradictions inherent to 
them mean women are not free to choose or free to refuse because their choices are 
made within cultural frameworks and prevailing power relations. In Western society, 
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high risk women receive many mixed messages which simultaneously require them to 
both own and remove their breasts and ovaries hence resistance will always be 
negotiated and never complete.   
 
Resistance as incomplete  
The stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline revealed ways in which 
they resisted the dominant way of thinking about HBOC risk as something which could 
be effectively and expediently managed through RRS.  Their multiple and varying 
perceptions on what led them to say no to RRS suggested resistance was shaped by 
the cultural contexts in which cancer risk was lived and experienced.  For Gotfrit (1991, 
pp. 176-177) “lived culture is a terrain of contradiction where dominant ideologies and 
practices are contested as well as produced”.  Accordingly, breast/ovarian loss is 
especially problematic for BRCA1/2 women owing to the social investment made in 
women’s bodies but as the analysis showed, the decision to accept or refuse RRS is 
more than a simple dichotomy of following or not following codes of female normativity. 
   
This study confirmed living with a BRCA1/2 mutation is a complex, emotional and 
challenging journey irrespective of whatever decisions are made with regards to 
managing risk.  Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui took control over their 
own bodies, an action which is fundamental to any notion of resistance (Allen, 2014; 
Gotfrit, 1991, 1992) but by demonstrating resistance, they encountered other risks to 
self.   It was evident the decision to say no to RRS was not a liberating moment in part 
owing to the inability of loved ones to accept this decision.  Pauline discussed how her 
husband, despite encouraging her autonomy, was unable to accept her decision which 
led to a break down in an important part of their relationship:   
John doesn’t like to talk about it. He said the decision was made so 
there was no point in discussing anymore and to be honest, I got 
drained talking about it, thinking about it constantly, all the time.  It’s sad 
really because I used to think we could talk about anything, face 
anything together, but no.  He just couldn’t accept it I suppose, even 
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though he said “it’s your decision”, he still couldn’t agree with it.  Yes, I 
didn’t that see coming (…) the loneliness from feeling like you are on 
your own.    
 
Pauline appears to have experienced a sense of isolation and perhaps alienation 
because her decision was not understood by her husband. Similarly Rosie’s story 
suggested she experienced feelings of isolation which were also particularly evident 
when discussing her husband’s reaction to her decision to say no to surgery: 
It was really difficult to get Tom [husband] and Jane [friend] to 
understand and there were a few heated discussions, I can tell you.  
Jane eventually came round and I could talk to her. She said as long as 
I was happy, well not happy, but happy with my decision, she could go 
along with me. But Tom, he’s a different story.  He struggled to 
understand my decision and we couldn’t talk about it without arguing, 
well he couldn’t, so we just stopped talking about it. I wanted to talk 
about it, don’t get me wrong, but it was just easier not to.  It became 
natural just to bottle things up (…) I couldn’t say “I’m having a down day 
today” or anything.  He might say “well you should have thought about 
that before”.    
 
Jacqui also described her sense of isolation in the family as her thoughts and feelings 
about her genetic status and about RRS differed to those around her. Her story 
continued as she discussed her emotions when she was confirmed as owning a 
BRCA1/2 mutation whereas her sister Joanne was mutation-negative: 
Beth [affected sister] got hyper-excited about it, going on as if everything 
was all okay and my result got a little side-lined I think. So I was left 
feeling alone, not really able to talk about it, it would have been as if I 
was being really negative and not sharing Joanne’s [sister] good news.  
It was also, the fact everyone was being all positive and “it’ll be alright” 
about me when they did discuss it.  It was as if now I knew I could have 
the preventative surgery and hey presto! [raised voice].  (…). I pulled 
back from everyone and stopped talking about it.  Just kept my thoughts 
to myself and told them what they wanted to hear.  But mentally the 
impact was huge, it just left me feeling totally drained and lost (…) and 
alone. The whole thing is a very isolating experience.  It can tear 
families apart.  
 
The participants’ stories illuminated the power of genetic information and the strength 
of the medical discourse for cancer risk.  How to attend to risk becomes the subject of 
extensive family debate, endlessly discussed and perhaps even argued over, which 
may lead to family discord (DiMillo et al., 2013; Eijzenga et al., 2014).   In saying no to 
RRS, Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui made a decision which was right 
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for them, but it was a decision which caused a degree of upset and disharmony in their 
families and left them feeling isolated and alienated.  Hence as Gotfrit (1992, p.121) 
stated, resistance can be “incomplete, ill-conceived, contradictory, inconsequential and 
even damaging”.   
 
Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui did fight back against the dominant way 
of thinking about managing cancer risk but they were unable to feel confident and 
secure in their decision and in this way, their resistance was incomplete.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly then, they were themselves confused at times by their decision to say no to 
RRS and admitted to some uncertainty as to how they would deal with risk in others.  
Jacqui talked of the possibility of her daughter owning a BRCA1/2 mutation:  
My daughter is 18 in less than a year and she’s wanting tested.  She 
can’t understand why I don’t have the ops, but she’s young and she 
hasn’t had a chance to really think about the consequences.  Of course I 
hope she won’t need to, there’s a 50 50 chance of her not inheriting it, 
which is how I try to think of it, be positive.  I don’t know what I will do if 
she does have it. Funny thing is I’m not sure I won’t encourage her to 
have the ops if she does have it [gene fault].  I know it’s like having 
double standards, but maybe I just want her to be safe, you know, to 
protect her?  The worst bit about this whole thing is, you just don’t know 
what to do for the best.   It’s a bit of a no-win situation. 
 
Jacqui herself acknowledged the contradiction apparent in her story but put this aside 
and instead emphasised her desire to protect and ‘save’ her daughter.  Jacqui’s stance 
here can be understood as an act of incomplete resistance and compromise whereby 
she was able to meet the requirements of a good mother by protecting her daughter 
from cancer despite resisting surgical intervention on her own body.  Westfall and 
Benoit (2008) found pregnant women identified as ‘high risk’ demonstrated various 
modes of resistance to medical discourse and the medicalisation of pregnancy, from 
out-right non-compliance to partial compliance whereby elements of the ‘high risk’ role 
were adopted as a compromise to meet the demands of competing discourses on 
childbearing. Since women are socialised within the dominant culture and the available 
modes of meaning, it is not possible to escape all traditional norms and expectations 
290 
 
(Gotfrit, 1991), hence resistance may be incomplete as high risk women negotiate the 
competing demands placed upon them.  The primary requirement of women to be 
protectors of the family (Acero, 2012) means there is limited discursive space in which 
to challenge and completely dismiss medical discourse when children are at risk.  
Susan said:  
I’ve talked to Emma and she knows I am at high risk and one day she’ll 
need to get tested to see if she is a carrier and needs anything done. I 
suppose it does include surgery, it would be her decision and of course 
as her mother, I’d support her.  She’s still too young to take in all in but I 
think she understands why I’ve gone this way [saying no to surgery].  I 
try not to think about her having it, it’s too upsetting.  Overall I think I am 
okay with it all then at times I just wish we’d never been tested then I 
wouldn’t have had to make a decision because there’s not a day goes 
by I don’t think, “have I done the right thing”? I really have to force 
myself go for the scans.  I hate it.  Every time you go you are thinking “is 
this the day it’s going to be discovered?”  It’s always at the back of your 
mind.  I think that’s what makes it so hard for people to understand why 
I’m not having the surgery (…) not sure I understand it myself. I just 
know for me it’s not the right thing to do. 
 
Susan’s story here reflected several elements of communal folklore in HBOC 
discourse.  Despite Susan’s regret at being tested, she positioned her daughter as 
‘needing’ to be tested so she could potentially undergo surgery should she own a 
BRCA1/2 mutation.  Susan reinforced the requirement for autonomy by highlighting it 
would be her daughter’s personal decision and she, as her mother, would support this 
decision.   This suggested in spite of Susan saying no to RRS, her personal 
perceptions and evaluations were insufficient in justifying her decision because she 
was unable to discount this for her daughter.  The ability to resist dominant ways of 
thinking in popular and health care culture may be critical to women maintaining a 
sense of well-being (Grassley & Nelms, 2009), however as the analysis in this study 
showed, resistance itself can be a risk.  Dominant ways of thinking about cancer risk 
may be so persuasive, even when women are able to demonstrate resistance, it is not 
without conflict and it is often incomplete.   
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It was also evident from this excerpt Susan continually questioned her decision to say 
no to RRS and lived with uncertainty on a daily basis, the fear of cancer never far from 
her mind.  DiMillo et al. (2013, p. 128) found women living with BRCA1/2 mutations 
who did not undergo RRS experienced an “unending and uncertain process” whereby 
they lived constantly with the fear of cancer; the only conclusion available being a 
diagnosis of cancer.  Ann alluded to an unending worry when she discussed there 
being ‘no escape’ from her risk:   
I don’t regret making the decision as such but I do think about it every 
day. And I do wonder if I should’ve had it [surgery]. I don’t think it will 
ever be completely out my mind, but I am hoping it stops as time goes 
on and I come to only think about it rarely.  Just now, it still feels a bit 
like there’s no escape from it, especially since Gillian [Ann’s daughter] 
will be coming up to 18 soon and she might go for genetic testing. (…)  I 
love her so much but at times I think maybe I shouldn’t have had any 
[children].  So I tell her to just go out and enjoy herself.  I try not to stress 
the small things (…) maybe there’s one good thing to have come out 
this nightmare, but truth be told, I wish the testing didn’t even exist in the 
first place.  I wish it was never invented. 
 
Although Ann appeared to have come to terms with her decision, her resistance was 
incomplete as like Susan, she questioned the sensibility of saying no to RRS.  A key 
motivator in undergoing genetic testing is the need to reduce uncertainty and cancer 
worry (DiMillo et al., 2013; Witt, 2013) however as this study showed, the opposite may 
occur and knowledge of genetic status may lead to the creation of new uncertainties 
and a chronicity of cancer worry.   Rosie said:  
It’s been nearly two years [since saying no to RRS] but it’s still on my 
mind.  Have I done the right thing? It’s ironic because I used to examine 
my breasts but I don’t anymore, it’s too scary.  I am probably just 
burying my head in the sand but I don’t touch or look at them unless I 
really have to. (…).Sometimes I regret being tested at all and think it’s a 
really bad idea.  I know I’m being selfish because, well, it’s helped other 
women, if they’ve had the surgery, not got cancer. But for me it’s been a 
can of worms.  I am left with this hanging over me, like opening 
Pandora’s box.  What is it they say?  She opened the box and all the 
bad came out but hope was left inside.  It’s like, hope has been, it’s 
gone. I’m usually a positive person but it was hard to see any positives.  
Well it’s [hope] still there but it’s hard to find now.  I hope for different 
things now, like to have a full week when I don’t think about all this.   
 
Here, Rosie’s story cogently captured the uncertainty, insecurity and fear and which 
can hang over the lives of BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (DiMillo et al., 2013; Samerski, 
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2006).  In this study, the act of keeping one’s breasts and ovaries intact denied Rosie, 
Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui the opportunity to reduce risk, isolated them 
from friends and family, perpetuated feelings of guilt and worry and left them in a state 
of flux as they continued to experience their bodies as risky and vulnerable.   
 
Analysis of the participants’ stories revealed the ways in which discourses of femininity 
and biomedicine formed an interlocking set of ideologies which served to silence their 
voice.   Resisting RRS allows women to keep their breasted bodies intact and align 
themselves with normative standards which although oppressive, are none-the-less the 
standards upon which women are necessarily dependant for understanding their body 
(Ehlers, 2012).  At the same time, saying no to surgery means the opportunity to be 
free from cancer worry and reduce cancer risk is lost and may ultimately lead to a 
woman developing cancer.   
 
The conflicts and contradictions inherent in HBOC discourse means high risk women 
are confronted with dilemmas for which there are no wholly satisfactory solutions.  
Having the strength to say ‘I am keeping my breasts’ requires high risk women to 
demonstrate resistance to the socially mandated requirement to protect oneself from 
cancer, a position which denies the personal and cultural importance attached to 
female breasts and ovaries.  Keeping one’s own breasts and ovaries intact lays 
BRCA1/2 women open to accusations of foolishness, recklessness and vanity and 
places upon them complete accountability for a decision which may result in cancer 
developing.  The following quote from an advertisement for the chemoprevention agent 
tamoxifen (taken from Press et al., 2000, p. 244) accentuates how women who care 
about their breasts are denigrated despite the necessity of being breasted in Western 
society; “If you care about breast cancer, care more about being a 1.7 than a 36B”.  
Here, the figure ‘1.7’ denotes a risk assessment computation with anything equal to or 
above 1.7 is categorised as high risk, and ‘36B’ refers to the size of a woman’s breasts.  
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The message here is clear: women should care more about their risk of cancer and 
less about their breasts.  Thus, the exercise of personal autonomy conflicts with the 
ideal subject position outlined in medical discourse and requires high risk women to 
create alternate subject positions which make sense of their experiences but which 
may also be unsatisfactory.   
 
To conclude this section, the analysis revealed ways, in which the participants sought 
to navigate, negotiate and manage the conflicts and contradictions inherent in medical 
discourse in the contexts of the alternate subject positions which they arrived at.  
However, it also suggested the alternate subject positions assumed were at times 
problematic and insufficient in justifying the decision to say no to RRS, such was the 
strength of the medical discourse, hence their resistance was an act of compromise, an 
incomplete process and ultimately a risk in itself.   
 
Summary of analysis and discussion  
A key argument underpinning this study was that the decision to say no to RRS for 
cancer risk must be understood within the context of the social, cultural and historical 
milieus in Western society which shape experience and direct the meanings attached 
to HBOC and RRS.  Three literary theories were used to provide a contextualised 
interpretation of the experiences of six women who said no to RRS. 
 
The application of Marxist literary theory was useful in providing an interpretation of the 
participants’ experiences in light of dominant ideologies in Western society which 
shape human experience in relation to gender, sexuality, work, the family and other 
cultural ideals.  The analysis submitted that an economic discourse underpins genetic 
medicine in which the ‘at risk’ body is conceived of as a potential source of economic 
gain for various stakeholders in the HBOC industry.  Ideologies of risk appear to 
impose a genetic responsibility on high risk women making them accountable for 
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cancer risk in themselves and others.  Additionally, ideologies of risk fragment the body 
and allow breasts and ovaries to be commodified as assets of varying worth which may 
be removed or replaced in the reconstruction marketplace.   A Marxist analysis of the 
participants’ stories revealed conflicts between interests and forces in society.  The 
contradictions in the participant’s stories were reflective of the contradictory nature of 
social reality, including the tension created by conflicting medical and gender/sexual 
ideologies.   
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, RRS is a practice open to multiple, changing 
interpretations, all of which vie for ascendency and which could equally be chosen as 
accurate representations at particular points in time. The analysis explored how ‘the 
truth’ about breast/ovarian cancer came to be and how this truth supported the 
dominant medical discourse and sanctioned surveillance strategies and risk reducing 
interventions to discipline the bodies of the asymptomatically ill.  This dominance made 
the participants’ decisions to say no to RRS perplexing.  It was evident Susan, Ann, 
Mary, Rosie, Pauline and Jacqui initially conformed to dominant understandings of 
cancer risk and RRS, but subsequently came to question the medical discourse, 
ultimately arriving at a decision to say no to RRS.  This highlighted the possibility for 
resistance to the dominant medical discourse and revealed ways in which high risk 
women negotiate competing societal discourses to make sense of their experiences. 
 
A feminist interpretation revealed that saying no to RRS could be understood as 
resistance to the official discourse on HBOC management; an action which provided 
the capacity to be oneself, to acknowledge the importance of one’s breasts and ovaries 
and a desire to keep one’s healthy body intact.  The analysis demonstrated resistance 
is possible through the body and suggested high risk women were able to reinvent the 
risky body and subvert the construction of normalising strategies inherent in the 
discourse of cancer prevention.  However, it was also evident that the female body 
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represented a contradictory site for women.  In some ways, the participants 
demonstrated a strong sense of agency to keep their bodies intact despite the strength 
of the discourse of surgical intervention for risk.  It took strength to challenge the 
dominant way of thinking and courage to keep one’s body intact in the face of great 
opposition.  However, this strength was juxtaposed against the epidemiological 
evidence which confirms RRS does reduce cancer risk in high risk populations, and the 
strength of the medical discourse which speaks in support of RRS.   
 
Why they said no 
Given the above analysis and use of the three literary lenses, this study found different 
understandings of risk to be central to the decision to say no to RRS. Although 
individual interpretations sometimes differed, the personal meanings the participants 
attached to risk differed to the dominant understandings of risk which permeate the 
communal folklore of breast/ovarian cancer and which support the medical pathway for 
cancer risk.  The women who took part in this study said no to RRS as a result of a 
shared a private folklore in which: 
 The genetic risk of cancer was not conflated with the disease of cancer; 
 Genetics was not considered to be the only ‘truth’ about why people develop 
cancer and genetic mutations were understood as only one of a number of 
equally important risks to health and life;  
 Medicine was not credited with knowing the solution to cancer risk; 
 The risk of cancer was not understood as something which was treatable in the 
same way as the disease of cancer is treatable; 
 The risk of cancer was not seen as something which could be controlled 
through RRS; 
 Breasts and ovaries were treasured as vital body parts which could not be given 
up or replaced on the basis of risk; 
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 RRS was perceived as damaging the body and hence was a greater risk to self 
than genetic cancer risk; 
 RRS simply did not make sense given no disease was present and given the 
risks of surgery to body and self. 
 
Chapter summary 
The analysis in this study proposes that contemporary understandings of cancer risk 
and how this risk should be managed are highly problematic and potentially harmful to 
high risk women who do not align with the views of the medical discourse.  Essentially, 
the participants’ experiences took place within a framework of technologies and 
disciplinary forces which did not take into account their personal meanings and 
contexts.  This research finds that far from being the evidence-based and obvious 
solution to cancer risk, RRS was understood by the participants in this study to be a 
risk to body and self which superseded the genetic risk of cancer.   
 
This study revealed how high risk women may be conflicted by competing and 
contradictory messages on how best to attend to HBOC risk.  The official discourse on 
HBOC risk is persuasive. That is, women designated at risk need to remove healthy 
breasts and ovaries to avoid cancer.  Simultaneously, the discourses of gender, 
sexuality and femininity ordained that RRS was perceived by the participants as a risk 
in itself, because to lose these valued organs was to damage the body and render it 
less valuable.   
 
By examining high risk women’s experiences of saying no to RRS this study also  
illuminated the significance of how such totalising, universalising discourses burden 
women with contradictory choices because the solution to cancer risk mimics the 
disease of cancer and strips the body of its essential female characteristics.   
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To conclude this section, this study showed the experiences of some women identified 
as being high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer contrast starkly and rather 
poignantly with the expected experiences reinforced through medical discourse.  This 
study highlighted the ways in which the high risk women are able to create a new 
space in the discourse of HBOC.  To this end, the participants made meaning of their 
experiences through the creation alternative discourses and personal ideologies which 
made sense of their decision to say no to RRS.  However, it was also apparent that 
despite making a decision which was right for them, they remained confused.   At the 
time of writing, these women did not feel empowered because they still lived within a 
discourse in which RRS was necessary to protect themselves and their families from 
risk.  By resisting the official management pathway of testing positive to BRCA 
mutations, Rosie, Susan, Pauline, Mary, Jacqui and Ann came to grasp the 
contradictions inherent within the official treatment pathway and consequently took 
steps to find meaning in their experiences which reaffirmed their sense of self rather 
than accepting their alienation from self.  Paradoxically, the need to control risk through 
RRS as outlined in the medical discourse, exposed the women to different type of risk: 
loss of the embodied self.   
 
The next section comprises the conclusion to the thesis.  The purpose and aims of the 
study and the methodological approach taken are revisited prior to a recapitulation of 
the key findings.  The strengths and limitations of the study are presented and 
recommendations for practice and further research in relation to HBOC are considered.  
The thesis concludes with a reflexive account which provides a critical reflection of the 
researcher’s perspective during the conduct of the study and which, in keeping with 
Dolby-Stahl (1985), acknowledges the researcher’s full responsibility for the final 
interpretations of the participants’ stories as presented in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
This study set out to explore the experiences of women who said no to RRS for 
breast/ovarian cancer risk following a mutation-positive genetic test result.  This 
research is important because it addressed an increasingly prominent and significant 
area of concern in contemporary health care: the care of people identified as ‘at risk’ of 
disease by virtue of their genetic status.  Genetics means medicine is now able not 
only to identify those with disease, but also those at risk of disease, which has 
redefined understandings of health, medicine and the human body (Webster, 2002). 
 
Although a relatively new branch of clinical medicine, genetics is at the centre of the 
public and professional dialogue on cancer (Maturo, 2012).    People at risk of disease 
are now able to be categorised as “pre-disease” (Kreiner & Hunt, 2014, p. 870) and 
people who are identified as owning a genetic mutation which increases the risk of 
cancer may be called “previvors” (Mahon, 2011, p. 126) or pre-survivors.  These new 
conceptualisations of health and disease mean risk is treated as a disease in itself 
(Moynihan et al., 2012) and medical interventions such as RRS, are able to be made 
on the still-healthy bodies of those at risk.  This may be understood as representing a 
communal folklore which defines how people understand the risk of cancer and 
accordingly how cancer risk should be dealt with.  However, despite the strength of the 
discourse surrounding cancer risk, some people who are identified as genetically 
predisposed to developing cancer say no to RRS.  The purpose of this study was to 
explore the experiences of high risk women to illuminate an understanding of why.   
 
Genetic medicine is a rapidly developing and dynamic field.  Although a growing body 
of evidence in relation to HBOC and RRS is emerging, research to date has focussed 
primarily on interventions to manage risk and the efficacy, benefits and potential harms 
of such.  The potential physical and emotional impacts of RRS have been investigated 
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but consideration of the material and social conditions which shape the everyday lives 
of high risk women has been neglected.   Notably research into the social, cultural and 
political contexts within which decision making about RRS takes places is lacking.  This 
study sought to remedy this weakness and to bring a new perspective to HBOC 
research by considering the positions and experiences of high risk women within the 
contexts of dominant discourses in Western society. 
 
Revisiting the methodological approach 
This study was underpinned by a belief the decision to say no to RRS for cancer risk 
must be understood within social, cultural and historical contexts in Western society 
which shape experience. It contended that a communal folklore surrounding 
breast/ovarian cancer exists, underpinned by dominant discourses and ideological 
practices which give consent to certain ways of acting in response to cancer risk.  
Likewise, a communal folklore about the female body means women’s bodies are 
understood in particular ways in Western society, a key component of which is having 
breasts and ovaries.  In the dominant medical discourse, ideologies of risk and 
treatment demonstrate that medicine has the power to prevent disease, through the 
practice of RRS.  The decisions of high risk women to say no to RRS are thus 
understood to be ‘anti-health’ within Western medicine, but are worth considering  from 
the interpretive assumption of the multiple truths and in the context of other societal 
discourses which validate the self and offer competing understandings for women who 
opted to say no to RRS.   
 
This study used a synthesis of Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography and Dolby-
Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristics as a framework for gathering, reading and 
interpreting the stories of the participants.  This strategy provided a contextualised 
narrative of the life experiences of high risk women who said no to RRS.   Foucauldian, 
Marxist and feminist literary theories were selected as suitable lenses through which 
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the participants’ stories could be read and interpreted since these theories allowed a 
focus on the key areas of concern.  Foucault’s theories on discourse and power, Marx’s 
concepts of ideology and commodification and the feminist concept of resistance were 
chosen as the concepts which could best explain the themes arising from the research 
in light of social, cultural and historical contexts in Western society.   
 
What this study found 
The findings from this study show HBOC is tainted by many discourses and multiple 
ideologies which as Turner (2008, p. 150) stated, are “never uniform in their effects or 
unified in content”. The multiplicity of such discourses and ideologies allowed questions 
to be posed in terms of how high risk women negotiated competing and conflicting 
messages in relation to the HBOC journey.  Unravelling the participants’ stories to 
illuminate an understanding of why they said no to RRS was challenging because the 
women themselves found it difficult to understand and articulate why.  Like the HBOC 
discourse, the participants’ stories were fraught with conflict and contradiction.  This 
was not surprising given they and their families had experienced first-hand the 
undesirable impacts of breast and/or ovarian cancer and its treatment.  The 
participants faced constant exposure to the communal folklore surrounding HBOC and 
its management and to gendered stereotypes on what a woman is and looks like.  
Privately, these women feared the loss of their breasts, and to a lesser extent their 
ovaries, and held a belief they would be less of a woman without them. Publicly 
however, they were expected to put ‘health before looks’ and do whatever it takes to 
protect themselves and others from cancer, including removing their healthy breasts 
and ovaries. 
 
The participants’ stories revealed a communal folklore about HBOC existed in which 
RRS was a ‘no-brainer’, the obvious choice when one’s body is at risk of cancer.  It 
was evident that all the participants had been encouraged to think of their bodies as 
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‘ticking time bombs’ because their genetic risk for cancer was considered in the same 
way as the disease of cancer.  Like cancer, risk became tangible: a thing which could 
take lives, devastate families and orphan children, but also something which was 
controllable through surgical intervention.  In this context, radical interventions on their 
healthy bodies made sense to others.  In contrast, the participants in this study shared 
understandings of risk which differed to the communal folklore and accordingly RRS 
did not make sense in their personal experiences.    Epiphany moments such as being 
identified as a BRCA1/2 mutation carrier and saying no to RRS appeared to call into 
question existing perceptions of self and required these women to construct alternative 
discourses and modes of reference which made meaning of their experiences and 
allowed them the strength to keep their healthy bodies intact.  However, as has been 
revealed, the covert power of the medical discourse remained a constant challenge to 
the resistance shown by participants when constantly presented with images, health 
advice and the reaction of family members and friends.   
 
This research clearly demonstrated that the social reality of women identified as high 
risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer comprised a complex, emotional and 
challenging journey in respect to their decision with regards to managing risk.  Their 
genetic status became the subject of extensive family debate, endlessly discussed and 
perhaps even argued over, as families and friends became concerned with their 
decision to say no to RRS.  Their bodies were debated, examined, scanned, 
discussed, invaded, medicated and for some, at the time of writing, perhaps even 
permanently altered in the quest to reduce cancer risk.  Being identified as owning a 
BRCA1/2 mutation placed their bodies in an enduring vulnerable and contingent state.  
What was discovered was that the medical discourse on managing risk through RRS 
was so entrenched in bringing meaning to this experience, that the women in this study 
were unable to fully escape its influence and reconcile with their decisions to say no to 
RRS. Despite demonstrating resistance to the accepted medical pathway, the 
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participants continued to benchmark and evaluate their decisions to say no against 
those who had undergone RSS and the constant pressure of family members, leaving 
them in an unending state of flux as to whether they had made the right choice. 
 
Another key finding of this study was that the participants shared a genetic pessimism 
which negatively transformed their lives and forced an awareness of the body as 
dangerous and potentially diseased.  Furthermore, the legacy of genetic responsibility 
meant the participants also experienced an awareness of their children’s bodies as 
dangerous for which they blamed themselves, even though genes are out with 
personal control.  It may be postulated that genetic risk is lived and understood in ways 
not accounted for in medical discourse: as a type of embodied risk for which there are 
no universal, acceptable prevention strategies.  The participants were largely unable to 
see the benefits in genetic testing, with most stating a wish it never existed and 
referring to genetic testing as opening a ‘can of worms’ which changed life for the 
worse and ultimately transformed them into asymptomatic patients.   
 
It is clear from this study that the relationship between genetic testing and cancer 
prevention strategies is not straightforward.  Counter to the conventional view that 
knowledge of genetic status empowers individuals to take action to improve health 
and/or prevent disease, this study revealed the potential for genetic testing to 
disempower and cause harm.  Genetic testing and RRS were exposed as 
biographically disruptive events for which there were no wholly satisfactory solutions, 
only negotiated positions which were taken up and which made sense at the time.  
Competing discourses allowed scope for resistance to medical discourse and showed 
other discourses do exist in which high risk women make decisions other than what 
medical experts advise.  By resisting medical discourse, the participants acknowledged 
they were rejecting the ‘normal’ response to breast/ovarian cancer risk.  This was part 
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of a reflexive process through which they came to understand themselves as 
individuals within multiple competing and conflicting discourses.   
 
The competing threads of communal folklore presented the participants with a dilemma 
and often silenced their voice, as their personal experiences had not yet been 
galvanised into a private folklore of their decision to say no to RRS.  Private folklore 
requires the sharing of stories with others having the same experience thus creating a 
space for the development of new understanding of an experience at odds with the 
communal folklore of having the genetic mutation.  The effects of dominant ideologies 
and discourses were so strong, those who said no were dubious of their own decisions 
and were still dealing with the effects of a discourse which isolated them from family, 
friends and from each other, because a discourse of saying no was not yet established.  
This research is therefore a conduit for communicating a new phenomenon and the 
emergent private folklore of the participants represents a new way of thinking about 
cancer risk and RRS in contemporary health care.  By saying no, the participants in this 
study are at the frontier of an alternative way of thinking about RRS in which high risk 
women are able to say no to surgery without being ostracised and in which they and 
their concerned others may be able to make peace with their decisions.  It is these non-
compliers who expose cancer risk management as a contested terrain and create the 
conditions in which people can restore agency and reclaim power over their still-healthy 
bodies.  The emergence of their private folklore shows how women attempt to make 
sense of their experiences and negotiate the conflicts and contradictions thrown up by 
competing discourses, as outlined in the diagram below.   
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Figure 6: Interplay between the key theoretical constructs and what these mean. 
To sum, this study challenges the dogma that genetic medicine is inherently beneficial 
and empowering and lends support to calls for more research into how genetic 
information impacts on the daily lives of people.  The study findings are thus important 
and timely given the increasing prominence of genetics in cancer care, and indeed the 
increasing numbers of women facing decisions on whether or not to surgically remove 
their healthy breasts and ovaries.  This study provides a means through which women 
who say no to RRS can know there are others who share their experience, thus 
legitimating their right to say no and creating an avenue for resistance, and, an 
emerging alternate discourse.   
 
A closing point here therefore is that although the resistance demonstrated by the 
participants in this study was not complete, neither was it inconsequential.   The ways 
in which high risk women understood their genetic risk and how other discourses and 
ideologies influenced decision making are important considerations for cancer 
prevention policies and strategies.  This study advocates that rather than motivate 
individuals to take steps to reduce risk, the medical discourse may alienate and isolate 
people who do not conform to their edits and thus expose them to greater health risks.   
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Contribution to knowledge 
This study makes a key contribution to knowledge because it problematises and 
challenges taken-for-granted assumptions about how BRCA1/2 mutation carrier 
women will respond to cancer risk.  Rather than adding to the body of research which 
has explored the potential physical, emotional and psychosocial impacts of RRS, a 
particular strength of this study is that it adds knowledge about the cultural, social, 
political and economic implications of HBOC and RRS and focusses on the 
experiences of women who have said no to RRS thus giving an alternative voice to 
those living with experience of having BRAC1/2 mutations.  Although RRS is offered 
and refused/accepted in the context of the medical consultation, personal and 
subjective contexts in which everyday lives are lived are shown to be central to the 
decision making process.  
 
This study exposed the divergence between medical and other discourses in Western 
society which high risk women use to make sense of their experiences.  Accordingly, a 
strength of this study is its ability to illuminate how personal, individual negotiations of 
breast/ovarian cancer risk are critical to understanding decision making and how these 
supersede factual, objective information about risk.  This study also contributes to 
knowledge by exposing how high risk women may be denied the opportunity to reduce 
their risk of cancer because of gendered discourses which construct women’s bodies in 
particular ways.  Again, acknowledgement of these discourses is not well articulated in 
medical discourse and where acknowledgement does occur, the solutions offered are 
equally problematic for some high risk women.   
 
Study limitations 
The findings from this study are drawn from a small sample of women who volunteered 
to take part in the study.  It was difficult to recruit more women owing to difficulties of 
access.  There was no formal provider looking after the women who decided to forego 
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RRS, therefore access was via media advertising.  Taking part in this study required 
the participants to make public what was privately difficult.  The issues these women 
were dealing with including anxiety, family conflict and isolation may make this a hard 
to reach group who are reticent to come forward and take part in research.  Indeed two 
participants asked to be interviewed without family knowledge owing to such issues.   
 
This was an exploratory study in which the focus was limited to a particular group of 
people.  The findings are thus limited to discussion of women who carried BRCA1/2 
genetic mutations which increase the risk of breast/ovarian cancer who said no to RRS.  
The participants were interviewed at one point in time and none had received their 
genetic test result more than three years prior to interview.  It is therefore not possible 
to say what the long term impact of saying no to RRS might be, or whether the 
participants’ decisions change over time.   
 
Recommendations  
One of the aims of this study was to make recommendations for the care, counselling 
and support of high risk women who say no to RRS.  Although health care 
professionals attempt to advise and counsel high risk women to make an autonomous 
decision which is right for them, there is evidence to suggest concealed discourses and 
ideological practices influence the decision making process from the perspective of 
both the individual and the clinician.  The assumption that health care professionals are 
always objective and impartial in advising high risk women must therefore be avoided 
and it is necessary to consider the implications for practice for all women identified as 
high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer, whether they say yes or no to RRS.  
With this in mind, the following recommendations are proposed.  
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Recommendations for health care professionals: 
 Health care professionals involved in the care and support of high risk women 
should be encouraged to be reflexive practitioners to ensure they are aware of their 
own beliefs, attitudes and subjectivities in relation to HBOC and how these might 
impact on their dealings with high risk women.   
 To this end, the findings from this study will be widely disseminated through 
publication in journals, presentation at conferences and through the researcher’s 
professional networks and will specifically identify and encourage reflexive thinking 
as a way of enhancing the support given to high risk women.  
 More attention should be paid in medical consultations to the subjective ways in 
which genetic risk is understood, interpreted and experienced by high risk women.  
This includes cognisance of the various resources, practices and discourses high 
risk women use to make health decisions and acknowledgement that even 
statistical ‘objective’ risk estimates are uncertain and unstable.  Educating health 
professionals about the wider factors which influence risk communication is an 
important step towards acknowledgment that conventional risk/benefit models of 
communicating cancer risk, may not be helpful for those identified as high risk of 
developing cancer.   
 Models for communicating risk information which encourage exploration of 
subjective elements of risk perception should be developed to provide a more 
holistic, person-centred means of communicating risk.  For example, Dauer et al. 
(2011) recommend risk communication models should be cognisant of the 
perceptions of those making the decision, perceptions which are dependent upon 
emotional factors such as fear, anxiety and mood rather than objective risk 
estimates.  Eijzenga et al. (2014) also advocate the inclusion of a psychosocial 
assessment when communicating cancer risk, to identify issues of personal 
importance so that tailored information can be given which addresses the issues of 
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most concern rather than focussing on the communication of risk per se.  The 
development of more holistic models for risk decision making may go some way 
towards ameliorating the potential negative impacts of genetic information which 
were evident in this study. 
 Health services involved in supporting high risk women should be proactive in 
providing tailored support to women who say no to RRS.  This may help ensure 
those who say no do not opt out of services, are identified quickly should cancer 
develop and are not made to feel blameworthy for their decisions.   
 
Recommendations for researchers: 
 Avenues for future research should be explored including studies which; 
o Identify less damaging ways of managing HBOC risk. 
o Take a longitudinal approach in which women’s experiences are 
investigated over time to create understanding of how their experiences and 
decisions might change and what the impacts of these might be. 
o Develop understanding of how genetic information impacts on the daily lives 
of mutation carriers and their significant others, for example daughters, 
partners and relatives who tested mutation-negative and male BRCA1/2 
mutation carriers. 
o Create counter-discourses which challenge the oppressive discourses of 
responsibility, positivity and concealment which surround HBOC and instead 
expose the social and economic forces which present HBOC and RRS in 
particular ways and thus limit the choices offered to high risk women 
considering RRS.  
o Advance a politics of HBOC which resists ideologies which silence high risk 
women’s voices and which counteracts victim-blaming.  
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Recommendations for policy holders: 
 These stories of high risk women who said no to RRS should be used as a valuable 
resource to inform and underpin aspects of care for women considering RRS. Wide 
dissemination of the study findings as outlined above will facilitate this.  It is also 
the intention of the researcher to present a synopsis of the study to prominent, 
influential cancer charities which support women with and at risk of breast/ovarian 
cancer.  This will allow the voices of those who said no to be heard by stakeholders 
who are in a position to influence the delivery of health care for high risk women.   
 Support groups for those who say no to RRS should be established to help manage 
this group of women and allow them to seek out others and share their experiences 
with those in a similar position.   
 
Reflexive account 
This section is a personal statement which revisits my own reflections over the course 
of undertaking this thesis.  It presents my perspective, both as a researcher and as a 
health care professional and woman who shared aspects of the participants’ folk group.   
It is a means through which I summarise information about the methodological 
approach taken and my personal motivations, inflections, thoughts and feelings in 
relation to the study and how undertaking the study has subsequently shaped and 
influenced me.   
 
My interest in hereditary breast/ovarian cancer stems back to my clinical experience as 
a Breast Care Nurse when I was directly involved in the care of many women with 
breast cancer at all stages of their cancer journey, including end of life care to those 
who had unfortunately succumbed to the disease.  Caring and supporting women with 
breast cancer from diagnosis to ‘cure’ or end of life was a privilege: it also meant I was 
intimately familiar with their experiences, good and bad, and the thoughts, worries and 
concerns they carried.  I witnessed first-hand how they struggled to cope with a 
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diagnosis of cancer and the impacts of surgery, chemotherapy and radiation therapy on 
their bodies and saw them weep over the loss of their breasts.  They shared with me 
their fears about their sexuality and their relationships following breast loss and it 
always seemed to me to be hugely unjust: at a time of crisis and facing a potentially 
deadly cancer, these women had the added burden of grieving for the loss of a body 
part which was so much more than just ‘breast tissue’.  Often, their situation was 
exacerbated through fears for their daughters, increasingly so as genetic causes for 
cancer began to take prominence in medicine and the media.  It was their predicament 
which ignited my interest in hereditary breast/ovarian cancer and led to this research.  I 
sought a research approach which would allow an insight into the very real struggles 
faced by women affected by hereditary breast/ovarian cancer, a situation made 
significantly worse because it was their breasts they were giving up.   A key motivator 
was to make the voices of such women heard, hence although my research training 
and experience has exposed me to a range of research methods, a qualitative 
approach was most suited to the study aims. 
 
The qualitative approach acknowledges that the researcher has influence over all 
aspects of the research process (Denzin, 1989; Dolby-Stahl, 1985; Parahoo, 2006) 
hence it is important the research is presented in a trustworthy and credible way 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Major & Savin-Baden, 2010).  Cohen & Crabtree (2008) 
contend one of the hallmarks of good qualitative research is the researcher’s attention 
to understanding how personal preconceptions and subjectivities influenced the 
research process, through the use of a reflexive journal.  Many definitions of reflexivity 
exist (Carolan, 2003) but there is consensus it is a process whereby the researcher 
continually reflects upon the ways in which he or she may have influenced the research 
process (Parahoo, 2006).  This may be in terms of the approach taken, study design 
employed, analysis of data and/or in the interactions between the researcher and 
participants (Bryman 2004).    Being reflexive is a process of turning the research gaze 
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onto the researcher therefore this next section comprises an evaluation of my own 
conduct during the research.  To this end, I maintained a reflexive journal which 
included personal understandings, assumptions and preconceptions, ponderings about 
the participants’ experiences, insights into how my perspective may have affected the 
interpretations and what could be considered my own epiphany moments.   
 
In keeping with Dolby-Stahl (1985), the reflexive process also helped with the creation 
of intimacy and drew me into the private folklore of the participants through the shared 
understandings which resulted from the dialogue between us.  I have provided a 
summary of the steps taken to facilitate the creation of intimacy in Chapter 4 (Step 4).  
The participants all appeared to welcome the opportunity to tell their story someone 
‘neutral’, that is, someone interested in their situation but with no wish to influence or 
criticise.  Indeed, several commented that family dynamics had changed for the worse 
as a result of the genetic revelations and therefore they had felt at times unable to 
discuss their experiences with family and friends.   My previous experience of working 
with women with cancer and their families meant I was familiar with the language used 
by women and the range of fears and emotions which accompany familial cancer.  This 
had to be balanced with a concern for appearing as expert and looking for what I 
expected to hear in their stories.  Thus I explained to the participants that whilst I was 
experienced working alongside women with familial breast/ovarian cancer, every 
woman’s story was unique and it was this uniqueness I wished to capture. When 
listening to their stories, I consciously reflected on what surprised me and why this 
might be.  For example, I was surprised that none of the participants spoke positively 
about breast reconstruction, perhaps because I have worked with many women who 
have had very positive reactions to reconstruction.   
 
My reasons for undertaking this research were presented in Chapter 1.   I am a nurse 
and academic and as such, I have been educated and socialised in a discipline aligned 
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to medicine and have therefore assimilated certain beliefs regarding the management 
of HBOC.  During the course of this research, I have learned that I too have talked in 
support of the medical discourse.  Part of the initial drive in examining the experiences 
of women who said no to RRS, was my belief they were unwise in rejecting a course of 
action which could prevent cancer and save their life. I never questioned the statistics 
and believed ‘the facts’ about HBOC and RRS were the solid, reliable truth.  It was the 
job of medicine to help women avoid breast/ovarian cancer and part of this was 
supporting procedures such as RRS as lives would be saved.  I realise I never fully 
understood the risk estimates, that RRS lowers risk in the population but not 
necessarily the individual, and that although RRS reduced the risk of cancer, it did not 
necessarily significantly add to years of life gained.   
 
Reflecting back on my previous clinical practice as a Breast Care Nurse supporting 
women prior to mastectomy, I observed occasions when surgeons would, unsolicited, 
offer women larger/smaller breasts, ‘perkier' breasts or more ‘youthful’ breasts through 
reconstruction.  TRAM flap procedures used to reconstruct breasts would be described 
as also offering the bonus of a ‘tummy tuck’.  At the time, I considered such 
suggestions as helpful to women, a way of coping with the negative impact of breast 
loss.  However, I am now able to see the gendered discourse which underpins breast 
reconstruction and how this perpetuates the communal folklore about the female body 
and what it should look like.  Assumptions about the type of body women ‘want’ are in 
fact ideologies which may limit women’s choices and create illusions of normalcy which 
subjugate all women.  As a woman in Western society, I share similar fears and 
concerns regarding my body and the communal cancer folklore.  I appreciate the 
potentially devastating effects of the loss of the breasts or ovaries and of developing a 
potentially fatal disease and I have pondered “what would I do if it were me?”  
Fortunately, the answer to this question is not for me known, although I am aware of 
the assumption ‘sensible’ women opt for surgical intervention to cure the problem.   
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Critiquing the medical discourse has thus been somewhat discomforting, as it has 
made me question aspects of my previous practice which may not have supported 
women facing breast/ovarian loss in ways most helpful to them.  My position has 
moved from concern for women facing RRS, to one of unease about the uncritical 
acceptance of genetics as the solution to cancer and the at times cavalier attitude with 
which high risk women and their breasts and ovaries are treated.  However, like the 
participants in this study, I too am unable to completely resist the medical discourse, as 
I remain concerned that high risk women may be risking their lives by saying no to 
RRS.   
 
Concluding statement  
This study has presented an exploration of high risk women’s experiences which led to 
the decision to say no to RRS.  The participants’ stories were constructed as personal 
experience narratives which were interpreted through the lenses of three literary 
theories, thus offering a novel and original way of examining the subject area.  The 
biographical approach utilised gave a voice to the participants and maintained a focus 
on real lives being lived by real people in the real world as their stories unfolded over 
time.  Accordingly, the biographies of the women in this study provide the social 
context of being identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer and saying 
no to what is deemed the primary method of reducing that risk.  The methodological 
approach taken in this study allowed an illumination of the emergent private folklore of 
high risk women; a folklore which was at odds with the communal HBOC folklore and 
the medical discourse.   
 
The stories of the participants in this study thus revealed discourses of control and 
resistance.  RRS has the potential to both increase and decrease the control women 
have over their bodies and thus potentially both secures and undermines the future.  
Two important questions emerge from this study which have not yet been addressed; 
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1. By resisting the medical discourse are high risk women risking their lives?   
2. Does the conflict and contradiction apparent in medical discourse which aims to 
reduce risk paradoxically expose high risk women to cancer risk in an even greater 
way?    
 
The participants in this study shared a genetic pessimism and while they resisted the 
medical discourse and kept their bodies intact, they were largely unable to transform 
themselves in a positive way.  Their decisions to say no to RRS left them in a position 
of regret, uncertainty and ambiguity as they were transformed into perpetual patients 
awaiting their fate.  However, by sharing their stories, these participants provided a 
means through which aspects of the inner lives of those identified as high risk of 
developing breast/ovarian cancer could be better understood.  This in turn provides a 
valuable resource for informing the care and support of women considering RRS. 
 
This study was designed to address a gap in the research relating to HBOC: decision 
making around RRS within the context of dominant discourses and ideologies which 
shape experience.  No other studies have interpreted high risk women’s stories about 
saying no to RRS using multiple literary theories.  This innovative approach facilitated a 
detailed and close examination of the phenomena of interest and allowed the research 
to be presented from the perspective of the participants.  The value of this study was its 
ability to document specific issues and challenges faced by high risk women and 
interpret these from a number of different perspectives.  No single interpretation is able 
to account for the many complex and intersecting discourses and ideologies which 
imbue HBOC. Therefore multiple interpretations are needed to create meaning.  This 
research has problematised the dominant HBOC discourse and alternate meanings 
attached to the experience of being identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian.  
It will therefore generate debate on how HBOC is talked about and ultimately 
experienced.   
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Appendix 1: Study Recruitment Advertisement  
 
Family history breast/ovarian cancer research participants required 
A research study is being conducted which aims to understand the experiences of  
women who chose not to have breast and/or ovarian surgery for a high risk of getting 
breast/ovarian cancer.  The research will involve being interviewed about their 
experiences and why they decided not to have surgery.  The information gained from 
the research will be used to make recommendations for the care and support of future 
women facing this choice.  The research is being carried out in conjunction with Edith 
Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia.  
If you can answer yes to all of these questions and would like to talk to us, we would 
like you to contact us; 
 I have a family history of breast and/or ovarian cancer and have undergone 
genetic testing which has shown that I have a gene fault. 
 I have been offered surgery to lower my risk of getting breast and/or ovarian 
cancer. 
 I have decided not to have surgery. 
 I am an English speaking woman living in the mainland United Kingdom. 
 I am over 18 years of age. 
 I am interested in taking part in this research. 
Please contact the lead researcher Doreen Molloy on telephone number XXXXX. 
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Appendix 2: Patient Information Sheet 
 
INFORMATION LETTER TO POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Title of study:  Saying ‘no’: A biographical analysis of the experiences of women with 
a genetic predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer who reject risk reducing 
surgery. 
 
Participant’s summary: 
This is an information sheet inviting you to take part in a research study being carried 
out as part of a PhD that the researcher is undertaking at the Edith Cowan University, 
Perth, Western Australia.  The purpose of this study is to find out more about the 
experiences of women who have been told they have a genetic predisposition to 
developing breast and/or ovarian cancer and who have been offered, but have chosen 
not to undergo, risk reducing surgery.    
 
The aim of this study is to find out as much as we can about the experiences people 
have so that we can improve the information and support given to women.  Although 
you will not benefit directly from taking part in this research study, it may improve the 
care given to women in the future. 
 
You have been asked to consider taking part in this study because you have had a 
genetic test and been told you have a high risk of developing breast and/or ovarian 
cancer, and been offered risk reducing surgery which you have chosen not to undergo.  
If you choose to participate in this study you will be asked to take part in an interview 
carried out by the researcher.  The interview will be carried out at a time and place 
convenient for you.  It is anticipated that each interview will last approximately 45 – 60 
minutes and will be tape-recorded so that the researcher carrying out the study can go 
over and understand what you have said.  The tapes will be transcribed onto paper and 
all material will be destroyed at the end of the study.   
 
During the interview, you will be asked questions about your experiences of being told 
you had a genetic predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer and influences on 
your decision not to undergo surgery.  You will also be given an opportunity to tell the 
researcher anything you feel is important regarding your situation.  The researcher will 
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use the information you give to produce a report on women’s experiences, which may 
be presented at conferences and published.  You will be encouraged to be as honest 
as you can as your views are very important.  Any information you might give will be 
anonymised and at no time will you be identified.  Participation in the study is voluntary. 
If you choose to participate, you will be required to sign a form stating your consent to 
take part.  If you would like to become involved and then decide to withdraw from the 
study, you are free to do so at any time without giving a reason and with no negative 
consequences.   
 
Thank you for considering this request. 
 
If you are interested in taking part in this study or have any questions regarding this, 
please contact; 
 
Doreen Molloy 
Lead Researcher 
Telephone number here  
 
 
Dr Joyce Hendricks 
Research Supervisor 
Room 21.454 
School of Nursing, Midwifery and Postgraduate Medicine 
Edith Cowan University 
Joondalup 
WA 6027. 
Email: here 
Tel: here 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form 
 
 
CONSENT DOCUMENT  
 
Saying ‘no’: A biographical analysis of the experiences of women with a genetic 
predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer who reject risk reducing surgery. 
 
 
I have been provided with a copy of the Information Letter, explaining the study.  
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and any questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that participation in the research study will involve taking part in an interview 
which will be tape-recorded and then transcribed onto paper.  I understand that the 
information provided will be anonymised and will only be used for the purposes of this 
study and I will not be identified in any written assignment or presentation/publication of the 
results of this study.  I understand that I am free to withdraw from further participation at 
any time, without explanation or penalty. 
 
I freely agree to participate in the study. 
 
Name  (Print)   ____________________________________ 
 
Signature    ____________________________________ 
 
Date     ____________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s signature ____________________________________ 
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Appendix 4: Support Services 
 
Support services  
The following list contains reputable organisations that provide a free, confidential help 
and support service to people affected by cancer.   
 
Organisation Telephone Website  
Breast Cancer Care 0808 800 6000 http://www.breastcancercare.org.uk/  
Macmillan Cancer 
Relief  
0808 808 0000 http://www.macmillan.org.uk/Home.aspx  
Cancerbackup 0800 735 0275 http://www.cancerbackup.org.je/  
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Appendix 5: Interview Guide 
 Tell me a little about when you first became aware you had a family history of 
cancer.  
 Were you aware cancer could run in families? 
 Describe how you feel about having a family history of cancer.  
 Describe what it was it like to be offered a genetic test for cancer.  
 What were your main concerns at the time? 
 Tell me what it was like to be told you had the genetic fault and you were at high 
risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer. 
 Explain your understanding of the options offered to you because of your genetic 
test result.  
 Describe how you felt to be offered surgery to remove your breasts/ovaries 
because of the test result.  
 What sorts of other things were going on in your life at the time? 
 Were there other things which helped you to come to a decision to say no to 
surgery? 
 How are you feeling about things now? 
 Overall, how do you think this whole experience has affected your life? 
 Is there anything else you would like to tell me about your experiences? 
